What this actor is
The military authorities formed by the July 2023 coup, under General Abdourahamane Tiani — the AES state that expelled both French and American forces, nationalised its uranium, and in August 2026 faced an armed mutiny inside its own capital.
Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-08-30Reviewed 2026-08-30
Political architecture
As of 2026-08The presidential guard deposed President Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023 and established the Conseil national pour la sauvegarde de la patrie (CNSP) under General Abdourahamane Tiani. National Consultations ran in Niamey from 15 to 19 February 2025 with 716 delegates; on 26 March 2025 Tiani signed and promulgated a Charter of Refoundation replacing the constitution, was sworn in for a five-year transition, and all political parties were dissolved. The Charter names three institutions: the CNSP as guarantor of the transition, a Government of the Refoundation as the executive, and a Consultative Council of the Refoundation as its political advisory body. Unlike Mali's charter revision and Burkina Faso's assembly extension, this was presented as a founding document rather than an amendment — the transition is not framed as temporary at all.
The departure of Western forces
As of 2026-08Niger expelled both of its principal Western security partners inside a year. The junta ordered US forces out in March 2024; withdrawal began on 19 May, American forces left Air Base 101 in Niamey on 7 July and Air Base 201 at Agadez on 5 August, and the process completed on the mutually agreed date of 15 September 2024. Air Base 201 had cost about US$110 million and was described by the US Air Force as the largest Air Force-led construction project in its history, built for drone operations and Nigerien force training. Russian trainers arrived at Air Base 101 in May 2024, while American troops were still present there.
Security posture
As of 2026-08- Principal theatreTillabéri and Tahoua in the west — the Liptako borderlands with Mali and Burkina FasoSecurity partnerRussia, co-located with the AES joint command at Base 101 in NiameyRegional stanceAES confederation; ECOWAS exit final Jan 2025Open pressureCohesion inside the army itself, after the August 2026 mutiny
Pressures
As of 2026-08Tillabéri recorded the highest number of civilian fatalities from attacks of any area in the central Sahel in 2025, and the reported perpetrator ranking places Islamic State Sahel first, the Nigerien military second and JNIM third — a state ranking above a jihadist coalition in killings of civilians on its own territory. The Benin border closure has cut the country's principal import route since July 2023. The uranium sector, its most valuable export, is in open legal conflict with its French operator and with an international tribunal. And on 29 August 2026 soldiers from units that had taken heavy casualties in the west attacked the capital.
The August 2026 mutiny
As of 2026-08-30On 29–30 August 2026 mutinous soldiers attacked the Diori Hamani International Airport, the presidential palace, the state broadcaster and Base 101 — the air force base that hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command. State media described hundreds of disaffected soldiers; reporting indicates the mutineers included troops from Niamey and from Ouallam, Téra and Dosso, localities where the army has sustained heavy losses. Government forces retook Base 101; General Salifou Modi said on state television that the situation was under control, and dozens of soldiers were shown paraded afterwards. Casualty and arrest totals have not been established. Reporting attributes aerial and ground support to Russian Africa Corps personnel, but no official statement from either government has been identified, and Russian personnel were themselves reportedly captured during the attack. Vigil records the event and its ambiguities and draws no conclusion about what it demonstrates.
Objectives
What the actor says, kept apart from what Vigil assesses. Each stated entry cites where the position was made; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.
Stated by the actor
Sovereignty and "refoundation": the March 2025 Charter replaced the constitution, dissolved the parties and installed a five-year transition presented as a founding order rather than an interim one.
As of 2025-03 Sources: Official government statements · Established international media reporting
Security partnership with Russia and the AES in place of the Western presence expelled in 2024, with the AES joint command and the Russian contingent co-located at Base 101 in Niamey.
As of 2026-08 Sources: Official government statements · Established international media reporting
Resource sovereignty over uranium: nationalisation of SOMAÏR announced in June 2025 and a declared intention to sell the stockpiled uranium despite an arbitral order not to.
As of 2026-08 Sources: Official government statements · Established international media reporting
Assessed by Vigil
The governing objective is regime survival inside an army that is the transition's only institution: the August 2026 mutiny came from units that had taken the war's heaviest losses in the west, and the leadership's response was to hold the capital's bases with Russian help rather than to change the war.
Confidence: Moderate Sources: Established international media reporting · ACLED conflict data & analysis↗ · International Crisis Group↗
Sovereignty is pursued as rupture — with ECOWAS, France, the United States, Benin, Orano — and each rupture has raised the cost of the imports and revenue the state runs on; the pattern is consistent across files and is not incidental.
Confidence: Moderate Sources: International Crisis Group↗ · World Bank country data (Mali)↗ · Established international media reporting
Constraints
What limits this actor's options, with the kind of limit it is.
Tillabéri recorded the highest civilian fatalities from attacks of any area in the central Sahel in 2025, with the Nigerien military ranked second among reported perpetrators; the state's own conduct in its principal theatre recruits for its enemies.
Military Confidence: Moderate Sources: ACLED conflict data & analysis↗ · Human Rights Watch investigations↗
The Benin border has been closed since July 2023 and 70–80 per cent of pre-crisis imports came through Cotonou; the reported public-revenue loss and the higher-cost rerouting through Lomé are the price of the political rupture.
Economic Confidence: Moderate Sources: World Bank country data (Mali)↗ · Established international media reporting
Army cohesion is the open pressure after 29–30 August 2026: a mutiny drawn from the western garrisons attacked the airport, the palace and Base 101, and its casualty and arrest totals are not established.
Institutional Confidence: Moderate Sources: Established international media reporting · Official government statements
The uranium dispute is being conducted in defiance of an ICSID order, which constrains every legal channel through which the stock could be sold at market value.
Legal Confidence: Moderate Sources: Established international media reporting · Official government statements
Sources of leverage
What this actor can bring to bear, and how firmly each is established.
The fourth-largest uranium producer, a pipeline to the Benin coast that both sides have kept running, and membership of a confederation whose other two members share the same enemies.
Confidence: Moderate Sources: World Bank country data (Mali)↗ · Official government statements
What remains unknown
- Internal decision-making, force strength and the terms of the Russian relationship are not documented.
- The August 2026 mutiny's casualty and arrest totals and the Russian role rest on unnamed sources.
Observables — Niger — CNSP Transitional Authorities
Observables, not predictions. Each is something that would change this assessment if it moved.
Escalation
A second mutiny or a purge of the western garrisons
The August events showed where the army's cohesion breaks; a repetition would show whether the response held it.
De-escalation
Reopening of the Benin crossing at Malanville
The one rupture whose reversal both sides have an interest in and neither has made.
Posture as of 2026-08-30Posture reviewed 2026-09-14
Not published for Niger — CNSP Transitional AuthoritiesRed lines
Elsewhere in Sahel
Last reviewed — 2026-08-30