Displacement
Displacement and refugees
Who left the country, who moved inside it, and what temporary-protection and return policy does to both.
Coverage · Eastern Europe
AssessmentModerate confidence
Broad regional level only. This surface never maps aid routes, facility locations or operational detail. Humanitarian agencies have no access to Russian-occupied territory; figures for those areas are floors, not counts.
Current state
What civilian pressure looks like now
Moderate confidence · Data as of 2026-07
The war has produced Europe's largest displacement crisis since the Second World War, and its humanitarian geography is double: a frontline and deep-strike emergency inside Ukraine, and a continent-wide displacement absorbed largely by European host states. Figures below are agency estimates at broad regional level, and the least visible part of the crisis — the occupied territories — is the least counted.
- Refugees recorded abroad6.8M+As of 2026-06High confidenceUNHCR-recorded; most under temporary protection in Europe
- Internally displaced~3.7 millionAs of 2025-12Moderate confidenceIOM/OCHA estimates; frontline evacuations shift the total continuously
- People in need10.8 millionAs of 2026-01High confidenceOCHA humanitarian needs and response plan for 2026, launched 13 January 2026. Lower than the 2025 figure this record previously carried, which reflects a reassessed caseload rather than an improvement on the ground.
- Verified civilian deaths16,874As of 2026-07High confidenceOHCHR-verified floor since 24 February 2022, including 820 children. Verification lags and occupied areas are largely unverifiable, so the actual total is considerably higher.
- Verified civilian injuries51,273As of 2026-07High confidenceOHCHR-verified floor since 24 February 2022, including 3,126 children. Recorded separately from deaths because the two move differently — wide-area weapons injure far more people than they kill.
- People targeted for response4.1 millionAs of 2026-01High confidenceThe prioritised subset of the 10.8 million, against a stated requirement of US$2.3 billion. Targeting is set by what the appeal can plausibly fund, not by the extent of need.
- Suspected mine / ERW contamination~20% of territoryAs of 2026Moderate confidenceAbout 139,000 km² considered potentially hazardous in 2026 mine-action reporting; suspected, not confirmed — survey work steadily releases cleared land, and broader definitions in circulation reach 25–30%
Changed in brief — 2026-08-02 · Humanitarian updated
Civilian pressure, as analytical objects The 7 pressures this module publishes on Ukraine–Russia, as selectable objects. Each carries its present condition where the module states one, its own figures, the module's analysis of it and — where the corpus establishes one — the mechanism by which security conditions reach it.Interrogate Ukraine–Russia in Explore
Civilian harm
Civilian harm
Verified civilian deaths and injuries, and the distance between what is verified and what is reported.
Protection
The occupied territories
Populations under occupation, the status imposed on them, and what independent monitoring can and cannot see.
Health & services
Health, education and demining
The services floor under sustained strikes, and the contaminated ground that shapes what can be rebuilt.
Civilian infrastructure
Energy and civilian infrastructure
The power, heat and water systems struck through successive winters, and what restoration keeps up with.
Contamination
Contamination and blocked return
Mines and explosive remnants across a thousand-kilometre front, and the land and return they hold back.
Assistance & funding
The response and its funding
How many people the response plans for, how many it reaches, and what a funding shortfall removes first.
How the pressures rest on each other The dependencies this module states between its own pressures. A relationship, not a consequence — what a disruption would actually do is an impact chain, and only where the corpus establishes one.
Health, education and deminingNear-front schooling moved online or underground
An edge says one pressure rests on another. It is not a failure cascade: it carries no magnitude, no sequence and no timing, and nothing here says what happens when a pressure is disrupted. Where the corpus establishes that, it is an impact chain with its own stages and its own per-step basis grades, linked from the pressure itself.
The full picture7 blocks of analysis and 7 dated figures, filed under the pressures above — the module’s own words, with their own vintages
Everything below is authored on this module’s humanitarian record. Figures carry the vintage of the release that produced them, not the date of this page: the section is graded Moderate confidence and its data is stated as of 2026-07.
Displacement and refugeesDisplacement
Current conditionLayered displacement; frontline evacuations continuingAs of 2026
Who left the country, who moved inside it, and what temporary-protection and return policy does to both.
Assessed as of 2026-06never reviewed as an object
Movements — named areas, never routes
- Across a borderUkraine to Europe, mostly under temporary protection6.8M+ · for 2026-06 · High confidence
- Internal displacementFrontline and evacuated settlements to Elsewhere in Ukraine~3.7 million · for 2025-12 · Moderate confidence
What would change this
- Temporary-protection and return policyHost-state decisions on protection status, benefits and labour access will shape whether displacement hardens into permanent emigration.
| Indicator | Value | As of | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Refugees recorded abroadUNHCR-recorded; most under temporary protection in Europe Sources: UNHCR Ukraine situation data↗ | 6.8M+ | 2026-06 | High confidence |
| Internally displacedIOM/OCHA estimates; frontline evacuations shift the total continuously Sources: IOM displacement tracking (Ukraine) | ~3.7 million | 2025-12 | Moderate confidence |
Displacement and refugees
As of 2026
Displacement runs in layers: refugees across Europe under temporary protection, millions displaced inside Ukraine, and mandatory evacuations that empty frontline settlements as the line creeps. Returns track security and housing, not sentiment — every strike campaign against cities and the grid pushes the calculus back. Host states have extended protection repeatedly, but long-term status, schooling and labour-market integration are quietly becoming permanent-emigration questions.
Sources: UNHCR Ukraine situation data↗ · UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Ukraine)↗
Recorded events:Full-scale invasion24 Feb 2022
Parties:UkraineEuropean UnionPoland
Civilian harmCivilian harm
Current conditionJuly 2026 the deadliest month for civilians since March 2022As of 2026-08
437 killed and 2,610 injured in July 2026 (OHCHR), against at least 429 missiles launched — more than double June's figure.
Verified civilian deaths and injuries, and the distance between what is verified and what is reported.
Assessed as of 2026-08never reviewed as an object
| Indicator | Value | As of | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Verified civilian deathsOHCHR-verified floor since 24 February 2022, including 820 children. Verification lags and occupied areas are largely unverifiable, so the actual total is considerably higher. Sources: OHCHR Ukraine civilian casualty monitoring↗ | 16,874 | 2026-07 | High confidence |
| Verified civilian injuriesOHCHR-verified floor since 24 February 2022, including 3,126 children. Recorded separately from deaths because the two move differently — wide-area weapons injure far more people than they kill. Sources: OHCHR Ukraine civilian casualty monitoring↗ | 51,273 | 2026-07 | High confidence |
Civilian harm
As of 2026-08
OHCHR's individually verified casualty counts are deliberate undercounts — verification lags, and occupied areas are largely unverifiable. Long-range missiles and drones keep every Ukrainian city in range, and the rise in casualties far from the front since 2024 reflects that reach. Near the line, glide bombs have demolished whole towns; most verified casualties come from explosive weapons with wide-area effects. Ballistic-heavy strikes on cities are the sharpest expression of this: the 31 July 2026 attack on Kyiv, in which Ukraine reported intercepting one of 27 ballistic missiles, killed ten people as of 2 August and damaged residential buildings, public infrastructure and a school. July 2026 was the deadliest month for civilians since March 2022 — 437 killed and 2,610 injured, against at least 429 missiles launched, more than double June's figure. The composition of that harm is the analytically important part, because each strand is answered by a different defensive system: long-range missiles and drones caused 38 per cent of casualties, short-range drones 27 per cent, and aerial bombardment — principally glide bombs — rose 143 per cent on June to become the second leading cause. Why so few ballistic missiles are intercepted is genuinely unresolved and this module does not pick between the available explanations; what can be said is that the categories of civilian harm do not share a single remedy, so no one decision about supply would address them together.
Recorded events:July recorded as Ukraine's deadliest month for civilians since March 202213 August 2026Twenty-four ballistic missiles, and none reported interceptednight of 4–5 Aug 2026
Analytical Notes:Ukraine's four air wars
The occupied territoriesProtection
Current conditionNo humanitarian access to occupied territoryAs of 2026
Populations under occupation, the status imposed on them, and what independent monitoring can and cannot see.
Assessed as of 2026never reviewed as an object
Dependencies
Ground:Southern steppe and the land corridorDonbas uplands and industrial belt
What would change this
- Access to occupied territoriesAny monitored humanitarian access to occupied areas would be a structural change — and its absence keeps every figure there a floor.
Occupied territories
As of 2026
The occupied territories are the crisis's least visible layer: no humanitarian access, pressure to accept Russian citizenship documented in UN reporting, and the reported deportation or transfer of Ukrainian children — the subject of International Criminal Court arrest warrants issued in 2023. What can be verified there is a fraction of what is reported; this module treats all figures for those areas as floors.
Recorded events:Annexation declarations and partial mobilizationSep 2022
Parties:Russia
Health, education and deminingHealth & services
Current conditionNear-front schooling moved online or undergroundAs of 2026
The services floor under sustained strikes, and the contaminated ground that shapes what can be rebuilt.
Assessed as of 2026never reviewed as an object
How conditions reach this
Grid campaign → heat, water and health services in winter
What losing electricity in January actually does to a household, a hospital and a water pump.
- Affected area or system Confirmed
- Access or service disruption Confirmed
- Civilian condition Confirmed
- Broader humanitarian significance Plausible exposure
Dependencies
Rests on:Energy and civilian infrastructure
Health, education and demining
As of 2026
Attacks on health care number in the thousands of WHO-verified incidents since 2022. Education near the front has moved online or underground — including metro-station schools in Kharkiv — trading a generation's schooling against safety. Mine and unexploded-ordnance contamination across former battlefield and border regions constrains agriculture and returns, and will outlast the war by decades.
Parties:Ukraine
Energy and civilian infrastructureCivilian infrastructure
Current conditionSeasonal strike campaigns force blackout cyclesAs of 2026-08
Water and heating systems that depend on the grid are strained by each campaign.
The power, heat and water systems struck through successive winters, and what restoration keeps up with.
Assessed as of 2026-08never reviewed as an object
How conditions reach this
Grid campaign → heat, water and health services in winter
What losing electricity in January actually does to a household, a hospital and a water pump.
- Affected area or system Confirmed
- Access or service disruption Confirmed
- Civilian condition Confirmed
- Broader humanitarian significance Plausible exposure
Dependencies
Rested on by:Health, education and demining
Physical systems:Electricity generation and fuel supply
Runs on:energy system
Resilience measures — announced kept apart from in place and tested
- In place · Repair and restoration · as of 2026-08Layered air defence, rapid repair and decentralised generationUkraine's answer to the seasonal campaigns since 2022; each campaign still forces blackout cycles.Ukraine · Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Ukraine)↗ · Ukrainian energy-system operator statements
- Announced · Programme · as of 2026-08-14Licensed domestic production of Patriot interceptorsPledged on 20 July 2026, publicly disowned by the US president on 31 July; as of 14 August no licence, contract or delivery had been established. Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Ukraine)↗ · Ukrainian energy-system operator statements
What would change this
- Winter strike campaigns vs grid resilienceInterceptor availability and transformer stocks decide how each heating season is survived — the quiet determinant of civilian endurance and of the next displacement wave.
Energy and civilian infrastructure
As of 2026-08
Since October 2022 Russia has run seasonal strike campaigns against the power grid and gas infrastructure, timed to winter. Ukraine has answered with layered air defence, rapid repair and decentralised generation, but each campaign forces blackout cycles and strains water and heating systems that depend on the grid. Infrastructure endurance — interceptor stocks, transformer replacement — is a humanitarian variable as much as a military one. What moved in 2026 was the politics of supply rather than supply itself: licensed domestic production of Patriot interceptors was pledged at a NATO summit on 20 July, publicly disowned by the US president on 31 July, described by the US ambassador to NATO on 3 August as something that would not be concluded before this winter, and asserted as decided by President Zelensky in August without US confirmation. As of 14 August 2026 no licence, contract or delivery had been established — a proposal in dispute, not a medium-term remedy.
Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Ukraine)↗ · Ukrainian energy-system operator statements
Recorded events:Strategic campaign against Ukraine's grid beginsOct 2022 →A repaired power line that could not be switched onMar – Aug 2026A Patriot production licence is pledged, disowned, and claimed again20 Jul – 14 Aug 2026
Contamination and blocked returnContamination
Current conditionAbout a fifth of the country suspected hazardousAs of 2026
Suspected, not confirmed; new contamination is added along the active line faster than any clearance rate.
Mines and explosive remnants across a thousand-kilometre front, and the land and return they hold back.
Assessed as of 2026never reviewed as an object
How conditions reach this
Attritional ground war → contamination → blocked return and lost land
The part of the war that keeps working after the shooting stops, on farmland and in the villages people want to go back to.
- Affected area or system Confirmed
- Access or service disruption Confirmed
- Civilian condition Confirmed
- Broader humanitarian significance Plausible exposure
Dependencies
Ground:Donbas uplands and industrial beltSouthern steppe and the land corridorNorthern forest and marsh belt
| Indicator | Value | As of | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Suspected mine / ERW contaminationAbout 139,000 km² considered potentially hazardous in 2026 mine-action reporting; suspected, not confirmed — survey work steadily releases cleared land, and broader definitions in circulation reach 25–30% Sources: Mine-action survey and clearance reporting | ~20% of territory | 2026 | Moderate confidence |
Contamination — suspected, surveyed and released
As of 2026
Three quantities are routinely confused here. Suspected hazardous area — about 139,000 square kilometres, or roughly a fifth of the country, in 2026 mine-action reporting — is the land that cannot be certified safe, not the land that is mined. Confirmed contamination is a small fraction of it and is established only by survey. Released land is what survey and clearance return to use, and most of it is released by survey finding nothing rather than by clearance finding something: the government reports more than 40,000 square kilometres returned to use since 2022, of which cleared agricultural land is a far smaller figure counted in hectares. The humanitarian effect runs through the first quantity, because a field that might be mined is not farmed and a village that might be mined is not returned to. Civilian mine and ordnance casualties are counted in the thousands since 2022 by Ukrainian authorities; this module carries no per-year figure, because the series are not consistently defined. New contamination is added along the active line faster than any clearance rate, so every figure here describes a moving boundary.
Sources: Mine-action survey and clearance reporting · Ukrainian state publications and official statements↗ · UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Ukraine)↗
What this does not establish
- Released, cleared and confirmed-contaminated areas are reported on different bases by different bodies; the figures here are not additive and no clearance rate is derived from them.
Parties:Ukraine
The response and its fundingAssistance & funding
Current conditionAbout 15 per cent of the 2026 requirement funded by end of Q1As of 2026-04
How many people the response plans for, how many it reaches, and what a funding shortfall removes first.
Assessed as of 2026-04never reviewed as an object
What would change this
- Response-plan fundingAppeal coverage is falling as global crises compete; funding levels set the floor for evacuations, winterisation and frontline aid.
| Indicator | Value | As of | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| People in needOCHA humanitarian needs and response plan for 2026, launched 13 January 2026. Lower than the 2025 figure this record previously carried, which reflects a reassessed caseload rather than an improvement on the ground. Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Ukraine)↗ | 10.8 million | 2026-01 | High confidence |
| People targeted for responseThe prioritised subset of the 10.8 million, against a stated requirement of US$2.3 billion. Targeting is set by what the appeal can plausibly fund, not by the extent of need. Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Ukraine)↗ | 4.1 million | 2026-01 | High confidence |
The response plan, its target and its funding
As of 2026-04
The 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan asks for US$2.31 billion to reach 4.12 million people, a prioritised subset of the 10.8 million assessed as in need. Both figures are lower than 2025's, and OCHA is explicit that the change is a reassessed caseload and a targeting method built around what can plausibly be funded, not an improvement on the ground. Funding lags need: US$354 million, about 15 per cent of the requirement, had been contributed by the end of the first quarter. What a shortfall removes first is predictable from the plan's own structure — multi-purpose cash, then winterisation stocks, then assistance outside the frontline oblasts, while evacuations and emergency shelter near the line are protected longest. A separate winter response plan for October 2026 to March 2027 sits inside the same appeal rather than beside it, so winter coverage rises and falls with the annual figure.
What this does not establish
- Funding coverage is published quarterly and in arrears; the 15 per cent figure is a first-quarter reading, and no later consolidated figure was available at this review.
Evidence and grading
- Figures
- Agency estimates on their own revision cycles. Each figure carries the date it is for; nothing on this surface averages, totals or compares across two vintages.
- Confidence
- How well established Vigil considers this assessment to be. It is not a measure of how severe the situation is.