ما هذه المنظومة
About 99% of Israel's import and export cargo by tonnage moves by sea. Since Houthi attacks emptied Eilat from late 2023 it runs through two Mediterranean port areas within range of fire, at a war-risk premium. Beirut's port kept operating through the 2024 and 2026 wars.
The trade lifeline of a state whose land borders carry little: the State Comptroller put seaborne trade at about 98% of Israel's foreign trade in 2020 and about 99% of import and export cargo by tonnage in January 2024. The system is also where the regional wars reach Israel's economy — through the Red Sea outlet, the Mediterranean ports under fire and the insurance on every call — and, at Beirut, where the Lebanese state's control of what enters the country is tested.
الثقة: متوسطة حتى 2026-07رُوجع 2026-10-12
المنظومة
- نظرة عامة
- Israel's seaborne trade runs through three port areas. Haifa, in the north, combines the Haifa Port Company — owned 70% by Adani Ports and 30% by Gadot since January 2023 — with the Bayport terminal run by SIPG on a 25-year concession since September 2021. Ashdod, in the south, combines the Ashdod Port Company with the Southport terminal run by TIL, part of MSC; private terminals handled 43% of containers in the first three quarters of 2023 and almost half in 2025, on trade-press figures. Eilat, the only Red Sea port, run under a Nakash group concession since 2013, handled about half of Israel's car imports before the war and has been near-dormant since late 2023. Lebanon's Port of Beirut, whose post-2020 reconstruction plan has no reported funding update since March 2024, is the module's other port: a state entry point whose 2026 traffic grew mainly through transshipment.
- Current state · as of 2026-07
- As of mid-2026, Israeli ports handled 29.52 million tonnes in the first half of 2026, up 4.6%, and 1.81 million TEU, up 8.8%, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press; Ashdod's port area was the largest by tonnage in January to May. Eilat has been commercially halted since 20 July 2025, and Globes reported it still empty in January 2026; no resumption was found. Adani said Haifa was fully operational after the Iranian strikes of 1 March 2026, and no confirmed damage to the commercial port in 2026 was found. The Port of Beirut handled 471,637 TEU in the first half of 2026, up 16.27%, with no Israeli strike on it or closure of it found.
- Documented exposure
- At the level operators, insurers and the State Comptroller publish: the share of trade carried by sea, the war-risk premium per call and the carrier surcharge per container, Eilat's published activity and revenue, and the operator's statements on Haifa during strikes. Hezbollah's claims of strikes toward Haifa are recorded as claims. No facility-level state is published here.
العُقد
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- ميناء أسدودميناء
The largest port area by tonnage in January to May 2026, and a stage in Gaza's aid supply.
- ميناء إيلاتميناء
The Red Sea outlet; near-dormant since late 2023, commercially halted since 20 July 2025.
- ميناء حيفاميناء
The northern port area, under fire in 2025 and 2026 and reported operating throughout.
- مرفأ بيروتميناء
Lebanon's main port and a state entry point; operating through the 2026 war.
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- التجارة البحرية الإسرائيليةGeneral trade · 3 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the recordتنتقل التجارة الخارجية لإسرائيل كلها تقريبًا بحرًا، ومنذ أن خلا منفذ البحر الأحمر صارت تمر عبر منطقتين مينائيتين على البحر المتوسط.
- نفاذ البضائع إلى غزةHumanitarian access · 8 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · joined by its nodesخمس بوابات على الخريطة وواحدة قيد الاستخدام: كل ممرات المساعدات وكل البضائع التجارية تلتقي الآن عند كرم أبو سالم، في ظل نظام تفتيش إسرائيلي لا تُنشر قواعده الخاصة بالأصناف.
- التجارة والعمالة في الضفة الغربيةGeneral trade · 6 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · joined by its nodesاقتصاد يبيع كل شيء تقريبًا لجار واحد، ويستورد عبر موانئ ذلك الجار وجماركه، وكان يكسب ذات يوم حصة كبيرة من أجوره هناك.
Organisations that run it
- شركة ميناء حيفاInfrastructure operator · Activeمشغّل ميناء حيفا، المملوك بنسبة 70% لشركة Adani Ports و30% لشركة Gadot منذ يناير 2023، والذي تُعدّ بياناته مؤشرًا على حالة الميناء حين تتعرض حيفا للنيران.
- شركة ميناء أسدودInfrastructure operator · Activeمشغّل ميناء أسدود، الذي أفاد بمناولة نحو 370,000 حاوية في النصف الأول من 2026 وبحصة 37.9% من سوق الحاويات المحلية، بحسب ما أُفيد.
- امتياز ميناء إيلات (مجموعة Nakash)Infrastructure operator · Suspendedصاحب امتياز ميناء إسرائيل على البحر الأحمر منذ 2013، الذي انهار نشاطه بعد أواخر 2023 وتوقفت عملياته في 20 يوليو 2025؛ وتخطط الوزارات لمناقصة جديدة بدلًا من التمديد.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
Seaborne access for Israel's foreign trade. About 99% of import and export cargo by tonnage passes through the seaports (State Comptroller, January 2024; about 98% of foreign trade in the 2020 report). There is no land or air substitute of comparable scale.
Red Sea passage for Eilat. Eilat is reached from the Indian Ocean only through Bab el-Mandeb, so its traffic depends on Red Sea shipping risk — the system Vigil's Iran–Gulf module records as its maritime access. When Houthi attacks on Israel-linked shipping began in November 2023, the port lost about 85% of its activity within weeks.
War-risk insurance and carrier willingness to call. Every escalation raises the cost of a call: above 2% of hull value at the November 2023 peak and 0.7–1.0% for a seven-day call in June 2025, on brokers' figures reported by Reuters, and a ZIM surcharge of $100 or $75 per TEU from 12 March 2026 after insurers raised the premium on all Israeli port calls.
Transshipment at Beirut. The Port of Beirut's 2026 growth came mainly from transshipment — 129,319 TEU in the first half, up 46.78%, against 7.81% growth in loading and unloading — on port statistics as relayed by the Lebanese press.
With Eilat dormant, Israeli seaborne trade rests on two Mediterranean port areas within range of fire from Lebanon and Iran: a loss of redundancy rather than an interruption, since neither has closed.
Eilat's concession, held by the Nakash group since 2013, expires around 2028; the ministries decided not to extend it and plan a new tender. In January 2026 the Knesset Finance Committee was weighing an import order against direct aid, with a NIS 30 million state-guaranteed loan and NIS 3.2 million in deferred fees provided so far.
The French-funded Beirut port master plan handed over on 13 March 2024 excludes the container terminal, and donors said no money would flow before an IMF agreement; no 2025–26 update was found.
The Port of Beirut handled 471,637 TEU in the first half of 2026, up 16.27% year on year, driven mainly by transshipment; no Israeli strike on the port or closure of it was found in the 2026 war.
ZIM imposed a war-risk surcharge of $100 or $75 per TEU on Israeli port calls after insurers raised the premium on all calls (notice of 9 March 2026).
After the Iranian strikes on Israel at the start of the 2026 war — a war recorded by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module — Adani said Haifa port was fully operational. Hezbollah claimed rocket salvos toward Haifa later in March; no confirmed damage to the commercial port was found.
Eilat suspended commercial operations after the municipality froze its accounts over unpaid municipal taxes; the chief executive's description of the port as bankrupt was a statement, not a court filing.
Shipping began to avoid Eilat after Houthi attacks on Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea; activity was down about 85% by December 2023. The Red Sea material is owned by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module.
The Haifa Port Company passed to a consortium of Adani Ports (70%) and Gadot (30%).
Bayport opened in Haifa, run by SIPG on a 25-year concession; with Southport at Ashdod, the private terminals took a growing share of container handling.
سلاسل الانتقال عبر هذه المنظومة
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- البحر الأحمر وميناء إسرائيل الجنوبيEconomic exposure · as of 2026-01
- asset مؤكَّد
- disruption مؤكَّد
- exposure مؤكَّد
- significance انكشاف معقول
- معبر واحد للبضائع ← قدرة الخدمات الإنسانية في غزةCivilian impact · as of 2026-10-08
- asset مؤكَّد
- disruption مؤكَّد
- exposure مؤكَّد
- exposure انكشاف معقول
- significance انكشاف معقول
Watch questions bearing on it
- هل تصل الأموال إلى جدول رواتب السلطة الفلسطينية وخدماتها العامة، وعبر أي قناة؟active · Baseline 2026-10-12
- هل ينفتح النظام الذي يحكم ما يدخل غزة — المعابر، وقواعد الاستخدام المزدوج، ومن يُسمح له بالتسليم — أم يبقى على حاله أم يُشدَّد؟active · Baseline 2026-10-12
- هل يصل الدعم الإيراني إلى حزب الله والجماعات المسلحة الفلسطينية في لبنان والأراضي الفلسطينية، وهل يُعترَض على الجانب اللبناني؟active · Baseline 2026-10-12
Economic exposures it underlies
Actors and arrangements
ما لا يزال مجهولًا
- Whether the Knesset Finance Committee adopted an import order or direct aid for Eilat was not verified, and no 2026 resumption of service was found.
- No official figure was found for the share of Lebanon's imports entering through the Port of Beirut.
- The reported reactivation of a state cargo war-risk insurance scheme from 1 September 2026 rests on a search snippet and is not carried.
قراءات تدعمها الأدلة أيضًا
- The rise in Israeli port volumes in 2025–26 may reflect restocking after each escalation rather than a structural recovery; the half-year figures cannot separate the two.
مُدرجة لأن تقييم السجل نفسه ليس التقييم الوحيد الذي تسمح به مصادره — لا بوصفها تحوّطًا من التقييم أعلاه.
افتح في «استكشف» تفاعلي: اختر هذا السجل وتتبّع ما يرتبط به.
التقييم حتى — 2026-07 آخر مراجعة — 2026-10-12