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Relationship record

Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) — Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)

The army that retook Kidal in 2023 and the front that took much of the north back in 2026 — the Algiers accord's collapse, as a war.

Adversarial Since 2024-12

Active
Assessed as of
2026-09
Last reviewed
2026-09-28

AssessmentModerate confidence

A described arrangement, not a rating. Vigil publishes no measure of how strong, warm or hostile a relationship is, and no relationship on this site carries a score, a trend or a direction of travel. What is recorded is what the arrangement covers, when it began, what has changed it, and how firmly each of those is established.

In short

The fighting between the Malian Armed Forces and the Azawad Liberation Front, formed at the end of 2024 from the CMA's components. It resumed with the race for MINUSMA's camps in 2023, produced the Kidal recapture and the Tinzaouatène defeat, and in 2026 converged with JNIM's campaign.

A symmetric arrangement: it reads the same from either side. Authored once, on one record.

The arrangement

Status
ActiveIn force and operating. Says nothing about how well it is working, or about which way it is heading.Last material change: 2026-05.
What it covers
DefenceCounter-terrorismCategories the arrangement is documented to include. Not a measure: a relationship covering more of them is described in more detail, not held more firmly.

Summary

The 2015 Algiers accord froze rather than ended the northern war, and its collapse ran in stages. MINUSMA's compressed withdrawal in the second half of 2023 restarted fighting over the camps it vacated; the army and its Russian partners retook Kidal in November 2023, the first time the state had held it since 2012; the CSP–Russian column was destroyed at Tinzaouatène in July 2024; Bamako terminated the accord in January 2024; and the CMA's movements dissolved into a single Azawad Liberation Front on 30 November – 1 December 2024. What changed in 2026 was coordination: the April–May offensives combined FLA and JNIM pressure against the columns between the hubs, and the army lost much of the ground it had taken in 2023 while keeping the regional capitals. The relationship is therefore one of a state army defending towns it cannot garrison the countryside around, against a front that holds the countryside and cannot take the towns — and, since 2026, against a front that fights alongside the jihadist coalition it once fought.

Why it matters

The north is where the state's military model was proven in 2023 and where it was tested to failure in 2026. Whether the army can hold the region capitals without the countryside decides whether the northern question is again frozen or again lost, and the FLA–JNIM convergence is the fact that makes 2026 different from 2012.

Related events

Organisations

Structures through which this relationship operates. Not parties to it — the parties are the two actors above.

Systems it depends on

Canonical logistics records. They carry the corridors, nodes, dependence and disruption history that this relationship rests on and does not restate.

Places

Markers this module already publishes. This record adds no geographic precision of its own.

What remains unknown

  • The depth and durability of FLA–JNIM coordination is described in reporting and by the parties' statements, not documented as a command arrangement; the record states convergence, not alliance.
  • Control of ground between the region capitals is not mapped by this module and the record makes no territorial claim beyond the published events.
  • The FLA's own account of its objectives has shifted between autonomy and independence; which it is fighting for is carried on the state-level record and the actor profile, not here.

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Assessed as of — 2026-09 Last reviewed — 2026-09-28