Formations

The unified military of the Ukrainian state — ground, air-assault, air, naval, marine, special-operations, unmanned and support branches under the General Staff. Expanded from its pre-2022 professional core into one of Europe's largest wartime militaries; this atlas records its structure at branch and formation level only.

The largest branch — mechanised, motorised and infantry brigades.

Elite rapid-reaction light infantry, used as a mobile "fire brigade".

Fighter aviation and ground-based air defence — never ceded the sky, never controlled it.

The ground-based air-defence arm of the Air Force — SAM brigades and regiments layered from legacy S-300 and Buk to Patriot, IRIS-T, NASAMS and SAMP/T.

A small navy that has nonetheless pushed the Black Sea Fleet back from the northwest.

Marine brigades that have fought overwhelmingly as ground troops — from the defence of Mariupol to the Dnipro crossings.

A dedicated drone branch stood up in 2024 — an organisational first.

Assault infantry formation, most associated with the 2022 defence of Mariupol.

A Kharkiv-based special unit associated with military intelligence; rose to prominence in the 2022 northeast counteroffensive.

The umbrella military of the Russian state — ground, aerospace, airborne, naval, strategic rocket, special-operations, railway and materiel-support branches under the General Staff. This atlas records its structure at branch, army and formation level only; it publishes no dispositions, strengths or locations, and several of the volunteer and irregular structures fighting alongside it sit outside this tree by design.

Combined-arms armies providing the bulk of the invasion's manpower.

The umbrella aerospace service — Air Force, Air & Missile Defence Forces and Space Forces; central to the glide-bomb and missile strike campaigns.

Elite light infantry — doctrinally airborne, used in practice as line assault troops.

Marine brigades committed as ground assault troops, notably in the south.

After the 2023 mutiny and the death of its founder, Wagner's structures were reorganised under Ministry of Defence control.

Army corps stood up in Ukraine's 2025 corps reform around the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade as its core formation.

Assault brigade formed in 2022, one of Ukraine's most publicised formations; core of the 3rd Army Corps since the 2025 reform.

Long-standing regular mechanized brigade; fought in the Donbas from 2014 and through the major positional battles of the full-scale war.

Mechanized brigade built around Western equipment — publicly documented operating Bradley IFVs and Abrams tanks in the 2023 southern offensive and after.

Veteran mechanized brigade, publicly associated with the long defence of Vuhledar in 2022–23.

Kharkiv-region brigade, prominent in the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive; later converted to an assault brigade.

One of Ukraine's best-known mechanized brigades — Bakhmut and the Donbas positional battles feature heavily in its public record.

The DShV's only parachute-designated brigade; in continuous heavy fighting from the 2022 Donbas battles onward.

Veteran air assault brigade — the 2014 'longest raid' and years of front-line rotations anchor its public history.

Tactical aviation brigade of the MiG-29 fleet — the workhorse fighter of Ukraine's wartime air defence.

The shore-based missile arm — home of the Neptune system that sank the cruiser Moskva.

The marine brigade of the 2022 Mariupol defence, reconstituted after Azovstal; a symbol of the corps' wartime cost.

The mass mobilisation branch stood up around the 2022 invasion — regional brigades that grew from local defence into regular front-line service.

The National Guard's first army corps, stood up in 2025 around the Azov brigade as its core — part of Ukraine's wider shift to corps-level command.

Russian volunteer legion fighting for Ukraine since 2022; publicly associated with the 2023–24 cross-border raids into Belgorod region.

The premier tank army, built for high-intensity manoeuvre war; mauled in the 2022 Kharkiv fighting and reconstituted since.

The prestige Kantemirovite tank division of the 1st Guards Tank Army; documented heavy losses in the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive.

The Taman ceremonial-turned-line division of the 1st Guards Tank Army, engaged since 2022.

Southern MD army closely associated with the Donetsk axis since 2022.

North Caucasus army, prominent on the Zaporizhzhia front in the 2023 defensive battles.

North Caucasus motor-rifle division, prominent in the Zaporizhzhia defensive battles of 2023.

The fixed-wing combat arm within the Aerospace Forces — fighter, strike, army, transport and long-range aviation.

The strategic bomber command — the Tu-95MS, Tu-160 and Tu-22M3 fleets that carry the cruise-missile campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.

The Pskov air assault division — among the most heavily committed and publicly documented VDV formations of the war.

The Tula airborne division; long service in the Donbas including the Bakhmut sector.

The fleet arm — in this war defined by the Black Sea Fleet's losses to a navy without capital ships, and by Kalibr strikes from distant waters.

The fleet at the war's centre: flagship lost to missiles in 2022, headquarters and bases struck repeatedly, and major units publicly reported relocated eastward from Sevastopol.

The submarine arm — Improved Kilo boats of the Black Sea Fleet are among the war's persistent Kalibr shooters.

Black Sea Fleet marine brigade; heavy documented service from Mariupol to the 2024 border battles.

The National Guard of Russia — rear-area security, occupation and internal-control roles.

Formations recruited in or branded from Chechnya. Explicitly NOT a unified "Chechen army": "Akhmat" is partly an official designation and partly a brand, and the real parents differ — Ministry of Defence, Rosgvardia, or the Chechen Interior Ministry — as stated on each member's record.

The Donetsk 'people's republic' corps of 2014–2022; integrated into regular Russian structures after annexation, reported as the 51st Combined Arms Army.

One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands; the command layer is being restructured in Ukraine's 2025–26 shift to corps-level command.

One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands; the command layer is being restructured in Ukraine's 2025–26 shift to corps-level command.

One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands; the command layer is being restructured in Ukraine's 2025–26 shift to corps-level command.

One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands; the command layer is being restructured in Ukraine's 2025–26 shift to corps-level command.

Mechanized brigade in near-continuous line service in the Donbas since 2014.

Mechanized brigade formed after 2014, committed through the full-scale war's major defensive battles.

Mechanized brigade in line service through the full-scale war's eastern and southern battles.

Heavy mechanized brigade formed in the later reorganisations; lineage from the 125th Territorial Defence Brigade is publicly reported.

One of Ukraine's small number of dedicated tank brigades; reported reorganised as a heavy mechanized formation in later restructuring.

Heavy artillery brigade of the high-command reserve — publicly documented operating the war's largest tube systems and early Bohdana batteries.

Airmobile brigade committed across the war's crisis points, from Soledar to the southern front.

Airmobile brigade formed around the full-scale invasion; service across the eastern front.

Air assault brigade publicly associated with the defence of the south in 2022 and years of Donbas fighting.

Air assault brigade with a prominent public record from Bakhmut and the northern axes.

Airmobile brigade re-established in 2014–15; long service in the Donbas including the Bakhmut sector.

Air assault brigade formed in 2022 and equipped with Western vehicles; publicly documented in the 2023 southern offensive and subsequent operations.

One of the Air Force's regional air commands, combining aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector.

One of the Air Force's regional air commands, combining aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector.

One of the Air Force's regional air commands, combining aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector.

One of the Air Force's regional air commands, combining aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector.

Tactical aviation brigade flying the Su-27 — the heavy fighter arm of the pre-F-16 fleet.

Anti-aircraft missile brigade of the air-defence belt around the capital region; publicly documented across the winter strike campaigns.

The small-boat surface component — patrol boats and minor combatants; the corvette programme abroad remains the future capital element.

Riverine and coastal defence forces on the Dnipro and the estuary approaches.

The naval air arm — maritime patrol and strike support; publicly documented Bayraktar operations over the northwestern Black Sea early in the war.

The navy's share of Ukraine's maritime-drone campaign; much of the publicly known USV effort is run by intelligence services, so this record stays deliberately broad.

Marine brigade with long service on the southern front, including the Dnipro estuary battles.

Marine brigade formed in the corps' 2023 expansion.

A separate special-operations arm since 2016, built to NATO patterns; publicly documented only in broad outline — which is all this atlas carries.

Engineering, CBRN defence and other combat-support functions consolidated as a separate branch.

The rear-services branch — supply, transport and maintenance for a million-strong force under persistent strike threat.

The military-medical branch — casualty evacuation and treatment at a scale Europe has not seen since 1945.

Forces under the Ministry of Internal Affairs fighting alongside the army — a parallel military strand whose combat brigades hold front-line sectors under operational control of the AFU's commands while remaining institutionally interior. Its 1st Corps, built around Azov, is the most publicly documented example.

National Guard operational brigade with a strong public combat record from Bakhmut and the eastern front; reported within the 1st Corps Azov.

Kharkiv-raised National Guard brigade known for technology-heavy operations; reported within the 1st Corps Azov.

A militarised border agency outside the Armed Forces; its detachments have fought in the line since 2022, most visibly in the defence of Mariupol.

Combat formations publicly associated with intelligence and security services (HUR/GUR, SBU). A browsing group, not a command — each member's actual institutional parent is stated on its own record, and much of this space is deliberately under-documented.

Military-intelligence service whose combat operations became a publicly prominent part of the war — including the maritime drone campaign widely attributed to it in public reporting. Deliberately under-documented here: only publicly claimed or widely reported associations are recorded.

The security service's publicly known combat arm — associated in public reporting with the Sea Baby maritime drone programme and long-range strike operations. Recorded here only to the extent of public claims and wide reporting.

Combat formations raised under the Interior Ministry outside the National Guard — police-based and assault units. A browsing group, not a command; each member's actual parent institution is stated on its own record.

Foreign volunteer and anti-Kremlin opposition formations fighting on the Ukrainian side. A browsing group only — these organisations do NOT share a command; each serves under its own documented Ukrainian parent structure, stated on each record.

Formations of Russian citizens fighting against Moscow on the Ukrainian side. A browsing group, not a command — each unit's Ukrainian parent structure is stated on its record.

Russian émigré volunteer corps formed in 2022, publicly known for the 2023 cross-border raids; its politics and command relationships are contested in public reporting.

Volunteer unit of Russian citizens formed within Ukrainian military structures in late 2023; named in reporting on the March 2024 cross-border raids. Public information is thin and largely self-published or single-sourced.

Belarusian volunteer formations fighting on the Ukrainian side. A browsing group, not a command.

Belarusian volunteer regiment formed at the start of the full-scale invasion — the largest Belarusian formation on the Ukrainian side; successor structures continue to evolve.

Chechen formations aligned with the Ichkerian cause fighting on Ukraine's side — distinct from, and opposed to, the Kadyrov-aligned units on the Russian side. A browsing group, not a command.

Chechen volunteer battalion named for Ichkeria's first president; active on the Ukrainian side since 2014.

Chechen volunteer battalion active on the Ukrainian side since 2014; operates outside formal Ukrainian force structures by most public accounts.

Reviewed foreign volunteer formations outside the Russian, Belarusian and Chechen groups. A browsing group, not a command.

The formal framework for foreign volunteers in Ukrainian service, established in February 2022.

A routing node, not a command. The Kyiv-aligned backers — the United States, the European Union, NATO and Poland — supply weapons, financing, intelligence and transit rather than forces, and none of them commands anything in this tree. Each now carries its own strategic profile, including stated and assessed objectives, constraints and leverage, under Profiles.

Military district re-established in 2024 from the Western MD split; peacetime parent of the 1st Guards Tank Army and 20th Combined Arms Army.

Combined-arms army of the old Western MD, engaged on the northeastern axes through the war.

Motor-rifle division of the 20th Army, formed in the post-2016 divisional revival on the western axis.

Motor-rifle division of the 20th Army on the northeastern axes; reformed in the post-2016 divisional revival.

Military district re-established in 2024 from the Western MD split, oriented toward the Baltic and Finland; peacetime parent of the 6th Combined Arms Army.

Combined-arms army historically covering the northwest; engaged on the Kharkiv axis in the full-scale war.

The military district facing the Black Sea and Caucasus — the war's primary staging district, and peacetime parent of the 8th and 58th armies.

Military district spanning the Volga, Urals and Siberia; peacetime parent of the 2nd and 41st armies.

Volga-region combined-arms army committed since the first weeks of the invasion.

Siberian combined-arms army; heavily engaged in the 2022 northern operations and after.

The Far Eastern military district; its formations, including the 5th Combined Arms Army, deployed west for the war.

Far Eastern combined-arms army deployed west; long service on the southern Donetsk axis.

The ground-based air- and missile-defence component of the Aerospace Forces, layered from point defence to strategic systems.

The military-space component of the Aerospace Forces — launch, satellite operations and missile early warning.

Airborne division committed across the war's axes, including the 2022 Kyiv operation.

The Novorossiysk mountain air-assault division; publicly prominent on the southern front, including the 2023 Zaporizhzhia defence.

Separate air assault brigade from the Far East; documented in the war from the 2022 northern operations onward.

Separate air assault brigade committed on the southern and eastern axes.

Ulyanovsk air assault brigade; publicly reported re-formed into a new VDV division in 2023–24 — carried here as a lineage record pending verification.

Small flotilla with outsized reach — an early launch platform for Kalibr strikes into Ukraine.

The Arctic-based strategic fleet; peripheral to the Black Sea theatre but a source of Kalibr-capable units and naval infantry for the land war.

The Far Eastern fleet; contributes naval infantry formations to the land war.

The Baltic-based fleet; contributes naval infantry and coastal formations to the war.

Fleet air arms — maritime patrol, anti-ship strike and helicopter forces.

Shore-based anti-ship missile forces — Bastion-P and Bal batteries around the Black Sea littoral.

Pacific Fleet naval infantry formation — the much-reconstituted 155th Brigade of the Vuhledar assaults, reported expanded to divisional status.

Pacific Fleet marine brigade from Kamchatka, committed to the land war.

Northern Fleet marine brigade, documented on multiple axes of the land war.

Baltic Fleet marine brigade committed to the land war.

The land-based strategic nuclear arm. Listed for structural completeness only — this atlas deliberately carries no detail below this line.

The dedicated special-operations command (SSO) established in 2013; publicly documented only in broad outline — which is all this atlas carries.

A dedicated railway-engineering arm — a Russian structural particularity that matters in a war supplied overwhelmingly by rail.

Material-technical support structures — the rear services sustaining the force, and a recurring target of Ukrainian deep strikes.

Volunteer and contract formations raised under Ministry of Defence structures (including BARS reserve formations). A browsing group, not a single command — each member's documented parent is stated on its record.

The mobilisation-reserve system expanded into numbered volunteer detachments across the front — a category record; individual detachments are not tracked here.

Volunteer formations recruited through the MoD-linked Redut structure — a recruitment shell whose exact composition is deliberately opaque in public reporting.

The best-known Akhmat-branded formation — an MoD-subordinated volunteer unit publicly fronted by the Chechen leadership; branding and structure are entangled by design.

Rosgvardia regiment recruited in Chechnya — the 'Kadyrovite' core formation, documented in the war from the 2022 Kyiv operation onward.

The former "people's republic" corps and their notable formations of 2014–2022. A historical and lineage category: after the 2022 annexations these structures were absorbed into regular Russian ones, and are not shown here as if unchanged.

The Luhansk counterpart corps of 2014–2022; integrated into regular Russian structures after annexation, reported as the 3rd Combined Arms Army.

The best-known Donetsk separatist battalion of 2014, later part of the 1st Army Corps and its Russian successor structures — carried as a lineage record.