Conflict coverage · Central Sahel · Strategic logistics

Strategic logistics

The systems a war and an economy actually run on: import corridors, ports, border crossings, transit nodes and regional hubs. Each record states what depends on the system and how completely, what has documentably disrupted it, and what disruption does. Dependence is the strategic fact — a corridor matters because there is no substitute for it.

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The corridor system

4 documented systems and 16 nodes, read from the records below. Select a corridor or a node to inspect it; the full record stays one click further on.

Why corridorsOECD and Sahel and West Africa Club research finds that nearly 70% of violent incidents in the region occur within kilometres of major roadways. That is a regional finding about where violence happens, not a measure of any individual corridor here.

Three overland routes supply a landlocked state's entire fuel demand — and since September 2025 they have been the target of a declared blockade.

Fuel imports6 nodes4 armed interdiction1 mixed or other

Mali’s primary trade artery to the Atlantic through Senegal — fuel lifeline and blockade target.
In this systemThe western route to the Atlantic through Senegal, and the axis on which the heaviest reported tanker losses occurred from late 2025. Published analysis puts 2 to 3 million tonnes a year through this corridor — more than 60% of Mali's import volumes — at roughly 400 trucks a day.
Why it mattersLandlocked Mali imports its fuel, and most of it comes this way. JNIM’s blockade campaign burned hundreds of tankers on this axis from late 2025; whether convoys move on it decides whether Bamako’s lights stay on.
What to watchTanker convoy interdiction; escort operations; Senegalese border traffic volumes.
Corridor · supply & trade arteryConfidence: HighAs of 2026-07Show on the map →
The southern trade route to Côte d’Ivoire’s ports — the second leg of Mali’s import lifeline.
In this systemThe southern route to Côte d'Ivoire's ports, carrying the balance of fuel and container trade as pressure on the Dakar axis increased.
Why it mattersWith the Dakar route under attack, the Abidjan corridor carries the balance of Mali’s fuel and container trade. Its security across the Sikasso region — and the politics of ECOWAS relations at the border — set the price of everything in Bamako.
What to watchInterdiction south of Bougouni; border-post friction with Côte d’Ivoire; freight rates.
Corridor · supply & trade arteryConfidence: ModerateAs of 2026-07Show on the map →
Western regional capital on the Senegal corridor, at the heart of the gold belt — attacked in July 2025.
In this systemThe western regional centre on the Dakar corridor; fuel queues here are one of the reported measures of the blockade's bite.
Why it mattersKayes region carries the Dakar trade lifeline and hosts Mali's biggest industrial gold mines. JNIM's coordinated July 2025 attacks on Kayes and nearby towns announced the war's arrival in the far west, and the subsequent blockade campaign targeted precisely this junction of fuel, trade and gold. The corridor it sits on is not one route among several: the Senegalese and Ivorian axes together are reported to carry close to 95% of Mali's petroleum imports, and the disruption runs in both directions — the Port of Dakar reported a daily backlog of around 120 Mali-bound containers between September and November 2025.
What to watchAttacks on mining-area roads; fuel convoy interdiction on the Dakar corridor, read as tankers burned against tankers escorted through; mine operator security postures.
Major cityConfidence: HighAs of 2026-08Show on the map →
Rail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes–Dakar corridor, in the belt JNIM began attacking in 2025.
In this systemRail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes stretch. Attacks in its cercle during the 2025 western offensive indicated the campaign targets corridor infrastructure along its length, not only its ends.
Why it mattersKita sits on the western lifeline that carries fuel and trade from Senegal. Its cercle saw attacks during the western offensive of 2025 — evidence the blockade campaign aims at corridor infrastructure, not just the far ends.
What to watchConvoy escorts and interdiction between Kita and Kayes; rail traffic.
Transport chokepointConfidence: ModerateAs of 2026-06Show on the map →
Mali's second city and its agricultural heartland, astride the corridor to Côte d'Ivoire.
In this systemThe southern regional centre through which the Abidjan corridor runs.
Why it mattersSikasso region grows much of Mali's cotton and food and carries the Abidjan trade artery — the corridor that moved roughly 1.47 million tonnes of goods by the end of 2025 and absorbs volume whenever the Dakar axis is squeezed. Long the least conflict-affected region, its northern districts began seeing JNIM activity as the group pushed south — the clearest measure of how far the insurgency has moved beyond its original geography.
What to watchIncidents on the Bamako–Abidjan corridor; taxation or checkpoint reports in rural districts.
Major cityConfidence: ModerateAs of 2026-08Show on the map →
The capital and the war's ultimate political prize — under economic siege since late 2025, its approaches probed by attack in 2026.
In this systemDestination and distribution point for national fuel supply, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Why it mattersEvery campaign in Mali ultimately points at Bamako: JNIM's fuel blockade squeezes it, the April 2026 attacks reached Kati next door, and sabotage has hit its water and power. The city itself remains government-held, but its dependence on road corridors through insecure territory is the government's single greatest vulnerability.
What to watchFuel and food availability; attacks on the Kati–Bamako perimeter and airport; whether corridor convoys keep the city supplied.
CapitalConfidence: HighAs of 2026-07Show on the map →

DependenceTotal, and concentrated. There is no domestic refining capacity, no pipeline, and no functioning rail alternative at scale — the Dakar–Bamako railway has not operated as a reliable freight route for years. Road import is not the cheapest option; it is the only one. Nor is the dependence evenly spread across the three routes: the Senegalese and Ivorian corridors alone are reported to carry close to 95% of the country's petroleum imports, so the Guinean leg is a margin rather than a substitute. That is why the corridors are a strategic vulnerability rather than a commercial inconvenience, and why convoy interdiction produces national effects within weeks.

Why it mattersThis is the clearest case in the module of an insurgency taxing an entire national economy without taking a city. Fuel sets transport costs, transport costs set food prices, and electricity in the capital depends on the same imports. A campaign against these corridors reaches every household in Mali without a shot being fired near most of them. It also explains where the violence is: OECD and Sahel and West Africa Club research finds that nearly 70% of violent incidents in the region occur within kilometres of major roadways. The corridors are not the background to this conflict system — they are, to a first approximation, its geography.

Documented pressure

June – September 2025Armed interdictionConfidence: Moderate
A blockade of the Kayes–Nioro axis in the far west, distinct from and earlier than the national campaign declared that September. Reported effects were acute fuel shortages, a slowdown in the gold sector, school closures and embassy evacuations — regional interdiction producing national-scale consequences on one axis, and the demonstration that preceded the countrywide declaration.
September 2025 – early 2026Armed interdictionConfidence: High
JNIM declared a blockade of fuel imports on 3 September 2025 and began systematically burning tanker convoys on the Senegalese, Ivorian and Guinean routes. Over 300 tankers were reported destroyed across the campaign. Satellite imagery showed Bamako visibly darker by late 2025, and from late October convoys moved under military escort — reportedly more than a thousand tankers brought in that way, which is why the corridor was degraded and taxed rather than severed.
Early 2026Mixed or otherConfidence: Low
Pressure on the corridors eased, reported as the product of negotiation and heightened military activity. The terms are not established and this entry is graded accordingly; it is recorded because a corridor that has been reopened once has a different risk profile from one that has never been.
April 2026 – ongoingArmed interdictionConfidence: Moderate
A full blockade of Bamako was reimposed on 28 April 2026, three days into the northern offensive, restoring escorted-convoy conditions. Reporting also indicates the campaign extended to the eastern supply route from Niger, which this record does not otherwise represent.
July 2026Armed interdictionConfidence: Moderate
Sabotage affecting the capital's water and power accompanied the second wave of attacks, compounding the supply pressure rather than replacing it.

What disruption doesFuel scarcity raises transport costs across a country where almost everything moves by road. That reaches market food supply, harvest movement, electricity generation in the capital, and the cost of the state's own military logistics — the army's relief columns burn the same imported diesel. The blockade is therefore simultaneously an economic, humanitarian and military fact, which is why three separate impact chains in this module begin here. The consequences do not stop at the border. Mali was Senegal's largest export market in 2024 at about 26.5% of Senegalese exports, roughly US$1.42 billion; between September and November 2025 the Port of Dakar reported a daily backlog of around 120 Mali-bound containers and estimated losses near US$26.5 million a month, with about 4,000 empty containers still stranded in Bamako in February 2026. Mali remained Côte d'Ivoire's largest customer inside the West African monetary union, the Abidjan–Bamako corridor carrying roughly 1.47 million tonnes by end-2025. Interdicting a landlocked state's imports is thus a revenue problem for the coastal states that carry them, which is how this conflict reaches countries that are not party to it.

Confidence: HighStatus as of 2026-08Reviewed 2026-08-30Open the full record →

Every force that has tried to hold the far north has had to hold one desert road — and the 2026 fighting was fought for exactly that.

Military sustainment6 nodes4 armed interdiction

The desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal — the axis on which the northern war is decided.
In this systemThe desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal. Serval used it in 2013, the army in 2023, and the Africa Corps relief column in July 2026.
Why it mattersEvery force that has tried to hold the far north has had to hold this road: Serval in 2013, the army in 2023, the Africa Corps relief column in July 2026. The Anéfis battle was fought for exactly this corridor, and the ambush at Tabrichat showed how exposed it remains.
What to watchConvoy movement and ambushes; who controls the junctions; whether Kidal can be approached at all.
Corridor · supply & trade arteryConfidence: HighAs of 2026-07Show on the map →
The largest city of the north and the government’s main northern base — attacked in the 2026 offensives but held.
In this systemThe northern logistics base and the anchor of any northern presence.
Why it mattersGao is the anchor of what remains of state presence in the north: the staging point for the Anéfis relief column and the hub the Africa Corps operates from. Jihadist-held in 2012, recaptured by Serval in 2013, it is now the position the JNIM–FLA campaign most needs to isolate.
What to watchWhether Gao stays supplied by road and air; attacks on its perimeter; pressure on the Gao–Kidal and Gao–Ansongo axes.
Major cityConfidence: HighAs of 2026-07Show on the map →
Garrison and air hub adjoining Mopti — the military key to central Mali, attacked in both 2026 offensives.
In this systemThe central hub covering the Mopti region and the approaches from the south.
Why it mattersSévaré’s airfield and garrisons make it the hub from which central Mali is held at all; it hosted MINUSMA and now anchors army and Africa Corps operations. Repeated attacks — including July 2026 — target exactly this function.
What to watchAttacks on the garrison perimeter and airfield approaches; whether the hub can keep supporting outlying positions.
Logistics hubConfidence: HighAs of 2026-07Show on the map →
Crossroads town between Gao and Kidal — besieged by the FLA and JNIM in July 2026, retaken by the army and Africa Corps after six days.
In this systemThe road junction connecting Gao to Kidal and the far north. Whoever cannot pass Anéfis cannot sustain anything beyond it — which is why the July 2026 battle was fought here.
Why it mattersAnéfis controls the road junction that connects Gao to Kidal and the far north. After Kidal fell in April 2026 it became the government’s forward position in the Kidal region; the July siege, convoy ambush and recapture made it the test of whether either side can hold ground beyond its strongholds.
What to watchWhether the garrison stays supplied overland; renewed FLA–JNIM pressure; the army’s ability to project beyond the town.
Contested / high-pressure townConfidence: ModerateAs of 2026-07Show on the map →
The political heart of the Azawad movements — retaken by the army in 2023, lost again to the FLA in April 2026.
In this systemThe northern terminus of the axis and the far north's political centre; held by the state 2023–2026, taken by the FLA in April 2026.
Why it mattersWhoever holds Kidal holds the symbol of the northern question. The army’s November 2023 recapture was the junta’s signature victory; the FLA’s April 2026 seizure reversed it and re-opened the entire northern settlement. Its status is the single clearest indicator of where the war stands.
What to watchAny government or Africa Corps move up the Gao–Kidal road; negotiations over the town’s status; conditions for civilians under FLA control.
Contested / high-pressure townConfidence: HighAs of 2026-07Show on the map →
Far-northern town near the Algerian border, reportedly vacated by government and Russian forces on 27 April 2026.
In this systemFar-northern border town, reportedly evacuated by government and Russian forces in the April 2026 withdrawals.
Why it mattersTessalit’s airstrip and border position made it strategically prized through every phase of the war. Africa Corps is reported to have withdrawn on 27 April 2026, on the same day as Aguelhok and within three days of Kidal, Tessit and Ber — a contraction across three northern regions rather than a single defeat, and one that left the far north largely to the Azawad movements, reversing the post-2023 military map. No return has been reported since.
What to watchWho administers the town and airstrip; whether the Mali–Algeria reset changes border dynamics here.
Contested / high-pressure townConfidence: LowAs of 2026-08Show on the map →

DependenceNear-total on the Gao–Anéfis–Kidal axis. Gao is the logistics base for the north and Sévaré the hub for the centre; both sit at the end of supply lines that themselves depend on imported fuel arriving through the southern corridors. Northern sustainment is therefore a second-order dependency on the same fuel imports JNIM is blockading — the two logistics systems in this module are connected, not parallel.

Why it mattersMali's war is decided on roads, not in cities. A garrison that cannot be supplied overland is a garrison that will eventually be withdrawn or lost, which is what the reported negotiated withdrawals from Tessalit and the far north in April 2026 demonstrated. Reading the northern conflict as a contest over towns misses the mechanism; reading it as a contest over sustainment explains both the 2023 recapture of Kidal and its 2026 reversal.

Documented pressure

November 2023Armed interdictionConfidence: High
Drone-supported government and Wagner forces used the axis to retake Kidal — the demonstration that the corridor works when the state can commit to it.
July 2024Armed interdictionConfidence: High
A Malian–Wagner column was routed at Tinzaouatène in Wagner's heaviest publicly documented African defeat, with JNIM claiming a role — the first clear signal that the corridor could be closed against a committed force.
April 2026Armed interdictionConfidence: Moderate
Government and Russian forces withdrew from the far north, reportedly under negotiated terms, as the FLA took Kidal. The axis north of Anéfis ceased to be a state sustainment route.
July 2026Armed interdictionConfidence: Moderate
Fighters besieged the Anéfis base and ambushed a relief convoy near Tabrichat, downing an Mi-24, before a second column broke through and the army announced the town retaken on 10 July.

What disruption doesWhen the axis is contested, state presence in the far north contracts to what can be reached and held, regardless of what any control map shows. That is the mechanism behind the module's central caution that an attack near a place is not possession of it, and that Anéfis changed hands twice in a week.

Confidence: ModerateStatus as of 2026-07Reviewed 2026-08-30Open the full record →

Four overland routes from four coastal states carry almost everything a landlocked country consumes — and its fuel is stored outside its own borders.

General trade2 nodes2 armed interdiction1 mixed or other

Burkina Faso's principal import artery from the Togolese coast, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country.
In this systemThe largest of the four, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country, from a port that handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and whose transit traffic is 92% bound for AES states.
Why it mattersBurkina Faso imports 98% of its merchandise by sea and moves it inland by road through four corridors; this is the largest of them. The Port of Lomé handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and 92% of its transit traffic is bound for AES states. The country's fuel is held in transit storage outside its own borders, in Lomé among other places, under the SONABHY state monopoly — so a landlocked state's strategic reserve sits on someone else's territory.
What to watchInterdiction on the corridor and its feeder routes; whether the Ghana–Burkina Faso convoy-security arrangement of August 2026 is extended to this axis; fuel availability in Ouagadougou.
Corridor · supply & trade arteryConfidence: ModerateAs of 2026-08Show on the map →
Burkina Faso's capital and the political centre of the AES's most repressive transition.
In this systemDestination and distribution point, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Why it mattersOuagadougou holds what the state still governs securely: the institutions, the corridor terminus and the officer corps that has produced two coups and governs through the second. It is also where the confederation does much of its institutional work — the AES experts' workshop on a common position toward ECOWAS met here in June 2026. The city itself is not contested; the country around it increasingly is.
What to watchCoup announcements and what they indicate about cohesion in the army; the corridor to Abidjan and Lomé; whether pressure reaches the capital's approaches as it has in Mali.
CapitalConfidence: HighAs of 2026-08Show on the map →

DependenceNear-total, and spread across four foreign jurisdictions rather than concentrated in one. Burkina Faso has no coastline, no domestic refining at scale and no rail link except the Ivorian one; 98% of merchandise arrives by sea and completes its journey by road. The spread is a genuine redundancy — pressure on one corridor can be absorbed by another at higher freight cost — but it is redundancy inside a single structural dependence, and every one of the four routes terminates in a state the country's own government has politically estranged through the ECOWAS exit.

Why it mattersThis is the structural reason a Burkinabè security problem is a West African economic one, and vice versa. A landlocked state that imports almost everything and stores its strategic fuel on four neighbours' territory has no purely national answer to corridor insecurity — which is why, in August 2026, Ghana and Burkina Faso signed a bilateral accord establishing joint patrols and security escorts for convoys carrying petroleum products and cereals on the Tema–Ouagadougou route. It also explains where the violence is: OECD and Sahel and West Africa Club research finds that nearly 70% of violent incidents in the region occur within kilometres of major roadways. The corridors are not the background to this conflict system; to a first approximation they are its geography.

Documented pressure

2022 – ongoingArmed interdictionConfidence: High
Corridor and feeder-route insecurity across the northern and eastern regions, of which the encirclement of Djibo is the extreme case: roads mined, convoys ambushed, and one provincial capital supplied chiefly by air since 2022.
February 2026Armed interdictionConfidence: Moderate
JNIM killed seven Ghanaian traders at Titao in northern Burkina Faso on 14 February 2026 — an indication that corridor insecurity reaches the nationals of the coastal states whose ports serve the country, not only Burkinabè hauliers.
August 2026Mixed or otherConfidence: Moderate
Ghana and Burkina Faso signed a bilateral accord establishing a joint mechanism to secure the Tema–Ouagadougou corridor, with joint patrols and security escorts for convoys carrying petroleum products and cereals. This is a response to disruption rather than a disruption, recorded here because it is the first documented instance in this module of a coastal and a Sahelian state building shared corridor security.

What disruption doesFuel and freight costs set consumer prices across a country where almost everything moves by road, and where the state's own logistics compete for the same imports. The dependence also runs outward: the coastal states' ports derive substantial transit revenue from this traffic, and the Lomé figure — 92% of its transit traffic bound for AES states — means Togo's port economy is tied to the security of Sahelian roads it does not control. Corridor insecurity is therefore a shared fiscal problem, which is the mechanism behind the 2026 Ghana accord.

Confidence: ModerateStatus as of 2026-08Reviewed 2026-08-30Open the full record →

A landlocked state whose principal route to the sea was closed by politics in 2023 and has been only partly replaced since.

General trade2 nodes4 political closure

Niger's historic principal import route from the Beninese coast — largely shut since July 2023 and only partly replaced.
In this systemThe historic principal route, carrying 70–80% of imports before 2023 and largely closed since. Its status is political rather than security-driven, which distinguishes it from every other corridor in this module.
Why it mattersBetween 70% and 80% of Niger's imports passed through the Port of Cotonou before the crisis, and Nigerien cargo is around 80% of that port's transit volume — a mutual dependence rather than a one-way one. The closure of the Malanville–Gaya bridge in July 2023, followed by Benin's suspension of transit from August to December that year, collapsed the route. Traffic redirected to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott at higher cost; Niger is reported to have lost 117 billion CFA francs in public revenue. The Niger–Benin oil pipeline to the Sème-Kpodji terminal still runs intermittently, because neither side has gained by dismantling it.
What to watchWhether the border reopens and on what terms; throughput shifting back from Lomé; the pipeline's operating status; whether the Kebbi transit route through Nigeria carries meaningful volume.
Corridor · supply & trade arteryConfidence: ModerateAs of 2026-08Show on the map →
Niger's capital — seat of the CNSP, host of the AES joint command and the Russian Africa Corps, and attacked twice in 2026.
In this systemDestination and distribution point for national imports.
Why it mattersNiamey is where three of this module's threads meet in one place. It is the political centre of the CNSP transition; Base 101 at its international airport hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command; and it has been attacked twice in one year — by Islamic State Sahel in January 2026, an assault Moscow publicly said its forces helped repel, and by mutinous soldiers of Niger's own army in August. The city is the clearest single illustration that the threats to these governments are external and internal at once.
What to watchCohesion inside the army after the August 2026 mutiny; whether any official account of Russian involvement is published; further attacks on the airport perimeter.
CapitalConfidence: HighAs of 2026-08Show on the map →

DependenceTotal for maritime access and, until 2023, heavily concentrated. Niger has no coastline and no domestic refining at the scale of its consumption; the Cotonou route was the overwhelming majority of its import traffic. The redirection to Lomé and the Atlantic ports proved that alternatives exist, at materially higher cost and over longer distances — the practical measure of which is the reported 117 billion CFA francs in lost public revenue. The reopened Kebbi transit route through Nigeria is a partial alternative whose carried volume is not established.

Why it mattersNiger is the case that separates corridor risk from insurgent risk. Mali's corridors are interdicted by an armed group; Burkina Faso's are threatened by one; Niger's principal route was closed by a bilateral political dispute and has stayed shut for three years. The consequences look similar — higher costs, longer routes, lost revenue — and the remedies are entirely different. It also demonstrates how little the ECOWAS rupture actually severed: the pipeline kept running, a Nigerian transit corridor was reopened for Niger-bound trade, and the volume simply moved to other ECOWAS ports. Political rupture and physical dependence are on different tracks.

Documented pressure

July 2023 – ongoingPolitical closureConfidence: High
Closure of the Malanville–Gaya bridge, the principal crossing on the Cotonou–Niamey axis, following the coup. Niger-bound cargo through Cotonou collapsed and has not returned to previous levels.
August – December 2023Political closureConfidence: High
Benin suspended transit to Niger outright. Border posts have since operated at reduced capacity rather than normally, and bilateral tensions have persisted past the formal lifting of sanctions.
2024Political closureConfidence: Moderate
Incidents at the Sème-Kpodji terminal, including the detention of Nigerien technicians, demonstrated that the pipeline arrangement remains fragile even as it continues to operate.
February 2026Political closureConfidence: Moderate
The Tsamiya–Kamba corridor, linking Ségbana in Benin to Sabon Birni in Niger through Kebbi State in Nigeria, was reopened — a route through north-western Nigeria functioning as transit infrastructure for the central Sahel.

What disruption doesHigher landed costs on everything imported, longer transit times, and a reported 117 billion CFA francs in lost public revenue. The counterpart exposure sits in Benin, where Nigerien cargo was around 80% of the Port of Cotonou's transit volume — a port that lost most of its transit business to a political decision. The pipeline's continued intermittent operation through the whole dispute is the clearest evidence that neither government wants the economic relationship ended, only leveraged.

Confidence: ModerateStatus as of 2026-08Reviewed 2026-08-30Open the full record →

How a corridor fails

Armed interdictionTraffic attacked on the route. Reversed, if at all, by security effort or by the attacker’s choice.
Mixed or otherDoes not resolve cleanly into one cause on the available evidence.
Political closureThe route shut by a state decision rather than by violence. Reversed by agreement, not by force.

Kept apart deliberately. A road that is dangerous and a border that is shut both stop the goods, and nothing else about them is alike — including who is able to reverse it.

The chain ends where the records do. Vigil publishes no location records for the coastal ports these corridors run to, so the external terminus is carried by the primary-corridor node — which is named for its port pair — rather than drawn as a node that does not exist. Nothing here shows routes, distances, capacities or schedules.

Systems

4 records

Burkina Faso's import corridors

General trade

Four overland routes from four coastal states carry almost everything a landlocked country consumes — and its fuel is stored outside its own borders.

2 nodes3 documented disruptionsConfidence: ModerateAssessed as of 2026-08Last reviewed 2026-08-30

Why it matters. This is the structural reason a Burkinabè security problem is a West African economic one, and vice versa. A landlocked state that imports almost everything and stores its strategic fuel on four neighbours' territory has no purely national answer to corridor insecurity — which is why, in August 2026, Ghana and Burkina Faso signed a bilateral accord establishing joint patrols and security escorts for convoys carrying petroleum products and cereals on the Tema–Ouagadougou route. It also explains where the violence is: OECD and Sahel and West Africa Club research finds that nearly 70% of violent incidents in the region occur within kilometres of major roadways. The corridors are not the background to this conflict system; to a first approximation they are its geography.

Lomé–Ouagadougou corridor · Primary corridor Ouagadougou · Regional hub

Lomé–Ouagadougou corridor — The largest of the four, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country, from a port that handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and whose transit traffic is 92% bound for AES states.
Ouagadougou — Destination and distribution point, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.

Open the full logistics record →

Mali's fuel import corridors

Fuel imports

Three overland routes supply a landlocked state's entire fuel demand — and since September 2025 they have been the target of a declared blockade.

6 nodes5 documented disruptionsConfidence: HighAssessed as of 2026-08Last reviewed 2026-08-30

Why it matters. This is the clearest case in the module of an insurgency taxing an entire national economy without taking a city. Fuel sets transport costs, transport costs set food prices, and electricity in the capital depends on the same imports. A campaign against these corridors reaches every household in Mali without a shot being fired near most of them. It also explains where the violence is: OECD and Sahel and West Africa Club research finds that nearly 70% of violent incidents in the region occur within kilometres of major roadways. The corridors are not the background to this conflict system — they are, to a first approximation, its geography.

Bamako–Dakar corridor · Primary corridor Bamako–Abidjan corridor · Primary corridor Kayes · Transit node Kita · Transit node Sikasso · Transit node Bamako · Regional hub

Bamako–Dakar corridor — The western route to the Atlantic through Senegal, and the axis on which the heaviest reported tanker losses occurred from late 2025. Published analysis puts 2 to 3 million tonnes a year through this corridor — more than 60% of Mali's import volumes — at roughly 400 trucks a day.
Bamako–Abidjan corridor — The southern route to Côte d'Ivoire's ports, carrying the balance of fuel and container trade as pressure on the Dakar axis increased.
Kayes — The western regional centre on the Dakar corridor; fuel queues here are one of the reported measures of the blockade's bite.
Kita — Rail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes stretch. Attacks in its cercle during the 2025 western offensive indicated the campaign targets corridor infrastructure along its length, not only its ends.
Sikasso — The southern regional centre through which the Abidjan corridor runs.
Bamako — Destination and distribution point for national fuel supply, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.

CampaignFuel blockade

Open the full logistics record →

Niger's import corridors

General trade

A landlocked state whose principal route to the sea was closed by politics in 2023 and has been only partly replaced since.

2 nodes4 documented disruptionsConfidence: ModerateAssessed as of 2026-08Last reviewed 2026-08-30

Why it matters. Niger is the case that separates corridor risk from insurgent risk. Mali's corridors are interdicted by an armed group; Burkina Faso's are threatened by one; Niger's principal route was closed by a bilateral political dispute and has stayed shut for three years. The consequences look similar — higher costs, longer routes, lost revenue — and the remedies are entirely different. It also demonstrates how little the ECOWAS rupture actually severed: the pipeline kept running, a Nigerian transit corridor was reopened for Niger-bound trade, and the volume simply moved to other ECOWAS ports. Political rupture and physical dependence are on different tracks.

Cotonou–Niamey corridor · Primary corridor Niamey · Regional hub

Cotonou–Niamey corridor — The historic principal route, carrying 70–80% of imports before 2023 and largely closed since. Its status is political rather than security-driven, which distinguishes it from every other corridor in this module.
Niamey — Destination and distribution point for national imports.

Open the full logistics record →

Northern military sustainment

Military sustainment

Every force that has tried to hold the far north has had to hold one desert road — and the 2026 fighting was fought for exactly that.

6 nodes4 documented disruptionsConfidence: ModerateAssessed as of 2026-07Last reviewed 2026-08-30

Why it matters. Mali's war is decided on roads, not in cities. A garrison that cannot be supplied overland is a garrison that will eventually be withdrawn or lost, which is what the reported negotiated withdrawals from Tessalit and the far north in April 2026 demonstrated. Reading the northern conflict as a contest over towns misses the mechanism; reading it as a contest over sustainment explains both the 2023 recapture of Kidal and its 2026 reversal.

Gao–Kidal corridor · Primary corridor Gao · Regional hub Sévaré · Regional hub Anéfis · Chokepoint Kidal · Transit node Tessalit · Transit node

Gao–Kidal corridor — The desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal. Serval used it in 2013, the army in 2023, and the Africa Corps relief column in July 2026.
Gao — The northern logistics base and the anchor of any northern presence.
Sévaré — The central hub covering the Mopti region and the approaches from the south.
Anéfis — The road junction connecting Gao to Kidal and the far north. Whoever cannot pass Anéfis cannot sustain anything beyond it — which is why the July 2026 battle was fought here.
Kidal — The northern terminus of the axis and the far north's political centre; held by the state 2023–2026, taken by the FLA in April 2026.
Tessalit — Far-northern border town, reportedly evacuated by government and Russian forces in the April 2026 withdrawals.

Campaign2026 offensives

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Context, not targeting. These records describe strategic dependence and documented disruption history. The schema has no fields for capacities, schedules, convoy composition, escort arrangements, storage or facility layout, and the alternatives section describes whether redundancy exists — never which route to use. See the methodology.