Displacement
Displacement across three states
Where the displaced actually are, how well each state counts them, and what a suspended registration does to the number.
Coverage · Central Sahel
AssessmentModerate confidence
Broad regional level only. This surface never maps aid routes, facility locations or operational detail. Locations here are regional; no facility, warehouse, convoy route or aid schedule is published anywhere in this module.
Current state
What civilian pressure looks like now
Moderate confidence · Data as of 2026-08
The central Sahel's humanitarian crisis is not a side-effect of the war; it is the medium the war is fought in. Blockades, sieges, road insecurity and communal violence produce the displacement, hunger and school closures — and the same insecurity blocks the response. Two things about the figures below matter as much as the figures. First, they are agency estimates at regional granularity and they revise often. Second, and more seriously, they are not equally current: Burkina Faso — which hosts roughly three quarters of the region's displaced people — has published no consolidated displacement count since March 2023, so the number still quoted for it in 2026 is three years old. Where that is the case this page says so beside the figure rather than at the bottom of it.
- Region: displaced by end-2026 (projected)~5.7 millionAs of 2026Moderate confidenceUNHCR projection for the central Sahel, Mauritania and the coastal states of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, up from 4 million at 30 Sep 2025. Includes refugees and stateless people, not IDPs alone
- Burkina Faso: internally displaced2.1 millionAs of 2023-03Low confidenceTHE LATEST AVAILABLE OFFICIAL FIGURE, NOT A CURRENT MEASUREMENT. No consolidated displacement count has been published since March 2023. It is still widely quoted against 2026 datelines — OCHA's April 2026 Sahel overview carries it unchanged — and it is three years old. Two partial readings exist beside it and cannot be reconciled with it: IOM's 2025 tracking put the displaced near two million, and the national emergency council reported more than 1.1 million returns to areas of origin by October 2025. Read this as the last established count rather than today's
- Burkina Faso: new displacement per year~400,000 (2025)As of 2025Low confidenceRegistered by the rapid-response coordination platform, similar to 2024 and down from roughly 700,000/year in 2022–2023. A flow figure, not a stock — it cannot be added to or substituted for the 2023 total
- Burkina Faso: people in need4.5 million (1.2m targeted)As of 2026Moderate confidenceOCHA. The reduction against prior years follows a change of targeting methodology based on accessible zones, which OCHA states does not indicate improvement — the same caveat that applies to Mali's figures
- Mali: people in need5.1 millionAs of 2026High confidenceOCHA 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan. Down more than 20% on 2025 — a change of METHODOLOGY, which OCHA states is not a reflection of any improvement in conditions
- Mali: people targeted for response3.8 millionAs of 2026High confidenceagainst a US$577.9m requirement; requirement, people in need and people targeted each fell by more than 20% on the same methodological revision
- Mali: internally displaced~414,500As of 2026-02Moderate confidenceIOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, February 2026, about ten per cent above February 2025; ~58% children. Registration-based — undercounts unregistered movement, and predates the April–May 2026 offensives
- Mali: displaced in total, inside and outside737,000+As of 2026-08Moderate confidenceA different population from the IDP figure above, not a revision of it — it counts Malians displaced outside the country as well as within
- Mali: acute food insecurity1.56 million peopleAs of 2026Moderate confidenceprojected for 2026; pockets of famine-like conditions reported in the north
- Mali: severe child malnutrition227,000+ childrenAs of 2026Moderate confidenceOCHA projection
- Mali: 2025 appeal funded~21% of US$771mAs of 2025-12High confidencethe lowest funding rate in ten years
Changed in brief — 2026-08-02 · Humanitarian updated
Civilian pressure, as analytical objects The 6 pressures this module publishes on Sahel, as selectable objects. Each carries its present condition where the module states one, its own figures, the module's analysis of it and — where the corpus establishes one — the mechanism by which security conditions reach it.Interrogate Sahel in Explore
Protection
Civilian protection
Civilians between armed groups, state forces and their partners, and who documents what happens to them.
Food & water
Food security and climate shock
Blockade, market prices and rainfall failure — three routes to the same hunger, only one of which is agricultural.
Health & services
Services under the war
Schools and clinics closed by insecurity rather than destroyed by it, and what that removes from a generation.
Humanitarian access
Humanitarian access
Whether assistance can move at all — the roads, the negotiations and the parties whose consent each depends on.
Assistance & funding
The response and its shortfall
What the appeals ask for, what they receive, and which caseload is cut first when they are not funded.
How the pressures rest on each other The dependencies this module states between its own pressures. A relationship, not a consequence — what a disruption would actually do is an impact chain, and only where the corpus establishes one.
Food security and climate shockBlockade-driven shortages; famine-like pockets reported
rests onHumanitarian access
Services under the warThousands of schools closed; health care intermittent
rests onHumanitarian access
An edge says one pressure rests on another. It is not a failure cascade: it carries no magnitude, no sequence and no timing, and nothing here says what happens when a pressure is disrupted. Where the corpus establishes that, it is an impact chain with its own stages and its own per-step basis grades, linked from the pressure itself.
The full picture8 blocks of analysis and 11 dated figures, filed under the pressures above — the module’s own words, with their own vintages
Everything below is authored on this module’s humanitarian record. Figures carry the vintage of the release that produced them, not the date of this page: the section is graded Moderate confidence and its data is stated as of 2026-08.
Displacement across three statesDisplacement
Current conditionDisplacement continuing; Burkina Faso count dates from 2023As of 2026-08
Roughly three quarters of the central Sahel's displaced are in Burkina Faso, whose consolidated count was last published in March 2023.
Where the displaced actually are, how well each state counts them, and what a suspended registration does to the number.
Assessed as of 2026-08never reviewed as an object
Dependencies
Ground:Inner Niger Delta and the central beltThe Liptako-Gourma borderlandsNorthern desert and Saharan belt
Movements — named areas, never routes
- Internal displacementConflict-affected regions of Burkina Faso to Elsewhere in Burkina Faso2.1 million · for 2023-03 · Low confidence — The last consolidated count, from March 2023; the 2025 flow of about 400,000 is a different measure and is not added to it.
- Internal displacementNorthern and central Mali to Elsewhere in Mali~414,500 · for 2026-02 · Moderate confidence — Registration-based, and predates the April–May 2026 offensives.
- Across a borderMali to Mauritania, Niger and Burkina FasoNo figure · 2026-08 — No separate refugee figure is published here; the 737,000+ total counts Malians displaced inside and outside the country together.
What would change this
- Displacement from the northWhether the 2026 fighting around Kidal, Anéfis and Ménaka produces sustained outflows toward Mauritania, Niger and Algeria.
| Indicator | Value | As of | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Region: displaced by end-2026 (projected)UNHCR projection for the central Sahel, Mauritania and the coastal states of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, up from 4 million at 30 Sep 2025. Includes refugees and stateless people, not IDPs alone Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ | ~5.7 million | 2026 | Moderate confidence |
| Burkina Faso: internally displacedTHE LATEST AVAILABLE OFFICIAL FIGURE, NOT A CURRENT MEASUREMENT. No consolidated displacement count has been published since March 2023. It is still widely quoted against 2026 datelines — OCHA's April 2026 Sahel overview carries it unchanged — and it is three years old. Two partial readings exist beside it and cannot be reconciled with it: IOM's 2025 tracking put the displaced near two million, and the national emergency council reported more than 1.1 million returns to areas of origin by October 2025. Read this as the last established count rather than today's Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ | 2.1 million | 2023-03 | Low confidence |
| Burkina Faso: new displacement per yearRegistered by the rapid-response coordination platform, similar to 2024 and down from roughly 700,000/year in 2022–2023. A flow figure, not a stock — it cannot be added to or substituted for the 2023 total Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ | ~400,000 (2025) | 2025 | Low confidence |
| Mali: internally displacedIOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, February 2026, about ten per cent above February 2025; ~58% children. Registration-based — undercounts unregistered movement, and predates the April–May 2026 offensives Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ | ~414,500 | 2026-02 | Moderate confidence |
| Mali: displaced in total, inside and outsideA different population from the IDP figure above, not a revision of it — it counts Malians displaced outside the country as well as within Sources: UNHCR operational data (Mali situation)↗ | 737,000+ | 2026-08 | Moderate confidence |
Where the displaced actually are, and how well it is counted
As of 2026-08
Roughly three quarters of the central Sahel's internally displaced people are in Burkina Faso — which is also the country whose figures are least current. Its consolidated count has not been officially updated since March 2023, when it stood at 2.1 million; that number is still quoted against 2026 datelines and is three years old. What has continued is flow data: about 400,000 newly displaced registered in 2025, similar to 2024, down from roughly 700,000 a year in 2022–2023. A falling flow against an unmeasured stock cannot be read as improvement, and this module does not read it that way. Mali's figures, by contrast, are current but measure two different populations — about 415,000 registered internally displaced, and more than 737,000 displaced inside and outside the country. Niger's displacement is not yet covered here at all. The honest summary is that the region's largest displacement crisis is its least well counted.
Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ · UNHCR operational data (Mali situation)↗
Displacement in Mali
As of 2026-08
Displacement is concentrated in the northern and central regions and moves with the fighting: the 2026 offensives displaced people from Kidal, Ménaka and the Mopti countryside, while earlier waves from the Ménaka region fled Islamic State Sahel's campaigns. Malian refugees have crossed into Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso — countries facing their own crises. Two figures are published on this page and they are not alternatives: roughly 415,000 people are registered as internally displaced, while more than 737,000 Malians are reported displaced inside and outside the country. The gap is the refugee population and the limits of registration, and reading either number alone understates or misattributes the movement. Mali's displaced are in turn a fraction of the central Sahel's ~2.8 million, which is itself the point: this is one regional emergency, not three national ones.
Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ · UNHCR operational data (Mali situation)↗
Recorded events:April 2026 offensive — Kidal falls, the defence minister is killed25 Apr – May 2026The encirclement of Djibo begins16 – 17 Feb 2022
Parties:Mali (transition)Burkina Faso (transition)Niger (CNSP)JNIMIS Sahel
Civilian protectionProtection
Current conditionCivilians targeted from several directions at onceAs of 2026-08
Civilians between armed groups, state forces and their partners, and who documents what happens to them.
Assessed as of 2026-08never reviewed as an object
Civilian protection
As of 2026-08
Civilians are targeted from several directions at once: jihadist attacks and blockades; Islamic State Sahel's massacres in the tri-border zone; communal militia violence and reprisal, as at Ogossagou; and documented abuses in state and Russian-partnered operations, of which Moura in 2022 remains the gravest. Contested drone strikes near Tinzaouatène have added a further category. Air strikes are now the growing part of that file: an investigation published on 31 July 2026 reported that Africa Corps strikes on the village of Kyrnia, in the Mopti region, on 15 June 2026 killed eight civilians including three children, at a village chief's residence and a cattle market. The pattern the case illustrates matters beyond the incident — treating an armed group's presence in or control of a settlement as sufficient grounds to strike civilian locations within it. Legal characterisations of individual strikes are recorded as the findings of the organisations that make them; official investigations into these cases are rare. No party to this war is a clean actor in it.
Sources: Human Rights Watch investigations↗ · Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect — country monitoring↗ · ACLED conflict data & analysis↗
Recorded events:Ogossagou massacre and the communal spiral23 Mar 2019A second documented Africa Corps civilian-harm case, and a second non-response20 August 2026A geolocated casework of Malian drone strikes describes a recurring pattern16 Sep 2026
Analytical Notes:Africa Corps in the Sahel: what changed, what did not
Parties:JNIMIS SahelFAMaRussia (Sahel role)Burkina Faso (transition)
Food security and climate shockFood & water
Current conditionBlockade-driven shortages; famine-like pockets reportedAs of 2026
Blockade, market prices and rainfall failure — three routes to the same hunger, only one of which is agricultural.
Assessed as of 2026never reviewed as an object
How conditions reach this
Road insecurity → market supply → hunger and service collapse
Hunger in Mali is a logistics problem before it is a harvest problem — and the same insecurity that causes it blocks the response.
- Affected area or system Confirmed
- Access or service disruption Confirmed
- Civilian condition Confirmed
- Broader humanitarian significance Plausible exposure
Dependencies
Rests on:Humanitarian access
Physical systems:Mali's fuel import corridors
Runs on:Import corridors
What would change this
- Blockade and food pricesFuel availability drives transport costs, which drive food prices in Bamako, Ségou and Kayes. Watch price series and market supply, not just attack counts.
| Indicator | Value | As of | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mali: acute food insecurityprojected for 2026; pockets of famine-like conditions reported in the north Sources: World Food Programme assessments↗ | 1.56 million people | 2026 | Moderate confidence |
| Mali: severe child malnutritionOCHA projection Sources: World Food Programme assessments↗ | 227,000+ children | 2026 | Moderate confidence |
Food security
As of 2026
Hunger here is a logistics problem before it is a harvest problem. The fuel blockade raised transport costs and cut market supply nationwide; road insecurity strands harvests away from the towns that need them; village blockades in the Niono and Mopti areas cut farmers from fields at planting and harvest. Pockets of famine-like conditions have been reported in northern areas, and malnutrition rates are worst among the displaced.
Sources: World Food Programme assessments↗ · UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗
Climate shocks
As of 2026
Rainfall variability, drought and flooding compound every other pressure, and the farmer–herder competition they sharpen is one of the insurgency's oldest recruiting grounds. Climate is not a separate crisis here — it is an accelerant of the conflict's existing fault lines.
Sources: World Food Programme assessments↗
Recorded events:JNIM declares a national fuel blockadeSep 2025 – ongoing
Parties:JNIMMali (transition)
Services under the warHealth & services
Current conditionThousands of schools closed; health care intermittentAs of 2026
Schools and clinics closed by insecurity rather than destroyed by it, and what that removes from a generation.
Assessed as of 2026never reviewed as an object
Services under the war
As of 2026
Thousands of schools have closed across the central and northern regions, from direct threats, teacher displacement and insecurity — a generation's education traded for the war's duration. Health facilities in contested areas run intermittently or not at all, on supply chains that depend on the same roads everything else does.
Humanitarian accessHumanitarian access
Current conditionAccess is the binding constraintAs of 2026
Whether assistance can move at all — the roads, the negotiations and the parties whose consent each depends on.
Assessed as of 2026-04never reviewed as an object
Dated changes
- 2026-04-27 · ClosureThe Labbezanga border post on the Mali–Niger river crossing was reported vacated during the April offensive withdrawals and then occupied by Islamic State Sahel.Moderate confidence · Sources: ACLED conflict data & analysis↗ · Established international media reporting
- 2023-07 · ClosureThe Gaya–Malanville bridge between Niger and Benin closed after the coup; Benin's commitment to reopen it in June 2026 produced no date.High confidence · Sources: Established international media reporting
Dependencies
Rested on by:Food security and climate shockServices under the war
Physical systems:Mali's fuel import corridorsBurkina Faso's import corridorsNiger's import corridors
Runs on:Import corridors
What would change this
- Access negotiationWhether agencies can keep negotiating passage with armed groups as control fragments further — the difference between a counted crisis and an invisible one.
Humanitarian access
As of 2026
Access is the binding constraint. Roads are mined and ambushed, armed groups tax or block movement, and authorisation regimes are slow; agencies negotiate passage with whoever holds each stretch of road. Access constraints also mean the figures on this page are floors, not ceilings — the least reachable areas are the least counted. This module deliberately maps humanitarian data at broad regional level only.
Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ · ACLED conflict data & analysis↗
Recorded events:JNIM declares a national fuel blockadeSep 2025 – ongoing
Parties:JNIMIS SahelMali (transition)
The response and its shortfallAssistance & funding
Current conditionLeast-funded major response; Mali's 2025 appeal ~21% fundedAs of 2025-12
What the appeals ask for, what they receive, and which caseload is cut first when they are not funded.
Assessed as of 2026-06never reviewed as an object
Dependencies
Physical systems:Mali's fuel import corridors
What would change this
- The funding gapThe 2025 appeal drew ~21% of requirements. Watch whether 2026 funding improves, and what agencies cut when it does not.
| Indicator | Value | As of | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso: people in needOCHA. The reduction against prior years follows a change of targeting methodology based on accessible zones, which OCHA states does not indicate improvement — the same caveat that applies to Mali's figures Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ | 4.5 million (1.2m targeted) | 2026 | Moderate confidence |
| Mali: people in needOCHA 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan. Down more than 20% on 2025 — a change of METHODOLOGY, which OCHA states is not a reflection of any improvement in conditions Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ | 5.1 million | 2026 | High confidence |
| Mali: people targeted for responseagainst a US$577.9m requirement; requirement, people in need and people targeted each fell by more than 20% on the same methodological revision Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ | 3.8 million | 2026 | High confidence |
| Mali: 2025 appeal fundedthe lowest funding rate in ten years Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ | ~21% of US$771m | 2025-12 | High confidence |
The response and what the shortfall removes
As of 2026-06
The central Sahel is the least-funded major response of its decade. Mali's 2025 appeal closed at about 21 per cent of US$771 million, the lowest rate in ten years, and the Sahel as a whole received about 29 per cent of what was asked; the 2026 Mali plan asks for US$577.9 million for 3.8 million people, a smaller figure produced by a methodology that counts accessible zones, which OCHA states is not an improvement. The shortfall is not spread evenly; it is applied. WFP reports having to prioritise further in 2026, removing more than 200,000 people from assistance in Mali, and reduced rations have coincided with a sharp rise in the population in crisis-level hunger since 2023. The order of cuts follows the funding: general food assistance outside the worst-affected areas first, then nutrition and school feeding, with the displaced in the north and centre protected longest because they are reachable and counted. The withdrawal of Western development finance after the coups and the 2025 contraction in United States humanitarian funding fell on the same population, which is why this module reads the appeal figure as a floor for the response rather than a measure of the need.
Sources: UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel)↗ · World Food Programme assessments↗
What this does not establish
- 2026 funding coverage is not yet published as a consolidated mid-year figure for either Mali or Burkina Faso; the ration and prioritisation figures are agency statements rather than a coverage series.
Recorded events:Mali expels MINUSMAJun – Dec 2023
Parties:Mali (transition)Burkina Faso (transition)Niger (CNSP)MINUSMA
Evidence and grading
- Figures
- Agency estimates on their own revision cycles. Each figure carries the date it is for; nothing on this surface averages, totals or compares across two vintages.
- Confidence
- How well established Vigil considers this assessment to be. It is not a measure of how severe the situation is.