Narażenie gospodarcze i rynkowe

Minerals, steel and the subsoil agreement

Stan na 2026-01

Two facts set this exposure. The first is loss on the ground: the Donbas held Ukraine's coking coal and much of its metallurgy, and the closure of the last coking-coal mine outside Pokrovsk in January 2025, as the front reached it, removed the domestic input for Ukrainian steel. The second is the framework built around what remains: the United States–Ukraine agreement of 30 April 2025 established a Reconstruction Investment Fund with equal management and contributions, to which Ukraine commits half the state revenue from new licences for minerals, oil and gas while retaining ownership of the subsoil; core drilling on prospective sites was scheduled to restart in January 2026. Nothing in the agreement produces a mine on any near horizon — most listed deposits are Soviet-era occurrences never proven at commercial grade, and several lie in occupied territory. Rosatom's nuclear-fuel business remains outside the main sanctions architecture by design, and Russian titanium is still embedded in Western aerospace supply, which is the module's clearest case of a dependency that sanctions deliberately left alone.

Źródła: Official government statements · Ukrainian state publications and official statements↗ · Reuters↗ · World Bank Ukraine damage and needs assessments

The price cap, the discount and the revenue it produces

Stan na 2026-05

Three instruments set what Russia earns from a barrel: the G7 price cap on services, the EU and UK import embargoes, and the discount buyers extract for taking sanctioned crude. The EU moved its cap from the fixed US$60 to a dynamic level set below the market average — US$47.60 from 3 September 2025 and US$44.10 from 1 February 2026 — while the United States kept the original US$60 figure, so the two regimes no longer agree. Enforcement runs through designations of vessels and traders rather than the cap number itself. The revenue effect compounds with price: federal oil-and-gas revenue fell 38 per cent year on year in January–April 2026 on the Finance Ministry's figures, driven mainly by lower prices in the preceding months, and the 2026 budget assumes Urals at US$59 — above where it traded for most of late 2025. Refinery strikes act on a different quantity again: they cut product exports and domestic supply rather than crude revenue, which is why the module keeps the three series apart.

Źródła: European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · US / EU / UK sanctions designations · CREA monthly analysis of Russian fossil-fuel exports and sanctions · Russian Central Bank and Rosstat published statistics · The Moscow Times↗

Gas after transit — what stopped, what remains, and the EU deadline

Stan na 2026-03

Russian pipeline gas stopped crossing Ukraine on 1 January 2025 when the transit contract expired and Kyiv declined to renew it. The physical effect on Europe was small — the Ukrainian route carried a low single-digit share of European supply by then — and the political effect was concentrated in Slovakia and Hungary, which had kept buying through it. What remains is TurkStream into south-eastern Europe and Russian LNG, together still an estimated 13 per cent of EU gas imports in 2025 on the Commission's figure, against roughly 45 per cent before the invasion. The EU regulation phasing out both entered into force on 3 February 2026, with the stepwise ban applying from 18 March 2026, existing LNG contracts ending by 1 January 2027 and long-term pipeline contracts by 30 September 2027. On the Ukrainian side the exposure runs the other way: strikes on gas production and storage in 2025–26 forced Naftogaz to import several billion cubic metres for the heating season, financed externally. Gas is therefore two exposures — a European market that has already repriced and a Ukrainian system that has not stopped being struck.

Źródła: European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · Ukrainian energy-system operator statements

Szlaki handlowe i wąskie gardła

Korytarz czarnomorski

Morska linia życia ukraińskiego eksportu; składki ubezpieczeniowe są jej barometrem w czasie rzeczywistym

Bosfor

Jedyne wyjście dla całego handlu czarnomorskiego; turecka polityka wobec cieśnin ogranicza eskalację morską

Cieśnina Kerczeńska

Brama do Morza Azowskiego i wielokrotnie atakowane ogniwo logistyczne z Krymem

Porty dunajskie

Awaryjna droga ukraińskiego eksportu, gdy korytarz morski się zawęża

Szlaki bałtyckie

Główna trasa floty cieni dla ropy objętej sankcjami; presja egzekucyjna rośnie

Pozostałe rurociągi

Resztkowy tranzyt gazu i system Przyjaźń — ograniczone, ale politycznie wciąż aktualne

Źródła: CREA monthly analysis of Russian fossil-fuel exports and sanctions · FAO and FAO/WFP food-security and crop assessments · IEA electricity and energy-security analysis

The corridor without a deal — how Ukraine's seaborne exports run

Stan na 2026-03

Since August 2023 Ukraine has exported by sea under its own declared corridor rather than under the 2022 grain agreement, hugging the western Black Sea coast toward Romanian and Bulgarian waters. The arrangement holds not because Russia consents but because Ukrainian strikes pushed the Black Sea Fleet out of the western basin and made interdiction costly; it is a security outcome, not a legal one, and it is repriced every time a port or a vessel is struck. The Odesa port cluster carries about 90 per cent of Ukraine's exports, and the maritime share of corn, wheat and soybean exports rose from 91 per cent in 2024 to 95 per cent in 2025, which is what the Danube and the western rail routes were built up to substitute for in 2022–23 and now carry only at the margin. The transmission path to the wider world is therefore short: corridor security → war-risk premium and charterer appetite → loading volumes → global grain and oilseed prices within days. The insurance premium is the cleanest single reading of it.

Źródła: Ukrainian state publications and official statements↗ · Reuters↗ · FAO and FAO/WFP food-security and crop assessments · Public market and insurance data

Grain — harvest, corridor and the farm gate

Stan na 2026-03

The war reaches grain through three separate mechanisms that reporting habitually merges. The first is land: mined and occupied farmland, and the loss of the southern and eastern oblasts' share of the sown area, set the harvest ceiling before weather does. The second is the corridor, which sets how much of the harvest leaves and at what discount. The third is the farm gate: freight, fuel, fertiliser and credit costs that decide whether the next season is planted at all. Ukraine exported 22.3 million tonnes of grain in the 2025/26 marketing year by 2 March 2026 against 29.6 million tonnes at the same point a year earlier, on the agriculture ministry's count — a smaller crop and a slower start, not a corridor failure. Global prices moved less than in 2022 because the market has priced the corridor as functioning; that is exactly why any port strike now moves prices more than the tonnage involved would suggest.

Źródła: Ukrainian state publications and official statements↗ · Reuters↗ · FAO and FAO/WFP food-security and crop assessments

Financing 2026–27 — the €90 billion loan and what it replaced

Stan na 2026-04

Ukraine's state does not finance its own budget and will not while the war lasts; the question each year is which instrument covers the gap and on what conditions. For 2026–27 the answer is a €90 billion EU loan agreed by the European Council on 18–19 December 2025, financed by EU borrowing backed by the budget headroom rather than by the immobilised Russian assets, after the asset-backed "reparations loan" option failed to secure agreement. Parliament approved the package in February 2026 and the Council finalised it on 23 April; roughly €60 billion is for military and defence-industrial needs and €30 billion for budget support, with disbursement from the second quarter of 2026 under rule-of-law and anti-corruption conditions. Ukraine repays only once it receives reparations, and the EU reserves the right to use the immobilised assets to repay itself. The loan sits on top of the G7's 2024 ERA loans serviced from the windfall profits on those assets, and the IMF programme that sets the macro-framework. The structural point is that the asset question was deferred rather than settled: the money moved, the legal decision did not.

Źródła: European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · Official government statements · IMF World Economic Outlook↗

Architektura sankcji i ograniczeń

Pułap cenowy na ropę egzekwowany przez usługi morskie; embarga UE na import ropy i produktów drogą morską; główne banki odcięte od SWIFT; około 300 mld USD rezerw banku centralnego zamrożonych za granicą; kontrola eksportu towarów podwójnego zastosowania i zaawansowanych technologii; zakazy usług lotniczych, ubezpieczeniowych i żeglugowych. Słabym punktem systemu jest przeładunek w państwach trzecich — sygnał dają działania egzekucyjne, a nie nowe pakiety. Amerykańska ustawa upoważniająca do nałożenia ceł na głównych nabywców rosyjskiej energii przeszła przez Senat stosunkiem głosów 86–11 7 sierpnia 2026 r.; nie przeszła przez Izbę Reprezentantów i nie jest obowiązującym prawem, a nic w tej architekturze jej nie uwzględnia.

Źródła: US / EU / UK sanctions designations · European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · CREA monthly analysis of Russian fossil-fuel exports and sanctions

The generation deficit and what imports can cover

Stan na 2026-03

Ukraine's thermal and hydro generation has been cut down over three winters of strikes, leaving a system that leans on nuclear baseload, distributed gas and diesel generation, and imports from the European synchronous area. The import channel is bounded by cross-border capacity and by the money to pay for it: monthly imports reached a record of about 1.26 terawatt-hours in February 2026 and fell to about 0.94 in March as demand eased and repaired units returned. The economic exposure is industrial before it is domestic — rolling restrictions are applied to industry first, so each winter converts into lost output, higher unit costs and a fiscal claim on partners for equipment, gas and emergency repair — and the deficit is a moving figure that depends on what was hit last week, which is why this module carries it as a mechanism rather than a number.

Źródła: Ukrainian energy-system operator statements · The Kyiv Independent↗ · IEA electricity and energy-security analysis

Kanały wpływu na rynki

Obronność

Wieloletnie cykle zakupowe i budżety zbrojeniowe w Europie i USA — najtrwalszy skutek wojny dla rynków

Kompleks energetyczny

Tempo uderzeń w rafinerie i terminale eksportowe; poziom zapasów w magazynach UE; ekonomika zastępowania gazu przez LNG

Rolnictwo

Przepustowość korytarza i wyniki zbiorów bezpośrednio wpływają na światowe indeksy cen żywności

Żegluga i ubezpieczenia

Składki za ryzyko wojenne na Morzu Czarnym; egzekwowanie wobec floty cieni na Bałtyku i poza nim

Kursy walut i wiarygodność kredytowa państw

Stabilność hrywny zależy od finansowania zewnętrznego; rubla — od dochodów z energii i kontroli kapitału

Inflacja i stopy procentowe

Wstrząsy energetyczne i żywnościowe przenoszą się na politykę banków centralnych w Europie i na rynkach wschodzących

Odbudowa

Przyszły wstrząs popytu na usługi inżynieryjne i materiały, szacowany na setki miliardów euro

Źródła: Public market and insurance data · IMF World Economic Outlook↗ · World Bank Ukraine damage and needs assessments

Gdzie koncentruje się narażenie

Kategorie sektorów, w których wrażliwość na konflikt jest strukturalnie najwyższa — opis, a nie rekomendacja jakiegokolwiek instrumentu.

Główni producenci uzbrojenia i amunicjiEuropejskie przedsiębiorstwa energetyczne i LNGProducenci nawozówHandlowcy rolniUbezpieczyciele morscy i P&IInżynieria i odbudowaUbezpieczenia od ryzyk cybernetycznych

Źródła: Public market and insurance data

How the shock became structure

Stan na 2026-02

The 2022 shock has largely passed through European prices; what remains is structural, and it works through three channels that no longer move together. Energy: Europe replaced Russian pipeline gas with seaborne LNG, so its marginal price is now set in the global LNG market — lower than the 2022 peak, higher than the pre-war base, and exposed to any disruption anywhere, as the 2026 Gulf war demonstrated. Defence: NATO's June 2025 commitment to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035 (3.5 core, 1.5 related) converted a wartime surge into a multi-year procurement cycle, the war's most durable market effect. Food: prices now move on corridor status rather than on the war's existence. The transmission into rates has correspondingly weakened; central banks treat the war as a supply-side risk to be monitored rather than as the driver it was in 2022. That normalisation is itself an exposure — a market pricing the war as background is the one that moves most when it is not.

Źródła: IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · NATO official texts and summit declarations↗ · IMF World Economic Outlook↗