What this actor is
The United States holds the chair or the pen on nearly every arrangement in the Levant system while remaining Israel's principal ally and military supplier. In Gaza it wrote the 20-point plan that resolution 2803 annexes, its president chairs the Board of Peace, a US officer commands the authorised but undeployed International Stabilization Force, and US Central Command set up the Civil-Military Coordination Center in October 2025. In Lebanon it chaired the 2024 cessation-of-hostilities Mechanism, brokered the April 2026 cessation and supports the Trilateral Framework of 26 June 2026, whose military coordination group it facilitates and whose assistance it conditions on "verifiable milestones". In the West Bank its Security Coordinator supports the Palestinian security services. Underneath all of it sits a ten-year, $38bn military assistance memorandum with Israel running to fiscal year 2028.
Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10-10Reviewed 2026-10-11
Objectives
US policy as stated at the Framework's signing is to "disarm Hizballah" and enable Israel to return to its borders once that threat is removed. In Gaza the plan it authored ends the war on agreement, excludes Hamas from governance, demilitarises the Strip under independent monitors and offers a conditional pathway to Palestinian statehood after PA reform. In both arenas US assistance is tied to milestones rather than to dates.
Sources: US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗
Constraints
The United States is at once mediator and party-ally, and the instruments it chairs depend on armed organisations reached largely through intermediaries — Hamas, reached through the guarantors Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye, and Hezbollah, reached through the Lebanese state and, for the June 2026 cessation, through the US–Iran memorandum. The International Stabilization Force it commands has not deployed, the technocratic committee it backs has not entered Gaza, and Israel has not signed the Board of Peace roadmap.
Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Security Council Report — monthly forecasts↗
Position in the system
No other external actor sits on as many of the module's mechanisms. That concentrates both leverage and exposure: a change in US policy moves the Gaza, Lebanon and West Bank arrangements at once, and the US said in August 2025 that resolution 2790 was the last UNIFIL extension it would support.
Sources: US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
Objectives
What the actor says, kept apart from what Vigil assesses. Each stated entry cites where the position was made; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.
Stated by the actor
Disarm Hezbollah and "enable Israel to return to its borders once that threat … is removed" — the Secretary of State's statement at the signing of the Trilateral Framework, 26 June 2026.
As of 2026-06-26 Sources: US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon
Full implementation of the 20-point plan for Gaza, including demilitarisation, a technocratic Palestinian committee under the Board of Peace and an International Stabilization Force, as endorsed by resolution 2803.
As of 2025-11-17 Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon
No further extension of UNIFIL beyond resolution 2790, as stated in the US explanation of vote of 28 August 2025.
As of 2025-08-28 Sources: US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
Assessed by Vigil
Replacing UN-centred arrangements with US-facilitated ones. In Lebanon the Framework does not mention resolution 1701, UNIFIL or the Security Council; in Gaza the Board of Peace and the ISF are non-UN bodies the Council endorsed. The pattern concentrates verification in US hands.
Confidence: Moderate Sources: Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
Using conditional money as the main lever: assistance to Lebanon is "strictly conditioned on verifiable milestones", and Gaza reconstruction funds wait on decommissioning.
Confidence: Moderate Sources: Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
Constraints
What limits this actor's options, with the kind of limit it is.
Its arrangements require forces it does not provide: the ISF depends on troop contributors (Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania signed on in February 2026) and has not deployed.
External Confidence: Moderate Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Security Council Report — monthly forecasts↗
Mediator and ally at once: its assistance memorandum with Israel and its chairing of instruments Israel is party to give Hamas and Hezbollah grounds to reject US-led verification.
External Confidence: Low Sources: US Congressional Research Service — reports on Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians↗ · Statements by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and allied armed organisations
Military assistance runs through congressional appropriation, and the current memorandum ends with fiscal year 2028.
Institutional Confidence: High Sources: US Congressional Research Service — reports on Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians↗
Sources of leverage
What this actor can bring to bear, and how firmly each is established.
Chair or facilitator of the Board of Peace, the ISF command, the Lebanon military coordination group and the talks themselves.
Confidence: High Sources: US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗
Military assistance to Israel and conditional assistance to Lebanon and Gaza reconstruction.
Confidence: High Sources: US Congressional Research Service — reports on Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians↗ · US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon
What remains unknown
- The Civil-Military Coordination Center's current status: established on 17 October 2025 with 50 partners (S/2026/418); a reported rebranding and closure are press-only.
- Whether the nominee for US Security Coordinator, Maj. Gen. Sean Salene (nominated December 2025), has been confirmed.
- The current US air-defence deployment in Israel.
- A next Lebanon round on 20 October 2026 at US Central Command is reported by Lebanese press and not confirmed officially.
Posture as of 2026-10-10Posture reviewed 2026-10-11
Not published for The United States and the LevantRed linesObservables
Elsewhere in Levant
Last reviewed — 2026-10-11