Ground Forces
Combined-arms armies providing the bulk of the invasion's manpower.
Broad area of activity
Combined-arms armies across the entire front, from the northern border axes to the Donbas and the southern land bridge.
Notable history
Planned for a days-long operation and got an attritional war: the 2022 drives on Kyiv, Kharkiv and the south consumed its professional core, and mobilisation refilled the ranks at lower quality. Adapted from failed battalion-group manoeuvre to assault-detachment infantry tactics backed by artillery mass, glide bombs and drones — an approach that takes ground slowly and at documented heavy cost in men and equipment.
Strengths
Mass — in manpower, tube artillery and refurbished armour reserves; deep fortification engineering, proven in 2023; an ammunition base extended by North Korean supply; a publicly assessed willingness to sustain exceptionally high losses.
Limitations
Quality dilution after years of attrition of experienced cadres; documented equipment losses force reactivation of ever-older storage stock; tactical rigidity at the lower levels; assault tempo is bought with casualty rates that are publicly assessed as historically exceptional.
Subordinate & associated
- Moscow Military District Formation
- Leningrad Military District Formation
- Southern Military District Formation
- Central Military District Formation
- Eastern Military District Formation
Documented equipment
Related locations
Nizhny Tagil (Uralvagonzavod): Home of the Uralvagonzavod plant — the industrial base behind the force's armour fleet.
Fires before movement, and pressure before manoeuvre. The force applies artillery and glide bombs to reduce a position, then takes it with small dismounted assaults across a wide frontage, accepting casualty rates that substitute for the operational skill the 2022 campaign showed it lacked.
Preferred operating methods
Fires before movement, and pressure before manoeuvre. The pre-war doctrine of battalion tactical groups conducting rapid deep operations was abandoned after 2022, when it failed against a defended state. What replaced it is recognisably different: massed artillery and, since 2023, glide bombs used to make a position untenable rather than to support an assault on it; small dismounted infantry groups attacking on narrow frontages once it has been reduced; and simultaneous pressure across a wide sector rather than concentration for breakthrough. Ground is taken by accumulation. The method is expensive in people and cheap in coordination, which is a rational fit for a force that has consistently demonstrated more of the former than the latter.
A broad generalisation about how this organisation operates, graded as an assessment — not a description of current tactics, and deliberately carrying no capability or effectiveness score.
Command style
Centralised, with authority held well above the level at which decisions are executed and limited latitude for junior initiative. Formation commanders are held accountable for progress on a timescale that encourages costly attacks. This has been partially offset since 2023 by the growth of drone units operating on shorter loops than the formal chain of command allows, which is the clearest internal tension in the force.
Where this generalisation breaks down
The generalisation fails in three ways. First, it describes the force since mid-2022 and not the force that invaded: the 2022 campaign attempted exactly the rapid deep operation this record says the force does not conduct. Second, performance is uneven between formations — airborne and naval infantry units have repeatedly been employed as a mobile reserve requiring more coordination than the general pattern implies. Third, "accepting casualties" is a description of observed practice, not an inference about intent, and the module has no basis for claiming what any commander considers acceptable.
Observed adaptations
Adoption of glide-bomb kits on existing munitions from 2023, giving stand-off strike at scale from aircraft that could not previously operate near the line — the most consequential Russian adaptation of the war.
A shift from mechanised assault to small dismounted infantry groups, forced by drone saturation making vehicle concentrations unsurvivable near the line.
Large-scale field fortification adopted as standing practice rather than as an emergency measure after 2022, which is what stopped the 2023 Ukrainian offensive.
Dispersal of ammunition storage after precision strikes on concentrated sites, reducing vulnerability at a cost in handling and transport.
What remains unknown
- Russian doctrinal publications since 2022 are not available, so this record describes observed practice rather than formal doctrine.
- Casualty rates are not published and are treated as instruments by both sides; the characterisation here rests on observer reporting rather than on figures.
- Variation between formations is reported anecdotally and cannot be systematically assessed from open sources.
Campaigns
Campaigns naming this organisation as a participant. The campaign record owns the relationship and grades it; this list is computed.
- The Ukrainian counteroffensives, 2022–2023 Opposing force · September 2022 – November 2023 · high confidence · as of 2023-11
- The eastern attritional campaign Primary force · Since April 2022 · high confidence · as of 2026-06
Assessed as of2026-06Last reviewed2026-06
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