TWO REVIEWS SAID THERE WAS NOTHING WHEN THERE WERE STATEMENTS. The Watch reviews and the Weekly Brief notes of 20 September and 11 October 2026 said there was "nothing on the Gyumri lease". In the first window Prime Minister Pashinyan said on 16–17 September that Armenia had never raised the withdrawal of the 102nd Base and would not object to one; in the second, a Russian foreign ministry department director said on 6 October that Moscow would discuss the base within the existing agreements. An earlier statement by President Putin on 2 September fell in the 6 September window, whose review did not mention it. None of the three is a proposal on the lease, and the base's status is unchanged, so the Watch question's reading stands. The statements are now recorded on the basing relationship and in the 18 October review, and the published reviews are left as they were.
Corrections log
Every material correction to published content is recorded here, newest first. Entries are never deleted.
A VESSEL TYPE STATED WRONGLY. The brief said UKMTO had reported "an LPG carrier struck west of Al-Jazira in the UAE on 9 October", and the maritime series' gap line said the same. UKMTO's own weekly overview of 16 October lists warning 160-26 as a tanker struck by an unknown projectile, with a fire later extinguished, at 25°44'N 055°34'E in the Arabian Gulf, and maritime security sources name it as the Panama-flagged crude carrier GEM NO.2. The series now says so. The published brief is left as it was.
A DATE INFERRED, NOT REPORTED. The baseline brief gave the date of the Dahr al-Baidar seizure as "reported as Thursday, presumably 8 October". Al Jazeera's account of 16 October dates the stop of the vehicle at the checkpoint to 5 October. The baseline brief is a dated record and is not edited; this correction records the date, and the 18 October review and the interdiction observable carry 5 October.
A GAP LINE THAT SAID AN ARRANGEMENT DID NOT EXIST. The question listed as an information gap that no mine countermeasures arrangement specific to the region had been established. Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye have run the Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group under a memorandum of 11 January 2024, operational since 1 July 2024, and on 8 July 2026 signed an amendment extending its missions to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure. The gap line now says so. The question's reviews, which found no change to the arrangement in their windows, are unaffected.
AN INSTRUMENT DESCRIBED BY ONE OF ITS PROVISIONS. The observable described Decree 13 of 16 January 2026 only as bringing Kurdish into the curriculum as an optional subject, and said no legal guarantee had been published. The decree also recognises Kurdish as a national language, annuls the measures that followed the 1962 al-Hasakah census and grants nationality, makes Nowruz a paid public holiday and prohibits discrimination on ethnic or linguistic grounds. The reading now states it in full and says that no constitutional guarantee, and no instrument beyond Decree 13, has been published. The question's standing condition and the civilian-files observable, which described the decree the same way, now name its other provisions too. The observable's state is unchanged and it is not met.
A DECISION RULE OVERSTATED. The relationship said every tranche of the Union's financing was subject to a unanimity any one member government could withhold, and that its financing instruments all required unanimity among twenty-seven governments. The largest current instrument, the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026–27, runs under Regulation (EU) 2026/467 of 24 February 2026 as an enhanced cooperation among 24 member states, with Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia outside it; a Council implementing decision on a Commission proposal makes the assistance accessible, and each release of funds is a Commission decision. The record now says so. The Council's voting rule for that implementing decision was not established from the text read and is recorded as an open item rather than stated.
A COMPARISON OVERSTATED. The relationship contrasted American measures with European measures that it said all required unanimity among twenty-seven governments. Since Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 the immobilisation of the Russian central bank's assets rests on a qualified-majority act; the comparison now refers to European sanctions packages, which still require unanimity.
AN ISRAELI ATTRIBUTION RECORDED AS FACT, AND A FINDING OF ABSENCE TOO STRONG. The observable named the commander killed in Beirut on 1 April 2026 as Hezbollah's southern front commander and the last senior commander killed. Hezbollah confirmed his death without naming his office; the IDF gives one office and a Lebanese security source another. Later killings in May, June and August are claimed by the IDF or reported from unnamed sources, so the reading now says he is the latest whose death Hezbollah formally confirmed. The reading also named the town to which one regional command was reported to have moved; that detail is removed, as the Force Atlas carries no unit locations.
A REPORT RECORDED AS SAYING MORE THAN IT SAID. The record said Reuters had reported Quds Force officers auditing and taking direct supervision of Hezbollah's military organisation. The Reuters report of 21 March 2026 names the Revolutionary Guard, not the Quds Force, and its supervision claim rests on one anonymous source. The record now says so, and sets it beside the two further investigations (Le Figaro, Middle East Eye) that report Iranian help with the command and disagree on who authored the move to smaller units. Two further statements were corrected: Hezbollah confirmed the death of the man Israel called its chief of staff in November 2025 but not his office, and the offices widely attached to the commanders killed in 2024 are Hezbollah's own only for a few of them; the rest are Israeli attributions. The Radwan Force record said everything about the force after 2024 came from Israeli sources; in May 2026 a source close to Hezbollah also named an operations commander of the force.
A PARTY'S LETTER CALLED A UN REPORT. The summary said more than $1bn had reached Hezbollah after the November 2024 ceasefire, "according to a UN report". The figure comes from Israel's letter to the Security Council (S/2025/621), a party's claim, as the module's own funding records already say. The summary now attributes it to Israel and gives the US Treasury's separate statement beside it.
A COUNT ATTRIBUTED TO THE WRONG SIDE. The campaign record said UNIFIL had recorded 52,514 trajectories from north to south of the Blue Line between 21 February and 20 June 2026, in the entry for Hezbollah. The UN Secretary-General's report S/2026/566 gives 52,514 from south to north and 6,929 from north to south, and attributes neither count to a party. The entry now gives both counts in their right directions, as the module's Hezbollah, UNIFIL and Israel–Hezbollah records already did.
A FINDING OF ABSENCE THAT WAS NOT ABSENT. The brief said no Makkah Agreement act was found and that no signatory named the Agreement, and the Makkah Watch question's review of 11 October recorded no instrument found. On 5 October the Agreement's Strategic Political and Defence Committee met in emergency session in Riyadh and, in a joint statement published by the Turkish and Pakistani foreign ministries and the Saudi Press Agency, decided to implement the collective-defence commitments and to provide the agreed forces and capabilities for rapid deployment in the kingdom. The published brief is left as it was; a key event, the two defence relationships and the Watch question now record the decision.
ONE ENGAGEMENT WHERE THE RECORD HAS TWO. The relationship's line and abstract said Moscow had publicly acknowledged its forces fighting in the Sahel once, at Niamey airport in January 2026. Since 9 September the same record has carried the second: Russia's ambassador said Africa Corps intervened, on the base command's request, in the August 2026 mutiny at Base 101. The line and abstract now name both, and the summary says the January assault is the only acknowledged engagement against jihadists. The Russia actor profile's paragraph on Niger is qualified the same way.
THE SAME STATUTE STILL RECORDED AS A BILL. The economy page's sanctions section still said the US act authorising tariffs on major buyers of Russian energy had not passed the House and was not law, after the relationship record was corrected on 11 October. It was signed into law on 18 September 2026. The section now says so and records OFAC General License 135 of 9 October 2026, and the page's watch item on House action now watches the use of the tariff authority instead.
A DECISION RULE OVERSTATED. The relationship said every element of the Union's architecture required unanimity among twenty-seven governments to adopt or renew. Since Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 of 12 December 2025, adopted by qualified majority under Article 122 of the Treaty, the immobilisation of the Russian central bank's assets no longer depends on the six-monthly unanimous renewal. The record now says so; the sanctions packages themselves still require unanimity.
A DECLARATION MISSED. The basing record and the Watch question's baseline of 21 September 2026 described Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons announced in Belarus from 2023 and nothing later. On 30 December 2025 Russia's defence ministry declared that a Strategic Missile Forces unit armed with the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile had gone on combat duty in Belarus. The basing record now carries the declaration, with no site or count, and the Watch question records it in its review of 11 October; the earlier reviews stand as published.
A START DATE CORRECTED. The record dated Margus Tsahkna's tenure from 23 July 2024, the day Kristen Michal's government took office. Estonia's foreign ministry states he has held the post since 17 April 2023, and he continued in it across the change of government. The record now dates the continuous tenure, as Vigil does for other office holders.
A DATE CORRECTED. The uncrewed airspace series said a Russian Geoscan drone was found near Porvoo on 2 September 2026. It was found on 1 September, on an island off Porvoo, and Finland's Border Guard identified it on 4 September as a Russian-made Geoscan 701 mapping drone. It remains outside the count, because no entry has been established.
A RUPTURE ALREADY ENDED. The record said Algeria, the former mediator, was estranged from Bamako. Relations had been restored in July 2026 after a fifteen-month rupture, and the Malian prime minister visited Algiers on 25–26 August, as the module's own Mali–Algeria record states. The record now says so, and keeps that no mediation channel between the state and the Front is publicly in operation.
A SESSION MISDATED. The interim parliament's first session was dated 1 July 2026 in the event, the transition-institutions question's condition and the observable records that cite it. It first sat on 12 July 2026, when 206 members took the oath and elected Abdulhamid al-Awak speaker. The records are corrected; earlier Watch reviews and briefs that carried 1 July stand as published.
A BREAK IN TENURE MISSED. The foreign minister's record showed Andrii Sybiha in post without interruption since September 2024. He left with the government dismissed in July 2026, held the post in an acting capacity, and was reappointed by parliament on 19 August 2026 with 266 votes; the record now carries the three holdings. The Commander-in-Chief's handover from Oleksandr Syrskyi to Mykhailo Drapatyi is now dated 22 July 2026, the date the Ministry of Defence gives, rather than 21 July.
A STATUTE RECORDED AS A BILL. The relationship said a bill authorising tariffs on major buyers of Russian energy had passed the Senate but not the House and was not law. It was signed into law on 18 September 2026, as the module's own key event on the act records. The relationship now says so, and also records OFAC General License 135 of 9 October 2026, which authorises transactions in Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027.
A SECTION THAT WAS MARKED. The Tavush delimitation record said no section of the Armenia–Azerbaijan border had been physically marked, and the marker-placement record said whether the 2024 line was marked on the ground was not established. Both were wrong: border markers were placed along the Tavush section by geodetic survey in April and May 2024 — about forty by 6 May, by the Armenian state news agency's report — and border guards of both states took over its protection from 24 May. Both records now say so, and say that no final marker count was published in a form Vigil could verify.
A CEASEFIRE LEFT OUT. The timeline and the campaign record ran from the opening of the war to the memorandum of understanding of 17 June 2026 with no pause between them. On 8 April 2026 Iran's Supreme National Security Council accepted a two-week ceasefire, an order to all military branches to cease fire was issued in the Supreme Leader's name, and talks in Islamabad followed without agreement. The timeline now carries a key event for it and the campaign record names it.
A DECREE MISSED. The records said the post of chief of the General Staff had been vacant since 28 February 2026 with no successor established, that many senior posts remained unfilled, and — in four weekly Watch reviews — that no published command arrangement had been identified. On 10 August 2026 the Supreme Leader appointed a chief of the General Staff and the Revolutionary Guard's senior commanders by decree and ordered the General Staff and the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters merged. The records now carry the decrees, a key event for them, two office records and a new Watch review; the earlier reviews stand as published.
A PARENTAGE STATED AS SETTLED, AND A MANDATE STATED AS FACT. The Force Atlas drew the Central Headquarters under the General Staff as a confirmed parent, and its record said the headquarters was mandated to command joint operations in war and was activated for the June 2025 war. The US Defense Intelligence Agency's 2019 report says it was separated from the General Staff in 2016 as a standing command, and the decree of 10 August 2026 orders the two merged; no Iranian statute setting out its authority has been found. The parent link is now graded disputed and the mandate is stated as a description, not a fact. The Watch question's account of two credible sources in disagreement is reframed: both readings rested largely on one compiled source, and the record is incomplete rather than contested.
A TOLL UNDERSTATED AND AN ATTACK MISSED. The review of 27 September said the defence ministry reported several soldiers killed in a clash near Fartel, east of Abala, on 23 September, and that no attack on a position was found in the week. Reporting available that week put the losses near twenty: Nigerien unofficial sources about twenty soldiers, a German agency nineteen gendarmes on the ministry's account, and Reuters describes a gendarme convoy ambushed. It was a force on the move either way and is still not a position record. The review also did not carry a second attack: Reuters reported on 28 September that more than thirty soldiers were killed in Birni N'Konni, in the Tahoua region, on 26 September; a German agency gave thirty-eight soldiers killed at a base in the Tahoua region on 23 September. Islamic State Sahel Province claimed both attacks. Whether the Konni attack struck a position, and on which day, is not established, so "no attack on a position was found" is withdrawn rather than reversed. A new review records this; the review of 27 September and the brief stand as published.
A WRONG DATE AND PLACE. The records said more than 5,700 ISIS detainees were transferred from north-eastern camps to Iraq in August 2026. US forces moved 5,704 adult male suspects from detention facilities in north-eastern Syria to Iraqi custody between 21 January and 12 February 2026; CENTCOM announced the completion on 15 February and Iraq's National Centre for International Judicial Cooperation gave the count. August 2026 is when the transfer was cited among the steps behind the integration-completion claim, not when it happened.
A DELIVERY THAT HAD NOT HAPPENED. Four records said 500 Stinger missiles took about a decade from notification to delivery, one of them in 2025. The missiles, sold in Foreign Military Sales cases notified in December 2015 and July 2019, were due by the end of 2025 but were not delivered; in May 2026 the defence minister expected them by the end of 2026. The records now say the case was still undelivered in May 2026.
AN INTERVAL LEFT OUT. The Moscow refinery's first reported repair interval — at least half a year after the strikes of 16 and 18 June 2026, from industry sources reported by Reuters on 24 June — was missing from the event and the repair-interval reading, which presented September's estimate of several weeks as the plant's only interval. Both now carry it, with the note that the halt of 20 September implies an earlier restart that was never announced.
A STRIKE DATED TO ITS EFFECT. The series recorded a strike on the Volgograd refinery on 3 August 2026. The report behind it said only that the plant stopped operating on 3 August; the strike was confirmed by Ukraine's General Staff for the night of 30–31 July, and no report read describes a second attack. The record now carries 31 July, the General Staff's confirmation and the halt on 3 August, as one episode; its id is unchanged.
A CHANGE OF FORM MISSED. The records described Baltic Air Policing as running "unchanged in form" and the Alliance's response as "added alongside air policing rather than changing it". Agreed at the Ankara summit on 8 July 2026, an air defence mission replaced Baltic Air Policing on 1 August 2026, keeping the four-month rotation and the three host bases and widening the mandate to uncrewed aircraft and cruise missiles. The Watch baselines of 21 September and the review of 27 September did not record it. The records now carry the change, a key event for it, and new Watch reviews; the earlier reviews and the brief stand as published.
TWO PURCHASES MERGED INTO ONE. The section said Lithuania contracted NASAMS in October 2024 with delivery reported from April 2026. The systems arriving from April 2026 are the second battery, ordered in 2023; the October 2024 contract is for a third battery, due in 2028. The section and the NASAMS record now keep the three purchases apart.
A CLAIM GRADED TOO HIGH. The campaign said Damascus had "publicly refused" Israel's demand for a humanitarian corridor to Sweida. No public Syrian statement on the corridor was found; the refusal rests on a Syrian source quoted by Reuters on 26 September 2025. The campaign now says Damascus was reported to have rejected it. The same record called the January 2026 outcome "an intelligence-sharing mechanism"; it now names what was published — the joint statement of 6 January 2026 creating a US-supervised communication cell.
A WRONG DAY. The question's current condition dated the US-mediated Israel–Syria meeting in Jordan to 30 August 2026. It took place on Sunday 23 August, as the Weekly Brief of 30 August and the question's own observable records state; 30 August is the date of the brief that reported it. The condition now says 23 August, and has been brought up to date with the reviews since 6 September.
A TOTAL READ AS A SHARE. The access record and the 20 September brief said Russia supplied 2.7 billion cubic metres of gas to Armenia in 2025, 82 per cent of imports. 2.7 billion cubic metres was Armenia's total gas import; Russia supplied 2.229 billion of the 2.705 billion, which is the 82 per cent, and Iran 476 million, on the regulator's figures. The 27 September brief declined a Russian official's figure of "over 2.2 bcm" as differing from the module's; his figure was the right one. Both briefs stand as published.
The prime minister's statement that Armenia may soon begin applying for EU membership was made to parliament on 24 August 2026, not 25 August. The profile is corrected; the brief stands as published.
A FIGURE ATTACHED TO THE WRONG TRADE. The records said the EU measure covers about 80 per cent of Armenia's exports to the Union, "including" about 99 per cent of its fresh fruit, vegetable and plant exports and more than 91 per cent of its beverages and spirits. The Council's text of 2 September states the 99 and 91 per cent figures for Armenia's exports to Russia: they measure how much of the trade Russia closed the EU's tariff lines take in, not a share of trade with the EU. The event now says so and records the duty-free quotas for eight products. The brief stands as published.
A DATE ONE DAY LATE. The United States, Armenia and Azerbaijan issued their anniversary joint statement on 10 August 2026, as the State Department's release and Armenia's public radio of that evening show, not on 11 August. The event and the records restating the date are corrected. The event also said the 60,000 tonnes moved through Azerbaijan to Armenia; the statement says to and from Armenia, and adds 20,000 tonnes of Azerbaijani oil products, which the event now records. Briefs stand as published.
THREE DETAILS WRONG OR MISSING. The broadest restriction, on all quarantine-regulated plant products from Armenia, took effect on 12 June 2026 as Rosselkhoznadzor's notice of 11 June states, not 13 June. The measures on Jermuk mineral water and on named Armenian wines and brandies were taken by Rospotrebnadzor, the consumer-safety agency, not by Rosselkhoznadzor. And the stop on Armenian fish from 26 June was not recorded. The event now carries the dated sequence. The 27 September brief stands as published.
INITIALLED IS NOT SIGNED. The records said Armenia and the United States signed the TRIPP framework agreement on 26 May 2026. On 26 May the Secretary of State and Armenia's foreign minister initialled it in Yerevan, at a ceremony where they signed a Strategic Partnership Charter and a critical-minerals memorandum; the agreement itself was signed remotely, by the Secretary of State in Washington on 1 June and by the foreign minister in Yerevan on 4 June. The event keeps its date of 26 May and now states both steps; the records restating it are corrected. Briefs stand as published.
A WRONG DAY. The Weekly Brief of 20 September and the Armenia access record said Gazprom suspended gas deliveries to Armenia from 14 September. The suspension ran from 15 September: Gazprom Armenia's announcement of 14 September gave the period as 15 to 25 September, and the reports of the resumption on 25 September give the same start. The logistics record now says 15 September and records the resumption; the published brief is left as it was published.
A PUBLISHED FACT MISSED. The records said no garrison, lead unit or headquarters had been published for Forward Land Forces Finland. The Swedish Armed Forces published on 10 July 2026 that its headquarters is in Rovaniemi and that Sweden's contribution is a battalion battle group based at Boden, under NATO command since 6 June. NATO itself still publishes no seat, and no lead unit is published. The Weekly Brief of 20 September 2026 said the headquarters remained unpublished; it stands as published.
A RECORD THAT DID NOT MATCH ITS SOURCE. The series recorded drone remains found at four sites on the Romanian Black Sea coast on 11 September 2026. The Romanian defence ministry release it cited describes a different occurrence: a drone crossing from Ukraine and Moldova on 12 September, reported over Botoșani, with a crashed object found near Botoșenița Mare in Suceava county. No release describing four coastal sites was found. The record now describes the 12 September occurrence and keeps its identifier.
A MISCOUNT. The question and its convoy-ambush reading counted one July 2026 ambush on the Gao–Anéfis axis and dated it 4 July. The record holds three — near Tabrichat on 5 July, near Tin Araban on 9 July and near Tabankort on 18 July — and the interval is now measured from 18 July.
AN UNDERSTATED REACH. The question's condition and three of its readings said Niamey had been reached once, that no Nigerien position was documented as taken, and that no attack on the oil pipeline had been identified in 2026. JNIM also attacked the military side of Niamey's airport on 18 June 2026; the module's positions series records eight overruns of camps in Tillabéri and Tahoua between May 2025 and June 2026, each left by the attackers; and the MPLJ attacked a site in the Agadem oil block on 10 February 2026. The condition and readings now say so.
A WRONG CROSSING. The record said the 2026 Iraqi fuel-oil corridor runs through the Rabia–al-Yarubiyah crossing. The tankers have run principally through the al-Tanf crossing — al-Waleed on the Iraqi side — which Syria's border authority says more than 65,000 fuel tankers had crossed by mid-September; Rabia–al-Yarubiyah also reopened in April. The tonnage the record carried was right.
AN UNDERSTATED LOSS. The economy section and the fuel and power record said generation capacity was roughly halved by the war. Available generation fell much further: about 1,400 MW in January 2025, passing 3,000 MW at the start of 2026, against about 10,000 MW installed in 2011, with electricity output down about three-quarters between 2011 and 2023. Both records now carry the figures with their dates.
AN OUTCOME MISSED. The records said the Cabinet's NT$210bn drone special act was still in committee and the bill outstanding. The Legislative Yuan rejected it on 27 August 2026 and passed the opposition parties' own act — NT$240bn over six years, NT$40bn a year, as a funding principle through annual budgets — which the president promulgated on 11 September. The Weekly Briefs of 30 August, 6 September and 20 September described the bill as still in committee; they stand as published.
A RULE APPLIED TWO WAYS. The series counted a Russian multi-port claim of 25 August once, at Odesa, but refused the comparable claim of 19 September as "a multi-port statement", and the 20 September brief said so. The rule is now one: a claim describing one attack episode across several ports is counted once, at the marker it names, and split only where each site is independently supported. The 19 September claim is counted at Odesa at low confidence, as are the single-port claims of 12 and 21 September and the multi-port claim of 25 September. The published brief is left as it was.
A FINDING OF ABSENCE THAT WAS NOT ABSENT. The brief recorded no published repair interval and no new pump-level rationing in its window. Reuters had reported on 15 September halts or deep cuts at the Kirishi, NORSI and Volgograd refineries and a Leningrad oblast rationing order running to 1 October, and industry sources reported Syzran and Saratov halted on 16 September. The published brief is left as it was; the Weekly Brief of 27 September reports these dated, and the standing refining question's observables carry them.
AN OVERSTATED WITHDRAWAL. The April 2026 offensive record said Africa Corps had left Aguelhok and Tessalit on 27 April, which read as the state leaving both. At Aguelhok the Malian army stayed: its position was attacked on 4 July 2026 and the army reported the attack repelled, and wire reporting that day called Anéfis and Aguelhok its last positions in the Kidal region. At Tessalit the departure is dated by the FLA's entry, filmed in the town by 1 May, rather than to 27 April alone. The event and both location records now say so.
A PUBLISHED ABSENCE THAT WAS NOT ONE. The Jiupeng event record, the Taiwan Weekly Brief of 20 September and the global brief of the same day said that no reporting described a cross-service data path or a targeting sequence, and called the exercise co-location rather than a chain. The Ministry of National Defense's own news agency had published an account on 19 September, the day before, stating that the firing was conducted according to kill-chain procedure — search, target acquisition, identification, target allocation and attack — using shipborne radar, Air Force air control, mobile radar vehicles and drones, joined through command-and-control nodes and a TAK battlefield-awareness interface to missiles and attack drones across services. The event record now states what the ministry described, graded as the ministry's own account, and what that account still does not establish — no assessment or retasking stage, no technical description of the link, and nothing describing any connection degraded.
A WRONG DAY. The event dated Israel's strikes on the T4, Palmyra and Hama airbases to 3 April 2025 and called them nine days after the previous strikes on T4 and Palmyra. They took place on the night of Wednesday 2 April 2025, as the Israeli military's statement of that night and same-day reporting record; 3 April is the date the reporting that tied them to the Turkish survey visits appeared. The event now says 2 April and eight days, and its sort date moved with it.
A COVERED ZERO THAT WAS NOT ZERO. The Taiwan Weekly Brief of 20 September and the patrol series' review of the same day recorded that Taiwan's defence ministry designated no PLA joint combat readiness patrol between 14 and 20 September. The ministry did, on 17 September, in a Chinese-language press release: nineteen aircraft sorties, fifteen across the median line into the south-west and central airspace, working with PLA vessels. The series now carries the record, and the week holds one patrol.
A FORMATION CARRIED AT THE WRONG ECHELON FOR NINE MONTHS. The record described the 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade, a Baltic Fleet marine brigade at Baltiysk, and dated that structure to July 2026. Russia's defence ministry announced on 22 December 2025 that the brigade had been expanded into a new Baltic Fleet naval infantry division, one of whose regiments retains the number 336. The record now carries the formation at divisional echelon, with the brigade designation as a predecessor and an alias, and its structural date moved back to December 2025 — the newest date for which the structure is actually sourced. The division's own designation is reported as the 120th Guards Naval Infantry Division and has not been publicly confirmed, so the record is not titled by it, and whether the division is manned to establishment is not published.
A STATEMENT CONTRADICTED BY VIGIL'S OWN SERIES. The question, opened on 14 September 2026, recorded that "the refinery series records no strike at a published marker in the window" of the 5–8 September capitals-only pause, and its condition said the deep-strike campaign resumed with the envoys' departure. The module's own activity series records three strikes at published markers inside that window — Ryazan on 6 September, Perm on 7 September and Saratov on 8 September. The information gap and the condition sentence are corrected to state what the series records: the reciprocity was capital-specific in practice, and Ukraine's deep-strike campaign did not pause with it.
A DATE, MOVED BY ONE DAY ON BETTER EVIDENCE. The Weekly Brief of 6 September recorded a Ukrainian strike on the Ryazan refinery "on 5 September", following the Ukrainian reporting available that day, and the activity series carried the record at that date. Reporting published afterwards — the General Staff confirmation of 6 September, the Kyiv Independent and Militarnyi accounts, and the Reuters industry sourcing that The Moscow Times carried on 10 September — places the strike on the night of 5–6 September. Vigil dates an overnight occurrence to the morning it ended, so the activity record is now dated 6 September and its id has changed from ryazan-2026-09-05 to ryazan-2026-09-06.
STRUCTURE ADDED, AND A MISSING VOCABULARY. Ukraine's Logistics Forces and Medical Forces were carried as branch records with no substructure at all, because the atlas had no honest word for the bodies they are built from: a central directorate and a military medical clinical centre are not formations, and filing either as one forced a tactical echelon ("brigade") onto it. The record model now carries a "support organisation" type with four organisational echelons — directorate, centre, institution and depot — and eighteen records were added under the two branches: the Armament and Rear services with their named central directorates and the 63rd Repair Base, and the six regional military medical clinical centres, the mobile hospitals and the Ukrainian Military Medical Academy. Both branch records were promoted from structural stubs to reviewed profiles.
Four corrections found during the Caucasus depth review. (1) TERMINOLOGY. The module overview described TRIPP in two places as a reframing of the "Zangezur corridor" — historical phase XII called it "the 'Trump Route' / TRIPP framing of the old Zangezur corridor question", and a watch item opened "The 'Zangezur'/TRIPP corridor question". TRIPP is a named framework with published instruments, which Armenia describes as operating under its own sovereignty; "Zangezur corridor" is Azerbaijan's older and continuing term for a connection it has framed as extraterritorial. Making them synonyms adopts one party's characterisation. Both passages rewritten to name the two things separately and to record that Baku still uses its own term. (2) WHO INITIALLED WHAT. Phase XII stated that the two leaders initialled the peace framework at the August 2025 Washington summit. The peace agreement text was initialled by the two foreign ministers; the leaders signed a joint declaration. Corrected. (3) A PRECONDITION ALREADY MET. The overview's first watch item listed "the OSCE Minsk structures' formal burial" among the conditions remaining before treaty signature, while the module's own key events record the Minsk Group's dissolution as accomplished. The watch item has been rewritten and now names the constitutional referendum timetable instead. (4) EUMM'S MANDATE. Five records described the EU Monitoring Mission as monitoring "the Georgian-controlled side", "from one side only" or "the government-controlled side". The mission's mandate covers the whole of Georgia; the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have denied it access since it deployed. The earlier wording attributed the limitation to the EU rather than to the parties imposing it. Corrected in the overview, the Georgia campaign, the boundary-access impact chain, the boundary-lines terrain record and the EUMM Force Atlas entry. Separately, the Georgia profile dated the Russia–South Ossetia treaty to June 2026; it was signed on 9 May 2026, with the de facto leadership change following in June.
The profile listed both the prime minister and the defence minister as "in transition" and named Serhii Koretskyi only as "reported as incoming". Parliament had in fact approved Koretskyi as prime minister on 16 July 2026 with 289 votes, and confirmed Maj. Gen. Yevhenii Khmara as defence minister on 19 August 2026 with 312 votes. Both rows now name the confirmed holders with their dates and votes, and the block's review date has been advanced from 22 July to 19 August 2026.
The key-event entry for the August 2025 Washington summit expanded TRIPP as the "Trans-Republic of Armenia Peace and Prosperity" route. The route's name is the "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity"; the earlier formulation does not yield the acronym and did not match the usage in the 18 July 2026 weekly brief or the module overview. Corrected. At the same time the module's account of the project's scope was extended: TRIPP had been recorded as the road and railway Armenian officials describe, which was accurate for those statements but omitted the wider scope set out in the Armenia–US implementation framework of 14 January 2026 — road, rail, electricity transmission, oil and gas pipelines and fibre-optic infrastructure. Two key events were added for the January 2026 framework and the 26 May 2026 signed framework agreement, and the United States profile now carries the scope, the reported route length and the agreement date.
Vigil described the 30 January 2026 integration agreement as moving "three divisions and two specialised brigades" of the SDF into the Ministry of Defence. That was the structure of the roadmap discussed in early January, not of the agreement as concluded. The agreement provides for a single Ministry of Defence division formed from three SDF brigades, plus a brigade at Kobani (Ain al-Arab) attached to a division affiliated with Aleppo governorate. The SDF actor profile, the Force Atlas records for the SDF and for Syrian state forces, the key-event entry for the agreement and the 18 July 2026 weekly brief were corrected.
Updated Ukraine leadership and command-structure references after corroborated reporting that Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on 21 July 2026, replacing Oleksandr Syrskyi, with Ihor Skybiuk named chief of the General Staff on 22 July. The Ukraine profile's leadership block was revised (commander-in-chief, chief of the General Staff, and the in-transition prime-minister and defence-minister posts following the July 2026 government reshuffle); a key event was added to the Ukraine timeline; and the Armed Forces of Ukraine Force Atlas record was reviewed for consistency. The first Vigil Analytical Note was published for the full context.
The Pokrovsk axis marker described the city as a hub whose loss "would" complicate Ukraine's Donbas position; Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad were in fact reported captured by Russian forces in early 2026. The record now reflects the reported capture and the shift of fighting to the axes west and north of the city.
Formation, branch, actor and equipment records that cited only broad source categories now additionally cite the specific references that document their structural claims (IISS Military Balance, MilitaryLand.net), and generic "official statements" citations were narrowed to the specific claimant (Ukrainian military statements / Russian MoD statements) where the claimant is unambiguous.
The Azov record was renamed to its current designation (12th Special Forces Brigade "Azov") and placed under the National Guard's 1st Corps "Azov" (2025), with predecessor lineage recorded back to the 2014 volunteer battalion.
KRAKEN 1654 (previously listed as "Kraken" under the National Guard) was re-grouped under intelligence-linked formations, reflecting its documented 2022 military-intelligence origin. Its current formal subordination is publicly contested and remains marked disputed pending source review; it has not been assigned to the 3rd Army Corps.
Russian Naval Infantry was shown directly under the Armed Forces of Russia; it is now correctly placed as a component of the Russian Navy, which has been added as a branch record.
The collapsed "Navy & Naval Infantry" node was split: the Navy record now covers the fleet arm, and the Marine Corps has its own record as a structurally distinct branch established in 2023.
The Aerospace Forces (VKS) record, previously a single flat branch, now carries its umbrella structure: Air Force, Air & Missile Defence Forces and Space Forces.
The Wagner-successor record is now titled "Wagner Group → Africa Corps" and carries machine-readable lineage (formed 2014, reorganised 2023 under Ministry of Defence control) instead of presenting the organisation as institutionally unchanged.
Corrections log opened alongside the initial publication of the Ukraine–Russia module in prototype status.