大宗商品
金屬、礦產與肥料
兩國經濟體為集中供應者的工業與儲備商品——鋼鐵與鐵礦石、核燃料、特殊金屬、肥料與黃金。
評估中等信心
不構成投資建議。本頁說明曝險與傳導管道;它從不推薦、排名或點名任何證券。數字均為估計值,並附有各自的截至日期與信心等級。
當前狀態
信心:中等 · 經濟資料截至2026-08
烏克蘭與俄羅斯共同支撐全球的穀物、肥料與能源市場。這場戰爭使歐洲天然氣永久重新定價,使俄羅斯原油以折價轉銷亞洲,將貿易分割為不同的制裁遵循區,並使黑海戰爭險成為即時的地緣政治指標。重建無論何時開始,都將是歐洲史上規模最大的建設計畫之一。
已在簡報中變更 — 2026-10-04 · 經濟已更新
大宗商品
兩國經濟體為集中供應者的工業與儲備商品——鋼鐵與鐵礦石、核燃料、特殊金屬、肥料與黃金。
能源
價格上限、禁運與煉油廠打擊行動——決定俄羅斯出口收入與國內燃料供應的三項因素。
能源
歐洲需求的結構性重新定價、剩餘的過境輸送,以及替代已停止部分的液化天然氣。
貿易與運輸
黑海走廊、西部陸路,以及為兩者定價的保險。
農業與糧食
兩個前五大出口國、一條海上走廊,以及隨之變動的農場收購價與全球糧價。
金融
讓一個國家維持償付能力的外部資金,以及讓另一國所受的制裁架構仍可承受的外部市場。
制裁
限制架構、其各部分能以多快的速度變動,以及壓在其上的凍結資產問題。
基礎設施
電網攻勢及其背後的發電缺口——在成為家戶曝險之前,先是產業與財政曝險。
經濟影響
這場戰爭如何影響價格,以及一旦影響發生,曝險實際集中在何處。
以下所有內容均撰寫於本模組的經濟紀錄上。數字所帶的是產生它們的發布版本日期,而非本頁的日期:本部分的信心等級為中等,其數字截至2026-08。
| 大宗商品 | 為何在此重要 | 曝險 |
|---|---|---|
| 鋼鐵與鐵礦石 | 烏克蘭冶金業嚴重受損;出口量隨走廊安全程度變動。 | 中度曝險 |
| 鈾與核燃料 | 俄羅斯國家原子能公司(Rosatom)大致仍未受制裁,並嵌入西方燃料循環——這是一個刻意保留的缺口。 | 中度曝險 |
| 鈦與特殊金屬 | 航太供應鏈仍部分依賴源自俄羅斯的材料。 | 中度曝險 |
| 黃金 | 俄方的規避制裁工具與儲備資產;局勢升高時的避險買盤。 | 低曝險 |
| 肥料與鉀肥 | 俄羅斯與白俄羅斯的供應集中;制裁豁免使貨流得以持續,但相當脆弱。 | 中度曝險 |
How pressure reaches it
截至2026-01
Two facts set this exposure. The first is loss on the ground: the Donbas held Ukraine's coking coal and much of its metallurgy, and the closure of the last coking-coal mine outside Pokrovsk in January 2025, as the front reached it, removed the domestic input for Ukrainian steel. The second is the framework built around what remains: the United States–Ukraine agreement of 30 April 2025 established a Reconstruction Investment Fund with equal management and contributions, to which Ukraine commits half the state revenue from new licences for minerals, oil and gas while retaining ownership of the subsoil; core drilling on prospective sites was scheduled to restart in January 2026. Nothing in the agreement produces a mine on any near horizon — most listed deposits are Soviet-era occurrences never proven at commercial grade, and several lie in occupied territory. Rosatom's nuclear-fuel business remains outside the main sanctions architecture by design, and Russian titanium is still embedded in Western aerospace supply, which is the module's clearest case of a dependency that sanctions deliberately left alone.
來源: Official government statements · Ukrainian state publications and official statements↗ · Reuters↗ · World Bank Ukraine damage and needs assessments
| 大宗商品 | 為何在此重要 | 曝險 |
|---|---|---|
| 原油與成品油 | 價格上限、禁運與烏克蘭對煉油廠的打擊,共同決定烏拉爾原油的折價與成品油價差。 | 高度曝險 |
How pressure reaches it
Runs through 能源體系
組織 Rosneft (energy company) · Gazprom Neft (energy company)
截至2026-05
Three instruments set what Russia earns from a barrel: the G7 price cap on services, the EU and UK import embargoes, and the discount buyers extract for taking sanctioned crude. The EU moved its cap from the fixed US$60 to a dynamic level set below the market average — US$47.60 from 3 September 2025 and US$44.10 from 1 February 2026 — while the United States kept the original US$60 figure, so the two regimes no longer agree. Enforcement runs through designations of vessels and traders rather than the cap number itself. The revenue effect compounds with price: federal oil-and-gas revenue fell 38 per cent year on year in January–April 2026 on the Finance Ministry's figures, driven mainly by lower prices in the preceding months, and the 2026 budget assumes Urals at US$59 — above where it traded for most of late 2025. Refinery strikes act on a different quantity again: they cut product exports and domestic supply rather than crude revenue, which is why the module keeps the three series apart.
來源: European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · US / EU / UK sanctions designations · CREA monthly analysis of Russian fossil-fuel exports and sanctions · Russian Central Bank and Rosstat published statistics · The Moscow Times↗
觀察重點
| 大宗商品 | 為何在此重要 | 曝險 |
|---|---|---|
| 天然氣 | 歐盟需求已結構性重新定價;剩餘的過境輸送與液化天然氣替代是長期觀察項目。 | 高度曝險 |
截至2026-03
Russian pipeline gas stopped crossing Ukraine on 1 January 2025 when the transit contract expired and Kyiv declined to renew it. The physical effect on Europe was small — the Ukrainian route carried a low single-digit share of European supply by then — and the political effect was concentrated in Slovakia and Hungary, which had kept buying through it. What remains is TurkStream into south-eastern Europe and Russian LNG, together still an estimated 13 per cent of EU gas imports in 2025 on the Commission's figure, against roughly 45 per cent before the invasion. The EU regulation phasing out both entered into force on 3 February 2026, with the stepwise ban applying from 18 March 2026, existing LNG contracts ending by 1 January 2027 and long-term pipeline contracts by 30 September 2027. On the Ukrainian side the exposure runs the other way: strikes on gas production and storage in 2025–26 forced Naftogaz to import several billion cubic metres for the heating season, financed externally. Gas is therefore two exposures — a European market that has already repriced and a Ukrainian system that has not stopped being struck.
來源: European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · Ukrainian energy-system operator statements
How pressure reaches it
來源: CREA monthly analysis of Russian fossil-fuel exports and sanctions · FAO and FAO/WFP food-security and crop assessments · IEA electricity and energy-security analysis
截至2026-03
Since August 2023 Ukraine has exported by sea under its own declared corridor rather than under the 2022 grain agreement, hugging the western Black Sea coast toward Romanian and Bulgarian waters. The arrangement holds not because Russia consents but because Ukrainian strikes pushed the Black Sea Fleet out of the western basin and made interdiction costly; it is a security outcome, not a legal one, and it is repriced every time a port or a vessel is struck. The Odesa port cluster carries about 90 per cent of Ukraine's exports, and the maritime share of corn, wheat and soybean exports rose from 91 per cent in 2024 to 95 per cent in 2025, which is what the Danube and the western rail routes were built up to substitute for in 2022–23 and now carry only at the margin. The transmission path to the wider world is therefore short: corridor security → war-risk premium and charterer appetite → loading volumes → global grain and oilseed prices within days. The insurance premium is the cleanest single reading of it.
來源: Ukrainian state publications and official statements↗ · Reuters↗ · FAO and FAO/WFP food-security and crop assessments · Public market and insurance data
觀察重點
| 大宗商品 | 為何在此重要 | 曝險 |
|---|---|---|
| 穀物與油籽 | 兩國皆為前五大出口國;走廊中斷會在數日內影響全球糧價。 | 高度曝險 |
How pressure reaches it
Runs through 黑海網路
截至2026-03
The war reaches grain through three separate mechanisms that reporting habitually merges. The first is land: mined and occupied farmland, and the loss of the southern and eastern oblasts' share of the sown area, set the harvest ceiling before weather does. The second is the corridor, which sets how much of the harvest leaves and at what discount. The third is the farm gate: freight, fuel, fertiliser and credit costs that decide whether the next season is planted at all. Ukraine exported 22.3 million tonnes of grain in the 2025/26 marketing year by 2 March 2026 against 29.6 million tonnes at the same point a year earlier, on the agriculture ministry's count — a smaller crop and a slower start, not a corridor failure. Global prices moved less than in 2022 because the market has priced the corridor as functioning; that is exactly why any port strike now moves prices more than the tonnage involved would suggest.
來源: Ukrainian state publications and official statements↗ · Reuters↗ · FAO and FAO/WFP food-security and crop assessments
How pressure reaches it
截至2026-04
Ukraine's state does not finance its own budget and will not while the war lasts; the question each year is which instrument covers the gap and on what conditions. For 2026–27 the answer is a €90 billion EU loan agreed by the European Council on 18–19 December 2025, financed by EU borrowing backed by the budget headroom rather than by the immobilised Russian assets, after the asset-backed "reparations loan" option failed to secure agreement. Parliament approved the package in February 2026 and the Council finalised it on 23 April; roughly €60 billion is for military and defence-industrial needs and €30 billion for budget support, with disbursement from the second quarter of 2026 under rule-of-law and anti-corruption conditions. Ukraine repays only once it receives reparations, and the EU reserves the right to use the immobilised assets to repay itself. The loan sits on top of the G7's 2024 ERA loans serviced from the windfall profits on those assets, and the IMF programme that sets the macro-framework. The structural point is that the asset question was deferred rather than settled: the money moved, the legal decision did not.
來源: European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · Official government statements · IMF World Economic Outlook↗
觀察重點
How pressure reaches it
附海事服務執法機制的石油價格上限;歐盟對海運原油與成品油的進口禁令;主要銀行被排除於SWIFT之外;約300十億美元的中央銀行儲備在海外遭凍結;對軍民兩用貨品與先進技術的出口管制;航空器、保險與航運服務禁令。這套體系的弱點是第三國轉運——訊號在於執法行動,而非新的制裁方案。一項授權對俄羅斯能源主要買家課徵關稅的美國法案,於2026年8月7日以86比11在參議院通過;該法案尚未在眾議院通過,也並非法律,這套架構中沒有任何部分反映此法案。
來源: US / EU / UK sanctions designations · European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · CREA monthly analysis of Russian fossil-fuel exports and sanctions
觀察重點
How pressure reaches it
截至2026-03
Ukraine's thermal and hydro generation has been cut down over three winters of strikes, leaving a system that leans on nuclear baseload, distributed gas and diesel generation, and imports from the European synchronous area. The import channel is bounded by cross-border capacity and by the money to pay for it: monthly imports reached a record of about 1.26 terawatt-hours in February 2026 and fell to about 0.94 in March as demand eased and repaired units returned. The economic exposure is industrial before it is domestic — rolling restrictions are applied to industry first, so each winter converts into lost output, higher unit costs and a fiscal claim on partners for equipment, gas and emergency repair — and the deficit is a moving figure that depends on what was hit last week, which is why this module carries it as a mechanism rather than a number.
來源: Ukrainian energy-system operator statements · The Kyiv Independent↗ · IEA electricity and energy-security analysis
來源: Public market and insurance data · IMF World Economic Outlook↗ · World Bank Ukraine damage and needs assessments
衝突敏感度在結構上最高的產業類別——屬描述性質,並非推薦任何投資工具。
國防主承包商與彈藥歐洲公用事業與液化天然氣肥料生產商農產品貿易商海上保險業者與船東互保協會(P&I)工程與重建網路保險
截至2026-02
The 2022 shock has largely passed through European prices; what remains is structural, and it works through three channels that no longer move together. Energy: Europe replaced Russian pipeline gas with seaborne LNG, so its marginal price is now set in the global LNG market — lower than the 2022 peak, higher than the pre-war base, and exposed to any disruption anywhere, as the 2026 Gulf war demonstrated. Defence: NATO's June 2025 commitment to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035 (3.5 core, 1.5 related) converted a wartime surge into a multi-year procurement cycle, the war's most durable market effect. Food: prices now move on corridor status rather than on the war's existence. The transmission into rates has correspondingly weakened; central banks treat the war as a supply-side risk to be monitored rather than as the driver it was in 2022. That normalisation is itself an exposure — a market pricing the war as background is the one that moves most when it is not.
來源: IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · NATO official texts and summit declarations↗ · IMF World Economic Outlook↗
觀察重點
一個靠外部融資維持償付能力的戰時經濟:公共支出約有一半用於國防,赤字由夥伴國融資,出口能力則隨黑海走廊的安全程度變動。
農業(具全球重要性)、國防科技與無人機(成長最快)、冶金(受戰爭破壞)、資訊科技服務(出口創匯來源)、能源(電網反覆遭受打擊),以及一條已成為外交工具的重建計畫管道。
制裁體系中的受益方:預算支援、凍結資產收益、免關稅進入歐盟市場。資本管制與管理匯率支撐了穩定;烏克蘭國家銀行的信譽是一項低調的戰時成就。
援助撥付時程;收成與走廊運量;電網能否撐過冬季;與遭凍結俄羅斯資產掛鉤的重建融資決定。
一個運轉過熱、受制裁的戰時經濟:軍事支出推動成長,而通膨、勞動力短缺與日益縮小的流動儲備基金,正在表面之下累積壓力。
碳氫化合物(預算的支柱)、處於多班制戰時狀態的國防工業、大致未受制裁的俄羅斯國家原子能公司全球核能業務、肥料,以及兼具出口品與規避手段角色的黃金。
規避價格上限有效但代價高昂;零組件進口經由轉運網絡流入,承受日益增加的次級制裁壓力;銀行孤立推高了一切交易成本。這套體系會漏——但每一個漏洞都有代價。
烏拉爾原油折價與執法行動;關鍵利率與勞動市場壓力;國家財富基金流動部分的提用速度;縱深打擊造成的煉油廠停機,以及國內燃料配給是否持續到夏季旅遊季之後;原油與成品油出口量之間的比例;中國支付管道出現的任何裂縫。
華盛頓在這場戰爭中的經濟工具是制裁設計、出口管制與石油價格上限——這些措施針對的是俄羅斯的收入而非俄羅斯的部隊,也是比任何撥款週期都更持久的措施。
武器援助方案需要撥款;制裁指定則不會以同樣方式失效。這種不對稱使制裁與出口管制成為整場戰爭中美國政策最具連續性的部分,也是最不受國內援助爭論影響的部分。
歐盟是烏克蘭國家的財政後盾,也是制裁架構的主要制定者——這兩項經濟事實最直接決定烏克蘭能否繼續作戰,以及俄羅斯在此期間的收入。
取代俄羅斯管線天然氣,是這場戰爭迫使歐洲經濟作出的最大、代價最高的結構性改變。它使歐洲工業能源相對於競爭對手永久重新定價,也消除了莫斯科原本以為會在第一個冬天使聯盟瓦解的槓桿。
入盟程序與重建融資正在匯合為單一工具:以司法、反貪腐與行政改革為條件的資金。這使布魯塞爾對烏克蘭戰後的樣貌擁有持久影響力,也使基輔必須在戰爭期間推動一項改革議程。
北約在這場戰爭中的經濟面向,是國防支出承諾及其背後的產業產能——該同盟是買方與標準制定者,而非烏克蘭的出資者。
更高的預算並未轉化為相應的產出。砲彈、攔截彈與推進劑的產能需要數年才能建立,並取決於各國政府遲遲未下的穩定多年期訂單。這是該同盟從這場戰爭中得到的最清楚的結構性教訓,也是與任何其他突發事態最直接相關的教訓。
波蘭的戰爭經濟呈雙向運作:承擔駐紮、過境與重整軍備的成本,以及同一角色所帶來的產業與物流活動。
運送軍事援助的走廊,也運送因黑海受阻而轉移的烏克蘭出口。當海上出口受限時,壓力便轉移到波蘭的公路與鐵路上——也轉移到與運抵穀物競爭的波蘭農民身上。因此,農業爭議位於海上戰役的下游,而非與其分離。
中國是對俄制裁得以被承受而非具決定性的原因:它是原油的買家、零組件的供應者,也是受制裁指定體系之外的結算系統。
轉向銷售的原油以低於基準的價格出售,這意味著俄羅斯每桶的收入減少,但仍有收入。這是價格上限機制部分奏效而非失效:其目標是讓石油持續流動、讓收入下降,而中國與印度取得的折價,正是衡量其成效程度的尺度。
近期影響最大的壓力並非施加於俄羅斯,而是施加於與其交易的銀行與企業。中國金融機構對次級曝險的謹慎,曾數度比主要制裁指定更有效地拖慢支付——這是最清楚的證據,顯示這種支撐性的關係有其代價,而北京不願全額承擔。
對一個受到嚴厲制裁的經濟體而言,這場戰爭是其可取得的最大硬通貨與大宗商品來源——這使供應關係成為經濟命脈,而非外交政策選擇。
影響最持久的經濟後果可能是制度性的,而非雙邊的:監督北韓制裁的聯合國專家小組於2024年因俄羅斯否決而失去授權。無論涉及的規模多大,十五年來記錄這些往來的監督架構,是這段關係最明確消除掉的東西。
兩個受到嚴厲制裁的經濟體交換各自擁有之物:伊朗的設計與製造知識,換取俄羅斯的現金、航空與技術——這段關係主要侵蝕的是施加於雙方的制裁架構。
其經濟邏輯並非一般意義上的貿易,而是相互緩解被排除的處境:每一方供應對方無法在公開市場上購得之物。這種模式——受制裁國家彼此填補短缺——與北韓關係中可見的模式相同,也是這場戰爭在制裁指定模式中暴露出的最明顯結構性弱點。
一個與俄羅斯經濟融為一體的受制裁經濟體:出口路線、能源供應與金融管道全都經由莫斯科或依賴莫斯科,這正是其政治依賴的物質基礎。
制裁切斷了白俄羅斯通往歐洲過境通道與市場的管道;俄羅斯提供了替代方案。結果是,參與的經濟代價被轉化為與要求其參與的國家更深的整合——這正是對明斯克的經濟壓力未能改變其立場、且看來也未必有能力改變的原因。
這是一種戰爭經濟,而非一般意義上的經濟:收入來自國家合約與資源特許權,經由不透明的空殼公司流轉,其定價既以貨幣計,也以政治影響力計。
與東道國政權簽訂的採礦特許權及以安全換資源的交易;報酬既有現金,也有開採權。空殼公司輪替的速度快於制裁指定的追蹤速度——這正是其設計。
黃金與礦產經由區域貿易樞紐流向海灣市場;物流依託俄羅斯國家運輸。此處僅在結構層面描述——相關路線記載於制裁指定文件與調查報導中,並未即時追蹤。
行動地區的保護經濟:安全服務的費用被計入東道國政權預算、對開採活動的非正式徵費,以及對國家正式稅收的取代。
針對支援企業的新制裁指定與執法行動;薩赫勒東道國政權的穩定;以及決定特許權模式價值的金價。