التشكيلات

مشتركة

الجيش الموحّد للدولة الأوكرانية — الفروع البرية والاقتحام الجوي والجوية والبحرية ومشاة البحرية والعمليات الخاصة والأنظمة غير المأهولة والدعم، تحت هيئة الأركان العامة. توسّع من نواته المحترفة قبل 2022 ليصبح أحد أكبر الجيوش الأوروبية في زمن الحرب؛ ولا يسجّل هذا الأطلس بنيته إلا على مستوى الفروع والتشكيلات.

برية · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

أكبر الفروع — ألوية آلية ومزوّدة بالمركبات ومشاة.

برية · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

مشاة خفيفة نخبوية للرد السريع، تُستخدم «فرقة إطفاء» متنقلة.

جوية · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

طيران مقاتل ودفاع جوي أرضي — لم يتنازل عن السماء قط، ولم يسيطر عليها قط.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوية

ذراع الدفاع الجوي الأرضي في القوات الجوية — ألوية وأفواج صواريخ أرض-جو متعددة الطبقات، من منظومات S-300 و Buk الموروثة إلى باتريوت و IRIS-T و NASAMS و SAMP/T.

قوة بحرية صغيرة نجحت مع ذلك في دفع أسطول البحر الأسود بعيدًا عن الشمال الغربي.

بحرية · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

ألوية مشاة بحرية قاتلت في معظمها قواتٍ برية — من الدفاع عن ماريوبول إلى عمليات عبور نهر دنيبرو.

غير مأهولة · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

فرع مخصص للمسيّرات أُنشئ في 2024 — سابقة تنظيمية.

برية · تابعة للفيلق 1 «آزوف»

تشكيل مشاة هجومي، يرتبط أكثر ما يرتبط بالدفاع عن ماريوبول في 2022.

وحدة خاصة مقرها خاركيف ومرتبطة بالاستخبارات العسكرية؛ برزت في الهجوم المضاد في الشمال الشرقي في 2022.

مشتركة

الجيش الجامع للدولة الروسية — الفروع البرية والجوفضائية والمحمولة جوًا والبحرية والصواريخ الاستراتيجية والعمليات الخاصة والسكك الحديدية والدعم المادي، تحت هيئة الأركان العامة. لا يسجّل هذا الأطلس بنيته إلا على مستوى الفروع والجيوش والتشكيلات؛ ولا ينشر أي انتشار أو قوام أو مواقع، وتقع عدة بنى تطوعية وغير نظامية تقاتل إلى جانبه خارج هذه الشجرة عن قصد.

برية · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الروسية

جيوش أسلحة مشتركة توفّر الجزء الأكبر من القوى البشرية للغزو.

جوية · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الروسية

الفرع الجوفضائي الجامع — القوات الجوية، وقوات الدفاع الجوي والصاروخي، والقوات الفضائية؛ وهو محوري في حملات الضرب بالقنابل الانزلاقية والصواريخ.

برية · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الروسية

مشاة خفيفة نخبوية — محمولة جوًا بحسب العقيدة، وتُستخدم عمليًا قوات اقتحام في الخط الأمامي.

تشكيلات مشاة بحرية زُجّ بها قواتِ اقتحام برية، ولا سيما في الجنوب.

بعد التمرد في 2023 ووفاة مؤسسها، أُعيد تنظيم بنى فاغنر تحت سيطرة وزارة الدفاع.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

فيلق أُنشئ في إصلاح الفيالق الأوكراني عام 2025 حول اللواء الهجومي المنفصل 3 بوصفه تشكيله الأساسي.

برية · تابعة للفيلق 3

لواء هجومي تشكّل في 2022، وهو من أكثر التشكيلات الأوكرانية شهرة إعلامية؛ ونواة الفيلق 3 منذ إصلاح 2025.

برية · تابعة للفيلق 3

Mechanized brigade formed in 2016 as an infantry brigade of the reserve corps and re-roled after 2022; publicly documented in the Kherson-oblast fighting of 2022, Bakhmut in 2023 and the Kupiansk and Lyman sectors in 2024; reported to have joined the 3rd Army Corps in July 2025.

برية · تابعة للفيلق 3

Mechanized brigade raised in 2014 and in near-continuous line service in the Donbas since — Marinka, Avdiivka and the Donetsk-city sectors; reported to have joined the 3rd Army Corps in August 2025.

برية · تابعة للفيلق 3

Mechanized brigade in line service through the full-scale war's eastern and southern battles, publicly associated with the Lyman and Siversk sectors; reported to have joined the 3rd Army Corps in August 2025.

برية · تابعة للفيلق 3

Heavy mechanized brigade formed in the later reorganisations from the 125th Territorial Defence Brigade, a Lviv formation whose 2024 Kharkiv-border record was publicly debated; reported to have joined the 3rd Army Corps in August 2025.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

Long-standing regular mechanized brigade from Yavoriv in the west, named for the medieval king of Galicia; fought in the Donbas from 2014 and through the major positional battles of the full-scale war, most publicly the long defence of Chasiv Yar in 2024. No corps assignment is published.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

لواء آلي مبني حول المعدات الغربية — موثّق علنًا أنه شغّل مركبات قتال المشاة Bradley ودبابات أبرامز في الهجوم الجنوبي في 2023 وما بعده.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

لواء آلي مخضرم، يرتبط علنًا بالدفاع الطويل عن Vuhledar في 2022–23.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

Kharkiv-region brigade, prominent in the September 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive that it helped spearhead from its home ground; converted from a mechanized to an assault brigade in the later reorganisations and publicly associated with the Kupiansk and border sectors since. No corps assignment is published.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

من أشهر الألوية الآلية الأوكرانية — تحتل باخموت ومعارك المواقع في دونباس مكانًا بارزًا في سجله العلني.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

The Kryvyi Rih tank brigade, one of Ukraine's small number of dedicated tank formations, reorganised in late October 2024 as the Ground Forces' first heavy mechanized brigade after its tank battalions had spent 2022–24 dispersed among mechanized brigades. No corps assignment is published.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

Heavy artillery brigade of the high-command reserve, formed in autumn 2014 — publicly documented operating the war's largest tube systems, the 203 mm 2S7 and the PzH 2000, and a fixture of the artillery duel since 2022. No corps assignment is published; the reserve status is the reason.

برية · تابعة لقوات الاقتحام الجوي

اللواء الوحيد المصنّف مظليًا في قوات الاقتحام الجوي (DShV)؛ في قتال عنيف متواصل منذ معارك دونباس في 2022.

برية · تابعة لقوات الاقتحام الجوي

Airmobile brigade committed across the war's crisis points — the defence of Soledar and Bakhmut in the winter of 2022–23, then the Orikhiv axis in the 2023 southern offensive.

برية · تابعة لقوات الاقتحام الجوي

Airmobile brigade formed in summer 2022 in the Air Assault Forces' wartime expansion; joined the defence of Bakhmut after Soledar fell in January 2023 and has served on the eastern front since.

برية · تابعة لقوات الاقتحام الجوي

Air assault brigade from Mykolaiv, publicly associated with the defence of the south in 2022, the Siverskyi Donets fighting that summer, and years of Donbas fighting since — Marinka and the Kurakhove sector among the most documented.

برية · تابعة لقوات الاقتحام الجوي

Air assault brigade from Lviv with a prominent public record from Bakhmut in 2023 and the northern axes; the formation from which the 82nd Brigade was raised in December 2022.

برية · تابعة لقوات الاقتحام الجوي

Airmobile brigade re-established in 2014–15 with a Donetsk airport lineage; long service in the Donbas including the Sloviansk front in 2022 and the Bakhmut and Siversk sectors since.

برية · تابعة لقوات الاقتحام الجوي

Air assault brigade formed in December 2022 from a battalion group of the 80th Brigade and equipped with Western vehicles — Challenger 2, Marder and Stryker — publicly documented at Robotyne in the 2023 southern offensive and in the August 2024 Kursk incursion.

برية · تابعة لقوات الاقتحام الجوي

Veteran air assault brigade from Zhytomyr — the 2014 "longest raid" behind separatist lines and years of front-line rotations anchor its public history; publicly documented on the Izium axis in 2022 and in the Donbas rotations, Bakhmut and Kreminna among them, since.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوية

Tactical aviation brigade of the MiG-29 fleet, from Vasylkiv near Kyiv — the workhorse fighter of Ukraine's wartime air defence, dispersed within hours of the February 2022 strikes and adapted to fire Western weapons before the F-16 arrived.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوية

Tactical aviation brigade flying the Su-27 from Myrhorod in Poltava oblast — the heavy fighter arm of the pre-F-16 fleet, dispersed in the first hours of 2022 and kept flying through the years its base was repeatedly struck.

جوية · تابعة لقوات الصواريخ أرض-جو

The Kyiv anti-aircraft missile brigade of the air-defence belt around the capital region — publicly documented on legacy S-300 and, from 2023, on Patriot, including the intercepts of ballistic and aeroballistic missiles over Kyiv that its commander described publicly in May 2023.

The small-boat surface component — patrol boats and minor combatants after the flagship frigate was scuttled at Mykolaiv in February 2022; the two corvettes under construction in Türkiye remain the future capital element, the first launched in 2022 and on trials since 2024.

The riverine arm — a Dnipro river flotilla raised in 2022 against the threat from the north and expanded in 2023 with a second division for the southern river, holding the estuary approaches and the Kherson reach with small craft.

The naval air arm — a single naval aviation brigade of transport aircraft, helicopters and Bayraktar TB2 drones; publicly documented for the drone operations over Snake Island and the north-western Black Sea in 2022.

الذراع الصاروخية الساحلية — موطن منظومة Neptune التي أغرقت الطراد موسكفا.

حصة القوات البحرية من حملة المسيّرات البحرية الأوكرانية؛ إذ تدير أجهزة الاستخبارات جزءًا كبيرًا من جهد الزوارق غير المأهولة المعروف علنًا، ولذلك يبقى هذا السجل عامًا عن قصد.

بحرية · تابعة لسلاح مشاة البحرية

لواء مشاة البحرية الذي دافع عن ماريوبول في 2022، وأُعيد تشكيله بعد آزوفستال؛ رمز لكلفة الحرب على السلاح.

بحرية · تابعة لسلاح مشاة البحرية

Marine brigade with long service on the southern front — the 2023 southern offensive, where it took Urozhaine with the 38th, and the Dnipro left-bank operation at Krynky from October 2023 to the withdrawal in 2024.

بحرية · تابعة لسلاح مشاة البحرية

Marine brigade formed in February 2023 from an existing marine battalion in the corps' expansion, and committed within months to the 2023 southern offensive, where it took Urozhaine with the 35th.

عمليات خاصة · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

ذراع مستقلة للعمليات الخاصة منذ 2016، بُنيت وفق نماذج الناتو؛ موثّقة علنًا في خطوطها العريضة فقط — وهذا كل ما يحمله هذا الأطلس.

برية · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

فرع التعبئة الجماهيرية الذي أُنشئ حول غزو 2022 — ألوية إقليمية تحوّلت من الدفاع المحلي إلى خدمة نظامية على خط الجبهة.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

الهندسة والدفاع الكيميائي والبيولوجي والإشعاعي والنووي ووظائف الإسناد القتالي الأخرى، مجمّعة في فرع مستقل.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

فرع الخدمات الخلفية — الإمداد والنقل والصيانة لقوة قوامها مليون فرد تحت تهديد ضربات مستمر.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات اللوجستية

The half of the Logistics Forces that owns weapons and vehicles — the central directorates for armour, automotive and missile-artillery equipment, and the repair estate behind them. The ministry publishes the Armament/Rear split and the branch's tasks; the directorate list beneath it is published compilation, which is why every child edge is graded reported.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات اللوجستية

The half of the Logistics Forces that owns consumption — fuel, food, general materiel and military signals supply, through central directorates and the storage bases beneath them. The ministry publishes the Armament/Rear split; the directorate list is published compilation and every child edge is graded reported for that reason.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الأوكرانية

الفرع الطبي العسكري — إخلاء الإصابات ومعالجتها على نطاق لم تشهده أوروبا منذ 1945.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات الطبية

The Kyiv centre at the top of the military medical system — the Main Military Clinical Hospital, the referral end of an evacuation chain that begins at a casualty collection point hundreds of kilometres away, and the clinical base of the Military Medical Academy.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات الطبية

The training and doctrine institution of the medical branch, founded by Cabinet resolution on 13 January 1993 — where the wartime revisions to Ukrainian battlefield medicine are taught, and the constraint on how fast the branch can grow.

داخلية / أمنية

قوات تابعة لوزارة الشؤون الداخلية تقاتل إلى جانب الجيش — خيط عسكري موازٍ تمسك ألويته القتالية قطاعات على خط الجبهة تحت السيطرة العملياتية لقيادات القوات المسلحة الأوكرانية، مع بقائها مؤسسيًا ضمن وزارة الداخلية. وفيلقاه المنشآن في 2025 — الفيلق 1 المبني حول آزوف، والفيلق 2 المبني حول Khartiia — هما المثال الأكثر توثيقًا علنًا.

برية · تابعة للحرس الوطني

الفيلق الأول للحرس الوطني، أُنشئ في 2025 حول لواء آزوف بوصفه نواته — جزء من التحوّل الأوكراني الأوسع نحو القيادة على مستوى الفيالق.

برية · تابعة للحرس الوطني

The National Guard's second army corps, announced on 15 April 2025 and built on the 13th Brigade "Khartiia", whose commander leads it — the Kharkiv counterpart to the Azov-built 1st Corps in the Guard's 2025 corps reform.

Land · under 2nd Corps "Khartiia"

Kharkiv-raised National Guard brigade known for technology-heavy operations, and since 15 April 2025 the core of the National Guard's second corps, which its commander leads.

Land · under 2nd Corps "Khartiia"

National Guard operational brigade raised in 2015 with a strong public combat record from the Kyiv airport fighting in 2022 and Bakhmut in 2023; reported assigned to the Guard's second corps in 2025 and attached to the 1st Corps for the Pokrovsk–Dobropillia sector in 2026.

داخلية / أمنية

جهاز حدود ذو طابع عسكري خارج القوات المسلحة؛ قاتلت مفارزه على الخط منذ 2022، وأبرز ذلك في الدفاع عن ماريوبول.

Combat formations publicly associated with intelligence and security services (HUR/GUR, SBU). A browsing group, not a command — the two services answer to different institutions (the Ministry of Defence and, for the SBU, the President), each member's actual parent is stated on its own record, and much of this space is deliberately under-documented.

جهاز استخبارات عسكرية أصبحت عملياته القتالية جزءًا بارزًا علنًا من الحرب — بما في ذلك حملة المسيّرات البحرية التي تنسبها إليه التقارير العلنية على نطاق واسع. موثّق هنا بأقل من قدره عن قصد: لا تُسجَّل إلا الارتباطات المُعلنة أو الواسعة الانتشار في التقارير.

عمليات خاصة · تابعة للتشكيلات المرتبطة بالاستخبارات والأمن

The security service's publicly known combat arm — its special operations centre and the directorate publicly associated with the Sea Baby maritime drones, the 2023 Crimean Bridge strike and the June 2025 strikes on strategic bomber airfields. Recorded here only to the extent of public claims and wide reporting.

Foreign volunteer and anti-Kremlin opposition formations fighting on the Ukrainian side. A browsing group only — these organisations do NOT share a command; each serves under its own documented Ukrainian parent structure, stated on each record. Two frameworks recur beneath the grouping: the International Legion created in February 2022 under the Ground Forces, and the formations publicly associated with Defence Intelligence.

فيلق متطوعين روس يقاتل في صف أوكرانيا منذ 2022؛ يرتبط علنًا بالغارات العابرة للحدود على منطقة بيلغورود في 2023–24.

Belarusian volunteer regiment formed as a battalion in March 2022 and raised to a regiment in May 2022 — the largest Belarusian formation on the Ukrainian side, reported within the Armed Forces under Defence Intelligence, and the parent of several successor and breakaway Belarusian units.

The formal framework for foreign volunteers in Ukrainian service, announced on 27 February 2022 and raised under the Ground Forces; its combat battalions were folded into assault regiments in the 2024 reorganisation, so the Legion is carried as a lineage record rather than a standing unit.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

منطقة عسكرية أُعيد إنشاؤها في 2024 من تقسيم المنطقة العسكرية الغربية؛ وهي في زمن السلم الجهة الأم لجيش الدبابات 1 للحرس والجيش 20 للأسلحة المشتركة.

برية · تابعة لمنطقة موسكو العسكرية

جيش الدبابات الأول، المبني لحرب المناورة عالية الكثافة؛ تكبّد خسائر فادحة في معارك خاركيف في 2022 وأُعيد تشكيله منذ ذلك الحين.

برية · تابعة لجيش الدبابات 1 للحرس

The prestige Kantemirovite tank division of the 1st Guards Tank Army, from Naro-Fominsk; its retreat from the Izium sector in September 2022, with independently counted T-80 losses of around half its strength, was among the most visible Russian losses of the war. Reconstituted and tracked on the Svatove–Kreminna sector since.

برية · تابعة لجيش الدبابات 1 للحرس

The Taman division of the 1st Guards Tank Army — Moscow's ceremonial and showcase formation, the first publicly fielding the T-90M — turned into a line division: the Izium bridgehead in spring 2022, the September retreat, and the Kupiansk axis since.

برية · تابعة لمنطقة موسكو العسكرية

Combined-arms army of the old Western MD, since 2024 under the re-created Moscow MD; parent of the 3rd and 144th Motor Rifle Divisions re-formed in 2016, and engaged on the north-eastern axes through the war.

برية · تابعة للجيش 20 للأسلحة المشتركة للحرس

Motor-rifle division of the 20th Army re-formed in 2016 at Valuyki in Belgorod oblast, on the Ukrainian border itself; committed on the Kharkiv axis in 2022 and tracked on the Kupiansk sector since.

برية · تابعة للجيش 20 للأسلحة المشتركة للحرس

Motor-rifle division of the 20th Army re-established in 2016 in Smolensk oblast as part of the return to divisions on the western frontier; committed on the northern axes in 2022 and tracked on the Svatove–Kreminna line since.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

Military district re-established on 1 March 2024 from the Western MD split, oriented toward the Baltic and Finland and including the Kaliningrad exclave; peacetime parent of the 6th Combined Arms Army.

برية · تابعة لمنطقة لينينغراد العسكرية

The Leningrad Military District's army-level formation — re-formed in the 2010 reform as the Western district's north-western army, engaged on the Kharkiv axis in the full-scale war, and assessed in 2026 to hold divisions in which UAV battalions are expected to be raised.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

المنطقة العسكرية المواجهة للبحر الأسود والقوقاز — منطقة الحشد الرئيسية في الحرب، والجهة الأم في زمن السلم للجيشين 8 و58.

برية · تابعة للمنطقة العسكرية الجنوبية

Southern MD army re-formed in 2017 at Novocherkassk, on the Donbas border, around a division re-established the year before; closely associated with the Donetsk axis since 2022, from the Mariupol operation to the Donetsk-city sectors, and the first Russian parent of the former separatist corps after the 2022 annexations.

برية · تابعة للمنطقة العسكرية الجنوبية

North Caucasus army headquartered at Vladikavkaz; held the Zaporizhzhia line against the 2023 Ukrainian offensive — Moscow's most consequential defensive success of the war — and lost its commander that July after he complained publicly of attrition and rotation.

برية · تابعة للجيش 58 للأسلحة المشتركة

The 58th Army's Chechnya-garrisoned motor-rifle division, re-formed in 2016 from three brigades; a backbone of the 2023 Zaporizhzhia defence in the Robotyne–Verbove sector, holding the fortified belts against the Ukrainian offensive.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

منطقة عسكرية تمتد عبر الفولغا والأورال وسيبيريا؛ والجهة الأم في زمن السلم للجيشين 2 و41.

برية · تابعة للمنطقة العسكرية الوسطى

Volga-region combined-arms army headquartered at Samara, committed since the first weeks of the invasion on the Kharkiv and Izium axes and tracked on the Kupiansk–Lyman sector since.

برية · تابعة للمنطقة العسكرية الوسطى

Siberian combined-arms army headquartered at Novosibirsk; committed in the 2022 northern operation around Chernihiv, where its deputy commander was publicly reported killed, and tracked on the Svatove–Kreminna line since.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

المنطقة العسكرية في الشرق الأقصى؛ انتشرت تشكيلاتها، ومنها الجيش 5 للأسلحة المشتركة، غربًا من أجل الحرب.

برية · تابعة للمنطقة العسكرية الشرقية

Far Eastern combined-arms army headquartered at Ussuriysk, deployed west in 2022; long service on the southern Donetsk axis from the Vuhledar assaults to the 2024 capture of Kurakhove, for which the ministry publicly commended its brigades.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوفضائية (VKS)

ذراع القتال بالطائرات ثابتة الجناح ضمن القوات الجوفضائية — الطيران المقاتل والضارب وطيران الجيش والنقل والطيران بعيد المدى.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوية

قيادة القاذفات الاستراتيجية — أساطيل Tu-95MS و Tu-160 و Tu-22M3 التي تحمل حملة صواريخ كروز على البنية التحتية الأوكرانية.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوفضائية (VKS)

مكوّن الدفاع الجوي والصاروخي الأرضي في القوات الجوفضائية، متعدد الطبقات من الدفاع النقطي إلى المنظومات الاستراتيجية.

برية · تابعة للقوات المحمولة جوًا (VDV)

فرقة الاقتحام الجوي في بسكوف — من أكثر تشكيلات VDV زجًّا في القتال وتوثيقًا علنيًا في هذه الحرب.

برية · تابعة للقوات المحمولة جوًا (VDV)

The Ivanovo airborne division, committed across the war's axes — the 2022 Kyiv operation, then the Bakhmut flanks in 2023, where its regiments were publicly identified — and used, like the rest of the VDV, as line assault infantry.

برية · تابعة للقوات المحمولة جوًا (VDV)

The Tula airborne division, one of the VDV's two parachute divisions; withdrawn from the 2022 northern operation via Belarus, then given the long Bakhmut-flank commitment of 2023, where both its regiments were publicly identified.

برية · تابعة للقوات المحمولة جوًا (VDV)

The Novorossiysk mountain air-assault division — the VDV's southern formation, engaged from the 2022 Kherson operation onward and publicly prominent in the 2023 defence of the Zaporizhzhia line at Robotyne.

برية · تابعة للقوات المحمولة جوًا (VDV)

Separate air-assault brigade from Buryatia in the Far East, one of the VDV's independent brigades; documented in the war from the 2022 northern operation onward and employed as line assault infantry since.

برية · تابعة للقوات المحمولة جوًا (VDV)

Separate air-assault brigade from Ussuriysk in the Far East, formed in 1986; publicly placed in the Kyiv-axis occupation zone in 2022 and committed on the southern and eastern axes since.

الذراع البحرية — التي تحددها في هذه الحرب خسائر أسطول البحر الأسود أمام قوة بحرية بلا سفن رئيسية، وضربات Kalibr من مياه بعيدة.

الأسطول الذي في قلب الحرب: فقد سفينة قيادته بالصواريخ في 2022، وتعرّضت قيادته وقواعده للضرب مرارًا، وأفادت التقارير العلنية بنقل وحدات رئيسية منه شرقًا من سيفاستوبول.

Small flotilla with outsized reach — the force that fired the first ship-launched Kalibr strikes into Syria in October 2015 and an early launch platform for Kalibr strikes into Ukraine; based at Kaspiysk since its relocation from Astrakhan in 2020.

The Arctic-based strategic fleet — home of most of Russia's ballistic-missile submarines — stripped of its joint strategic command status in February 2024 when its regions passed to the re-created Leningrad Military District; peripheral to the Black Sea theatre but a source of Kalibr-capable units and a naval-infantry brigade for the land war.

The Far Eastern fleet, in this war a source of formations rather than of ships: its two naval-infantry brigades were committed to the land war from 2022, mauled in the Vuhledar assaults, and the Vladivostok brigade was announced re-formed as a division in December 2025.

The Russian fleet of the Baltic — based in the Kaliningrad exclave and at the head of the Gulf of Finland, answering to the Navy's main command since the 2024 command reform; contributes naval infantry and coastal formations to the land war, and was assessed in 2026 to have formed a regiment of unmanned naval strike vehicles.

The submarine arm — Improved Kilo boats of the Black Sea Fleet are among the war's persistent Kalibr shooters, the platform Ukrainian defences can least answer; one was publicly documented destroyed in dry dock at Sevastopol in 2023 and another struck by an underwater drone at Novorossiysk in December 2025, by Ukrainian claim.

The fleet air arms — maritime patrol, anti-ship strike and shipborne helicopter forces organised per fleet; in this war the Black Sea Fleet's arm, whose Crimean airfields were struck from August 2022 and whose fighter regiment's losses have been independently counted.

Shore-based anti-ship missile forces — the Bastion and Bal systems held by each fleet's coastal troops — which in this war have been fired from Crimea at land targets around Odesa as often as at ships.

Pacific Fleet naval infantry formation — the much-reconstituted 155th Brigade of the Vuhledar assaults, whose re-formation as the 55th Division the fleet announced on 1 December 2025, reviving a division that existed from 1968 to 2009.

لواء مشاة بحرية تابع لأسطول البحر الأسود؛ خدمة موثّقة كثيفة من ماريوبول إلى المعارك الحدودية في 2024.

Pacific Fleet marine brigade from Kamchatka, committed to the land war and publicly documented spearheading the unsuccessful assaults on Vuhledar in 2022–23 alongside the 155th Brigade.

The Northern Fleet's marine brigade from the Sputnik garrison in Murmansk oblast, part of the amphibious grouping sent to the Black Sea before the invasion and documented on multiple axes of the land war since.

مشاة البحرية التابعة لأسطول البلطيق في Baltiysk، التي زُجّ بها في الحرب البرية بوصفها لواء الحرس 336، وأُعلن توسيعها إلى مستوى فرقة في ديسمبر 2025؛ أما تسمية الفرقة نفسها فقد أفادت بها التقارير ولم تُؤكَّد.

عمليات خاصة · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الروسية

قيادة العمليات الخاصة المخصّصة (SSO) المنشأة في 2013؛ موثّقة علنًا في خطوطها العريضة فقط — وهذا كل ما يحمله هذا الأطلس.

برية · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الروسية

A dedicated railway-engineering arm within the armed forces' material-technical support system — a Russian structural particularity that matters in a war supplied overwhelmingly by rail, and the builder of the 2024 line through occupied territory that bypasses the Crimean Bridge.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الروسية

بنى الدعم المادي والتقني — الخدمات الخلفية التي تُديم القوة، وهدف متكرر للضربات الأوكرانية العميقة.

الحرس الوطني الروسي — أدوار أمن المناطق الخلفية والاحتلال والضبط الداخلي.

تشكيلات جُنِّدت في الشيشان أو تحمل علامتها. وهي صراحةً ليست «جيشًا شيشانيًا» موحّدًا: فـ«Akhmat» تسمية رسمية جزئيًا وعلامة جزئيًا، والجهات الأم الفعلية تختلف — وزارة الدفاع، أو الحرس الوطني الروسي، أو وزارة الداخلية الشيشانية — كما هو مذكور في سجل كل عضو.

The former "people's republic" corps and their notable formations of 2014–2022. A historical and lineage category: after the 2022 annexations these structures were absorbed into regular Russian ones — the two corps reported re-formed as the 51st and 3rd Combined Arms Armies in 2024 — and are not shown here as if unchanged.

فيلق «جمهورية دونيتسك الشعبية» في 2014–2022؛ دُمج في البنى الروسية النظامية بعد الضم، وأفادت التقارير بأنه بات الجيش 51 للأسلحة المشتركة.

The Luhansk counterpart corps of 2014–2022; formally incorporated into the Russian armed forces after the annexation and reported re-formed as the 3rd Combined Arms Army in 2024 — carried as a lineage record.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands, covering the north and the Belarusian border. The 2025–26 corps reform placed the new army corps beneath the four commands rather than abolishing them; the corps under this command are reported but not carried as records, so the tree ends here by design.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands, covering the south and the lower Dnipro. The 2025–26 corps reform placed the new army corps beneath the four commands rather than abolishing them; the corps under this command are reported but not carried as records, so the tree ends here by design.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands, covering the east. The 2025–26 corps reform placed the new army corps beneath the four commands rather than abolishing them; the corps under this command are reported (the 20th Army Corps among them) but are not carried as records, so the command's tree ends here by design.

برية · تابعة للقوات البرية

One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands, covering the west — the rear, the training base and the border with NATO states. The 2025–26 corps reform placed the new army corps beneath the four commands rather than abolishing them; the corps under this command are reported but not carried as records, so the tree ends here by design.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوية

One of the Air Force's four regional air commands, covering the capital region and central Ukraine; each command combines aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector. The Air Force publishes the four commands but not their brigade lists, so none is drawn beneath it.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوية

One of the Air Force's four regional air commands, covering the east and the air defence of the front-line rear; each command combines aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector. The Air Force publishes the four commands but not their brigade lists, so none is drawn beneath it.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوية

One of the Air Force's four regional air commands, covering the south and the Black Sea coast; each command combines aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector. The Air Force publishes the four commands but not their brigade lists, so none is drawn beneath it.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوية

One of the Air Force's four regional air commands, covering the west and the approaches from Belarus and over NATO's border; each command combines aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector. The Air Force publishes the four commands but not their brigade lists, so none is drawn beneath it.

مشتركة · تابعة لدائرة التسليح

Armoured-vehicle equipment across the force: pattern management, repair policy and the recovery of a fleet that has absorbed heavy losses and heavy foreign resupply at once. Carried from published compilation of the Armament service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.

مشتركة · تابعة لدائرة التسليح

The soft-skinned fleet — trucks, tractors and light vehicles — which is what actually moves a war of this size when the railway stops. Carried from published compilation of the Armament service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.

مشتركة · تابعة لدائرة التسليح

Guns, launchers and above all ammunition: the directorate at the centre of the war’s defining scarcity. Carried from published compilation of the Armament service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.

مشتركة · تابعة لدائرة التسليح

A named repair establishment under the armament service — the kind of rear installation whose throughput, not its existence, is the analytically interesting quantity. Carried from published compilation as the representative of a repair estate the ministry describes only generically.

مشتركة · تابعة لدائرة الخدمات الخلفية

Fuel supply for the whole force, run against an energy system that has been a declared strike target since 2022. Carried from published compilation of the Rear service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.

مشتركة · تابعة لدائرة الخدمات الخلفية

Rations and food supply — the least discussed and most continuous of the sustainment problems. Carried from published compilation of the Rear service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.

مشتركة · تابعة لدائرة الخدمات الخلفية

Clothing, equipment and general materiel: the directorate that absorbed the largest share of donated non-lethal aid. Carried from published compilation of the Rear service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.

مشتركة · تابعة لدائرة الخدمات الخلفية

Communications equipment as a supply problem rather than an operational one — issue, repair and replacement of the radios a dispersed force runs on. Carried from published compilation of the Rear service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات الطبية

The Lviv regional centre: the western end of the evacuation chain, and the closest large military hospital to the Polish border and onward treatment abroad. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات الطبية

The Odesa regional centre, covering the southern axis and the coast. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات الطبية

The Kharkiv regional centre — a major military hospital inside a city that has itself been under repeated strike since 2022. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات الطبية

The Dnipro regional centre, the principal receiving hospital for the eastern front and by wide reporting the busiest node in the chain. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات الطبية

The Vinnytsia regional centre, covering the central rear and part of the onward-treatment flow. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات الطبية

The numbered mobile hospitals (59th, 61st, 65th, 66th and 71st) as one record at the level this atlas works: deployable surgical capacity sitting between front-line stabilisation and the regional clinical centres. A category record by design; where any of them is deployed is never authored.

Combat formations raised under the Interior Ministry outside the National Guard — police-based assault units, most visibly the assault brigade the ministry's Offensive Guard programme raised from police special-purpose regiments in 2023. A browsing group, not a command; each member's actual parent institution would be stated on its own record. The group currently has no records beneath it, which is a research gap and not a claim that none exist.

Formations of Russian citizens fighting against Moscow on the Ukrainian side — the Freedom of Russia Legion, the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Siberian Battalion, publicly associated with Defence Intelligence and named together in the 2023–24 cross-border raids. A browsing group, not a command: each unit's Ukrainian parent structure is stated, and graded, on its record.

تطوعية / غير نظامية · تابعة للتشكيلات الروسية المناهضة للكرملين

Russian émigré volunteer corps formed in 2022, publicly known for the 2023–24 cross-border raids into Bryansk, Belgorod and Kursk regions; its politics and command relationships are contested in public reporting — described by Ukrainian officials at different times as an independent organisation and as a formation Ukraine helps, and by reporting as associated with Defence Intelligence.

Volunteer unit of Russian citizens formed within Ukrainian military structures in October 2023 — publicly confirmed by Kyiv at the time — and named with the Freedom of Russia Legion and the RDK in the March 2024 cross-border raids. Reported as part of Defence Intelligence's international legion; public information beyond that is thin and largely self-published.

Belarusian volunteer formations fighting on the Ukrainian side, of which the Kalinoŭski Regiment raised in March 2022 is the largest and the only one carried here. A browsing group, not a command; the regiment's own record states its reported parent.

Chechen formations aligned with the Ichkerian cause fighting on Ukraine's side since 2014 — distinct from, and opposed to, the Kadyrov-aligned units on the Russian side. A browsing group, not a command: the two battalions carried here have different relationships to Ukrainian structures, stated on their own records.

Chechen volunteer battalion named for Ichkeria's first president, formed in 2014 by a veteran of the Chechen wars and active on the Ukrainian side since; described in reporting as within Ukrainian force structures and filed by compilation under Defence Intelligence, neither of which is a published subordination.

Chechen volunteer battalion of veterans of the two Chechen wars, active on the Ukrainian side since 2014 and re-formed in March 2022; by consistent public accounts the one Chechen unit that has remained a volunteer formation outside formal Ukrainian force structures.

Reviewed foreign volunteer formations outside the Russian, Belarusian and Chechen groups — in practice the International Legion of February 2022, the Ground Forces' legal framework for foreign volunteers, carried as a lineage record after its 2024 reorganisation. A browsing group, not a command.

عقدة توجيه، لا قيادة. الداعمون المنحازون إلى كييف — الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي والناتو وبولندا — يقدّمون الأسلحة والتمويل والاستخبارات والعبور لا القوات، ولا يقود أيٌّ منهم شيئًا في هذه الشجرة. ولكلٍّ منهم الآن ملمحه الاستراتيجي الخاص، بما في ذلك الأهداف المُعلَنة والأهداف بحسب تقييم Vigil والقيود وأوراق النفوذ، ضمن الملامح.

جوية · تابعة للقوات الجوفضائية (VKS)

The military-space component of the Aerospace Forces — launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome, satellite control and the missile attack warning system. Its contribution to this war (reconnaissance, navigation, warning) is structural rather than documented, and the atlas does not author it.

برية · تابعة للقوات المحمولة جوًا (VDV)

Ulyanovsk air-assault brigade, documented in the war from 2022; publicly reported to have become the basis of the re-formed 104th Guards Air Assault Division in September 2023, a plan announced in 2015 — carried here as a lineage record pending source review of the successor.

مشتركة · تابعة للقوات المسلحة الروسية

The land-based strategic nuclear arm — a separate branch of the armed forces alongside the ground, aerospace and naval services. Listed for structural completeness only: this atlas deliberately carries no detail below this line, by policy rather than for want of sources.

Volunteer and contract formations raised under Ministry of Defence structures — the BARS combat-reserve detachments and the formations recruited through the Redut shell. A browsing group, not a single command: each member's documented parent is stated on its record, and both members are category records because the ministry publishes no list of the units.

The Ministry of Defence's combat army reserve, created in 2015 on a part-time contract model and expanded from 2022 into numbered volunteer detachments across the front — a category record; individual detachments are not tracked here because no list of them is published.

Volunteer formations recruited through the Redut structure — described by investigative reporting and UK Defence Intelligence as a recruitment shell operated for Russian military intelligence, whose contractors were offered ministry contracts after 2022 and which fed more than twenty formations. A category record: the composition is deliberately opaque in public reporting.

The best-known Akhmat-branded formation — a Ministry of Defence-subordinated volunteer unit publicly fronted by the Chechen leadership, whose commander was appointed to a ministry post in 2024. Branding and structure are entangled by design: the unit publicly claims roles (Bakhmut 2023, the Belgorod and Kursk border in 2023–24) that independent reporting confirms only in part.

Rosgvardia regiment recruited in Chechnya — the 'Kadyrovite' core formation, documented in the war from the 2022 Kyiv operation onward. Its formal parent is the National Guard's Chechen directorate; the Akhmat grouping above it is navigation only, and its combat record since 2022 is contested in public reporting.

The best-known Donetsk separatist battalion of 2014, named in 2017 for its assassinated first commander; later a reconnaissance unit of the 1st Army Corps and, by public reporting, of the corps' Russian successor — carried as a lineage record because its current designation is not consistently reported.