The eastern attritional campaign
The war's centre of gravity: a slow, costly contest for fortified industrial ground that neither side can leave and neither can finish.
Since April 2022 the war's main effort has been a grinding contest for the Donbas, fought settlement by settlement across fortified industrial terrain and now dominated by drone-saturated approaches. Russia advances slowly at high cost; neither side's theory of victory has been demonstrated.
Summary
After withdrawing from the northern axes, Russia concentrated on the east, where the war had already been fought since 2014 and where both sides had built defences over eight years. The campaign has proceeded through a succession of contested towns — Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk in 2022, Bakhmut through the winter and spring of 2023, Avdiivka in early 2024, and the Pokrovsk axis since — with advances measured in kilometres over months and casualty exchange rates that both sides dispute. Its character changed fundamentally with drone saturation: cheap reconnaissance and strike drones on both sides made the approaches to the line dangerous for vehicles and concentrations, which is the principal reason assaults are now conducted by small dismounted groups and why advances are slow rather than absent. Russia has generally held the initiative since 2024 while paying heavily for it; Ukraine's binding constraints have been infantry manpower and the predictability of external ammunition supply.
Why it matters
This is where the war is actually decided, and where the theory of victory on both sides is being tested. Russia is betting that superior manpower and ammunition production will eventually produce operational collapse somewhere along the line; Ukraine is betting that the cost of each advance is unsustainable for a system that must also keep its economy and politics intact. Neither proposition has been demonstrated, and the eastern campaign is the evidence base for both. It is also the reason the war's outcome depends on industrial output and mobilisation policy in capitals far from the front.
Stated objectives
What the participants say. Each entry cites where the position was stated; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.
Russia states its objective in the east as full control of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions within the boundaries it declared annexed in September 2022.
Ukraine states its objective as the restoration of its internationally recognised borders, and in the immediate term as holding the line while imposing unsustainable costs.
Assessed objectives
Vigil's reading, graded. Kept structurally apart from stated positions so an assessment can never be published as someone's declared aim.
Russian operational method prioritises steady pressure across a wide frontage over concentrated breakthrough, which is consistent with a theory of victory based on exhaustion rather than manoeuvre.
Ukraine's defensive approach has traded space for casualties deliberately at some points and involuntarily at others, and public evidence does not reliably separate the two.
Primary forces
- Ground Forces Primary force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06
Opposing forces
- Armed Forces of Ukraine Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06
- 3rd Army Corps Opposing force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2026-06
Recorded as a formation the module publishes and that is consistently associated with the eastern axis in open reporting. No position is stated.
Supporting & external
- 1st Army Corps (DNR) Supporting force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2026-06
- Unmanned Systems Forces Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06
The Unmanned Systems Forces are the clearest institutional expression of how this campaign's character changed after 2023.
Reported participants
- Wagner Group → Africa Corps Reported participant · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2023-05
Private military structures, principally Wagner, were central to the Bakhmut phase before the June 2023 mutiny and subsequent restructuring.
Phases
Concentration on the east
Russian forces redeployed from the failed northern axes and concentrated artillery-led attacks in Luhansk, taking Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk through massed fires before the effort culminated.
Bakhmut and the winter of maximum cost
The longest and costliest single action of the war to that point, conducted substantially by Wagner and ending in Russian control of a largely destroyed town. Its operational value has been disputed since; its cost to both sides was not.
Avdiivka and the shift of initiative
Following the failure of Ukraine's southern offensive and coinciding with the six-month interruption in US supply, Russia regained the initiative and took Avdiivka in February 2024. Ukraine's cross-border operation into Kursk later that year did not reverse the eastern trend.
Drone saturation and the slow grind
Ubiquitous reconnaissance and strike drones on both sides made vehicle movement and troop concentration near the line prohibitively dangerous. Assaults became small and dismounted, advances slow but persistent, and the depth of the contested zone behind the line grew substantially.
Outcome and present status
Unresolved and continuing. Russia holds the initiative and has advanced slowly at high cost since 2024, without achieving operational breakthrough or the full control of Donetsk region it states as its objective. Ukraine has not been forced into collapse anywhere along the line, and has not been able to reverse the trend. The campaign's present state is best described as an exchange in which both sides are betting on the other's exhaustion.
Observed adaptations
Both sides moved from mechanised assault to small dismounted infantry groups supported by drones, because vehicle concentrations near the line became unsurvivable.
Ukraine institutionalised drone warfare as a separate branch — the Unmanned Systems Forces — rather than distributing the capability across existing arms.
Fibre-optic controlled drones were adopted by both sides to defeat electronic-warfare jamming, an adaptation and counter-adaptation cycle that has repeated several times.
Military implications
Demonstrates that a saturated reconnaissance-strike environment can suppress manoeuvre by both sides simultaneously — the most-studied military lesson of the war.
Economic implications
Makes ammunition and drone production rates a direct determinant of territorial outcomes, which is why industrial policy in Europe and Russia is a front-line variable.
Humanitarian implications
Produces continuous mandatory evacuation of frontline settlements and the progressive destruction of the towns being contested.
Linked events
Locations
Places this module already publishes as map markers, listed because the campaign is about them. Not an operational area.
What remains unknown
- Casualty figures on both sides are contested by wide margins, are used as instruments by both governments, and are not stated by this module.
- Current unit dispositions and the real state of any sector are deliberately not published here; the module's own frontline is illustrative and dated.
- Ammunition expenditure and stock levels are classified on both sides and are inferred from fire rates reported by observers.
- Ukrainian and Russian claims about the effectiveness of each other's fortification programmes are unverifiable from open sources.
Readings the evidence also supports
- Slow Russian advances can be read as evidence that the offensive is culminating, or as evidence that a deliberate attritional method is working as intended and simply looks unimpressive on a map. The two readings imply opposite expectations, and territorial data alone cannot distinguish them.
- Ukrainian withdrawals from contested towns can be read as capability failure or as a shift to a deliberate defence-in-depth that trades ground for casualties. Both have been asserted by Ukrainian officials at different times about different withdrawals.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
What to watch
Ukrainian infantry manpower and mobilisation policy
The binding constraint on the defence. Conscription-age changes and recruitment rates matter more to the line than any single equipment transfer.
Russian recruitment without a second formal mobilisation
Whether contract recruitment continues to cover losses is the equivalent constraint on the other side, and a formal mobilisation would be a costly political signal.
Ammunition and drone production on both sides
European output, Russian defence production and North Korean supply together set the rate of fire this campaign can sustain.
Whether any advance becomes operational rather than incremental
The campaign's whole character would change if slow gains produced a collapse of a defensive sector rather than another fortified line behind it.