- Pavillon d’armée · officiel
- Affiliation étatique · Russie
- Emblème de catégorie Vigil · pas un insigne officiel
Provenance de l’identité
Service ensign: Flag of the Russian Ground Forces. The service flag of the Ground Forces, adopted 2004. The design itself is not an object of copyright: Article 1259(6) of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation excludes official symbols and signs. The file shipped is the Wikimedia Commons SVG "Flag of the Russian Ground Forces.svg", released under PD-RU-exempt on that basis, so no attribution or share-alike obligation attaches. Optimised for web display; geometry unaltered.
Affiliation étatique : Russie.
La petite marque carrée est un emblème de catégorie Vigil, établi à partir du domaine, de l’échelon et du rôle propres à cette fiche — pas un insigne officiel.
En bref
Des armées interarmes qui fournissent l’essentiel des effectifs de l’invasion.
- Périmètre
- Structure, rôle, filiation et liens. 5 fiches subordonnées publiées.
- Subordination
- Subordination confirmée
- Sources
- 4 dans la fiche
- État de la fiche
- Complète
- Zone d’activité générale
- Combined-arms armies across the entire front, from the northern border axes to the Donbas and the southern land bridge.
- Historique notable
- Planned for a days-long operation and got an attritional war: the 2022 drives on Kyiv, Kharkiv and the south consumed its professional core, and mobilisation refilled the ranks at lower quality. Adapted from failed battalion-group manoeuvre to assault-detachment infantry tactics backed by artillery mass, glide bombs and drones — an approach that takes ground slowly and at documented heavy cost in men and equipment.
- Points forts
- Mass — in manpower, tube artillery and refurbished armour reserves; deep fortification engineering, proven in 2023; an ammunition base extended by North Korean supply; a publicly assessed willingness to sustain exceptionally high losses.
- Limites
- Quality dilution after years of attrition of experienced cadres; documented equipment losses force reactivation of ever-older storage stock; tactical rigidity at the lower levels; assault tempo is bought with casualty rates that are publicly assessed as historically exceptional.
Formations subordonnées
Moscow Military DistrictDistrict militaireLeningrad Military DistrictDistrict militaireSouthern Military DistrictDistrict militaireCentral Military DistrictDistrict militaireEastern Military DistrictDistrict militaireLes rangées ne servent qu’à la mise en page — leur position et leur ordre n’indiquent ni hiérarchie, ni importance, ni séquence, ni force. Chaque fiche affichée est un subordonné immédiat de l’organisation sélectionnée.
Équipements documentés
Lieux associés
Nizhny Tagil (Uralvagonzavod): Home of the Uralvagonzavod plant — the industrial base behind the force's armour fleet.
Fires before movement, and pressure before manoeuvre. The force applies artillery and glide bombs to reduce a position, then takes it with small dismounted assaults across a wide frontage, accepting casualty rates that substitute for the operational skill the 2022 campaign showed it lacked.
Modes opératoires privilégiés
Fires before movement, and pressure before manoeuvre. The pre-war doctrine of battalion tactical groups conducting rapid deep operations was abandoned after 2022, when it failed against a defended state. What replaced it is recognisably different: massed artillery and, since 2023, glide bombs used to make a position untenable rather than to support an assault on it; small dismounted infantry groups attacking on narrow frontages once it has been reduced; and simultaneous pressure across a wide sector rather than concentration for breakthrough. Ground is taken by accumulation. The method is expensive in people and cheap in coordination, which is a rational fit for a force that has consistently demonstrated more of the former than the latter.
Une généralisation large sur la manière dont cette organisation opère, qualifiée comme une évaluation — pas une description des tactiques actuelles, et délibérément sans aucun score de capacité ni d’efficacité.
Style de commandement
Centralised, with authority held well above the level at which decisions are executed and limited latitude for junior initiative. Formation commanders are held accountable for progress on a timescale that encourages costly attacks. This has been partially offset since 2023 by the growth of drone units operating on shorter loops than the formal chain of command allows, which is the clearest internal tension in the force.
Là où cette généralisation ne tient plus
The generalisation fails in three ways. First, it describes the force since mid-2022 and not the force that invaded: the 2022 campaign attempted exactly the rapid deep operation this record says the force does not conduct. Second, performance is uneven between formations — airborne and naval infantry units have repeatedly been employed as a mobile reserve requiring more coordination than the general pattern implies. Third, "accepting casualties" is a description of observed practice, not an inference about intent, and the module has no basis for claiming what any commander considers acceptable.
Adaptations observées
Adoption of glide-bomb kits on existing munitions from 2023, giving stand-off strike at scale from aircraft that could not previously operate near the line — the most consequential Russian adaptation of the war.
A shift from mechanised assault to small dismounted infantry groups, forced by drone saturation making vehicle concentrations unsurvivable near the line.
Large-scale field fortification adopted as standing practice rather than as an emergency measure after 2022, which is what stopped the 2023 Ukrainian offensive.
Dispersal of ammunition storage after precision strikes on concentrated sites, reducing vulnerability at a cost in handling and transport.
Ce qui reste inconnu
- Russian doctrinal publications since 2022 are not available, so this record describes observed practice rather than formal doctrine.
- Casualty rates are not published and are treated as instruments by both sides; the characterisation here rests on observer reporting rather than on figures.
- Variation between formations is reported anecdotally and cannot be systematically assessed from open sources.
Campagnes
Campagnes nommant cette organisation comme participante. La fiche de campagne détient la relation et lui attribue son degré de confiance ; cette liste est calculée.
- Les contre-offensives ukrainiennes, 2022–2023 Opposing force · September 2022 – November 2023 · high confidence · as of 2023-11
- La campagne d’attrition dans l’Est Primary force · Since April 2022 · high confidence · as of 2026-06
Actions rapides
Accès au système
Là où cette fiche se rattache au reste de Vigil. Chaque ligne figure ici parce que cette organisation y aboutit effectivement.
Évalué au — 2026-06 Dernière revue — 2026-06
Voir cette force dans la structure Interactif : sélectionnez cette fiche et suivez ce qui s’y rattache.