Energy
Israeli offshore gas and its exports
Leviathan and Karish production, wartime shutdowns, and the export contracts that carry Israeli gas to Egypt and Jordan.
Coverage · Levant
AssessmentModerate confidence
Not investment advice. This surface explains exposure and transmission channels; it never recommends, ranks or names securities. Figures are estimates and carry their own as-of dates and confidence grades.
Current state
Where this economy stands
Moderate confidence · Economic data as of 2026-10
The economic file in Levant is a set of transmission mechanisms. Money, labour, goods and gas cross the lines between Israel, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and their neighbours through a small number of arrangements — the clearance transfer, a correspondent-banking link, work permits, one cargo crossing into Gaza, gas pipelines to Egypt and Jordan — and each is now held open, suspended or conditioned by a political decision rather than by a market. What follows separates what an instrument provides from what moved under it, keeps the reconstruction assessments apart by method, and attributes every party's figure. It is not investment advice and contains no forecast of its own; where a figure is a scenario, it is the issuer's.
- Gas export to EgyptLeviathan deal of about 130 bcm through 2040 (about $35bn); export permit approved by the government on 17 December 2025As of 2025-12-17Moderate confidenceIsrael
- Reconstruction needs (pre-2026 war)$11bn recovery and reconstruction needs; $14bn economic cost ($6.8bn damage, $7.2bn losses), 8 October 2023 – 20 December 2024As of 2025-03-07High confidenceLebanonWorld Bank Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment; overtaken by the 2026 war, and no new assessment has been found.
- West Bank growth, 2025About 3 per cent (World Bank); 4.4 per cent (PCBS), with the West Bank still about 13 per cent below 2023As of 2026Moderate confidencePA
- Gaza economyContracted by 84 per cent; damage $35.2bn, recovery and reconstruction needs $71.4bn over a decade (October 2023 – October 2025)As of 2026-04-20High confidenceHamasWorld Bank, EU and UN Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment.
The economy, as analytical objects What is economically exposed in Levant, as 8 selectable objects. Each carries its own records, its exposure class and — where the corpus establishes one — the mechanism by which pressure reaches it.Interrogate Levant in Explore
Trade & transport
West Bank work in Israel and the settlements
Cross-border employment, permits and unemployment — the labour channel through which movement policy reaches West Bank incomes.
Trade & transport
What enters Gaza — goods and fuel
Gaza's productive collapse, commercial entry through one cargo crossing, and the fuel that generators, pumps and desalination run on.
Finance
Clearance revenue and the Palestinian budget
The Paris Protocol transfer, its suspension and statutory deductions, and the wage, arrears and financing-gap consequences for the Palestinian Authority.
Finance
The Israeli–Palestinian banking interface
The correspondent relationships through which Palestinian banks settle trade and return shekel cash, and the indemnity letters they run on.
Reconstruction & aid
Gaza reconstruction and its financing
The three reconstruction figures held apart by method, the Board of Peace fund and pledges, and what stands between them and reconstruction.
Reconstruction & aid
Lebanese reconstruction and its conditions
The pre-2026 damage baseline, the financing that exists, and the Trilateral Framework's sequencing of reconstruction behind disarmament.
Infrastructure
Israeli ports and seaborne trade
Eilat's dormancy and the concentration of Israeli seaborne trade on the Mediterranean ports.
The full assessment8 blocks of analysis and 3 graded exposures, filed under the objects above — the module’s own words, with their own dates
Everything below is authored on this module’s economy record. Figures carry the vintage of the release that produced them, not the date of this page: the section is graded Moderate confidence and its figures are stated as of 2026-10.
Israeli offshore gas and its exportsEnergyHigh exposure
| Commodity | Why it matters here | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Natural gas | Israel's offshore fields supply its own power system and export to Egypt and Jordan. Leviathan and Karish were shut when the war with Iran began in late February 2026 and restarted in April, and the largest export contract runs to 2040. | High exposure |
Runs through East Mediterranean gas
Organisations Chevron (energy company) · Energean (energy company)
Israeli gas — a domestic supply and a regional export that stop together
As of 2026-10
Leviathan and Karish were shut when the war with Iran began. Karish shut on 28 February 2026 and restarted on 9 April after 41 days (MEES). Leviathan's shut-in is dated 28 February by the operators and 2 March by Argus, which reports a ministry order; its restart was cleared on 31 March and regular production resumed on 2 April. Both had also been shut from 13 June 2025 until late that month. Leviathan supplies Jordan under a 2016 contract and exports to Egypt, and Israeli business press reported power cuts in both countries after the 2026 shutdown. The largest export commitment is the Leviathan–Egypt agreement signed in August 2025 — about 130 bcm through 2040, valued at roughly $35 billion — for which the Israeli government approved the export permit on 17 December 2025. Its first phase is about 20 bcm; its second, about 110 bcm, depends on expanding Leviathan's output. Gas is the module's one economic channel that runs from Israel outward into the two states whose peace treaties with Israel anchor the regional interface.
Sources: MEES — Middle East Economic Survey↗ · Argus Media — energy market reporting↗ · Established international media reporting · Public market and insurance data · Established historical record
What to watch
- Do Israel's offshore fields stay in production through the next escalation, and do deliveries to Egypt run at the contracted rate?Field status (producing or shut) with its date during any escalation, and first-phase deliveries to Egypt against the contract. A shutdown is also an Egyptian and Jordanian power event.
West Bank work in Israel and the settlementsTrade & transport
Work across the line — the clearest measure of movement policy in the economy
As of 2026-08
The World Bank, on Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data, counts 177,400 West Bank cross-border workers in Israel and the settlements in the third quarter of 2023, about 24,000 after October 2023, and 51,800 in the fourth quarter of 2025 — a recovery it attributes largely to workers without permits. PCBS counted about 53,000 in the second quarter of 2026, about 35,000 of them in Israel (reported by the Jerusalem Post, 12 August 2026). Gaza's cross-border labour is historical. West Bank unemployment was 27.5 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2025, down from a 35 per cent peak. Estimates of 2025 growth differ by source — about 3 per cent on the World Bank's reading, 4.4 per cent on PCBS's, which also puts the West Bank economy about 13 per cent below its 2023 level. A permit count, a count of cross-border workers and a count of those actually working measure different populations, and this module names the one it uses each time.
Sources: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics↗ · The Jerusalem Post↗
What enters Gaza — goods and fuelTrade & transportHigh exposure
| Commodity | Why it matters here | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Fuel and lubricants for Gaza's generators | Gaza's water, health and remaining commercial activity run on generators and pumps supplied through one cargo crossing. OCHA reported lubricant and engine-oil shortages shutting generators down in October 2026. | High exposure |
How pressure reaches it
- Fuel and power inputs → Gaza's water productionhumanitarian · as of 2026-10-02
- Affected area or system Confirmed
- Access or service disruption Confirmed
- Civilian condition Confirmed
- Broader humanitarian significance Plausible exposure
Runs through Gaza power and water infrastructure
Gaza's economy reduced to what enters it
As of 2026-10
The World Bank, EU and UN assessment of April 2026 puts Gaza's economic contraction at 84 per cent over October 2023 to October 2025. The Bank's May 2026 report records unemployment at 78 per cent in 2025 against 22 per cent before the war, and year-on-year growth of about 30 per cent in 2025 that is a base effect after 2024, not a recovery. The IPC's July 2026 snapshot finds 83 per cent of households with no income and commercial imports at about 100 trucks a day; OCHA, relaying the Gaza Chamber of Commerce, counted 788 to 881 commercial truckloads a week in September 2026 — a different unit and source, not a comparable series. Every load passes one cargo crossing: OCHA reports Kerem Shalom as the only operational cargo crossing on 2 October 2026, with Zikim, the northern route, closed since 24 May. Fuel is the input the rest runs on — generators, water pumps, desalination — and OCHA's same report records lubricant and engine-oil shortages shutting generators down. Volumes are counted in incompatible units: COGAT counts trucks, and according to Gisha changed the number of pallets it counts as a truck in early 2026; the UN2720 mechanism counts UN consignments by stage. Neither is carried here as a measure of the other.
Sources: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · IPC — Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analyses for the Gaza Strip↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · Gisha — Legal Center for Freedom of Movement↗ · COGAT — Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories↗ · UN2720 Mechanism for Gaza (UNOPS)↗
What to watch
- Does a second cargo crossing into Gaza operate, and do commercial imports rise above the September 2026 level?Zikim reopening, an Erez goods terminal opening, or an OCHA figure for commercial entry above the 788–881 truckloads a week it relayed from the Gaza Chamber of Commerce in September 2026, compared in that same unit. Announcements of a crossing are not an operating crossing.
Clearance revenue and the Palestinian budgetFinance
How pressure reaches it
- Clearance-revenue withholding → PA liquidity → institutional pressureeconomic · as of 2026-10-10
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Confirmed
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
The clearance transfer — a budget resting on a transfer it does not control
As of 2026-10
Under the 1994 Paris Protocol, Israel collects customs and VAT on goods bound for the Palestinian territories and remits the proceeds to the Palestinian Authority, less deductions. The World Bank's May 2026 Economic Update reports these clearance revenues suspended completely since May 2025, and records that transfers and deductions remain disputed with no reconciled accounting. The effect is visible in wages: the Authority paid public salaries at 50 to 70 per cent of the commitment through 2025, and in January 2026 a flat NIS 2,000 to every employee, three months late. The Bank puts the 2025 financing gap at about $1.3 billion after Israeli deductions — 7.7 per cent of GDP, against 3.7 per cent in 2023 — and the 2026 gap at $1.6 billion after deductions, or $3.8 billion if clearance stays halted, which is the Bank's scenario. At end-2025 public debt stood at $4.8 billion, $3.3 billion of it owed to domestic banks, with arrears of $2.85 billion to public employees and $1.82 billion to private suppliers. On 8 June 2026 the Knesset passed, 29 to 5, an amendment to the 2018 Freezing Law (bill no. 1124, per the Knesset Shkufa tracker) under which a ministerial committee sets an additional annual deduction to cover compensation paid to victims of attacks; no amount had been set by October 2026. June 2026 salaries were paid on 23 September, with a NIS 2,000 minimum, and the Authority's finance minister put its monthly need at about NIS 1.5 billion against NIS 800–850 million available (WAFA, 27 September). The mechanism, step by step, is the impact chain on clearance withholding. The total withheld is itself a disputed quantity: the Authority's finance minister put it at about NIS 13 billion in February 2026 and the PLO Executive Committee at about $7 billion on 10 October 2026, while the World Bank publishes no total.
Sources: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · The Times of Israel↗ · Palestinian Authority statements and documents · WAFA — Palestinian News and Info Agency↗ · Knesset Shkufa — civic tracker of Knesset bills and votes↗ · Established historical record
What to watch
- Does any clearance-revenue transfer to the Palestinian Authority resume, and what deduction is set under the June 2026 law?A transfer recorded by the World Bank, the Authority's Finance Ministry or the Israeli Finance Ministry would end the suspension that began in May 2025; the first annual amount fixed by the security cabinet under the 8 June 2026 law is the observable for the deduction regime. A statement of intent is neither.
The Israeli–Palestinian banking interfaceFinance
How pressure reaches it
- Correspondent banking → the shekel surplus → payment frictioneconomic · as of 2026-10-07
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Confirmed
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
The correspondent-banking link — a date, not a successor
As of 2026-10
Palestinian banks settle trade through correspondent relationships with Israeli banks, which operate under indemnity and immunity letters from Israel's Finance Ministry. The World Bank notes that those letters, historically issued for six to twelve months, have more recently been extended for two weeks at a time, and that Palestinian banks held about NIS 16 billion of surplus shekel cash in December 2025. Israel Discount Bank and Bank Hapoalim had planned to exit in September and October 2026; according to the Bank of Israel's deputy governor, speaking to Reuters on 1 September 2026, both agreed after talks with the Finance Ministry to continue until the end of 2026, the reported horizon after the Finance Minister agreed in July to extend the waiver; the Palestine Monetary Authority's governor said on 7 October that there had been no severance (Global Trade Review). No written instrument was found, and the government company approved in 2019 cannot operate without a law. The Bank of Israel caps the shekel cash it absorbs from Palestinian banks at NIS 4.5 billion a quarter, and the surplus reached NIS 17–18 billion at end-June 2026 (MAS) — the friction traced in the impact chain on the shekel surplus. The interface is tied to the fiscal one: the banks whose settlement link is in question hold $5.3 billion of exposure to the Palestinian public sector, 42 per cent of their credit, on the World Bank's end-2025 figure.
Sources: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · Reuters↗ · Bank of Israel↗ · Global Trade Review (GTR)↗ · Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) — economic and fiscal updates↗ · Established international media reporting
What to watch
- Is the correspondent-banking arrangement extended beyond 31 December 2026, and on what instrument?A written Bank of Israel or Finance Ministry instrument, its length, or an operating government company taking over the activity. Two-week extensions continuing past the end of 2026 are an observation too, and a different one from a renewal.
Gaza reconstruction and its financingReconstruction & aidHigh exposure
| Commodity | Why it matters here | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| Construction materials (dual-use) | Cement, timber and metal sheeting are the inputs reconstruction and shelter repair need, and the Norwegian Refugee Council reported them blocked in October 2026 under Israel's unpublished dual-use list, with Gisha reporting no reconstruction under way. | High exposure |
Three reconstruction numbers, one channel, no reconstruction under way
As of 2026-10
Three reconstruction figures circulate for Gaza and they measure three different things. The Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment of 18 February 2025 (World Bank, EU and UN) put needs at $53.2 billion over a decade, on data to October 2024. The Arab League plan adopted in Cairo on 4 March 2025 costed its own programme at about $53 billion over five years — the cost of a plan, not an assessment. The Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment of 20 April 2026 puts recovery and reconstruction needs at $71.4 billion over a decade, $26.3 billion of it in the first 18 months, on damage of $35.2 billion and losses of $22.7 billion over October 2023 to October 2025. Vigil carries each with its method and adds none together. The financing channel exists on paper: the Board of Peace's first report to the Security Council (S/2026/418, 15 May 2026) records $17 billion pledged and a Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund with the World Bank as limited trustee, its answer to resolution 2803's call for a donor-governed trust fund. The same report names Hamas' refusal to accept verified decommissioning as the principal obstacle to implementation, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza has not entered the Strip, and no disbursement figure for the fund was found. The Financial Times reported on 27 May 2026 that the trustee fund had received no money and that contributions had gone to a Board of Peace account instead; no later statement of either channel's balance was found. Cement, timber and metal sheeting remained blocked in October 2026 (Norwegian Refugee Council).
Sources: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Established international media reporting
What to watch
- Does the Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund disburse, and where does reconstruction begin?A trustee or Board of Peace statement showing a fund balance or a disbursement, and a named location where reconstruction, rather than debris clearance or temporary shelter, is under way.
Lebanese reconstruction and its conditionsReconstruction & aid
How pressure reaches it
- 2026 war damage → a reconstruction framework that does not cover iteconomic · as of 2026-10-13
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Confirmed
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
Lebanon — reconstruction sequenced behind disarmament, with no current assessment
As of 2026-10
The only damage and needs assessment found for Lebanon is the World Bank's of 7 March 2025, covering 8 October 2023 to 20 December 2024: $11 billion in recovery and reconstruction needs and an economic cost of $14 billion ($6.8 billion of damage and $7.2 billion of losses). It predates the war that began on 2 March 2026, and no newer assessment was found, so Vigil publishes no current figure. The financing that exists is small and conditional. The Bank approved a $250 million Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project on 25 June 2025, within a framework scalable to $1 billion; its own FAQ of 17 February 2026 shows nothing yet available for reconstruction works and only 2023–24 damage eligible. On 15 September 2026 the Prime Minister told Parliament that the 2026 war's direct cost was "$3–4bn so far", citing an unpublished World Bank preliminary estimate — his claim, not an assessment Vigil holds. The EU announced €505 million for 2026–27. The Trilateral Framework signed on 26 June 2026 makes new US assistance conditional on verifiable milestones, commits Lebanon to keep reconstruction funds from non-state armed groups, and places reconstruction in each pilot zone after disarmament there is confirmed; the US Secretary of State's statement the same day committed $100 million in humanitarian assistance. The cabinet's approval of the US paper's objectives on 7 August 2025 included an economic conference with the United States, France, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Reconstruction here is sequenced behind disarmament, as it is in Gaza. Outside the state channel, Hezbollah announced on 13 October 2026 a compensation programme of up to $14,000 per household in Beirut and its southern suburbs and $12,000 elsewhere, paid in four instalments over a year, according to AFP; no payment has been confirmed and the funding source was not stated.
Sources: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · Lebanese government statements and decisions (Presidency, Council of Ministers, ministries)↗ · Agence France-Presse↗
What to watch
- Is there a damage and needs assessment for Lebanon that covers the 2026 war, and does reconstruction begin in any pilot zone?A World Bank or UN assessment dated after March 2026 would replace the 2025 baseline; reconstruction recorded in a named pilot zone is the first test of the Framework's sequencing.
Israeli ports and seaborne tradeInfrastructure
How pressure reaches it
- The Red Sea and Israel's southern porteconomic · as of 2026-01
- Affected asset, route or region Confirmed
- Operational disruption Confirmed
- Exposed sector or commodity Confirmed
- Broader economic significance Plausible exposure
Runs through Israeli and Lebanese seaports
Organisations Haifa Port Company (infrastructure operator) · Ashdod Port Company (infrastructure operator) · Eilat port concession (Nakash group) (infrastructure operator)
Israeli seaborne trade — concentration on the Mediterranean
As of 2026-10
Eilat, Israel's only Red Sea port, lost most of its activity after late 2023: its revenue fell from NIS 212 million in 2023 to NIS 42 million in 2024, and commercial operations halted from about 20 July 2025 after the municipality froze its accounts. No return to regular service in 2026 was found, and its 2026 traffic is not established. Trade runs through the Mediterranean ports: Haifa, 70 per cent owned by Adani Ports, reported normal operations after the strikes of 1 March 2026, and Israeli ports handled 24.3 million tonnes of cargo in January to May 2026 on Transport Ministry data reported by trade press. Israeli airspace closed on 28 February 2026; the Transport Ministry announced Ben Gurion's full reopening for 8–9 April, and foreign carriers returned in stages. The exposure is concentration rather than closure: about 98–99 per cent of Israeli foreign trade moves by sea (State Comptroller), now through two Mediterranean port areas within range of fire from Lebanon and Iran.
Sources: Globes (Israeli business daily, English edition)↗ · State Comptroller of Israel — audit reports (seaports)↗ · Container News (shipping trade press)↗ · Established international media reporting
Actor economiesThe economic record Vigil holds on each of the 14 parties in this module — revenue base, figures and constraints, per actor
State actor — economic profile
Israel
Israel enters the Levant system's economy as the gas supplier to its two treaty neighbours, as the collector of Palestinian public revenue, and as a port system whose Red Sea gateway has gone near-dormant.
Gas export to EgyptLeviathan deal of about 130 bcm through 2040 (about $35bn); export permit approved by the government on 17 December 2025As of 2025-12-17 · Confidence: Moderate
Offshore gas in the 2026 warLeviathan and Karish shut on 28 February 2026; Leviathan restarted after 32 daysAs of 2026-04 · Confidence: Moderate Karish's restart date has not been verified.
Eilat portCommercial operations halted from about 20 July 2025; near-dormant sinceAs of 2026-10 · Confidence: Moderate
Energy as an interface
Leviathan supplies Jordan and Egypt, so an Israeli field shutdown is a power problem in Amman and Cairo: blackouts in both followed the 2026 shutdown, according to Israeli business press. The export deal's second phase depends on expanding Leviathan, which makes it a long-dated commitment exposed to every escalation.
Revenue held as policy
Under the 1994 Paris Protocol Israel collects customs, VAT and purchase tax on goods destined for the Palestinian territories and transfers them monthly, less deductions. The World Bank reports transfers completely suspended from May 2025; in April 2026 the finance minister's office said about NIS 590m of that month's NIS 740m had been deducted for outstanding bills and the remainder frozen.
Sources: Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · Established international media reporting
Confidence: Moderate Gas and port figures rest on business press; the clearance figures are the Israeli finance ministry's own account, relayed by press.Economic data as of 2026-05Israel — full profile →
State actor — economic profile
Lebanon
The Lebanese state carries the 2026 war's reconstruction and displacement costs on top of an economy whose last damage assessment predates the war.
Reconstruction needs (pre-2026 war)$11bn recovery and reconstruction needs; $14bn economic cost ($6.8bn damage, $7.2bn losses), 8 October 2023 – 20 December 2024As of 2025-03-07 · Confidence: High World Bank Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment; overtaken by the 2026 war, and no new assessment has been found.
US support at the Framework's signing$100m immediate humanitarian assistance; more than $30m to reimburse the Lebanese armyAs of 2026-06-26 · Confidence: High
Displacement1,049,328 displaced since 2 March 2026 (UN, to 20 June); 341,228 internally displaced and 864,680 returned at IOM's round of 15 September 2026As of 2026-09-15 · Confidence: Moderate The IOM round was read through summaries.
A damage baseline the war has overtaken
The only published damage assessment covers the 2023–24 hostilities. The 2026 war displaced more than a million people and has no equivalent assessment yet, so the state's reconstruction need is unknown in published figures. The Framework conditions new US assistance on verifiable milestones and commits Lebanon to keep reconstruction funds from non-state armed groups, which makes reconstruction money a lever of the disarmament process.
Sources: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
Non-state actor — war economy
PA
A public budget that depends on a revenue stream another state collects, in an economy that the World Bank and PCBS both show still below its pre-October 2023 level.
West Bank growth, 2025About 3 per cent (World Bank); 4.4 per cent (PCBS), with the West Bank still about 13 per cent below 2023As of 2026 · Confidence: Moderate
Fiscal gap2025 financing gap about $1.3bn after Israeli deductions (7.7 per cent of GDP); 2026 deficit after deductions projected at $1.6bn, or $3.8bn if clearance stays halted (World Bank)As of 2026-05 · Confidence: High
West Bank unemployment27.5 per cent in Q4 2025, down from a 35 per cent peak (World Bank)As of 2025-12 · Confidence: High
Cross-border workers177,400 before the war (Q3 2023); 24,000 at the low; 51,800 in Q4 2025 (World Bank, from PCBS)As of 2025-12 · Confidence: High The rise is driven largely by workers without permits; the figure is not a permit count.
The fiscal mechanism
Under the Paris Protocol Israel collects customs, VAT and purchase tax on goods bound for the Palestinian territories and transfers them monthly less a handling fee and deductions. With transfers suspended, the PA paid partial wages and, in January 2026, a flat NIS 2,000 to all employees three months late; donor support of about $940m in 2025 left a deficit below $100m after grants but a gap of about $1.3bn after deductions. The correspondent-banking arrangement that lets Palestinian banks clear shekels through Israeli banks continues to the end of 2026 according to a Bank of Israel deputy governor's interview with Reuters; the World Bank notes indemnity extensions recently running two weeks at a time. 31 December is therefore a second fiscal cliff.
Sources: Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · Reuters↗ · Bank of Israel↗
Confidence: Moderate World Bank figures are from the May 2026 Economic Update, read in full; the PA's and Israel's own figures measure different things and are not combined.Economic data as of 2026-05PA — full profile →
Non-state actor — war economy
Hamas
No verifiable account of Hamas's own finances was read for this record. Its economic position is that of the authority in a Strip whose economy has largely collapsed and whose reconstruction is conditioned on its disarmament.
Gaza economyContracted by 84 per cent; damage $35.2bn, recovery and reconstruction needs $71.4bn over a decade (October 2023 – October 2025)As of 2026-04-20 · Confidence: High World Bank, EU and UN Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment.
Reconstruction pledges$17bn pledged, with a Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund under World Bank limited trusteeship, as reported by the Board of PeaceAs of 2026-05-15 · Confidence: Moderate
Money that waits on weapons
The Board of Peace answers resolution 2803's call for a donor-governed trust fund with the Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund. Its first report states the principal obstacle as Hamas's refusal of verified decommissioning, which makes the organisation's weapons decision the gate on the Strip's reconstruction money.
Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
Confidence: Low The Strip-wide figures are well sourced; Hamas's own revenue and financing are not published and are not estimated.Economic data as of 2026-05Hamas — full profile →
Non-state actor — war economy
PIJ
PIJ has no economic role the module tracks beyond its dependence on external funding, which US government reporting attributes principally to Iran.
Economic roleNone as an administrator or producer; funded externally, principally by Iran according to US government reportingAs of 2021 · Confidence: Low
An unreported budget
No published source read for this record states PIJ's budget or its funding channels after 2025. The module records the US government's characterisation and its date, and estimates nothing.
Sources: US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon
Non-state actor — war economy
Hezbollah
Hezbollah's economic position in this system is that of a recipient of external funding whose channels the 2024–25 changes in Syria and Lebanon narrowed but did not close, according to the US Treasury.
External fundingOver $1bn from the IRGC-Qods Force, mostly via exchange companies (US Treasury, 6 Nov 2025); more than $1bn since November 2024 (Israel's claim, S/2025/621)As of 2025-11-06 · Confidence: Moderate An official US statement and a party's claim; attributed, not combined.
Money that changed route
UN reporting describes funding rerouted through Türkiye, Iraq, the sea and exchange houses after the land and air routes closed. The routes themselves are the Syria and Iran–Gulf modules' records; this module records only what reaches Lebanon, attributed.
Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
State actor — economic profile
Iran
Iran's economic role in the Levant is that of a funder of armed partners, whose transfers the closure of the Syrian route pushed into exchange houses and other alternative channels.
Transfers to HezbollahOver $1bn via money exchange companies (US Treasury, 6 Nov 2025); more than $1bn since November 2024 (Israel's claim, S/2025/621)As of 2025-11-06 · Confidence: Moderate
Funding under sanctions and route loss
Iran's support is financed by a state under its own war and sanctions, and moved through channels — exchange houses, Iraq, the sea — that US designations target. Iran's national economy is the Iran–Gulf module's record and is not restated here.
Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · US / EU / UK sanctions designations
State actor — economic profile
United States
The US economic role in the Levant is as funder: military assistance to Israel under a ten-year memorandum, and conditional humanitarian and security assistance to Lebanon and Gaza.
Israel memorandum$38bn over FY2019–FY2028As of 2025-05 · Confidence: High
Lebanon, June 2026$100m immediate humanitarian assistance; more than $30m to reimburse the Lebanese armyAs of 2026-06-26 · Confidence: High
Money as sequencing
The Trilateral Framework conditions new US assistance on verifiable milestones, and the Gaza plan ties reconstruction to demilitarisation. US money therefore arrives after the security steps it is meant to reward, which makes its timing a function of the disarmament processes rather than of need.
Sources: Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
State actor — economic profile
Egypt
Egypt's Levant economy is gas: it imports Israeli gas under a long-dated contract that the 2026 war showed can stop overnight.
ContractAbout 130 bcm through 2040, phase 1 of 20 bcm at about 2 bcm a year from the first half of 2026As of 2025-12-17 · Confidence: Moderate
Supply shockIsraeli fields shut on 28 February 2026; blackouts in Egypt and Jordan followed, according to Israeli business pressAs of 2026-04 · Confidence: Low
Dependence in both directions
The deal's second phase depends on expanding Leviathan, so Egyptian supply is tied to Israeli investment decisions and to every escalation that shuts the fields. Israel, in turn, gains its largest export customer in a treaty partner.
State actor — economic profile
Jordan
Jordan's Levant economy runs through three Israeli dependencies — water under the treaty, gas from Leviathan, and the Allenby trade route to the West Bank.
GasLeviathan supplies Jordan's national electricity company under a 2016 contractAs of 2026-04 · Confidence: Moderate
WaterTreaty allocations plus an additional 50 million cubic metres a year purchased under the 2021 dealAs of 2021-10 · Confidence: Moderate
Three interruptible dependencies
Each of the three interfaces can be interrupted by a single Israeli decision or a single escalation. The 2026 field shutdown and the 2025 bridge closures show both happening within months.
State actor — economic profile
Qatar
Qatar's economic role in the Levant is as a prospective donor; no Qatari reconstruction commitment specific to Gaza was verified for this record.
Economic roleProspective donor; reconstruction pledges are reported in aggregate by the Board of Peace, not by donor in the sources readAs of 2026-05-15 · Confidence: Low
Donor, not system
The Board of Peace reported $17bn pledged for Gaza reconstruction by May 2026 without a donor breakdown in the material read. Qatar's share is therefore not stated.
Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
Non-state actor — war economy
UNIFIL
UNIFIL has no economic role in the module beyond its own presence in the south; its budget is set by the UN and was cut by 15 per cent in 2026.
BudgetCut by 15 per cent, leading to the handover of positions to the Lebanese armyAs of 2026-06-20 · Confidence: High
A shrinking presence
The budget cut and the end-2026 cessation together mean the force is contracting before any successor exists; its positions pass to the Lebanese army one by one.
Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
Non-state actor — war economy
UNRWA
UNRWA's economic position is a funding and access problem: an agency of voluntary contributions cutting staff while legally cut off from the utilities and banking its facilities depend on in areas Israel governs.
Gaza staffingAbout 600 staff dismissed and a 20 per cent salary cut; 70 further Gaza staff terminated in June 2026As of 2026-06 · Confidence: Low Press and NGO reporting; UNRWA's own figures were not read.
Services without utilities
The December 2025 amendment defines water, electricity and banking as prohibited contact, which reaches the agency's ability to run facilities and pay staff in East Jerusalem without any change to its mandate.
Sources: Knesset — legislation and committee records↗ · Established international media reporting
Non-state actor — war economy
Board of Peace
The Board's economic role is to coordinate Gaza's reconstruction finance, against a need the World Bank, EU and UN put at $71.4bn over a decade.
Pledged$17bn, as reported by the Board, with eight founding donorsAs of 2026-05-15 · Confidence: Moderate
Assessed need$71.4bn over ten years, $26.3bn in the first 18 months (Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, April 2026)As of 2026-04-20 · Confidence: High
A fund that waits on weapons
Resolution 2803 calls on the World Bank to support reconstruction through a donor-governed trust fund; the Board's answer is the GRAD. The Board's May 2026 report is quoted as saying that reconstruction cannot begin where weapons have not been laid down, which ties disbursement to the decommissioning the roadmap has not yet started. The technocratic committee presented a six-month recovery programme of about $2.45bn in September 2026, according to reporting.
Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · Established international media reporting
Evidence and grading
- Exposure
- How strongly this part of the economy is exposed to conflict developments. An assessed exposure class, not a price forecast and not a probability.
- Confidence
- How well established Vigil considers this assessment to be. It is not a measure of how badly the economy is affected.