The fighting between the Malian Armed Forces and the Azawad Liberation Front, formed at the end of 2024 from the CMA's components. It resumed with the race for MINUSMA's camps in 2023, produced the Kidal recapture and the Tinzaouatène defeat, and in 2026 converged with JNIM's campaign.
A symmetric arrangement: it reads the same from either side. Authored once, on one record.
The arrangement
- Status
- ActiveIn force and operating. Says nothing about how well it is working, or about which way it is heading.Last material change: 2026-05.
- What it covers
- DefenceCounter-terrorismCategories the arrangement is documented to include. Not a measure: a relationship covering more of them is described in more detail, not held more firmly.
Summary
The 2015 Algiers accord froze rather than ended the northern war, and its collapse ran in stages. MINUSMA's compressed withdrawal in the second half of 2023 restarted fighting over the camps it vacated; the army and its Russian partners retook Kidal in November 2023, the first time the state had held it since 2012; the CSP–Russian column was destroyed at Tinzaouatène in July 2024; Bamako terminated the accord in January 2024; and the CMA's movements dissolved into a single Azawad Liberation Front on 30 November – 1 December 2024. What changed in 2026 was coordination: the April–May offensives combined FLA and JNIM pressure against the columns between the hubs, and the army lost much of the ground it had taken in 2023 while keeping the regional capitals. The relationship is therefore one of a state army defending towns it cannot garrison the countryside around, against a front that holds the countryside and cannot take the towns — and, since 2026, against a front that fights alongside the jihadist coalition it once fought.
Why it matters
The north is where the state's military model was proven in 2023 and where it was tested to failure in 2026. Whether the army can hold the region capitals without the countryside decides whether the northern question is again frozen or again lost, and the FLA–JNIM convergence is the fact that makes 2026 different from 2012.
Related events
- The army retakes Kidal 14 Nov 2023
Military · Territorial change
- Mali expels MINUSMA Jun – Dec 2023
Diplomatic · Military
- Mali terminates the Algiers Agreement 25 Jan 2024
Diplomatic · Political
- Tinzaouatène — the separatists' revenge 25 – 27 Jul 2024
Military
- Azawad Liberation Front created 30 Nov – 1 Dec 2024
Political · Military
- April 2026 offensive — Kidal falls, the defence minister is killed 25 Apr – May 2026
Military · Territorial change · Leadership change
Organisations
Structures through which this relationship operates. Not parties to it — the parties are the two actors above.
Systems it depends on
Canonical logistics records. They carry the corridors, nodes, dependence and disruption history that this relationship rests on and does not restate.
What remains unknown
- The depth and durability of FLA–JNIM coordination is described in reporting and by the parties' statements, not documented as a command arrangement; the record states convergence, not alliance.
- Control of ground between the region capitals is not mapped by this module and the record makes no territorial claim beyond the published events.
- The FLA's own account of its objectives has shifted between autonomy and independence; which it is fighting for is carried on the state-level record and the actor profile, not here.
All Sahel relationships Open in Explore
Assessed as of — 2026-09 Last reviewed — 2026-09-28