What this system is
About 99% of Israel's import and export cargo by tonnage moves by sea. Since Houthi attacks emptied Eilat from late 2023 it runs through two Mediterranean port areas within range of fire, at a war-risk premium. Beirut's port kept operating through the 2024 and 2026 wars.
The trade lifeline of a state whose land borders carry little: the State Comptroller put seaborne trade at about 98% of Israel's foreign trade in 2020 and about 99% of import and export cargo by tonnage in January 2024. The system is also where the regional wars reach Israel's economy — through the Red Sea outlet, the Mediterranean ports under fire and the insurance on every call — and, at Beirut, where the Lebanese state's control of what enters the country is tested.
Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07Reviewed 2026-10-12
The system
- Overview
- Israel's seaborne trade runs through three port areas. Haifa, in the north, combines the Haifa Port Company — owned 70% by Adani Ports and 30% by Gadot since January 2023 — with the Bayport terminal run by SIPG on a 25-year concession since September 2021. Ashdod, in the south, combines the Ashdod Port Company with the Southport terminal run by TIL, part of MSC; private terminals handled 43% of containers in the first three quarters of 2023 and almost half in 2025, on trade-press figures. Eilat, the only Red Sea port, run under a Nakash group concession since 2013, handled about half of Israel's car imports before the war and has been near-dormant since late 2023. Lebanon's Port of Beirut, whose post-2020 reconstruction plan has no reported funding update since March 2024, is the module's other port: a state entry point whose 2026 traffic grew mainly through transshipment.
- Current state · as of 2026-07
- As of mid-2026, Israeli ports handled 29.52 million tonnes in the first half of 2026, up 4.6%, and 1.81 million TEU, up 8.8%, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press; Ashdod's port area was the largest by tonnage in January to May. Eilat has been commercially halted since 20 July 2025, and Globes reported it still empty in January 2026; no resumption was found. Adani said Haifa was fully operational after the Iranian strikes of 1 March 2026, and no confirmed damage to the commercial port in 2026 was found. The Port of Beirut handled 471,637 TEU in the first half of 2026, up 16.27%, with no Israeli strike on it or closure of it found.
- Documented exposure
- At the level operators, insurers and the State Comptroller publish: the share of trade carried by sea, the war-risk premium per call and the carrier surcharge per container, Eilat's published activity and revenue, and the operator's statements on Haifa during strikes. Hezbollah's claims of strikes toward Haifa are recorded as claims. No facility-level state is published here.
Nodes
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- Ashdod portPort
The largest port area by tonnage in January to May 2026, and a stage in Gaza's aid supply.
- Eilat portPort
The Red Sea outlet; near-dormant since late 2023, commercially halted since 20 July 2025.
- Haifa portPort
The northern port area, under fire in 2025 and 2026 and reported operating throughout.
- Port of BeirutPort
Lebanon's main port and a state entry point; operating through the 2026 war.
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- Israeli seaborne tradeGeneral trade · 3 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the recordAlmost all of Israel's foreign trade goes by sea, and since the Red Sea outlet emptied it goes through two Mediterranean port areas.
- Cargo access into GazaHumanitarian access · 8 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · joined by its nodesFive gates on the map and one in use: every aid corridor and all commercial cargo now converge on Kerem Shalom, under an Israeli inspection regime whose item rules are unpublished.
- West Bank trade and labourGeneral trade · 6 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · joined by its nodesAn economy that sells almost everything to one neighbour, imports through that neighbour's ports and customs, and once earned a large share of its wages there.
Organisations that run it
- Haifa Port CompanyInfrastructure operator · ActiveThe operator of Haifa port, owned 70% by Adani Ports and 30% by Gadot since January 2023, whose statements are the signal of the port's state when Haifa comes under fire.
- Ashdod Port CompanyInfrastructure operator · ActiveThe operator of Ashdod port, which reported about 370,000 containers in the first half of 2026 and a 37.9% share of the local container market, as reported.
- Eilat port concession (Nakash group)Infrastructure operator · SuspendedThe concession holder for Israel's Red Sea port since 2013, whose business collapsed after late 2023 and whose operations halted on 20 July 2025; the ministries plan a new tender rather than an extension.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
Seaborne access for Israel's foreign trade. About 99% of import and export cargo by tonnage passes through the seaports (State Comptroller, January 2024; about 98% of foreign trade in the 2020 report). There is no land or air substitute of comparable scale.
Red Sea passage for Eilat. Eilat is reached from the Indian Ocean only through Bab el-Mandeb, so its traffic depends on Red Sea shipping risk — the system Vigil's Iran–Gulf module records as its maritime access. When Houthi attacks on Israel-linked shipping began in November 2023, the port lost about 85% of its activity within weeks.
War-risk insurance and carrier willingness to call. Every escalation raises the cost of a call: above 2% of hull value at the November 2023 peak and 0.7–1.0% for a seven-day call in June 2025, on brokers' figures reported by Reuters, and a ZIM surcharge of $100 or $75 per TEU from 12 March 2026 after insurers raised the premium on all Israeli port calls.
Transshipment at Beirut. The Port of Beirut's 2026 growth came mainly from transshipment — 129,319 TEU in the first half, up 46.78%, against 7.81% growth in loading and unloading — on port statistics as relayed by the Lebanese press.
With Eilat dormant, Israeli seaborne trade rests on two Mediterranean port areas within range of fire from Lebanon and Iran: a loss of redundancy rather than an interruption, since neither has closed.
Eilat's concession, held by the Nakash group since 2013, expires around 2028; the ministries decided not to extend it and plan a new tender. In January 2026 the Knesset Finance Committee was weighing an import order against direct aid, with a NIS 30 million state-guaranteed loan and NIS 3.2 million in deferred fees provided so far.
The French-funded Beirut port master plan handed over on 13 March 2024 excludes the container terminal, and donors said no money would flow before an IMF agreement; no 2025–26 update was found.
The Port of Beirut handled 471,637 TEU in the first half of 2026, up 16.27% year on year, driven mainly by transshipment; no Israeli strike on the port or closure of it was found in the 2026 war.
ZIM imposed a war-risk surcharge of $100 or $75 per TEU on Israeli port calls after insurers raised the premium on all calls (notice of 9 March 2026).
After the Iranian strikes on Israel at the start of the 2026 war — a war recorded by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module — Adani said Haifa port was fully operational. Hezbollah claimed rocket salvos toward Haifa later in March; no confirmed damage to the commercial port was found.
Eilat suspended commercial operations after the municipality froze its accounts over unpaid municipal taxes; the chief executive's description of the port as bankrupt was a statement, not a court filing.
Shipping began to avoid Eilat after Houthi attacks on Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea; activity was down about 85% by December 2023. The Red Sea material is owned by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module.
The Haifa Port Company passed to a consortium of Adani Ports (70%) and Gadot (30%).
Bayport opened in Haifa, run by SIPG on a 25-year concession; with Southport at Ashdod, the private terminals took a growing share of container handling.
Transmission chains through this system
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- The Red Sea and Israel's southern portEconomic exposure · as of 2026-01
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Confirmed
- significance Plausible exposure
- One cargo crossing → Gaza's humanitarian service capacityCivilian impact · as of 2026-10-08
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Confirmed
- exposure Plausible exposure
- significance Plausible exposure
Watch questions bearing on it
- Does money reach the Palestinian Authority's payroll and public services, and through which channel?active · Baseline 2026-10-12
- Does the regime governing what enters Gaza — the crossings, the dual-use rules, who may deliver — open, hold or tighten?active · Baseline 2026-10-12
- Is Iranian support reaching Hezbollah and the Palestinian armed groups in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, and is it intercepted on the Lebanese side?active · Baseline 2026-10-12
Economic exposures it underlies
Actors and arrangements
What remains unknown
- Whether the Knesset Finance Committee adopted an import order or direct aid for Eilat was not verified, and no 2026 resumption of service was found.
- No official figure was found for the share of Lebanon's imports entering through the Port of Beirut.
- The reported reactivation of a state cargo war-risk insurance scheme from 1 September 2026 rests on a search snippet and is not carried.
Readings the evidence also supports
- The rise in Israeli port volumes in 2025–26 may reflect restocking after each escalation rather than a structural recovery; the half-year figures cannot separate the two.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
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Assessed as of — 2026-07 Last reviewed — 2026-10-12