提供背景，而非指引目標。本圖譜描述結構與歷史。它刻意排除當前位置、即時兵力、部隊調動以及任何作戰敏感內容——內容模型中根本沒有這些欄位。分支的深度反映的是能從公開來源確立的內容，而非一支部隊的規模、能力或重要性：分支單薄意味著該國公開的資訊很少，而紀錄數量從來不是衡量實力的標準。
更多篩選條件
已檢視的概況119份，共160筆紀錄
完整16份，檢視中103份。另有41筆紀錄為結構性簡略條目。信心、隸屬關係與來源均在各紀錄之內。
烏克蘭武裝部隊
國家軍隊
聯合烏克蘭國家的統一軍隊——在總參謀部之下的陸軍、空中突擊、空軍、海軍、海軍陸戰隊、特種作戰、無人系統與支援軍種。由其2022年前的職業化核心擴編為歐洲最大的戰時軍隊之一；本圖譜僅在軍種與部隊層級記錄其結構。
海軍
軍種一支小型海軍，卻仍將黑海艦隊從西北部逼退。
KRAKEN 1654
特殊單位以哈爾科夫為基地、與軍事情報機構相關的特種單位；在2022年東北部反攻中嶄露頭角。
俄羅斯武裝部隊
國家軍隊
聯合俄羅斯國家的總體軍事力量——在總參謀部之下的陸軍、空天、空降、海軍、戰略火箭、特種作戰、鐵道與物資支援軍種。本圖譜僅在軍種、集團軍與部隊層級記錄其結構；不公布任何部署、兵力或位置，而與其並肩作戰的若干志願與非正規結構，依設計位於此樹狀結構之外。
海軍步兵
軍種被投入作為地面突擊部隊的海軍步兵部隊，尤其在南部。
瓦格納集團 → 非洲軍團
私人軍事公司譜系在2023年的兵變及其創辦人死亡之後，瓦格納的結構被重組至國防部控制之下。
陸上 · 隸屬第3軍Mechanized brigade formed in 2016 as an infantry brigade of the reserve corps and re-roled after 2022; publicly documented in the Kherson-oblast fighting of 2022, Bakhmut in 2023 and the Kupiansk and Lyman sectors in 2024; reported to have joined the 3rd Army Corps in July 2025.
陸上 · 隸屬第3軍Mechanized brigade raised in 2014 and in near-continuous line service in the Donbas since — Marinka, Avdiivka and the Donetsk-city sectors; reported to have joined the 3rd Army Corps in August 2025.
陸上 · 隸屬第3軍Mechanized brigade in line service through the full-scale war's eastern and southern battles, publicly associated with the Lyman and Siversk sectors; reported to have joined the 3rd Army Corps in August 2025.
陸上 · 隸屬第3軍Heavy mechanized brigade formed in the later reorganisations from the 125th Territorial Defence Brigade, a Lviv formation whose 2024 Kharkiv-border record was publicly debated; reported to have joined the 3rd Army Corps in August 2025.
陸上 · 隸屬陸軍Long-standing regular mechanized brigade from Yavoriv in the west, named for the medieval king of Galicia; fought in the Donbas from 2014 and through the major positional battles of the full-scale war, most publicly the long defence of Chasiv Yar in 2024. No corps assignment is published.
陸上 · 隸屬陸軍Kharkiv-region brigade, prominent in the September 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive that it helped spearhead from its home ground; converted from a mechanized to an assault brigade in the later reorganisations and publicly associated with the Kupiansk and border sectors since. No corps assignment is published.
陸上 · 隸屬陸軍The Kryvyi Rih tank brigade, one of Ukraine's small number of dedicated tank formations, reorganised in late October 2024 as the Ground Forces' first heavy mechanized brigade after its tank battalions had spent 2022–24 dispersed among mechanized brigades. No corps assignment is published.
陸上 · 隸屬陸軍Heavy artillery brigade of the high-command reserve, formed in autumn 2014 — publicly documented operating the war's largest tube systems, the 203 mm 2S7 and the PzH 2000, and a fixture of the artillery duel since 2022. No corps assignment is published; the reserve status is the reason.
陸上 · 隸屬空中突擊部隊Airmobile brigade committed across the war's crisis points — the defence of Soledar and Bakhmut in the winter of 2022–23, then the Orikhiv axis in the 2023 southern offensive.
陸上 · 隸屬空中突擊部隊Airmobile brigade formed in summer 2022 in the Air Assault Forces' wartime expansion; joined the defence of Bakhmut after Soledar fell in January 2023 and has served on the eastern front since.
陸上 · 隸屬空中突擊部隊Air assault brigade from Mykolaiv, publicly associated with the defence of the south in 2022, the Siverskyi Donets fighting that summer, and years of Donbas fighting since — Marinka and the Kurakhove sector among the most documented.
陸上 · 隸屬空中突擊部隊Air assault brigade from Lviv with a prominent public record from Bakhmut in 2023 and the northern axes; the formation from which the 82nd Brigade was raised in December 2022.
陸上 · 隸屬空中突擊部隊Airmobile brigade re-established in 2014–15 with a Donetsk airport lineage; long service in the Donbas including the Sloviansk front in 2022 and the Bakhmut and Siversk sectors since.
陸上 · 隸屬空中突擊部隊Air assault brigade formed in December 2022 from a battalion group of the 80th Brigade and equipped with Western vehicles — Challenger 2, Marder and Stryker — publicly documented at Robotyne in the 2023 southern offensive and in the August 2024 Kursk incursion.
陸上 · 隸屬空中突擊部隊Veteran air assault brigade from Zhytomyr — the 2014 "longest raid" behind separatist lines and years of front-line rotations anchor its public history; publicly documented on the Izium axis in 2022 and in the Donbas rotations, Bakhmut and Kreminna among them, since.
空中 · 隸屬空軍Tactical aviation brigade of the MiG-29 fleet, from Vasylkiv near Kyiv — the workhorse fighter of Ukraine's wartime air defence, dispersed within hours of the February 2022 strikes and adapted to fire Western weapons before the F-16 arrived.
空中 · 隸屬空軍Tactical aviation brigade flying the Su-27 from Myrhorod in Poltava oblast — the heavy fighter arm of the pre-F-16 fleet, dispersed in the first hours of 2022 and kept flying through the years its base was repeatedly struck.
空中 · 隸屬地對空飛彈部隊The Kyiv anti-aircraft missile brigade of the air-defence belt around the capital region — publicly documented on legacy S-300 and, from 2023, on Patriot, including the intercepts of ballistic and aeroballistic missiles over Kyiv that its commander described publicly in May 2023.
水面部隊
軍種The small-boat surface component — patrol boats and minor combatants after the flagship frigate was scuttled at Mykolaiv in February 2022; the two corvettes under construction in Türkiye remain the future capital element, the first launched in 2022 and on trials since 2024.
河川與沿岸區艦隊
軍種The riverine arm — a Dnipro river flotilla raised in 2022 against the threat from the north and expanded in 2023 with a second division for the southern river, holding the estuary approaches and the Kherson reach with small craft.
海軍航空兵
軍種The naval air arm — a single naval aviation brigade of transport aircraft, helicopters and Bayraktar TB2 drones; publicly documented for the drone operations over Snake Island and the north-western Black Sea in 2022.
岸基飛彈兵種——擊沉莫斯科號巡洋艦的海王星系統即隸屬於此。
無人海上部隊
軍種海軍在烏克蘭海上無人機行動中所占的部分；公開已知的無人水面艇作戰多由情報機構執行，因此本紀錄刻意保持概括。
海上 · 隸屬海軍陸戰隊Marine brigade with long service on the southern front — the 2023 southern offensive, where it took Urozhaine with the 38th, and the Dnipro left-bank operation at Krynky from October 2023 to the withdrawal in 2024.
海上 · 隸屬海軍陸戰隊Marine brigade formed in February 2023 from an existing marine battalion in the corps' expansion, and committed within months to the 2023 southern offensive, where it took Urozhaine with the 35th.
聯合 · 隸屬後勤部隊The half of the Logistics Forces that owns weapons and vehicles — the central directorates for armour, automotive and missile-artillery equipment, and the repair estate behind them. The ministry publishes the Armament/Rear split and the branch's tasks; the directorate list beneath it is published compilation, which is why every child edge is graded reported.
聯合 · 隸屬後勤部隊The half of the Logistics Forces that owns consumption — fuel, food, general materiel and military signals supply, through central directorates and the storage bases beneath them. The ministry publishes the Armament/Rear split; the directorate list is published compilation and every child edge is graded reported for that reason.
聯合 · 隸屬醫療部隊The Kyiv centre at the top of the military medical system — the Main Military Clinical Hospital, the referral end of an evacuation chain that begins at a casualty collection point hundreds of kilometres away, and the clinical base of the Military Medical Academy.
聯合 · 隸屬醫療部隊The training and doctrine institution of the medical branch, founded by Cabinet resolution on 13 January 1993 — where the wartime revisions to Ukrainian battlefield medicine are taught, and the constraint on how fast the branch can grow.
國民警衛隊
內部安全部隊
內部 / 安全隸屬內政部、與陸軍並肩作戰的部隊 — 一條平行的軍事支線，其作戰旅在烏克蘭武裝部隊各司令部的作戰管制下據守前線地段，但在制度上仍隸屬內政體系。其2025年的兩個軍 — 以亞速為核心的第1軍與以Khartiia為核心的第2軍 — 是公開記載最詳盡的例子。
陸上 · 隸屬國民警衛隊The National Guard's second army corps, announced on 15 April 2025 and built on the 13th Brigade "Khartiia", whose commander leads it — the Kharkiv counterpart to the Azov-built 1st Corps in the Guard's 2025 corps reform.
Land · under 2nd Corps "Khartiia"Kharkiv-raised National Guard brigade known for technology-heavy operations, and since 15 April 2025 the core of the National Guard's second corps, which its commander leads.
Land · under 2nd Corps "Khartiia"National Guard operational brigade raised in 2015 with a strong public combat record from the Kyiv airport fighting in 2022 and Bakhmut in 2023; reported assigned to the Guard's second corps in 2025 and attached to the 1st Corps for the Pokrovsk–Dobropillia sector in 2026.
情報與安全相關部隊
組合 · 非指揮關係Combat formations publicly associated with intelligence and security services (HUR/GUR, SBU). A browsing group, not a command — the two services answer to different institutions (the Ministry of Defence and, for the SBU, the President), each member's actual parent is stated on its own record, and much of this space is deliberately under-documented.
軍事情報機構，其戰鬥行動成為這場戰爭中公開矚目的一部分——包括公開報導普遍歸於它的海上無人機行動。此處刻意記載有限：僅記錄公開宣稱或廣泛報導的關聯。
特種作戰 · 隸屬情報與安全相關部隊The security service's publicly known combat arm — its special operations centre and the directorate publicly associated with the Sea Baby maritime drones, the 2023 Crimean Bridge strike and the June 2025 strikes on strategic bomber airfields. Recorded here only to the extent of public claims and wide reporting.
外國與反對派部隊
組合 · 非指揮關係Foreign volunteer and anti-Kremlin opposition formations fighting on the Ukrainian side. A browsing group only — these organisations do NOT share a command; each serves under its own documented Ukrainian parent structure, stated on each record. Two frameworks recur beneath the grouping: the International Legion created in February 2022 under the Ground Forces, and the formations publicly associated with Defence Intelligence.
自由俄羅斯軍團
志願部隊自2022年起為烏克蘭作戰的俄羅斯志願軍團；公開資料將其與2023–24年越境突襲別爾哥羅德州聯繫在一起。
Belarusian volunteer regiment formed as a battalion in March 2022 and raised to a regiment in May 2022 — the largest Belarusian formation on the Ukrainian side, reported within the Armed Forces under Defence Intelligence, and the parent of several successor and breakaway Belarusian units.
國際軍團
志願部隊The formal framework for foreign volunteers in Ukrainian service, announced on 27 February 2022 and raised under the Ground Forces; its combat battalions were folded into assault regiments in the 2024 reorganisation, so the Legion is carried as a lineage record rather than a standing unit.
陸上 · 隸屬第1近衛戰車集團軍The prestige Kantemirovite tank division of the 1st Guards Tank Army, from Naro-Fominsk; its retreat from the Izium sector in September 2022, with independently counted T-80 losses of around half its strength, was among the most visible Russian losses of the war. Reconstituted and tracked on the Svatove–Kreminna sector since.
陸上 · 隸屬第1近衛戰車集團軍The Taman division of the 1st Guards Tank Army — Moscow's ceremonial and showcase formation, the first publicly fielding the T-90M — turned into a line division: the Izium bridgehead in spring 2022, the September retreat, and the Kupiansk axis since.
陸上 · 隸屬莫斯科軍區Combined-arms army of the old Western MD, since 2024 under the re-created Moscow MD; parent of the 3rd and 144th Motor Rifle Divisions re-formed in 2016, and engaged on the north-eastern axes through the war.
陸上 · 隸屬第20近衛諸兵種合成集團軍Motor-rifle division of the 20th Army re-formed in 2016 at Valuyki in Belgorod oblast, on the Ukrainian border itself; committed on the Kharkiv axis in 2022 and tracked on the Kupiansk sector since.
陸上 · 隸屬第20近衛諸兵種合成集團軍Motor-rifle division of the 20th Army re-established in 2016 in Smolensk oblast as part of the return to divisions on the western frontier; committed on the northern axes in 2022 and tracked on the Svatove–Kreminna line since.
列寧格勒軍區
軍區陸上 · 隸屬陸軍Military district re-established on 1 March 2024 from the Western MD split, oriented toward the Baltic and Finland and including the Kaliningrad exclave; peacetime parent of the 6th Combined Arms Army.
第6諸兵種合成集團軍
集團軍陸上 · 隸屬列寧格勒軍區The Leningrad Military District's army-level formation — re-formed in the 2010 reform as the Western district's north-western army, engaged on the Kharkiv axis in the full-scale war, and assessed in 2026 to hold divisions in which UAV battalions are expected to be raised.
第8近衛諸兵種合成集團軍
集團軍陸上 · 隸屬南部軍區Southern MD army re-formed in 2017 at Novocherkassk, on the Donbas border, around a division re-established the year before; closely associated with the Donetsk axis since 2022, from the Mariupol operation to the Donetsk-city sectors, and the first Russian parent of the former separatist corps after the 2022 annexations.
第58諸兵種合成集團軍
集團軍陸上 · 隸屬南部軍區North Caucasus army headquartered at Vladikavkaz; held the Zaporizhzhia line against the 2023 Ukrainian offensive — Moscow's most consequential defensive success of the war — and lost its commander that July after he complained publicly of attrition and rotation.
陸上 · 隸屬第58諸兵種合成集團軍The 58th Army's Chechnya-garrisoned motor-rifle division, re-formed in 2016 from three brigades; a backbone of the 2023 Zaporizhzhia defence in the Robotyne–Verbove sector, holding the fortified belts against the Ukrainian offensive.
第2近衛諸兵種合成集團軍
集團軍陸上 · 隸屬中部軍區Volga-region combined-arms army headquartered at Samara, committed since the first weeks of the invasion on the Kharkiv and Izium axes and tracked on the Kupiansk–Lyman sector since.
第41諸兵種合成集團軍
集團軍陸上 · 隸屬中部軍區Siberian combined-arms army headquartered at Novosibirsk; committed in the 2022 northern operation around Chernihiv, where its deputy commander was publicly reported killed, and tracked on the Svatove–Kreminna line since.
第5諸兵種合成集團軍
集團軍陸上 · 隸屬東部軍區Far Eastern combined-arms army headquartered at Ussuriysk, deployed west in 2022; long service on the southern Donetsk axis from the Vuhledar assaults to the 2024 capture of Kurakhove, for which the ministry publicly commended its brigades.
陸上 · 隸屬空降軍（VDV）The Ivanovo airborne division, committed across the war's axes — the 2022 Kyiv operation, then the Bakhmut flanks in 2023, where its regiments were publicly identified — and used, like the rest of the VDV, as line assault infantry.
陸上 · 隸屬空降軍（VDV）The Tula airborne division, one of the VDV's two parachute divisions; withdrawn from the 2022 northern operation via Belarus, then given the long Bakhmut-flank commitment of 2023, where both its regiments were publicly identified.
陸上 · 隸屬空降軍（VDV）The Novorossiysk mountain air-assault division — the VDV's southern formation, engaged from the 2022 Kherson operation onward and publicly prominent in the 2023 defence of the Zaporizhzhia line at Robotyne.
陸上 · 隸屬空降軍（VDV）Separate air-assault brigade from Buryatia in the Far East, one of the VDV's independent brigades; documented in the war from the 2022 northern operation onward and employed as line assault infantry since.
陸上 · 隸屬空降軍（VDV）Separate air-assault brigade from Ussuriysk in the Far East, formed in 1986; publicly placed in the Kyiv-axis occupation zone in 2022 and committed on the southern and eastern axes since.
海軍
軍種艦隊兵種——在這場戰爭中，其特徵是黑海艦隊敗給一支沒有主力艦的海軍，以及從遠方水域發動的Kalibr打擊。
黑海艦隊
艦隊位於這場戰爭中心的艦隊：旗艦於2022年被飛彈擊沉，總部與基地多次遭到打擊，主要單位據公開報導已從塞瓦斯托波爾向東轉移。
裡海區艦隊
小艦隊Small flotilla with outsized reach — the force that fired the first ship-launched Kalibr strikes into Syria in October 2015 and an early launch platform for Kalibr strikes into Ukraine; based at Kaspiysk since its relocation from Astrakhan in 2020.
北方艦隊
艦隊The Arctic-based strategic fleet — home of most of Russia's ballistic-missile submarines — stripped of its joint strategic command status in February 2024 when its regions passed to the re-created Leningrad Military District; peripheral to the Black Sea theatre but a source of Kalibr-capable units and a naval-infantry brigade for the land war.
太平洋艦隊
艦隊The Far Eastern fleet, in this war a source of formations rather than of ships: its two naval-infantry brigades were committed to the land war from 2022, mauled in the Vuhledar assaults, and the Vladivostok brigade was announced re-formed as a division in December 2025.
波羅的海艦隊
艦隊The Russian fleet of the Baltic — based in the Kaliningrad exclave and at the head of the Gulf of Finland, answering to the Navy's main command since the 2024 command reform; contributes naval infantry and coastal formations to the land war, and was assessed in 2026 to have formed a regiment of unmanned naval strike vehicles.
潛艦部隊
軍種The submarine arm — Improved Kilo boats of the Black Sea Fleet are among the war's persistent Kalibr shooters, the platform Ukrainian defences can least answer; one was publicly documented destroyed in dry dock at Sevastopol in 2023 and another struck by an underwater drone at Novorossiysk in December 2025, by Ukrainian claim.
海軍航空兵
軍種The fleet air arms — maritime patrol, anti-ship strike and shipborne helicopter forces organised per fleet; in this war the Black Sea Fleet's arm, whose Crimean airfields were struck from August 2022 and whose fighter regiment's losses have been independently counted.
Shore-based anti-ship missile forces — the Bastion and Bal systems held by each fleet's coastal troops — which in this war have been fired from Crimea at land targets around Odesa as often as at ships.
Pacific Fleet naval infantry formation — the much-reconstituted 155th Brigade of the Vuhledar assaults, whose re-formation as the 55th Division the fleet announced on 1 December 2025, reviving a division that existed from 1968 to 2009.
黑海艦隊的海軍步兵旅；從馬立波到2024年邊境戰鬥，均有大量有紀錄的作戰經歷。
Pacific Fleet marine brigade from Kamchatka, committed to the land war and publicly documented spearheading the unsuccessful assaults on Vuhledar in 2022–23 alongside the 155th Brigade.
The Northern Fleet's marine brigade from the Sputnik garrison in Murmansk oblast, part of the amphibious grouping sent to the Black Sea before the invasion and documented on multiple axes of the land war since.
駐Baltiysk的波羅的海艦隊海軍步兵，以近衛第336旅的番號投入陸上戰爭，並於2025年12月宣布擴編為師級；該師本身的番號係據報導，尚未獲證實。
鐵道部隊
軍種
陸上 · 隸屬俄羅斯武裝部隊A dedicated railway-engineering arm within the armed forces' material-technical support system — a Russian structural particularity that matters in a war supplied overwhelmingly by rail, and the builder of the 2024 line through occupied territory that bypasses the Crimean Bridge.
俄羅斯國民近衛軍
內部安全部隊俄羅斯國民近衛軍——負責後方地區安全、佔領與內部控制任務。
以車臣為基地的部隊與Akhmat部隊
組合 · 非指揮關係在車臣招募或以車臣為品牌的部隊。明確「不是」統一的「車臣軍隊」：「Akhmat」部分是正式番號、部分是品牌，實際的上級單位各不相同——國防部、俄羅斯國民近衛軍或車臣內政部——如各成員紀錄所載。
頓內次克與盧甘斯克遺留部隊
組合 · 非指揮關係The former "people's republic" corps and their notable formations of 2014–2022. A historical and lineage category: after the 2022 annexations these structures were absorbed into regular Russian ones — the two corps reported re-formed as the 51st and 3rd Combined Arms Armies in 2024 — and are not shown here as if unchanged.
2014–2022年「頓內次克人民共和國」的軍；兼併後整合進俄羅斯正規結構，據報為第51諸兵種合成集團軍。
The Luhansk counterpart corps of 2014–2022; formally incorporated into the Russian armed forces after the annexation and reported re-formed as the 3rd Combined Arms Army in 2024 — carried as a lineage record.
北部作戰司令部
司令部陸上 · 隸屬陸軍One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands, covering the north and the Belarusian border. The 2025–26 corps reform placed the new army corps beneath the four commands rather than abolishing them; the corps under this command are reported but not carried as records, so the tree ends here by design.
南部作戰司令部
司令部陸上 · 隸屬陸軍One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands, covering the south and the lower Dnipro. The 2025–26 corps reform placed the new army corps beneath the four commands rather than abolishing them; the corps under this command are reported but not carried as records, so the tree ends here by design.
東部作戰司令部
司令部陸上 · 隸屬陸軍One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands, covering the east. The 2025–26 corps reform placed the new army corps beneath the four commands rather than abolishing them; the corps under this command are reported (the 20th Army Corps among them) but are not carried as records, so the command's tree ends here by design.
西部作戰司令部
司令部陸上 · 隸屬陸軍One of the Ground Forces' four territorial operational commands, covering the west — the rear, the training base and the border with NATO states. The 2025–26 corps reform placed the new army corps beneath the four commands rather than abolishing them; the corps under this command are reported but not carried as records, so the tree ends here by design.
中部空軍司令部
司令部空中 · 隸屬空軍One of the Air Force's four regional air commands, covering the capital region and central Ukraine; each command combines aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector. The Air Force publishes the four commands but not their brigade lists, so none is drawn beneath it.
東部空軍司令部
司令部空中 · 隸屬空軍One of the Air Force's four regional air commands, covering the east and the air defence of the front-line rear; each command combines aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector. The Air Force publishes the four commands but not their brigade lists, so none is drawn beneath it.
南部空軍司令部
司令部空中 · 隸屬空軍One of the Air Force's four regional air commands, covering the south and the Black Sea coast; each command combines aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector. The Air Force publishes the four commands but not their brigade lists, so none is drawn beneath it.
西部空軍司令部
司令部空中 · 隸屬空軍One of the Air Force's four regional air commands, covering the west and the approaches from Belarus and over NATO's border; each command combines aviation, surface-to-air missile and radio-technical forces for its sector. The Air Force publishes the four commands but not their brigade lists, so none is drawn beneath it.
聯合 · 隸屬軍備勤務部Armoured-vehicle equipment across the force: pattern management, repair policy and the recovery of a fleet that has absorbed heavy losses and heavy foreign resupply at once. Carried from published compilation of the Armament service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.
聯合 · 隸屬軍備勤務部The soft-skinned fleet — trucks, tractors and light vehicles — which is what actually moves a war of this size when the railway stops. Carried from published compilation of the Armament service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.
聯合 · 隸屬軍備勤務部Guns, launchers and above all ammunition: the directorate at the centre of the war’s defining scarcity. Carried from published compilation of the Armament service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.
第63修理基地
倉庫 / 基地聯合 · 隸屬軍備勤務部A named repair establishment under the armament service — the kind of rear installation whose throughput, not its existence, is the analytically interesting quantity. Carried from published compilation as the representative of a repair estate the ministry describes only generically.
聯合 · 隸屬後方勤務部Fuel supply for the whole force, run against an energy system that has been a declared strike target since 2022. Carried from published compilation of the Rear service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.
聯合 · 隸屬後方勤務部Rations and food supply — the least discussed and most continuous of the sustainment problems. Carried from published compilation of the Rear service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.
聯合 · 隸屬後方勤務部Clothing, equipment and general materiel: the directorate that absorbed the largest share of donated non-lethal aid. Carried from published compilation of the Rear service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.
聯合 · 隸屬後方勤務部Communications equipment as a supply problem rather than an operational one — issue, repair and replacement of the radios a dispersed force runs on. Carried from published compilation of the Rear service's structure; the ministry names the service, not the directorate.
聯合 · 隸屬醫療部隊The Lviv regional centre: the western end of the evacuation chain, and the closest large military hospital to the Polish border and onward treatment abroad. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.
聯合 · 隸屬醫療部隊The Odesa regional centre, covering the southern axis and the coast. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.
聯合 · 隸屬醫療部隊The Kharkiv regional centre — a major military hospital inside a city that has itself been under repeated strike since 2022. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.
聯合 · 隸屬醫療部隊The Dnipro regional centre, the principal receiving hospital for the eastern front and by wide reporting the busiest node in the chain. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.
聯合 · 隸屬醫療部隊The Vinnytsia regional centre, covering the central rear and part of the onward-treatment flow. One of the five regional centres the branch publishes; capacity and caseload are not.
軍事行動醫院
機構聯合 · 隸屬醫療部隊The numbered mobile hospitals (59th, 61st, 65th, 66th and 71st) as one record at the level this atlas works: deployable surgical capacity sitting between front-line stabilisation and the regional clinical centres. A category record by design; where any of them is deployed is never authored.
內政部所屬部隊
組合 · 非指揮關係Combat formations raised under the Interior Ministry outside the National Guard — police-based assault units, most visibly the assault brigade the ministry's Offensive Guard programme raised from police special-purpose regiments in 2023. A browsing group, not a command; each member's actual parent institution would be stated on its own record. The group currently has no records beneath it, which is a research gap and not a claim that none exist.
俄羅斯反克里姆林宮部隊
組合 · 非指揮關係Formations of Russian citizens fighting against Moscow on the Ukrainian side — the Freedom of Russia Legion, the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Siberian Battalion, publicly associated with Defence Intelligence and named together in the 2023–24 cross-border raids. A browsing group, not a command: each unit's Ukrainian parent structure is stated, and graded, on its record.
俄羅斯志願軍團（RDK）
志願部隊
志願 / 非正規 · 隸屬俄羅斯反克里姆林宮部隊Russian émigré volunteer corps formed in 2022, publicly known for the 2023–24 cross-border raids into Bryansk, Belgorod and Kursk regions; its politics and command relationships are contested in public reporting — described by Ukrainian officials at different times as an independent organisation and as a formation Ukraine helps, and by reporting as associated with Defence Intelligence.
西伯利亞營
志願部隊Volunteer unit of Russian citizens formed within Ukrainian military structures in October 2023 — publicly confirmed by Kyiv at the time — and named with the Freedom of Russia Legion and the RDK in the March 2024 cross-border raids. Reported as part of Defence Intelligence's international legion; public information beyond that is thin and largely self-published.
白俄羅斯志願部隊
組合 · 非指揮關係Belarusian volunteer formations fighting on the Ukrainian side, of which the Kalinoŭski Regiment raised in March 2022 is the largest and the only one carried here. A browsing group, not a command; the regiment's own record states its reported parent.
車臣與Ichkerian部隊
組合 · 非指揮關係Chechen formations aligned with the Ichkerian cause fighting on Ukraine's side since 2014 — distinct from, and opposed to, the Kadyrov-aligned units on the Russian side. A browsing group, not a command: the two battalions carried here have different relationships to Ukrainian structures, stated on their own records.
Chechen volunteer battalion named for Ichkeria's first president, formed in 2014 by a veteran of the Chechen wars and active on the Ukrainian side since; described in reporting as within Ukrainian force structures and filed by compilation under Defence Intelligence, neither of which is a published subordination.
Sheikh Mansur營
志願部隊Chechen volunteer battalion of veterans of the two Chechen wars, active on the Ukrainian side since 2014 and re-formed in March 2022; by consistent public accounts the one Chechen unit that has remained a volunteer formation outside formal Ukrainian force structures.
其他外國志願部隊
組合 · 非指揮關係Reviewed foreign volunteer formations outside the Russian, Belarusian and Chechen groups — in practice the International Legion of February 2022, the Ground Forces' legal framework for foreign volunteers, carried as a lineage record after its 2024 reorganisation. A browsing group, not a command.
外國支持方
外部一個路由節點，而非指揮單位。與基輔立場一致的支持方——美國、歐盟、北約與波蘭——提供武器、資金、情報與過境通道，而非部隊，它們之中沒有任何一方指揮此樹狀結構中的任何單位。如今每一方都在概況之下擁有自己的戰略概況，包括宣示目標與經評估的目標、制約因素與槓桿。
太空部隊
軍種
空中 · 隸屬空天軍（VKS）The military-space component of the Aerospace Forces — launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome, satellite control and the missile attack warning system. Its contribution to this war (reconnaissance, navigation, warning) is structural rather than documented, and the atlas does not author it.
陸上 · 隸屬空降軍（VDV）Ulyanovsk air-assault brigade, documented in the war from 2022; publicly reported to have become the basis of the re-formed 104th Guards Air Assault Division in September 2023, a plan announced in 2015 — carried here as a lineage record pending source review of the successor.
戰略飛彈部隊
軍種
聯合 · 隸屬俄羅斯武裝部隊The land-based strategic nuclear arm — a separate branch of the armed forces alongside the ground, aerospace and naval services. Listed for structural completeness only: this atlas deliberately carries no detail below this line, by policy rather than for want of sources.
國防部志願編隊
組合 · 非指揮關係Volunteer and contract formations raised under Ministry of Defence structures — the BARS combat-reserve detachments and the formations recruited through the Redut shell. A browsing group, not a single command: each member's documented parent is stated on its record, and both members are category records because the ministry publishes no list of the units.
BARS戰鬥預備部隊
志願部隊The Ministry of Defence's combat army reserve, created in 2015 on a part-time contract model and expanded from 2022 into numbered volunteer detachments across the front — a category record; individual detachments are not tracked here because no list of them is published.
Redut相關部隊
志願部隊Volunteer formations recruited through the Redut structure — described by investigative reporting and UK Defence Intelligence as a recruitment shell operated for Russian military intelligence, whose contractors were offered ministry contracts after 2022 and which fed more than twenty formations. A category record: the composition is deliberately opaque in public reporting.
Akhmat特種任務部隊
志願部隊The best-known Akhmat-branded formation — a Ministry of Defence-subordinated volunteer unit publicly fronted by the Chechen leadership, whose commander was appointed to a ministry post in 2024. Branding and structure are entangled by design: the unit publicly claims roles (Bakhmut 2023, the Belgorod and Kursk border in 2023–24) that independent reporting confirms only in part.
Rosgvardia regiment recruited in Chechnya — the 'Kadyrovite' core formation, documented in the war from the 2022 Kyiv operation onward. Its formal parent is the National Guard's Chechen directorate; the Akhmat grouping above it is navigation only, and its combat record since 2022 is contested in public reporting.
The best-known Donetsk separatist battalion of 2014, named in 2017 for its assassinated first commander; later a reconnaissance unit of the 1st Army Corps and, by public reporting, of the corps' Russian successor — carried as a lineage record because its current designation is not consistently reported.
沒有符合目前篩選條件的部隊。
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