What this system is
West Bank trade runs overwhelmingly to and through Israel: Israeli ports, the Paris Protocol customs envelope and the Allenby crossing to Jordan, closed to cargo from September to December 2025. Movement obstacles and suspended work permits weigh on the same economy at once.
Trade, customs revenue and labour income all pass through Israeli- controlled points, so a single Israeli decision — a crossing closure, a permit suspension, a customs or clearance measure — reaches Palestinian firms, the PA budget and household income at once. The record is the physical counterpart of the fiscal dependency carried in the clearance relationship.
Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-08-12Reviewed 2026-10-12
The system
- Overview
- The West Bank trades mostly with Israel. In the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics' monthly releases for January–November 2025, Israel took 87–94 per cent of registered exports and supplied 53–64 per cent of registered imports, depending on the month. Imports from third countries arrive through Israeli ports such as Haifa and Ashdod and clear Israeli customs inside the single customs envelope of the 1994 Paris Protocol; the duties and VAT collected on them become the clearance revenue Israel transfers to the Palestinian Authority, suspended since May 2025 according to the World Bank. The Allenby / King Hussein Bridge is the West Bank's land gateway to Jordan and the Arab markets beyond. Inside the territory, goods and people move through a system of obstacles that OCHA counted at 925 as of December 2025 — 89 full checkpoints, 218 partial checkpoints, 232 road gates (159 of them frequently closed), 114 linear closures, 167 earthmounds and 105 roadblocks — 43 per cent above the 20-year average of 647. Labour is the other flow: before October 2023 about 177,400 West Bank residents worked in Israel and the settlements (PCBS, Q3 2023, via the World Bank).
- What depends on it
- Near-total. Registered exports depend on the Israeli market for most of their value, third-country imports depend on Israeli ports and customs, and the only land gateway abroad that does not pass through Israel proper is the Allenby crossing, whose West Bank side Israel controls. Labour income from Israel is a standing mechanism that has been suppressed rather than replaced: the number employed in Israel and the settlements fell from about 177,400 (Q3 2023) to about 24,000 (Q4 2023) and recovered to 51,800 (Q4 2025), largely without permits (PCBS via the World Bank).
- What disruption does
- A crossing closure cuts the only land export route to Arab markets; a permit suspension removes wage income from tens of thousands of households at once; and every import that clears Israeli customs adds to revenue that the PA has not received since May 2025. Inside the territory, the growth in road gates and closures raises the cost of moving goods between the cities that act as regional hubs. As counterfactual context only, the World Bank estimated in October 2013 that lifting restrictions in Area C — about 61 per cent of the West Bank — could add $3.4bn a year of value-added, about 35 per cent of 2011 GDP; that is a dated estimate of potential, not a measured loss.
- Alternatives and redundancy
- There is no alternative to the system as a whole. Allenby is the only routine land gateway abroad for West Bank Palestinians; third-country imports have no route that avoids Israeli ports or crossings and Israeli customs; and the Israeli market cannot be replaced by Jordan or other Arab markets at anything like its present share. Redundancy exists only between the Israeli ports, not beyond them.
Nodes
In the order this record authors them — an authored sequence, not a route.
The Jordan River crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and the West Bank's main gateway abroad for Palestinians; Israel controls the West Bank side. It was closed after a shooting on 8 September 2024. After a Jordanian truck driver killed two Israeli soldiers there on 18 September 2025, Israel closed it again; passenger traffic resumed within days, and goods and aid traffic reopened around 10 December 2025 with a new dedicated security force.
In this systemThe West Bank's land gateway to Jordan for people and goods. Israel closed it after an attack in September 2025; passenger traffic resumed within days and cargo about ten weeks later.
Why it mattersThe crossing is the West Bank's link to Jordan for people, trade and aid destined for Gaza, so every closure is felt at once in Palestinian movement and commerce. Its hours and closures are set on the Israeli side and are not logged in any official published series.
What to watchClosures and changes to operating hours, for passengers and goods separately; the Jordan aid corridor into Gaza; Israeli and Jordanian statements after any security incident.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
One of Israel's two main Mediterranean cargo port areas, on Haifa Bay. The Haifa Port Company has been owned 70% by India's Adani Ports and 30% by the Israeli company Gadot since January 2023; the separate Bayport terminal has been run by China's SIPG on a 25-year concession since September 2021. In January to May 2026 the Haifa port area handled 3.36 million tonnes and Bayport 2.93 million tonnes, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
In this systemOne of the Israeli ports through which third-country imports for the West Bank arrive and clear customs under the Paris Protocol. No published figure gives the West Bank share of its cargo.
Why it mattersHaifa is one of the nodes through which the regional wars reached Israel's trade. In June 2025 shrapnel fell in its chemical terminal during Iranian missile attacks. After the Iranian strikes of 1 March 2026 Adani said the port was fully operational; around 19–20 March an Iranian missile hit the Haifa refinery with no significant damage reported; Hezbollah claimed rocket salvos toward Haifa in March 2026. No confirmed damage to the commercial port in 2026 was found.
What to watchPort operations during escalations as the operator and Israeli authorities report them; Israeli port cargo statistics by port area.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-05 Show on the map →
Israel's southern Mediterranean cargo port area, the nearest major port to the Gaza Strip. It includes the Ashdod Port Company's port and the private Southport terminal run by TIL, part of the MSC group. The Ashdod Port Company reported revenue of NIS 657 million in the first half of 2026, up 11%, and about 370,000 TEU of containers, up 2.6%, as reported. In January to May 2026 the Ashdod port area handled 8.56 million tonnes and Southport 3.26 million tonnes, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
In this systemAn Israeli port inside the same customs envelope for Palestinian imports. No published share figure was found.
Why it mattersAshdod is both a node of Israel's trade and a stage in Gaza's aid supply: UN-pipeline consignments landed here travel on to Kerem Shalom, and OCHA tracks the Ashdod route separately — in one July 2026 week only 65% of its supplies were offloaded at the crossing. With Eilat dormant, Ashdod and Haifa carry almost all of Israel's seaborne trade.
What to watchCargo volumes by port area; the Ashdod route's share of UN2720-tracked consignments into Gaza; operations during escalations.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
The seat of the Palestinian Authority's presidency and government in the West Bank, in Area A — the zone of Palestinian civil and security control under the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II). The PLO created a vice-presidency in April 2025, and a presidential decree of 2 February 2026 set elections to the Palestinian National Council for 1 November 2026, the first by direct vote.
In this systemSeat of the PA ministries, including the Finance Ministry that reports clearance revenue and deductions.
Why it mattersRamallah is where the Palestinian Authority's capacity is decided: its revenues depend on the clearance taxes Israel collects for it under the 1994 Paris Protocol, its succession arrangements were rewritten in 2025, and any role for it in Gaza's governance under the Board of Peace plan runs through it.
What to watchWhether the 1 November 2026 National Council elections take place on schedule; monthly clearance-revenue transfers and deductions; succession arrangements; the Authority's security operations in the northern West Bank.
Major city Confidence: High As of 2026-02 Show on the map →
One of the largest cities of the northern West Bank, in Area A, ringed by Israeli checkpoints and road gates. It was the base of the Lions' Den, a local armed group that emerged in 2022–2023.
In this systemThe northern West Bank's commercial centre.
Why it mattersNablus shows the West Bank's movement regime at the scale of one city: OCHA counted 925 movement obstacles across the West Bank in December 2025, against a 20-year average of 647, and access to and from the northern cities depends on them.
What to watchOCHA's movement-obstacle counts; Israeli operations inside Area A; Palestinian Authority security deployment.
Major city Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-04 Show on the map →
The largest city in the southern West Bank and the only one divided by agreement: under the 1997 Hebron Protocol, H1 passed to the Palestinian Authority while H2, which includes the Old City and the Israeli settlements in the city centre, stayed under Israeli control.
In this systemThe principal city of the southern West Bank.
Why it mattersH2 concentrates the West Bank's movement regime in a few streets: OCHA counted 101 movement obstacles there in December 2025, 34 of them checkpoints. On 8 February 2026 Israel's security cabinet decided to move building-permit authority in Hebron to its Civil Administration, as reported; the military orders implementing it have not been verified.
What to watchOCHA's obstacle counts for H2; Israeli decisions on planning and civil authority in Hebron; Palestinian access to the Old City.
Major city Confidence: High As of 2026-04 Show on the map →
Most work permits for Palestinians in Israel were revoked or suspended after 7 October 2023. The number of West Bank residents employed in Israel and the settlements fell from about 177,400 in Q3 2023 to about 24,000 in Q4 2023 and recovered to 51,800 in Q4 2025, a rise largely without permits (PCBS via the World Bank). PCBS put the figure at about 53,000 in Q2 2026, of whom about 35,000 worked in Israel (as reported by the Jerusalem Post). The roughly 18,500 permits held by Gaza residents before October 2023 (COGAT, via AFP) ended with the war; Gaza labour in Israel is historical.
After an attack at the crossing on 18 September 2025 in which two Israeli soldiers were killed, Israel closed the Allenby / King Hussein Bridge in both directions from 24 September "until further notice" (the Palestinian General Authority for Crossings, as reported). Passenger traffic resumed from about 26 September; goods and aid traffic reopened around 10 December 2025, as reported by the Times of Israel. The EU High Representative issued a statement on the closure on 27 September 2025.
OCHA counted 849 movement obstacles in its January–February 2025 survey and 925 as of December 2025, with more than 120 new road gates in 2025; gates rose from 34 to 41 per cent of all obstacles. The count excludes checkpoints on the Green Line, closed military zones and camp closures, and covers the territory as a whole.
Economic implications
Palestinian trade, customs revenue and labour income share one set of Israeli-controlled points, so trade policy and fiscal policy cannot be separated.
Humanitarian implications
Movement restrictions at territory scale reach access to work, markets and services together; OCHA reports 36 per cent of 87,427 patient permit applications in 2025 were denied or pending.
What remains unknown
- No 2026 figure for commercial West Bank cargo through the Allenby crossing was found, and its status as of October 2026 rests on the absence of a reported closure (low to moderate confidence).
- No figure gives the share of Palestinian imports through each Israeli port.
- The three labour measures count different populations and are not interchangeable: PCBS counts employed persons (about 53,000, Q2 2026); Knesset research reported through Al-Quds counts about 8,000 Green Line permit holders (June 2026) and 26,855 workers reaching workplaces on one day (29 April 2026), not read in the original.
- Trade shares are from PCBS monthly releases for January–November 2025; the annual 2025 release was not read.
- A reported Israeli cabinet decision of 31 July 2026 not to readmit Palestinian workers is unverified and is not used.
Readings the evidence also supports
- Israel presents permit suspensions, crossing closures and the obstacle system as security measures following attacks; Palestinian officials, OCHA and donors describe their cumulative economic effect as a restriction on the Palestinian economy as a whole. Both readings are attributed.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
Israeli decisions on West Bank work permits
A cabinet or COGAT decision changing the permit quota is the lever on the labour flow; the quarterly PCBS labour-force count is how it shows.
Official closure and reopening notices for the Allenby crossing
Issued by the Palestinian General Authority for Crossings, Jordanian authorities or COGAT; commercial cargo volumes are not published.
OCHA's next movement-and-access survey
The territory-wide obstacle count by type, last reported as of December 2025.
Watch questions this system bears on
Standing analytical questions whose evidence runs through this system, each with its latest review. Derived from the Watch object, never restated here.
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Assessed as of — 2026-08-12 Last reviewed — 2026-10-12