What this system is
Between 70% and 80% of Niger's imports once passed through Cotonou, and Nigerien cargo was around 80% of that port's transit. A bridge closure and a transit suspension in 2023 collapsed the route; traffic moved to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott at higher cost.
Niger is the case that separates corridor risk from insurgent risk. Mali's corridors are interdicted by an armed group; Burkina Faso's are threatened by one; Niger's principal route was closed by a bilateral political dispute and has stayed shut for three years. The consequences look similar — higher costs, longer routes, lost revenue — and the remedies are entirely different. It also demonstrates how little the ECOWAS rupture actually severed: the pipeline kept running, a Nigerian transit corridor was reopened for Niger-bound trade, and the volume simply moved to other ECOWAS ports. Political rupture and physical dependence are on different tracks.
Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-08Reviewed 2026-09-26
The system
- Overview
- Before 2023, between 70% and 80% of Niger's imports passed through the Port of Cotonou in Benin, and Nigerien cargo made up around 80% of that port's transit volume — a dependence running in both directions. The closure of the Malanville–Gaya bridge in July 2023, followed by Benin's suspension of transit to Niger from August to December that year, collapsed the route. Traffic redirected to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott: the Port of Lomé handled 2.06 million TEU in 2024 with 92% of its transit traffic bound for AES states, and set an African monthly record of 123,000 container moves in March 2025. Niger is reported to have lost 117 billion CFA francs in public revenue to the closure. On 9 February President Tinubu reopened the Tsamiya–Kamba corridor linking Ségbana in Benin to Sabon Birni in Niger through Kebbi State in north-western Nigeria. The Niger–Benin oil pipeline to the Sème-Kpodji terminal has continued to operate intermittently throughout, because neither side has gained by dismantling it; incidents at the terminal in 2024 included the detention of Nigerien technicians.
- What depends on it
- Total for maritime access and, until 2023, heavily concentrated. Niger has no coastline and no domestic refining at the scale of its consumption; the Cotonou route was the overwhelming majority of its import traffic. The redirection to Lomé and the Atlantic ports proved that alternatives exist, at materially higher cost and over longer distances — the practical measure of which is the reported 117 billion CFA francs in lost public revenue. The reopened Kebbi transit route through Nigeria is a partial alternative whose carried volume is not established.
- What disruption does
- Higher landed costs on everything imported, longer transit times, and a reported 117 billion CFA francs in lost public revenue. The counterpart exposure sits in Benin, where Nigerien cargo was around 80% of the Port of Cotonou's transit volume — a port that lost most of its transit business to a political decision. The pipeline's continued intermittent operation through the whole dispute is the clearest evidence that neither government wants the economic relationship ended, only leveraged.
- Alternatives and redundancy
- Demonstrated and expensive. Volume redirected to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott after 2023, which establishes that the country is not dependent on any single port — but every alternative is longer, costlier, and still runs through an ECOWAS coastal state. The Kebbi transit corridor through north-western Nigeria, reopened in February, is the one route that bypasses the Benin dispute directly; its volume is unknown. Wider AES adaptation includes the Conakry–Bamako and Nouakchott–Bamako routes, the latter improved by the Rosso Bridge scheduled for 2026, and modest air freight such as a weekly Niger Air Cargo service between Belgium and Niamey — all of which serve Mali more than Niger.
Nodes
In the order this record authors them — an authored sequence, not a route.
Niger's historic principal import route from the Beninese coast — largely shut since July 2023 and only partly replaced.
In this systemThe historic principal route, carrying 70–80% of imports before 2023 and largely closed since. Its status is political rather than security-driven, which distinguishes it from every other corridor in this module.
Why it mattersBetween 70% and 80% of Niger's imports passed through the Port of Cotonou before the crisis, and Nigerien cargo is around 80% of that port's transit volume — a mutual dependence rather than a one-way one. The closure of the Malanville–Gaya bridge in July 2023, followed by Benin's suspension of transit from August to December that year, collapsed the route. Traffic redirected to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott at higher cost; Niger is reported to have lost 117 billion CFA francs in public revenue. The Niger–Benin oil pipeline to the Sème-Kpodji terminal still runs intermittently, because neither side has gained by dismantling it.
What to watchWhether the border reopens and on what terms; throughput shifting back from Lomé; the pipeline's operating status; whether the Kebbi transit route through Nigeria carries meaningful volume.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-08 Show on the map →
Niger's capital — seat of the CNSP, host of the AES joint command and the Russian Africa Corps, and attacked twice in 2026.
In this systemDestination and distribution point for national imports.
Why it mattersNiamey is where three of this module's threads meet in one place. It is the political centre of the CNSP transition; Base 101 at its international airport hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command; and it has been attacked twice in one year — by Islamic State Sahel in January 2026, an assault Moscow publicly said its forces helped repel, and by mutinous soldiers of Niger's own army in August, which Moscow says its force put down at the base command's request. The city is the clearest single illustration that the threats to these governments are external and internal at once.
What to watchCohesion inside the army after the August 2026 mutiny; whether a Nigerien account of the request Moscow says Base 101's command made is published; further attacks on the airport perimeter.
Capital Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The Niger river bridge between Niger and Benin, closed since July 2023 — the place where Niger's principal import route was shut by politics.
In this systemThe Niger river bridge to Benin — the physical closure point of the Cotonou route since July 2023. Added 2026-09-26.
Why it mattersBefore 2023 between 70% and 80% of Niger's imports crossed here from the Port of Cotonou. The bridge was closed after the coup, Benin suspended transit altogether from August to December 2023, and the crossing has stayed shut since: Benin and Niger formalised a commitment to reopen it in June 2026, technical talks ended without a date, and traffic still moves by Lomé and Burkina Faso. It is the module's clearest case of a corridor closed by a bilateral dispute rather than by an armed group.
What to watchWhether and when the crossing reopens; the terms; freight shifting back from the Burkina Faso route.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Regional capital on the road from Niamey to the closed Beninese border — where the armed-group map of western Niger meets the Nigerian frontier.
In this systemRegional capital on the RN1 between Niamey and the closed crossing. Added 2026-09-26.
Why it mattersDosso lies on the RN1 between Niamey and Gaya, the axis of Niger's historic import route through Cotonou. The region has become a second front: JNIM and Islamic State Sahel fight each other in its northern districts, IS-Sahel claimed its first attack in the region in May 2025, and a gendarmerie camp at Tessa was besieged and looted in August 2026. Reporting on the August 2026 mutiny named units from Dosso among those involved. Attacks on positions in Dosso region are counted at this marker, and the record names the place.
What to watchAttacks on positions in the region; the status of the Gaya–Malanville crossing; armed-group movement across the Nigerian border.
Major city Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The road through Fada N'Gourma and Kantchari to Niamey — since 2023 the principal route of Niger's seaborne imports, run under armed escort.
In this systemThe road from Lomé through Burkina Faso that has carried most of Niger's seaborne imports since 2023, under armed escort. Added 2026-09-26.
Why it mattersWhen Benin closed its border in 2023, traffic for Niger moved to the Port of Lomé and onto this road, which leaves Burkina Faso at Kantchari and enters Niger at Makalondi and Torodi. Humanitarian logistics assessments describe it as the only operational route from Lomé to Niamey and say convoys need escorts. It crosses the east of Burkina Faso, the area of JNIM's heaviest pressure on fixed positions, and the Nigerien base at Makalondi was attacked twice in 2026.
What to watchAttacks on convoys between Fada N'Gourma and Torodi; the escort regime; whether Niger's imports shift back to the Beninese route.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Niger's entry on the road from Burkina Faso — the holding area at Makalondi and the customs post at Torodi, both attacked by JNIM in 2026.
In this systemNiger's entry on that road, opposite Kantchari; the position at Makalondi was overrun by JNIM in February 2026. Added 2026-09-26.
Why it mattersFreight for Niamey from the port of Lomé enters Niger here, crossing from Kantchari to the holding area at Makalondi and the customs post at Torodi. JNIM overran the position at Makalondi on 4 February 2026, the opening attack of its February campaign, attacked positions at Torodi on 30 June 2026 and, according to reporting, killed the Torodi prefect in January. The corridor that replaced Niger's closed Beninese route therefore runs through one of JNIM's most active areas in the country. Attacks on positions in Torodi department are counted at this marker, and the record names the place.
What to watchAttacks on the two towns' positions; whether escorted freight keeps moving through them.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Closure of the Malanville–Gaya bridge, the principal crossing on the Cotonou–Niamey axis, following the coup. Niger-bound cargo through Cotonou collapsed and has not returned to previous levels.
Benin suspended transit to Niger outright. Border posts have since operated at reduced capacity rather than normally, and bilateral tensions have persisted past the formal lifting of sanctions.
Incidents at the Sème-Kpodji terminal, including the detention of Nigerien technicians, demonstrated that the pipeline arrangement remains fragile even as it continues to operate.
The Tsamiya–Kamba corridor, linking Ségbana in Benin to Sabon Birni in Niger through Kebbi State in Nigeria, was reopened — a route through north-western Nigeria functioning as transit infrastructure for the central Sahel.
Political implications
The corridor is a bilateral bargaining instrument, which makes its status a diplomatic indicator rather than a security one.
Military implications
Sustainment for a force fighting in the west runs on lengthened supply lines from ports further away than the one it used to use.
Economic implications
Cost inflation on all imports, lost customs revenue, and a mirrored loss on the Beninese side.
Humanitarian implications
Relief supply uses the same lengthened routes into a country whose western regions carry the region's highest recorded civilian death toll.
Actors with a stake
Transmission chains through this system
What remains unknown
- The eastern route into Mali, in which Niger is the transit country rather than the destination, is now its own record (niger-mali-eastern-fuel-route, 2026-09-26). Documented escorted convoys populate it; attacks on it after February 2025 were not found, and that record says so.
- The volume carried by the reopened Kebbi transit corridor is not published.
- Current throughput on the Cotonou axis, as against its pre-2023 level, is not established; the collapse is documented, the residual is not.
- The 117 billion CFA franc revenue figure rests on a single source and is recorded as reported rather than established.
Readings the evidence also supports
- The redirection of traffic to Lomé can be read as a durable restructuring of Sahelian transit or as a temporary accommodation that would reverse on a Benin–Niger settlement. Port statistics support the first; the pipeline's continued operation and the reopened Kebbi route support the second.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
Pipeline operating status
The Niger–Benin pipeline has kept running through a three-year rupture. Its interruption would signal a materially worse bilateral position than anything since 2023.
Watch questions this system bears on
Standing analytical questions whose evidence runs through this system, each with its latest review. Derived from the Watch object, never restated here.
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Assessed as of — 2026-08 Last reviewed — 2026-09-26