Commodities
Industrial inputs and bottlenecks
Propellant, nitrocellulose and the raw-material constraint on ammunition output, with the dispute about it recorded unresolved.
Coverage · NATO Eastern Flank
AssessmentModerate confidence
Not investment advice. This surface explains exposure and transmission channels; it never recommends, ranks or names securities. Figures are estimates and carry their own as-of dates and confidence grades.
Current state
Where this economy stands
Moderate confidence · Economic data as of 2026-09-22
The eastern flank's economic question is not whether the Alliance can afford its posture. It is whether money already committed can become delivered capability on the timescale the posture assumes. Allies agreed at The Hague in June 2025 to spend five per cent of GDP annually on defence by 2035, in two components; forces are now pre-assigned to regional plans that require them to move; and the industrial base that would sustain them contracted for thirty years and is being rebuilt against raw-material, skills and order-book limits. Almost everything published about that rebuild is an announcement. This layer records what has actually been commissioned or delivered, keeps it apart from what has been promised, and states which is which.
- Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25High confidenceNATO
- Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25High confidencePoland
- Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25High confidenceGermany
- Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25High confidenceFinland
Changed in brief — 2026-10-25 · Economy updated
The economy, as analytical objects What is economically exposed in NATO Eastern Flank, as 8 selectable objects. Each carries its own records, its exposure class and — where the corpus establishes one — the mechanism by which pressure reaches it.Interrogate NATO Eastern Flank in Explore
Energy
Energy dependence and interconnection
Residual Russian pipeline dependence inside the Alliance, and the cross-border electricity links the flank runs on.
Finance
Defence investment and burden sharing
The five per cent commitment of June 2025, its two-component structure and the 2029 review.
Sanctions
Sanctions and maritime enforcement
Sanctions on Russia as they bear on this flank, and enforcement against shadow-fleet vessels in the Baltic.
Infrastructure
Military mobility investment
The rail, road and port investment that plan-assigned reinforcement depends on, and the gauge break at the Baltic frontier.
Defence industry
Ammunition production
European artillery-ammunition output: what is commissioned, what is announced and what has been delivered.
Defence industry
Air and missile defence procurement
Interceptor and fire-unit procurement across the flank, and which contracts have reached a named receiving force.
Defence industry
Armour and naval recapitalisation
Tank, infantry-vehicle, frigate and submarine programmes running on decade schedules beneath a posture built in months.
The full assessment8 blocks of analysis and 6 graded exposures, filed under the objects above — the module’s own words, with their own dates
Everything below is authored on this module’s economy record. Figures carry the vintage of the release that produced them, not the date of this page: the section is graded Moderate confidence and its figures are stated as of 2026-09-22.
Industrial inputs and bottlenecksCommoditiesHigh exposure
| Commodity | Why it matters here | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Propellant and nitrocellulose | The raw-material bottleneck behind ammunition output. One chief executive says supply is no longer a problem; industry reporting disagrees, and the dispute is live. | High exposure |
How pressure reaches it
- The defence investment commitment and the delivery gapeconomic · as of 2026-09
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Plausible exposure
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
Raw materials and the bottleneck dispute
As of 2026-09
Propellant and its nitrocellulose input are the acknowledged constraint on artillery-ammunition output. A manufacturer's chief executive said in July 2026 that nitrocellulose supply is "no longer a problem" after securing its own supply and reserves; industry reporting on the chemicals shortage disagrees, and a cotton-linter bottleneck has been acknowledged at alliance level. Both positions are recorded. Neither is resolved, and this module states no input figure of its own.
Energy dependence and interconnectionEnergyModerate exposure
| Commodity | Why it matters here | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Natural gas and crude oil | Two flank members remain structurally dependent on Russian supply through infrastructure that has no short-term alternative, which is a different problem from price. | Moderate exposure |
| Electricity interconnection | Cross-border links are the civilian system the military system runs on, and they are the assets the Baltic damage series counts. | Moderate exposure |
How pressure reaches it
- Baltic undersea infrastructure damage and its exposureeconomic · as of 2026-09
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Plausible exposure
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
Energy dependence inside the Alliance
As of 2026-09
Two flank members — Hungary and Slovakia — remain structurally dependent on Russian pipeline supply, which is a different problem from price exposure because the infrastructure has no short-term alternative. This module records the dependence as a live economic condition and does NOT author it as a canonical bilateral relationship: the structural evidence required for that was not obtained this pass, and one news article is not a structural finding. The question is named in the module's Watch layer instead, where the evidence bar for a change is stated.
Defence investment and burden sharingFinance
How pressure reaches it
- The defence investment commitment and the delivery gapeconomic · as of 2026-09
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Plausible exposure
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
The investment commitment and what it counts
As of 2026-09
Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025 to invest five per cent of GDP annually on defence by 2035, in two components, with a review in 2029. The two-component structure is the analytically important part: it allows infrastructure and resilience spending to count toward the figure, which is what connects the political commitment to the mobility and host-nation constraints this module treats as binding. NATO stated in July 2026 an expectation that five Allies would meet the core guideline and seventeen the related one in 2026; the per-country table was not read this pass and no national figure is stated here. The United States' posture testimony to Congress of 18 March 2026 calls the commitment "the new global standard for our allies", names Poland, Germany and Finland as "model allies" and states that Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defence — the clearest published statement of what the largest ally expects the commitment to buy. It quotes one ally's percentage; this module does not carry it until NATO's own table has been read.
Sources: NATO official texts and summit declarations↗ · Official government statements
What to watch
- The 2029 review of the investment commitmentThe five per cent commitment carries its own review point. It is the first published moment at which the trajectory can be checked against the pledge.
Sanctions and maritime enforcementSanctions
How pressure reaches it
- Baltic undersea infrastructure damage and its exposureeconomic · as of 2026-09
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Plausible exposure
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
Sanctions, enforcement and the shadow fleet
As of 2026-09
Allies have imposed sanctions on Russia since February 2022 and continue to refine them; this module creates no sanctions relationship of its own, because the claim is the same one the corpus already carries. What is specific to this flank is enforcement at sea. Vessels associated with the shadow fleet have been boarded or stopped by flank states roughly eight to twelve times in twenty-one months, concentrated in Sweden since March 2026, and several of the vessels in the module's undersea damage series were later listed. Enforcement actions are not counted as a series: two classes are mixed in public reporting — at-sea interventions and in-port administrative detentions — and no aggregator publishes either.
Sources: Established international media reporting · European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions
Military mobility investmentInfrastructureHigh exposure
| Commodity | Why it matters here | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Rail freight capacity | Reinforcement moves by rail. The Baltic corridor is being rebuilt to a different gauge from the network it replaces, and the schedule is the constraint. | High exposure |
How pressure reaches it
- Plan-assigned forces and the movement constrainteconomic · as of 2026-09-22
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Plausible exposure
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
Runs through Military mobility
Mobility investment and the gauge break
As of 2026-09-22
Reinforcement under the regional plans assumes movement, and the infrastructure that would carry it is civilian. The Baltic states' existing network is built to the 1,520 mm gauge rather than the European standard, which is the problem the Rail Baltica programme exists to solve; its completion schedule is therefore a movement constraint rather than a construction story, and that schedule moved on 22 September 2026, when the Baltic prime ministers declared the main line would become operational within the EU's 2028–2034 budget period rather than by 2030 and said they would seek at least ten billion euros of further Connecting Europe Facility funding for it. NATO's own list of reinforcement measures names a new policy for improving logistics support to move, reinforce, supply and sustain forces — which states that the requirement exists, not that it is met. No milestone, target or measure for that policy has been published.
Sources: Rail Baltica programme authority (RB Rail AS)↗ · NATO official texts and summit declarations↗ · Official government statements
What to watch
- Rail Baltica milestones against the published scheduleThe joint venture's own documents are the source of record. A slipped milestone is a movement constraint.
Ammunition productionDefence industryHigh exposure
| Commodity | Why it matters here | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Artillery ammunition | The consumption item that defines sustainment. European output is being rebuilt from a low base; the only commissioned plant in this module opened in August 2025 and its stated output for 2026 is a target. | High exposure |
How pressure reaches it
- The defence investment commitment and the delivery gapeconomic · as of 2026-09
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Plausible exposure
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
Runs through Defence industry
Organisations Rheinmetall (manufacturer)
Ammunition production — commissioned against announced
As of 2026-09
One plant in this module is commissioned: Rheinmetall's Unterlüß facility in Germany, opened in August 2025. The company states 140,000 rounds there in 2026 and 350,000 a year from 2027, with group output around 1.5 million shells a year from 2027 — targets, not output. The company reported first deliveries of 155 mm projectiles from Unterlüß in July 2026, to Ukraine, not to a force in this module. Its Baisogala plant in Lithuania broke ground in November 2025; the company says operations during 2026 with line qualification to year-end and a ramp from 2027, while one company executive has said early 2027, and no source read in September 2026 says it is operating. Poland's state group carries a 155 mm consortium whose headline figure is a financing decision. The European Commission's own page records about €500 million disbursed across 31 projects under its ammunition-production instrument; the widely cited two-million-rounds-a-year target is not on that page and is not used here.
Sources: Official government statements · Established international media reporting
What to watch
- Delivery statements against production targetsAnnouncements of plants and targets are frequent; statements of delivery to a named force are rare. The ratio between them is the honest measure of the rebuild, and it is what this layer tracks.
Air and missile defence procurementDefence industryHigh exposure
| Commodity | Why it matters here | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Air-defence interceptors | The scarcest item in the theatre and the one with the longest lead time. One multinational contract covers up to a thousand interceptors for four states; no delivery under it was established this pass. | High exposure |
How pressure reaches it
- The defence investment commitment and the delivery gapeconomic · as of 2026-09
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Plausible exposure
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
- Airspace pressure and shared civil systemseconomic · as of 2026-10
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Plausible exposure
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
Air and missile defence — deliveries against contracts
As of 2026-10
Two Baltic deliveries now name a receiving force. The Estonian Defence Forces state that the Air Force's Air Defence Wing received the first of three IRIS-T SLM fire units on 22 June 2026, the others due in 2027; it is not declared operational. Lithuania's Air Defence Battalion began receiving its second NASAMS battery, ordered in 2023, in April 2026, as public broadcasting reports; a third battery, contracted in October 2024, is due in 2028. Latvia's IRIS-T, ordered in November 2023, is expected by the end of 2026. Poland's first Patriot squadron reached full operational capability in December 2025, while its counter-drone system, contracted in January 2026, shows no delivery. The manufacturer's output targets — up to ten fire units in 2026 and sixteen a year within two years — are its own statements. A multinational agency contract of January 2024 covers up to a thousand Patriot interceptors for four states, and no delivery under it was found; no flank state publishes interceptor stocks.
Sources: Estonian Defence Forces (Kaitsevägi) structure pages↗ · Latvian National Armed Forces (NBS) official pages↗ · Polish Ministry of National Defence and Armed Forces official pages↗ · Official government statements · Established international media reporting
Actor economiesThe economic record Vigil holds on each of the 29 parties in this module — revenue base, figures and constraints, per actor
State actor — economic profile
NATO
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Poland
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Germany
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Finland
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Russia
Not built. Economic coverage of this actor is authored at P5 and is bounded to what bears on the eastern flank — the defence-industrial and energy interfaces — never a general account of the national economy.
CoverageNot yet authored. No defence-spending, production or trade figure is carried for this actor anywhere in this moduleAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no figure appears here yet
Economic claims about this actor circulate widely and at wildly different confidences. Vigil publishes one only from a source it has read, with that source’s own date and grade attached. None was established during the verification sprint, so the record says so.
State actor — economic profile
Belarus
Not built. Economic coverage of this actor is authored at P5 and is bounded to what bears on the eastern flank — the defence-industrial and energy interfaces — never a general account of the national economy.
CoverageNot yet authored. No defence-spending, production or trade figure is carried for this actor anywhere in this moduleAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no figure appears here yet
Economic claims about this actor circulate widely and at wildly different confidences. Vigil publishes one only from a source it has read, with that source’s own date and grade attached. None was established during the verification sprint, so the record says so.
State actor — economic profile
Belgium
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Bulgaria
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Canada
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Czechia
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Denmark
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Estonia
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
European Union
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
France
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Hungary
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Italy
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Latvia
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Lithuania
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Moldova
Not built. This actor is an interface rather than a member of the system, and its economic coverage here is bounded to the interfaces that touch the flank — authored at P5.
CoverageNot yet authored — bounded to the flank-facing interfaces when it isAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Scope of what will be authored
Only the economic facts that bear on the eastern flank’s defence, reinforcement or Black Sea security belong here. A fuller economic account of this actor is not this module’s subject and would duplicate coverage that belongs elsewhere.
State actor — economic profile
Netherlands
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Norway
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Romania
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Slovakia
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Spain
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Sweden
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Türkiye
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
Ukraine
Not built. This actor is an interface rather than a member of the system, and its economic coverage here is bounded to the interfaces that touch the flank. Rail Baltica's programme authority names future links to Ukraine among its strategic-corridor purposes; that is the one economic interface on the module's own record.
CoverageBounded to the flank-facing interfaces; the war economy is the Ukraine–Russia module's subjectAs of 2026-09-28 · Confidence: High
Scope of what is authored
Only the economic facts that bear on the eastern flank’s defence, reinforcement or Black Sea security belong here. A fuller economic account of this actor is not this module’s subject and would duplicate coverage that belongs elsewhere. The Rail Baltica programme's stated purpose of strategic corridors including future links to Ukraine is carried on the logistics record; no Ukrainian rail, port or export figure is carried in this module.
State actor — economic profile
United Kingdom
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
State actor — economic profile
United States
The one economic commitment that applies across this system is the spending pledge Allies agreed at The Hague on 25 June 2025. Per-ally standing against it is deliberately not carried — see below. The module’s wider economic layer, including defence-industrial production and the cost of the reinforcement system, is authored at P5.
Alliance spending commitment5% of GDP annually by 2035 — at least 3.5% core defence, up to 1.5% defence- and security-related — agreed 25 June 2025, reviewed in 2029As of 2025-06-25 · Confidence: High
This ally’s standing against itNot carried. NATO’s 2026 defence-investment tables were published in a form the verification pass could not read, and no percentage is authored from memoryAs of 2026-09-20 · Confidence: High
Why no national percentage appears here
Defence spending as a share of GDP is the most quoted number in this subject and one of the easiest to get wrong: the figures move between estimate, plan and outturn, and different bodies count different things. NATO publishes an authoritative table annually. The 2026 edition downloaded as an image-only document that the verification pass could not read, so no figure from it is carried. It is added when the table has been read — not before.
The industrial base as the US reading of the commitment
As of 2026-03-18The March 2026 testimony calls expanding transatlantic defence- industrial capacity "the most important step NATO allies can take to operationalize the 5% defense spending commitment", asks Europe for a parallel "call to industrial arms", and objects to measures that would exclude US industry from European procurement. That is the United States' stated economic reading of the pledge, and it is why the module's economy layer files the commitment beside its ammunition-production and industrial-inputs objects rather than as a budget page.
Sources: Official government statements
Evidence and grading
- Exposure
- How strongly this part of the economy is exposed to conflict developments. An assessed exposure class, not a price forecast and not a probability.
- Confidence
- How well established Vigil considers this assessment to be. It is not a measure of how badly the economy is affected.