Fuel imports
Mali's fuel import corridors
Three overland routes supply a landlocked state's entire fuel demand — and since September 2025 they have been the target of a declared blockade.
Coverage · Central Sahel
Context, not targeting. These records describe strategic dependence and documented disruption history. The schema has no fields for capacities, schedules, convoy composition, escort arrangements, storage or facility layout.
Supply systems 7 systems Sahel runs on, with 27 documented disruptions between them. Dependence is the strategic fact — a corridor matters because there is no substitute for it.
Fuel imports
The eastern fuel route from Niger into Mali
Nigerien fuel reaching northern Mali by the river road through Labbezanga — a route that worked under joint escort until its border gate left state hands.
General trade
Burkina Faso's import corridors
Four overland routes from four coastal states carry almost everything a landlocked country consumes — and its fuel is stored outside its own borders.
General trade
Niger's import corridors
A landlocked state whose principal route to the sea was closed by politics in 2023 and has been only partly replaced since.
General trade
The AES escort corridor through Burkina Faso
The escorted road on which Burkina Faso and Niger hand convoys to each other at Dori — and on which confederation fuel for Mali has travelled.
Military sustainment
Central Mali sustainment and position regeneration
One hub, a flooded delta and a set of camps that are easier to lose than to put back.
Military sustainment
Northern military sustainment
Every force that has tried to hold the far north has had to hold one desert road — and the 2026 fighting was fought for exactly that.
The corridor system
7 documented systems and 40 nodes, read from the records below. Select a corridor or a node to inspect it; the full record stays one click further on.
Why corridorsOECD and Sahel and West Africa Club research finds that nearly 70% of violent incidents in the region occur within kilometres of major roadways. That is a regional finding about where violence happens, not a measure of any individual corridor here.
One hub, a flooded delta and a set of camps that are easier to lose than to put back.
Garrison and air hub adjoining Mopti — the military key to central Mali, attacked in both 2026 offensives.
In this systemThe central hub: the garrison and airfield beside Mopti, the seat of the central military region, and where the region's roads narrow.
Why it mattersSévaré’s airfield and garrisons make it the hub from which central Mali is held at all; it hosted MINUSMA and now anchors army and Africa Corps operations. Repeated attacks — including July 2026 — target exactly this function.
What to watchAttacks on the garrison perimeter and airfield approaches; whether the hub can keep supporting outlying positions.
Logistics hub Confidence: High As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
The “Venice of Mali” at the Niger–Bani confluence — regional capital of the centre, where the war moved after 2015.
In this systemThe regional centre at the Niger–Bani confluence, where the river and road systems meet and access to the delta is organised.
Why it mattersMopti region is where the insurgency stopped being a northern problem: Katiba Macina’s expansion, communal violence and militia formation made it the deadliest part of Mali for years. JNIM claimed wide control around the city in the April 2026 offensive — a claim to treat as a claim, but the surrounding countryside has long been beyond state administration.
What to watchAccess on the Sévaré–Bamako road; conditions in surrounding cercles; the balance between negotiated local accommodations and fighting.
Major city Confidence: High As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
Town on the eastern edge of the Niger floodplain, about 60 km north-east of Mopti, where the road from Sévaré to Gao leaves the delta — the point that brought France into the war in 2013.
In this systemWhere the road from Sévaré to Gao leaves the floodplain — the junction between the central hub and the northern axis, and the point a column moving north passes first.
Why it mattersKonna is where the central hub's road network stops being a delta road and becomes the northern axis. A jihadist column took the town on 10 January 2013 and moved on Sévaré, and France intervened within hours: the whole post-2013 shape of the war begins at this junction. It remains a working part of the same geography. On 4 July 2026 the army said it had repelled an attack here, and at Somadougou, with help from Africa Corps — one of the attacks that week that did not produce a lost position.
What to watchWhether attacks on Konna and the Mopti–Douentza road recur; whether the junction stays passable without escort; whether a position here is ever given up rather than defended.
Contested / high-pressure town Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Village in the Ténenkou cercle whose army camp has been attacked five times since 2019 and was left empty after the assault of 10 September 2026.
In this systemA delta camp roughly 130 km west-north-west of Sévaré in a straight line, attacked five times since 2019 and left empty after September 2026.
Why it mattersDioura is the clearest case in the module of a position the state keeps re-garrisoning and does not keep. Its camp was raided in 2019, overrun by northern movements in 2023, taken and looted by JNIM in May 2025, and attacked again on 10 September 2026 in what security sources described to AFP as one of the heaviest single losses the Malian army has taken in the war. On each occasion the attackers withdrew rather than stayed. What changed in 2026 is the aftermath: no relief column was sent, the camp was reported emptied of its weaponry, and on 21 September, eleven days after the assault, RFI reported no Malian soldier and no Africa Corps member at the site.
What to watchWhether the state re-establishes a position at or near Dioura; whether the vacated ground is administered by anyone; whether comparable delta camps are given up on the same pattern.
Contested / high-pressure town Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The great irrigation zone of the Ségou region — Mali’s rice bowl, under insurgent pressure since 2020.
In this systemThe head of the Office du Niger, on the south-western approach to the delta, where the irrigation zone and the insurgency's village-level pressure occupy the same ground.
Why it mattersThe Office du Niger scheme feeds a large share of the country. Katiba Macina’s sieges of villages such as Farabougou and taxation of the zone showed how the insurgency converts agricultural dependence into leverage — food security and counterinsurgency are the same problem here.
What to watchHarvest and planting-season security; village sieges; rice prices in Bamako and Ségou.
Agricultural region · broad Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-06 Show on the map →
Junction town on the RN16 between Mopti and Gao — the hinge between central and northern Mali.
In this systemThe eastern end of the central road, toward the Gourma and the Burkinabè border belt.
Why it mattersDouentza controls the only paved road linking the centre to Gao and the north. Whoever pressures Douentza pressures every northern garrison’s land supply — which is why the town has changed hands, hosted every force in the war, and remains chronically insecure.
What to watchConvoy interdiction on the Sévaré–Gao axis; JNIM checkpoints; garrison status.
Contested / high-pressure town Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-06 Show on the map →
Regional capital on the road from Ségou to Mopti — its garrison camp attacked in August 2026, with two irreconcilable accounts of the outcome.
In this systemThe garrison town on the road from Ségou to Sévaré that every column into the centre passes; its camp was attacked in August 2026. Added 2026-09-26.
Why it mattersSan sits on the road that connects Bamako to the central hub at Sévaré, the line every relief into central Mali has to travel. Its gendarmerie and police station were attacked on the night of 14 October 2025, and on 9 August 2026 JNIM attacked the camp of the army regiment garrisoned here: the army said the attack was repelled, while JNIM published video from inside the compound and claimed control of it. San was made a region of its own in the 2023 reorganisation.
What to watchFurther attacks on the camp; the Ségou–San–Sévaré road; whether either account of 9 August is settled.
Contested / high-pressure town Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The southern trade route to Côte d’Ivoire’s ports — the second leg of Mali’s import lifeline.
In this systemOne of the two southern import corridors the centre's fuel arrives through before any of it moves north or east.
Why it mattersWith the Dakar route under attack, the Abidjan corridor carries the balance of Mali’s fuel and container trade. Its security across the Sikasso region — and the politics of ECOWAS relations at the border — set the price of everything in Bamako.
What to watchInterdiction south of Bougouni; border-post friction with Côte d’Ivoire; freight rates.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
DependenceNear-total on Sévaré for anything moving inside the centre, and on the southern import corridors for the fuel that makes movement possible at all — the same corridors JNIM has blockaded since September 2025, which makes central sustainment a second-order dependency on the blockade in exactly the way northern sustainment is. Regeneration carries a third dependency the supply question does not: replacement manpower and replacement equipment. The manpower side is a stated government programme — the 2025–2026 action plan announced the recruitment of 15,000 military and 9,000 security personnel and the construction of camps — and the equipment side has run, since 2026, through Russian sealift into West African ports and onward by road, with deliveries via Conakry in March 2026 and via Lomé in July 2026 documented by ship tracking and reporting. Neither channel is published in a form that allows output to be set against loss.
Why it mattersA state that can hold its hubs and cannot rebuild what lies beyond them has a map that shrinks without a defeat being declared anywhere on it. That is a different mechanism from the one the northern record describes, and it produces a different measure: not whether the road is open, but whether the position returns. It also changes what an attack means. An armed group that can make a camp unreplaceable does not have to garrison the ground it took, which is why JNIM's claims of "total control" at Dioura in 2026, at Boulikessi in 2025 and at Dioura again in 2025 were each followed by withdrawal rather than by administration.
Documented pressure
June 2025Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
JNIM overran the Malian and Russian position at Boulikessi in the Douentza cercle on 1 June, looted the barracks, and the base was abandoned on 6 June after a counterattack failed. Around a hundred Malian soldiers were reported killed and twenty-two captured.
April 2026Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
The 25 April offensive struck the central hubs directly — the army camp and the airport at Sévaré, and Mopti — alongside attacks across the country. The hubs were not taken.
July 2026Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Attacks on 4 July reached Sévaré, Konna and Somadougou in the centre, alongside the northern wave. The army said the assaults were repelled, and that Konna and Somadougou were held with Africa Corps support — a rare public acknowledgement of the partnership by the Malian army itself. On 12 July an army logistics convoy of food, fuel and ammunition bound for positions beyond Niono was ambushed on the road to Nampala and trucks were burned.
August 2026Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
JNIM attacked the regiment's camp at San on 9 August. The army said the attack was repelled; JNIM published video from inside the compound and claimed control of it. The two accounts have not been reconciled, and the camp sits on the road every column into the centre uses.
September 2026Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
The camp at Dioura was overrun on 10 September. Sources gave AFP a toll rising over eight days to more than a hundred soldiers killed and between sixty and ninety captured, with five Africa Corps personnel among the dead. Local sources said the attackers returned the next day, that no reinforcements were sent, that the camp was emptied of its weaponry, and that it remained abandoned eight days later.
What disruption doesWhen a central camp is not regenerated, three things follow and only the first is visible. The state's presence in that area ends, without any announcement that it has. The equipment that was in the camp changes hands rather than being destroyed — of 137 visually confirmed Malian equipment losses compiled from the April 2026 fighting, 99 were assessed as captured — so the loss is transferred capability, not only absent capability. And the remaining garrisons in the same area become more isolated, which raises the cost of holding each of them and makes the next decision easier to take the same way.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-09 Reviewed 2026-09-26 Open the full record →
Three overland routes supply a landlocked state's entire fuel demand — and since September 2025 they have been the target of a declared blockade.
Mali’s primary trade artery to the Atlantic through Senegal — fuel lifeline and blockade target.
In this systemThe western route to the Atlantic through Senegal, and the axis on which the heaviest reported tanker losses occurred from late 2025. Published analysis puts 2 to 3 million tonnes a year through this corridor — more than 60% of Mali's import volumes — at roughly 400 trucks a day.
Why it mattersLandlocked Mali imports its fuel, and most of it comes this way. JNIM’s blockade campaign burned hundreds of tankers on this axis from late 2025; whether convoys move on it decides whether Bamako’s lights stay on.
What to watchTanker convoy interdiction; escort operations; Senegalese border traffic volumes.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: High As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
The southern trade route to Côte d’Ivoire’s ports — the second leg of Mali’s import lifeline.
In this systemThe southern route to Côte d'Ivoire's ports, carrying the balance of fuel and container trade as pressure on the Dakar axis increased.
Why it mattersWith the Dakar route under attack, the Abidjan corridor carries the balance of Mali’s fuel and container trade. Its security across the Sikasso region — and the politics of ECOWAS relations at the border — set the price of everything in Bamako.
What to watchInterdiction south of Bougouni; border-post friction with Côte d’Ivoire; freight rates.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
Western regional capital on the Senegal corridor, at the heart of the gold belt — attacked in July 2025.
In this systemThe western regional centre on the Dakar corridor; fuel queues here are one of the reported measures of the blockade's bite.
Why it mattersKayes region carries the Dakar trade lifeline and hosts Mali's biggest industrial gold mines. JNIM's coordinated July 2025 attacks on Kayes and nearby towns announced the war's arrival in the far west, and the subsequent blockade campaign targeted precisely this junction of fuel, trade and gold. The corridor it sits on is not one route among several: the Senegalese and Ivorian axes together are reported to carry close to 95% of Mali's petroleum imports, and the disruption runs in both directions — the Port of Dakar reported a daily backlog of around 120 Mali-bound containers between September and November 2025.
What to watchAttacks on mining-area roads; fuel convoy interdiction on the Dakar corridor, read as tankers burned against tankers escorted through; mine operator security postures.
Major city Confidence: High As of 2026-08 Show on the map →
Rail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes–Dakar corridor, in the belt JNIM began attacking in 2025.
In this systemRail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes stretch. Attacks in its cercle during the 2025 western offensive indicated the campaign targets corridor infrastructure along its length, not only its ends.
Why it mattersKita sits on the western lifeline that carries fuel and trade from Senegal. Its cercle saw attacks during the western offensive of 2025 — evidence the blockade campaign aims at corridor infrastructure, not just the far ends.
What to watchConvoy escorts and interdiction between Kita and Kayes; rail traffic.
Transport chokepoint Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-06 Show on the map →
Mali's second city and its agricultural heartland, astride the corridor to Côte d'Ivoire.
In this systemThe southern regional centre through which the Abidjan corridor runs.
Why it mattersSikasso region grows much of Mali's cotton and food and carries the Abidjan trade artery — the corridor that moved roughly 1.47 million tonnes of goods by the end of 2025 and absorbs volume whenever the Dakar axis is squeezed. Long the least conflict-affected region, its northern districts began seeing JNIM activity as the group pushed south — the clearest measure of how far the insurgency has moved beyond its original geography.
What to watchIncidents on the Bamako–Abidjan corridor; taxation or checkpoint reports in rural districts.
Major city Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-08 Show on the map →
The capital and the war's ultimate political prize — under economic siege since late 2025, its approaches probed by attack in 2026.
In this systemDestination and distribution point for national fuel supply, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Why it mattersEvery campaign in Mali ultimately points at Bamako: JNIM's fuel blockade squeezes it, the April 2026 attacks reached Kati next door, and sabotage has hit its water and power. The city itself remains government-held, but its dependence on road corridors through insecure territory is the government's single greatest vulnerability.
What to watchFuel and food availability; attacks on the Kati–Bamako perimeter and airport; whether corridor convoys keep the city supplied.
Capital Confidence: High As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
DependenceTotal, and concentrated. There is no domestic refining capacity, no pipeline, and no functioning rail alternative at scale — the Dakar–Bamako railway has not operated as a reliable freight route for years. Road import is not the cheapest option; it is the only one. Nor is the dependence evenly spread across the three routes: the Senegalese and Ivorian corridors alone are reported to carry close to 95% of the country's petroleum imports, so the Guinean leg is a margin rather than a substitute. That is why the corridors are a strategic vulnerability rather than a commercial inconvenience, and why convoy interdiction produces national effects within weeks.
Why it mattersThis is the clearest case in the module of an insurgency taxing an entire national economy without taking a city. Fuel sets transport costs, transport costs set food prices, and electricity in the capital depends on the same imports. A campaign against these corridors reaches every household in Mali without a shot being fired near most of them. It also explains where the violence is: OECD and Sahel and West Africa Club research finds that nearly 70% of violent incidents in the region occur within kilometres of major roadways. The corridors are not the background to this conflict system — they are, to a first approximation, its geography.
Documented pressure
June – September 2025Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
A blockade of the Kayes–Nioro axis in the far west, distinct from and earlier than the national campaign declared that September. Reported effects were acute fuel shortages, a slowdown in the gold sector, school closures and embassy evacuations — regional interdiction producing national-scale consequences on one axis, and the demonstration that preceded the countrywide declaration.
September 2025 – early 2026Armed interdiction Confidence: High
JNIM declared a blockade of fuel imports on 3 September 2025 and began systematically burning tanker convoys on the Senegalese, Ivorian and Guinean routes. Over 300 tankers were reported destroyed across the campaign. Satellite imagery showed Bamako visibly darker by late 2025, and from late October convoys moved under military escort — reportedly more than a thousand tankers brought in that way, which is why the corridor was degraded and taxed rather than severed.
Early 2026Mixed or other Confidence: Low
Pressure on the corridors eased, reported as the product of negotiation and heightened military activity. The terms are not established and this entry is graded accordingly; it is recorded because a corridor that has been reopened once has a different risk profile from one that has never been.
April 2026 – ongoingArmed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
A full blockade of Bamako was reimposed on 28 April 2026, three days into the northern offensive, restoring escorted-convoy conditions. Reporting also indicates the campaign extended to the eastern supply route from Niger, which this record does not otherwise represent.
July 2026Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Sabotage affecting the capital's water and power accompanied the second wave of attacks, compounding the supply pressure rather than replacing it.
What disruption doesFuel scarcity raises transport costs across a country where almost everything moves by road. That reaches market food supply, harvest movement, electricity generation in the capital, and the cost of the state's own military logistics — the army's relief columns burn the same imported diesel. The blockade is therefore simultaneously an economic, humanitarian and military fact, which is why three separate impact chains in this module begin here. The consequences do not stop at the border. Mali was Senegal's largest export market in 2024 at about 26.5% of Senegalese exports, roughly US$1.42 billion; between September and November 2025 the Port of Dakar reported a daily backlog of around 120 Mali-bound containers and estimated losses near US$26.5 million a month, with about 4,000 empty containers still stranded in Bamako in February 2026. Mali remained Côte d'Ivoire's largest customer inside the West African monetary union, the Abidjan–Bamako corridor carrying roughly 1.47 million tonnes by end-2025. Interdicting a landlocked state's imports is thus a revenue problem for the coastal states that carry them, which is how this conflict reaches countries that are not party to it.
Confidence: High Status as of 2026-10 Reviewed 2026-10-14 Open the full record →
Every force that has tried to hold the far north has had to hold one desert road — and the 2026 fighting was fought for exactly that.
The desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal — the axis on which the northern war is decided.
In this systemThe desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal. Serval used it in 2013, the army in 2023, and the Africa Corps relief column in July 2026.
Why it mattersEvery force that has tried to hold the far north has had to hold this road: Serval in 2013, the army in 2023, the Africa Corps relief column in July 2026. The Anéfis battle was fought for exactly this corridor, and the ambush at Tabrichat showed how exposed it remains.
What to watchConvoy movement and ambushes; who controls the junctions; whether Kidal can be approached at all.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: High As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
The largest city of the north and the government’s main northern base — attacked in the 2026 offensives but held.
In this systemThe northern logistics base and the anchor of any northern presence.
Why it mattersGao is the anchor of what remains of state presence in the north: the staging point for the Anéfis relief column and the hub the Africa Corps operates from. Jihadist-held in 2012, recaptured by Serval in 2013, it is now the position the JNIM–FLA campaign most needs to isolate.
What to watchWhether Gao stays supplied by road and air; attacks on its perimeter; pressure on the Gao–Kidal and Gao–Ansongo axes.
Major city Confidence: High As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
Garrison and air hub adjoining Mopti — the military key to central Mali, attacked in both 2026 offensives.
In this systemThe central hub covering the Mopti region and the approaches from the south.
Why it mattersSévaré’s airfield and garrisons make it the hub from which central Mali is held at all; it hosted MINUSMA and now anchors army and Africa Corps operations. Repeated attacks — including July 2026 — target exactly this function.
What to watchAttacks on the garrison perimeter and airfield approaches; whether the hub can keep supporting outlying positions.
Logistics hub Confidence: High As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
Crossroads town between Gao and Kidal — besieged by the FLA and JNIM in July 2026, retaken by the army and Africa Corps after six days.
In this systemThe road junction connecting Gao to Kidal and the far north. Whoever cannot pass Anéfis cannot sustain anything beyond it — which is why the July 2026 battle was fought here.
Why it mattersAnéfis controls the road junction that connects Gao to Kidal and the far north. After Kidal fell in April 2026 it became the government’s forward position in the Kidal region; the July siege, convoy ambush and recapture made it the test of whether either side can hold ground beyond its strongholds.
What to watchWhether the garrison stays supplied overland; renewed FLA–JNIM pressure; the army’s ability to project beyond the town.
Contested / high-pressure town Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
The political heart of the Azawad movements — retaken by the army in 2023, lost to the FLA in April 2026, and re-entered by the army and Africa Corps on 6 October 2026 after the FLA withdrew.
In this systemThe northern terminus of the axis and the far north's political centre; held by the state 2023–2026, taken by the FLA in April 2026.
Why it mattersWhoever holds Kidal holds the symbol of the northern question. The army’s November 2023 recapture was the junta’s signature victory; the FLA’s April 2026 seizure reversed it and re-opened the entire northern settlement. The army came back on 6 October 2026 without a battle for the town, as the FLA withdrew into the surrounding desert, calling the withdrawal temporary. Its status is the single clearest indicator of where the war stands.
What to watchWhether the army holds the town and supplies it by road; any move on Tessalit; an FLA or JNIM return; whether administration and residents come back to a town most had left.
Contested / high-pressure town Confidence: High As of 2026-10-06 Show on the map →
Far-northern town near the Algerian border, vacated by government and Russian forces at the end of April 2026 and entered by the FLA.
In this systemFar-northern border town, reportedly evacuated by government and Russian forces in the April 2026 withdrawals.
Why it mattersTessalit’s airstrip and border position made it strategically prized through every phase of the war. Africa Corps and the army were reported to be withdrawing from 27 April 2026, and by 1 May video verified by Reuters showed FLA fighters raising their flag in the town — the same days as the withdrawals from Kidal, Tessit and Ber and the Africa Corps pull-out from Aguelhok, a contraction across three northern regions rather than a single defeat, and one that left the far north largely to the Azawad movements, reversing the post-2023 military map. No return has been reported since.
What to watchWho administers the town and airstrip; whether the Mali–Algeria reset changes border dynamics here.
Contested / high-pressure town Confidence: Low As of 2026-08 Show on the map →
DependenceNear-total on the Gao–Anéfis–Kidal axis. Gao is the logistics base for the north and Sévaré the hub for the centre; both sit at the end of supply lines that themselves depend on imported fuel arriving through the southern corridors. Northern sustainment is therefore a second-order dependency on the same fuel imports JNIM is blockading — the two logistics systems in this module are connected, not parallel.
Why it mattersMali's war is decided on roads, not in cities. A garrison that cannot be supplied overland is a garrison that will eventually be withdrawn or lost, which is what the reported negotiated withdrawals from Tessalit and the far north in April 2026 demonstrated. Reading the northern conflict as a contest over towns misses the mechanism; reading it as a contest over sustainment explains both the 2023 recapture of Kidal and its 2026 reversal.
Documented pressure
November 2023Armed interdiction Confidence: High
Drone-supported government and Wagner forces used the axis to retake Kidal — the demonstration that the corridor works when the state can commit to it.
July 2024Armed interdiction Confidence: High
A Malian–Wagner column was routed at Tinzaouatène in Wagner's heaviest publicly documented African defeat, with JNIM claiming a role — the first clear signal that the corridor could be closed against a committed force.
June 2025Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
The FLA ambushed a Malian army and Africa Corps logistics convoy moving from Anéfis to Aguelhok near Anoumalane on 13 June. The army confirmed the attack; the FLA claimed more than twenty vehicles destroyed — the heaviest reported blow on the axis since Tinzaouatène.
April 2026Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Government and Russian forces withdrew from the far north, reportedly under negotiated terms, as the FLA took Kidal. The axis north of Anéfis ceased to be a state sustainment route.
July 2026Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Fighters besieged the Anéfis base and ambushed a relief convoy near Tabrichat, downing an Mi-24, before a second column broke through and the army announced the town retaken on 10 July. On 18 July the convoy returning from Anéfis to Gao was ambushed near Tabankort, in an attack JNIM and the FLA both claimed.
What disruption doesWhen the axis is contested, state presence in the far north contracts to what can be reached and held, regardless of what any control map shows. That is the mechanism behind the module's central caution that an attack near a place is not possession of it, and that Anéfis changed hands twice in a week.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-07 Reviewed 2026-09-26 Open the full record →
The escorted road on which Burkina Faso and Niger hand convoys to each other at Dori — and on which confederation fuel for Mali has travelled.
The escorted road linking Burkina Faso's convoy hubs to western Niger — the AES states' own supply route between each other.
In this systemThe generalised corridor marker; never a route line.
Why it mattersThis is the corridor on which Burkina Faso and Niger hand convoys to each other at Dori, used during the 2023 sanctions and described by Niger's state press as part of the Lomé–Kaya–Dori–Niamey route. It is the one physical expression of the confederation's supply solidarity: in November 2025 a Nigerien fuel convoy bound for Bamako was attacked between Dori and Ouagadougou and part of it held at Kaya. Feeder roads from Dori to the besieged Liptako towns branch off it. Attacks on convoys on this road and its feeders are counted at this marker.
What to watchAttacks on escorted convoys between Kaya, Dori and Téra; whether AES convoys to Mali use it again.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Burkina Faso's capital and the political centre of the AES's most repressive transition.
In this systemBurkina Faso's capital and the road's western end.
Why it mattersOuagadougou holds what the state still governs securely: the institutions, the corridor terminus and the officer corps that has produced two coups and governs through the second. It is also where the confederation does much of its institutional work — the AES experts' workshop on a common position toward ECOWAS met here in June 2026. The city itself is not contested; the country around it increasingly is.
What to watchCoup announcements and what they indicate about cohesion in the army; the corridor to Abidjan and Lomé; whether pressure reaches the capital's approaches as it has in Mali.
Capital Confidence: High As of 2026-08 Show on the map →
Capital of the Centre-Nord (Kuilsé since the July 2025 reform) — the convoy staging point between Ouagadougou and the besieged north and east.
In this systemWhere convoys are formed and held.
Why it mattersKaya is the rear end of the roads this conflict is fought over in Burkina Faso. Convoys for Dori and the Nigerien border are formed and held here, and when a Nigerien fuel convoy bound for Bamako was attacked between Dori and Ouagadougou in November 2025, part of it was held at Kaya. The army base at Dargo in the same region was overrun on 28 July 2025. Kaya marks where the state's secure road network ends and escorted movement begins; attacks on positions in the region with no marker of their own are counted here and the record names the place.
What to watchConvoys held at or formed in Kaya; attacks on the Kaya–Dori road; attacks on positions in the Centre-Nord.
Transport chokepoint Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Regional capital of Burkina Faso's Sahel region (Liptako since the July 2025 reform) and the hand-off point of the escort corridor between Burkina Faso and Niger.
In this systemWhere Burkinabè and Nigerien escorts hand over, and the origin of the feeder convoys to the besieged Liptako towns.
Why it mattersDori is where two states' supply systems meet. In August 2023, during the ECOWAS sanctions on Niger, Burkinabè forces escorted a convoy of about 300 trucks from Kaya to Dori and Nigerien forces took it on from there; Niger's state press later described the route as the Lomé–Kaya–Dori–Niamey corridor. It is also the gateway to the besieged towns of the Liptako — Gorom-Gorom and Sebba — and the escorted supply convoy for Gorom-Gorom that left it was attacked on 28 July 2025.
What to watchAttacks on convoys leaving Dori for the besieged towns; whether the Niger–Burkina escort hand-off is used again; pressure on the town itself.
Logistics hub Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Western Niger's garrison town on the Burkina Faso border — the Nigerien end of the escort corridor, and a named origin of the August 2026 mutineers.
In this systemThe Nigerien entry town.
Why it mattersTéra is where the Burkina–Niger escort route enters Niger, and the department around it is where JNIM has pressed hardest on Niger's positions: the gendarmerie position at Garbougna in November 2025, the army engineer camp there in May 2026 and the National Guard post at Diagourou in June 2026. Reporting on the August 2026 mutiny in Niamey named units from Téra among those involved. Attacks on positions elsewhere in Téra department are counted at this marker, and the record names the place.
What to watchAttacks on the department's posts; ambushes on the Bankilaré–Téra road; cohesion of the units drawn from here.
Contested / high-pressure town Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Niger's capital — seat of the CNSP, host of the AES joint command and the Russian Africa Corps, and attacked twice in 2026.
In this systemThe eastern end.
Why it mattersNiamey is where three of this module's threads meet in one place. It is the political centre of the CNSP transition; Base 101 at its international airport hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command; and it has been attacked twice in one year — by Islamic State Sahel in January 2026, an assault Moscow publicly said its forces helped repel, and by mutinous soldiers of Niger's own army in August, which Moscow says its force put down at the base command's request. The city is the clearest single illustration that the threats to these governments are external and internal at once.
What to watchCohesion inside the army after the August 2026 mutiny; whether a Nigerien account of the request Moscow says Base 101's command made is published; further attacks on the airport perimeter.
Capital Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
DependenceNiger depends on it partly, as one of two roads to Lomé; Mali depends on it occasionally, for Nigerien fuel; the besieged Liptako towns depend on its feeders completely.
Why it mattersThe confederation's mutual-supply commitments exist on paper in Bamako, Niamey and Ouagadougou and on the ground on this road. It is also where the two halves of this module's second activity series meet: the supply convoys attacked on its feeders are the connections between the fixed positions the first series counts. The escorted convoy to Gorom-Gorom attacked near Balliata on 28 July 2025 — the same day the army base at Dargo in the Centre-Nord was overrun — shows both pressures in one day.
Documented pressure
July 2025Armed interdiction Confidence: High
An escorted supply convoy of about a hundred trucks for Gorom-Gorom was attacked near Balliata on the Dori–Gorom-Gorom road on 28 July 2025; trucks were burned and drivers and escort soldiers killed. Human rights researchers and AFP's sources attributed it to Islamic State Sahel.
November 2025Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
The Nigerien fuel convoy bound for Bamako was reported attacked between Dori and Ouagadougou, with part of it held at Kaya; the convoy reached Bamako on 22 November. The day and the scale of the attack were not published.
What disruption doesEvery delay on this road is paid three times: in Niamey's import costs, in the fuel reaching Mali's capital, and in the besieged towns whose only land supply is an escorted feeder. The corridor is the reason the three states' security problems cannot be separated into national ones.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-09 Reviewed 2026-09-26 Open the full record →
Nigerien fuel reaching northern Mali by the river road through Labbezanga — a route that worked under joint escort until its border gate left state hands.
The river road from Niamey through Ayorou and Labbezanga to Gao — the one supply line between two confederation members, closed in practice since April 2026.
In this systemThe generalised corridor marker; never a route line.
Why it mattersEscorted Nigerien fuel convoys reached northern Mali along this road in 2025, handed from Nigerien to Malian escort at the Labbezanga border post. JNIM declared in November 2025 that its blockade covered fuel from Niger, and in April 2026 the state gave up the Labbezanga post, which Islamic State Sahel was reported to occupy. No escorted convoy on the road has been documented since. A convoy attacked on the road would be counted at this marker.
What to watchAny escorted convoy documented on the road again; who holds the Labbezanga crossing; attacks on traffic between Ayorou and Gao.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Niger's capital — seat of the CNSP, host of the AES joint command and the Russian Africa Corps, and attacked twice in 2026.
In this systemOrigin of the convoys and seat of the Nigerien supplier; the Zinder refinery itself lies outside this module's mapped area.
Why it mattersNiamey is where three of this module's threads meet in one place. It is the political centre of the CNSP transition; Base 101 at its international airport hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command; and it has been attacked twice in one year — by Islamic State Sahel in January 2026, an assault Moscow publicly said its forces helped repel, and by mutinous soldiers of Niger's own army in August, which Moscow says its force put down at the base command's request. The city is the clearest single illustration that the threats to these governments are external and internal at once.
What to watchCohesion inside the army after the August 2026 mutiny; whether a Nigerien account of the request Moscow says Base 101's command made is published; further attacks on the airport perimeter.
Capital Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The last Nigerien town on the river road to Gao — the route of Niger's fuel deliveries to northern Mali, and a National Guard camp attacked in 2026.
In this systemThe last Nigerien town on the river road; its National Guard camp was attacked in February 2026.
Why it mattersAyorou lies on the Niamey–Labbezanga–Gao road, the eastern supply leg by which escorted Nigerien fuel convoys reached northern Mali in 2025, handed from Nigerien to Malian escort at the border. Islamic State Sahel briefly occupied the town's National Guard camp on 2 February 2026, and the base at Inates in the same department was overrun in June 2026. Attacks on positions in Ayorou department with no marker of their own are counted here, and the record names the place.
What to watchAttacks on the camp; whether fuel convoys to Mali use the river road again after Labbezanga passed out of state hands in April 2026.
Transport chokepoint Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Border post on the Niger river crossing to Niger — reportedly captured by Islamic State Sahel in the April 2026 offensive.
In this systemWhere the escort passed from Nigerien to Malian forces. Vacated by the state on 27 April 2026 and reportedly occupied by IS-Sahel since.
Why it mattersLabbezanga is the main river crossing between Mali and Niger. The post is reported to have been vacated on 27 April 2026, during the wider withdrawals, and then occupied by IS-Sahel — the group's most visible gain of the offensive period and a direct threat to trade inside the AES space. The sequence matters as much as the outcome: the crossing changed hands because it was given up, not because it was taken, which is the pattern of most of that week.
What to watchWho controls the crossing; traffic on the Gao–Niamey axis; IS-Sahel consolidation in the border strip.
Border crossing Confidence: Low As of 2026-08 Show on the map →
River town south of Gao on the road to Niger, in the belt where JNIM and IS-Sahel compete.
In this systemThe river town between the border and Gao.
Why it mattersThe Ansongo cercle carries the Gao–Niamey axis and sits in the seam between JNIM and IS-Sahel areas of operation — one of the places where the rivalry between the two jihadist projects is fought out, with civilians most exposed.
What to watchJNIM–IS clashes in the cercle; the state of the Gao–Labbezanga road.
Contested / high-pressure town Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-06 Show on the map →
The largest city of the north and the government’s main northern base — attacked in the 2026 offensives but held.
In this systemDestination of the documented convoys and hub of the northern garrisons.
Why it mattersGao is the anchor of what remains of state presence in the north: the staging point for the Anéfis relief column and the hub the Africa Corps operates from. Jihadist-held in 2012, recaptured by Serval in 2013, it is now the position the JNIM–FLA campaign most needs to isolate.
What to watchWhether Gao stays supplied by road and air; attacks on its perimeter; pressure on the Gao–Kidal and Gao–Ansongo axes.
Major city Confidence: High As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
DependencePartial and regional. The north's garrisons and towns around Gao depend on fuel that is expensive and slow to bring from the Atlantic corridors across a blockaded centre, which is what made a short route from Niamey valuable. The capital never depended on it.
Why it mattersThe route is the physical test of the AES states' claim to supply each other. It shows the confederation's logistics at their most literal — two armies handing a convoy across a border — and it shows how thin they are: one road, one border gate, a refinery at Zinder that Niger's own fuel company said in 2026 no longer covers domestic demand, and a gate that passed out of state hands in April 2026 when Malian and Russian troops withdrew from Labbezanga and Islamic State Sahel moved in. JNIM had already declared in November 2025 that its blockade covered fuel trucks coming from Niger. The route therefore has two armed groups astride it rather than one.
Documented pressure
November 2025Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
JNIM announced that its fuel blockade extended to tankers coming from Niger. No attack on a convoy on this route was found in the reporting that followed; the declaration is recorded as a declaration.
April 2026 – ongoingArmed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Malian and Russian troops withdrew from the Labbezanga border post on 27 April 2026 and Islamic State Sahel was reported to have occupied it. No escorted convoy on the route has been documented since.
What disruption doesWith its border gate held by an armed group, the one supply line between two confederation members is closed in practice without either government having closed it, and the north's fuel must come the long way round or not at all. The route's history also qualifies a claim the confederation makes about itself: mutual supply happened, under escort, for most of a year, and then ended with a withdrawal rather than an attack.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-09 Reviewed 2026-09-26 Open the full record →
Four overland routes from four coastal states carry almost everything a landlocked country consumes — and its fuel is stored outside its own borders.
Burkina Faso's principal import artery from the Togolese coast, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country.
In this systemThe largest of the four, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country, from a port that handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and whose transit traffic is 92% bound for AES states.
Why it mattersBurkina Faso imports 98% of its merchandise by sea and moves it inland by road through four corridors; this is the largest of them. The Port of Lomé handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and 92% of its transit traffic is bound for AES states. The country's fuel is held in transit storage outside its own borders, in Lomé among other places, under the SONABHY state monopoly — so a landlocked state's strategic reserve sits on someone else's territory.
What to watchInterdiction on the corridor and its feeder routes; whether the Ghana–Burkina Faso convoy-security arrangement of August 2026 is extended to this axis; fuel availability in Ouagadougou.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-08 Show on the map →
Burkina Faso's capital and the political centre of the AES's most repressive transition.
In this systemDestination and distribution point, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Why it mattersOuagadougou holds what the state still governs securely: the institutions, the corridor terminus and the officer corps that has produced two coups and governs through the second. It is also where the confederation does much of its institutional work — the AES experts' workshop on a common position toward ECOWAS met here in June 2026. The city itself is not contested; the country around it increasingly is.
What to watchCoup announcements and what they indicate about cohesion in the army; the corridor to Abidjan and Lomé; whether pressure reaches the capital's approaches as it has in Mali.
Capital Confidence: High As of 2026-08 Show on the map →
DependenceNear-total, and spread across four foreign jurisdictions rather than concentrated in one. Burkina Faso has no coastline, no domestic refining at scale and no rail link except the Ivorian one; 98% of merchandise arrives by sea and completes its journey by road. The spread is a genuine redundancy — pressure on one corridor can be absorbed by another at higher freight cost — but it is redundancy inside a single structural dependence, and every one of the four routes terminates in a state the country's own government has politically estranged through the ECOWAS exit.
Why it mattersThis is the structural reason a Burkinabè security problem is a West African economic one, and vice versa. A landlocked state that imports almost everything and stores its strategic fuel on four neighbours' territory has no purely national answer to corridor insecurity — which is why, in August 2026, Ghana and Burkina Faso signed a bilateral accord establishing joint patrols and security escorts for convoys carrying petroleum products and cereals on the Tema–Ouagadougou route. It also explains where the violence is: OECD and Sahel and West Africa Club research finds that nearly 70% of violent incidents in the region occur within kilometres of major roadways. The corridors are not the background to this conflict system; to a first approximation they are its geography.
Documented pressure
2022 – ongoingArmed interdiction Confidence: High
Corridor and feeder-route insecurity across the northern and eastern regions, of which the encirclement of Djibo is the extreme case: roads mined, convoys ambushed, and one provincial capital supplied chiefly by air since 2022.
February 2026Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
JNIM killed seven Ghanaian traders at Titao in northern Burkina Faso on 14 February 2026 — an indication that corridor insecurity reaches the nationals of the coastal states whose ports serve the country, not only Burkinabè hauliers.
August 2026Mixed or other Confidence: Moderate
Ghana and Burkina Faso signed a bilateral accord establishing a joint mechanism to secure the Tema–Ouagadougou corridor, with joint patrols and security escorts for convoys carrying petroleum products and cereals. This is a response to disruption rather than a disruption, recorded here because it is the first documented instance in this module of a coastal and a Sahelian state building shared corridor security.
August – September 2026Mixed or other Confidence: Moderate
Ghana's state distributor BOST supplied half of the 80,000 tonnes of fuel Burkina Faso requested for July and August, its managing director told Reuters on 16 September, citing domestic demand. BOST said the next day that lower Sahel exports were due mainly to revamp works at its Bolgatanga depot, its gateway to the Sahel market, that no supply cut had been implemented, and that it was trucking fuel from Tema meanwhile. The two accounts of the cause are not reconciled here.
What disruption doesFuel and freight costs set consumer prices across a country where almost everything moves by road, and where the state's own logistics compete for the same imports. The dependence also runs outward: the coastal states' ports derive substantial transit revenue from this traffic, and the Lomé figure — 92% of its transit traffic bound for AES states — means Togo's port economy is tied to the security of Sahelian roads it does not control. Corridor insecurity is therefore a shared fiscal problem, which is the mechanism behind the 2026 Ghana accord.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-09 Reviewed 2026-10-14 Open the full record →
A landlocked state whose principal route to the sea was closed by politics in 2023 and has been only partly replaced since.
Niger's historic principal import route from the Beninese coast — largely shut since July 2023 and only partly replaced.
In this systemThe historic principal route, carrying 70–80% of imports before 2023 and largely closed since. Its status is political rather than security-driven, which distinguishes it from every other corridor in this module.
Why it mattersBetween 70% and 80% of Niger's imports passed through the Port of Cotonou before the crisis, and Nigerien cargo is around 80% of that port's transit volume — a mutual dependence rather than a one-way one. The closure of the Malanville–Gaya bridge in July 2023, followed by Benin's suspension of transit from August to December that year, collapsed the route. Traffic redirected to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott at higher cost; Niger is reported to have lost 117 billion CFA francs in public revenue. The Niger–Benin oil pipeline to the Sème-Kpodji terminal still runs intermittently, because neither side has gained by dismantling it.
What to watchWhether the border reopens and on what terms; throughput shifting back from Lomé; the pipeline's operating status; whether the Kebbi transit route through Nigeria carries meaningful volume.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-08 Show on the map →
Niger's capital — seat of the CNSP, host of the AES joint command and the Russian Africa Corps, and attacked twice in 2026.
In this systemDestination and distribution point for national imports.
Why it mattersNiamey is where three of this module's threads meet in one place. It is the political centre of the CNSP transition; Base 101 at its international airport hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command; and it has been attacked twice in one year — by Islamic State Sahel in January 2026, an assault Moscow publicly said its forces helped repel, and by mutinous soldiers of Niger's own army in August, which Moscow says its force put down at the base command's request. The city is the clearest single illustration that the threats to these governments are external and internal at once.
What to watchCohesion inside the army after the August 2026 mutiny; whether a Nigerien account of the request Moscow says Base 101's command made is published; further attacks on the airport perimeter.
Capital Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The Niger river bridge between Niger and Benin, closed since July 2023 — the place where Niger's principal import route was shut by politics.
In this systemThe Niger river bridge to Benin — the physical closure point of the Cotonou route since July 2023. Added 2026-09-26.
Why it mattersBefore 2023 between 70% and 80% of Niger's imports crossed here from the Port of Cotonou. The bridge was closed after the coup, Benin suspended transit altogether from August to December 2023, and the crossing has stayed shut since: Benin and Niger formalised a commitment to reopen it in June 2026, technical talks ended without a date, and traffic still moves by Lomé and Burkina Faso. It is the module's clearest case of a corridor closed by a bilateral dispute rather than by an armed group.
What to watchWhether and when the crossing reopens; the terms; freight shifting back from the Burkina Faso route.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Regional capital on the road from Niamey to the closed Beninese border — where the armed-group map of western Niger meets the Nigerian frontier.
In this systemRegional capital on the RN1 between Niamey and the closed crossing. Added 2026-09-26.
Why it mattersDosso lies on the RN1 between Niamey and Gaya, the axis of Niger's historic import route through Cotonou. The region has become a second front: JNIM and Islamic State Sahel fight each other in its northern districts, IS-Sahel claimed its first attack in the region in May 2025, and a gendarmerie camp at Tessa was besieged and looted in August 2026. Reporting on the August 2026 mutiny named units from Dosso among those involved. Attacks on positions in Dosso region are counted at this marker, and the record names the place.
What to watchAttacks on positions in the region; the status of the Gaya–Malanville crossing; armed-group movement across the Nigerian border.
Major city Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The road through Fada N'Gourma and Kantchari to Niamey — since 2023 the principal route of Niger's seaborne imports, run under armed escort.
In this systemThe road from Lomé through Burkina Faso that has carried most of Niger's seaborne imports since 2023, under armed escort. Added 2026-09-26.
Why it mattersWhen Benin closed its border in 2023, traffic for Niger moved to the Port of Lomé and onto this road, which leaves Burkina Faso at Kantchari and enters Niger at Makalondi and Torodi. Humanitarian logistics assessments describe it as the only operational route from Lomé to Niamey and say convoys need escorts. It crosses the east of Burkina Faso, the area of JNIM's heaviest pressure on fixed positions, and the Nigerien base at Makalondi was attacked twice in 2026.
What to watchAttacks on convoys between Fada N'Gourma and Torodi; the escort regime; whether Niger's imports shift back to the Beninese route.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Niger's entry on the road from Burkina Faso — the holding area at Makalondi and the customs post at Torodi, both attacked by JNIM in 2026.
In this systemNiger's entry on that road, opposite Kantchari; the position at Makalondi was overrun by JNIM in February 2026. Added 2026-09-26.
Why it mattersFreight for Niamey from the port of Lomé enters Niger here, crossing from Kantchari to the holding area at Makalondi and the customs post at Torodi. JNIM overran the position at Makalondi on 4 February 2026, the opening attack of its February campaign, attacked positions at Torodi on 30 June 2026 and, according to reporting, killed the Torodi prefect in January. The corridor that replaced Niger's closed Beninese route therefore runs through one of JNIM's most active areas in the country. Attacks on positions in Torodi department are counted at this marker, and the record names the place.
What to watchAttacks on the two towns' positions; whether escorted freight keeps moving through them.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
DependenceTotal for maritime access and, until 2023, heavily concentrated. Niger has no coastline and no domestic refining at the scale of its consumption; the Cotonou route was the overwhelming majority of its import traffic. The redirection to Lomé and the Atlantic ports proved that alternatives exist, at materially higher cost and over longer distances — the practical measure of which is the reported 117 billion CFA francs in lost public revenue. The reopened Kebbi transit route through Nigeria is a partial alternative whose carried volume is not established.
Why it mattersNiger is the case that separates corridor risk from insurgent risk. Mali's corridors are interdicted by an armed group; Burkina Faso's are threatened by one; Niger's principal route was closed by a bilateral political dispute and has stayed shut for three years. The consequences look similar — higher costs, longer routes, lost revenue — and the remedies are entirely different. It also demonstrates how little the ECOWAS rupture actually severed: the pipeline kept running, a Nigerian transit corridor was reopened for Niger-bound trade, and the volume simply moved to other ECOWAS ports. Political rupture and physical dependence are on different tracks.
Documented pressure
July 2023 – ongoingPolitical closure Confidence: High
Closure of the Malanville–Gaya bridge, the principal crossing on the Cotonou–Niamey axis, following the coup. Niger-bound cargo through Cotonou collapsed and has not returned to previous levels.
August – December 2023Political closure Confidence: High
Benin suspended transit to Niger outright. Border posts have since operated at reduced capacity rather than normally, and bilateral tensions have persisted past the formal lifting of sanctions.
2024Political closure Confidence: Moderate
Incidents at the Sème-Kpodji terminal, including the detention of Nigerien technicians, demonstrated that the pipeline arrangement remains fragile even as it continues to operate.
February 2026Political closure Confidence: Moderate
The Tsamiya–Kamba corridor, linking Ségbana in Benin to Sabon Birni in Niger through Kebbi State in Nigeria, was reopened — a route through north-western Nigeria functioning as transit infrastructure for the central Sahel.
What disruption doesHigher landed costs on everything imported, longer transit times, and a reported 117 billion CFA francs in lost public revenue. The counterpart exposure sits in Benin, where Nigerien cargo was around 80% of the Port of Cotonou's transit volume — a port that lost most of its transit business to a political decision. The pipeline's continued intermittent operation through the whole dispute is the clearest evidence that neither government wants the economic relationship ended, only leveraged.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-08 Reviewed 2026-09-26 Open the full record →
How a corridor fails
- Armed interdictionTraffic attacked on the route. Reversed, if at all, by security effort or by the attacker’s choice.
- Mixed or otherDoes not resolve cleanly into one cause on the available evidence.
- Political closureThe route shut by a state decision rather than by violence. Reversed by agreement, not by force.
Kept apart deliberately. A road that is dangerous and a border that is shut both stop the goods, and nothing else about them is alike — including who is able to reverse it.
The chain ends where the records do. Vigil publishes no location records for the coastal ports these corridors run to, so the external terminus is carried by the primary-corridor node — which is named for its port pair — rather than drawn as a node that does not exist. Nothing here shows routes, distances, capacities or schedules.
What the nodes are not Qualifiers the records themselves carry. A node named on a corridor is not necessarily a working one — several are proposed, closed, seasonal or legacy, and each says so in the record's own words.
- Bamako–Dakar corridor — The western route to the Atlantic through Senegal, and the axis on which the heaviest reported tanker losses occurred from late 2025. Published analysis puts 2 to 3 million tonnes a year through this corridor — more than 60% of Mali's import volumes — at roughly 400 trucks a day.
- Bamako–Abidjan corridor — The southern route to Côte d'Ivoire's ports, carrying the balance of fuel and container trade as pressure on the Dakar axis increased.
- Kayes — The western regional centre on the Dakar corridor; fuel queues here are one of the reported measures of the blockade's bite.
- Kita — Rail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes stretch. Attacks in its cercle during the 2025 western offensive indicated the campaign targets corridor infrastructure along its length, not only its ends.
- Sikasso — The southern regional centre through which the Abidjan corridor runs.
- Bamako — Destination and distribution point for national fuel supply, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
The eastern fuel route from Niger into Mali
- Niamey–Gao corridor — The generalised corridor marker; never a route line.
- Niamey — Origin of the convoys and seat of the Nigerien supplier; the Zinder refinery itself lies outside this module's mapped area.
- Ayorou — The last Nigerien town on the river road; its National Guard camp was attacked in February 2026.
- Labbezanga — Where the escort passed from Nigerien to Malian forces. Vacated by the state on 27 April 2026 and reportedly occupied by IS-Sahel since.
- Ansongo — The river town between the border and Gao.
- Gao — Destination of the documented convoys and hub of the northern garrisons.
Burkina Faso's import corridors
- Lomé–Ouagadougou corridor — The largest of the four, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country, from a port that handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and whose transit traffic is 92% bound for AES states.
- Ouagadougou — Destination and distribution point, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
- Cotonou–Niamey corridor — The historic principal route, carrying 70–80% of imports before 2023 and largely closed since. Its status is political rather than security-driven, which distinguishes it from every other corridor in this module.
- Niamey — Destination and distribution point for national imports.
- Gaya–Malanville crossing — The Niger river bridge to Benin — the physical closure point of the Cotonou route since July 2023. Added 2026-09-26.
- Dosso — Regional capital on the RN1 between Niamey and the closed crossing. Added 2026-09-26.
- Ouagadougou–Niamey corridor — The road from Lomé through Burkina Faso that has carried most of Niger's seaborne imports since 2023, under armed escort. Added 2026-09-26.
- Torodi–Makalondi — Niger's entry on that road, opposite Kantchari; the position at Makalondi was overrun by JNIM in February 2026. Added 2026-09-26.
The AES escort corridor through Burkina Faso
- Kaya–Dori–Téra corridor — The generalised corridor marker; never a route line.
- Ouagadougou — Burkina Faso's capital and the road's western end.
- Kaya — Where convoys are formed and held.
- Dori — Where Burkinabè and Nigerien escorts hand over, and the origin of the feeder convoys to the besieged Liptako towns.
- Téra — The Nigerien entry town.
- Niamey — The eastern end.
Central Mali sustainment and position regeneration
- Sévaré — The central hub: the garrison and airfield beside Mopti, the seat of the central military region, and where the region's roads narrow.
- Mopti — The regional centre at the Niger–Bani confluence, where the river and road systems meet and access to the delta is organised.
- Konna — Where the road from Sévaré to Gao leaves the floodplain — the junction between the central hub and the northern axis, and the point a column moving north passes first.
- Dioura — A delta camp roughly 130 km west-north-west of Sévaré in a straight line, attacked five times since 2019 and left empty after September 2026.
- Niono & the Office du Niger — The head of the Office du Niger, on the south-western approach to the delta, where the irrigation zone and the insurgency's village-level pressure occupy the same ground.
- Douentza — The eastern end of the central road, toward the Gourma and the Burkinabè border belt.
- San — The garrison town on the road from Ségou to Sévaré that every column into the centre passes; its camp was attacked in August 2026. Added 2026-09-26.
- Bamako–Abidjan corridor — One of the two southern import corridors the centre's fuel arrives through before any of it moves north or east.
- Gao–Kidal corridor — The desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal. Serval used it in 2013, the army in 2023, and the Africa Corps relief column in July 2026.
- Gao — The northern logistics base and the anchor of any northern presence.
- Sévaré — The central hub covering the Mopti region and the approaches from the south.
- Anéfis — The road junction connecting Gao to Kidal and the far north. Whoever cannot pass Anéfis cannot sustain anything beyond it — which is why the July 2026 battle was fought here.
- Kidal — The northern terminus of the axis and the far north's political centre; held by the state 2023–2026, taken by the FLA in April 2026.
- Tessalit — Far-northern border town, reportedly evacuated by government and Russian forces in the April 2026 withdrawals.
Evidence and grading
- Scope
- These records describe strategic dependence and documented disruption history. The schema has no fields for capacities, schedules, convoy composition, escort arrangements, storage or facility layout, and the alternatives section describes whether redundancy exists — never which route to use.
- Confidence
- How well established Vigil considers this assessment to be. It is not a measure of how severe the situation is.