Fuel imports
Fuel into Gaza
Diesel, cooking gas and engine oil entering through one crossing, under UN facilitation and Israeli approval, on which Gaza's generators, wells and desalination run.
Coverage · Levant
Context, not targeting. These records describe strategic dependence and documented disruption history. The schema has no fields for capacities, schedules, convoy composition, escort arrangements, storage or facility layout.
Supply systems 5 systems Levant runs on, with 17 documented disruptions between them. Dependence is the strategic fact — a corridor matters because there is no substitute for it.
Gas & LNG
East Mediterranean gas exports
Israel's offshore gas powers its own grid and supplies Egypt and Jordan, and every war since 2023 has switched part of it off.
General trade
Israeli seaborne trade
Almost all of Israel's foreign trade goes by sea, and since the Red Sea outlet emptied it goes through two Mediterranean port areas.
General trade
West Bank trade and labour
An economy that sells almost everything to one neighbour, imports through that neighbour's ports and customs, and once earned a large share of its wages there.
Humanitarian access
Cargo access into Gaza
Five gates on the map and one in use: every aid corridor and all commercial cargo now converge on Kerem Shalom, under an Israeli inspection regime whose item rules are unpublished.
The corridor system
5 documented systems and 23 nodes, read from the records below. Select a corridor or a node to inspect it; the full record stays one click further on.
Israel's offshore gas powers its own grid and supplies Egypt and Jordan, and every war since 2023 has switched part of it off.
Israel's largest offshore gas field, in the eastern Mediterranean west of Haifa, and the source of the Leviathan–Egypt export agreement signed on 7 August 2025. A broad, deliberately imprecise marker for the field, not for any installation.
In this systemThe largest field and the export field; capacity about 14 bcm a year after the third gathering line on NewMed's account (Argus gives 12 bcm a year nameplate).
Why it mattersLeviathan is where a regional war becomes an energy shortfall in Egypt and Jordan. It was shut in June 2025 and again when the war with Iran began in 2026 — on 28 February on Energean's and press accounts, on 2 March on the ministry order Argus reports — and returned to regular production on 2 April 2026, with exports to Jordan and Egypt resuming with it.
What to watchMinistry shut-in and restart orders during escalations; whether the first phase of the Egypt agreement raises actual exports, which no published figure yet shows.
Mining area · broad region Confidence: High As of 2026-04 Show on the map →
An Israeli offshore gas field in the eastern Mediterranean, operated by Chevron. A broad, deliberately imprecise marker for the field, not for any installation.
In this systemOperated by Chevron; shut from 9 October to 13 November 2023.
Why it mattersTamar was the field shut at the start of the Gaza war: Chevron was ordered to close it on 9 October 2023 as a security measure, Leviathan kept running and exports were rerouted via Jordan, and the restart was ordered on 9 November, announced on 13 November, with flows to Egypt resuming on 14 November 2023.
What to watchMinistry shut-in and restart orders during escalations.
Mining area · broad region Confidence: Moderate As of 2023-11 Show on the map →
An Israeli offshore gas field in the eastern Mediterranean, operated by Energean, on Israel's side of the maritime boundary settled with Lebanon in October 2022. A broad, approximate marker for the field, not for any installation.
In this systemOperated by Energean; shut 41 days in 2026, restarted 9 April.
Why it mattersKarish shows how long a wartime shut-in lasts. It was shut on 13 June 2025 and on 28 February 2026; in 2026 it restarted on 9 April after 41 days and was reported fully operational on 13 April, and Energean cut its 2026 production guidance to 130–140 thousand barrels of oil equivalent a day.
What to watchMinistry shut-in and restart orders during escalations; the operator's production guidance.
Mining area · broad region Confidence: High As of 2026-04 Show on the map →
DependenceJordan and Egypt depend on Israeli pipeline gas for part of their supply, and Israel's own power system on the same fields. When Leviathan and Karish were shut in 2026, Egypt turned to LNG: its first-quarter LNG imports tripled year on year on Kpler data reported by Argus.
Why it mattersGas is the one economic channel that runs from Israel outward into the two Arab states whose peace treaties anchor the regional interface. When a war shuts a field, the cost lands in Egyptian and Jordanian power systems as well as Israel's.
Documented pressure
2023-10-09 to 2023-11-14Mixed or other Confidence: High
Chevron was ordered to shut Tamar on 9 October 2023 as a security measure, the field being within rocket range of Gaza. Leviathan kept running and exports were rerouted via Jordan. A restart was ordered on 9 November and announced on 13 November, and flows to Egypt resumed on 14 November 2023.
2025-06-13 to 2025-06-25Mixed or other Confidence: High
Leviathan and Karish were shut on 13 June 2025 when the June war with Iran began (recorded by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module). The ministry restarted surplus exports to Egypt and Jordan on 20 June, and the fields reopened after the ceasefire, around 24–25 June.
2026-02-28 to 2026-04-13Mixed or other Confidence: High
Leviathan and Karish were shut when the 2026 war with Iran began (the war is Iran–Gulf's record). Leviathan's halt is dated 28 February by Energean and the press and 2 March by the ministry order Argus reports; it received restart clearance on 31 March and returned to regular production on 2 April, with flows to Jordan and Egypt resuming. Karish, shut on 28 February, restarted on 9 April after 41 days and was fully operational on 13 April, and Energean cut its 2026 guidance to 130–140 thousand barrels of oil equivalent a day.
What disruption doesEach shut-in removes Israeli supply and Egyptian and Jordanian imports at once. In 2026 Egypt bought more LNG, its first-quarter imports tripling year on year on Kpler data reported by Argus. The pattern — about three shut-ins in three years, each lasting weeks — makes Israeli gas a supply that stops with every regional war rather than one that is lost.
Confidence: High Status as of 2026-07 Reviewed 2026-10-12 Open the full record →
Almost all of Israel's foreign trade goes by sea, and since the Red Sea outlet emptied it goes through two Mediterranean port areas.
One of Israel's two main Mediterranean cargo port areas, on Haifa Bay. The Haifa Port Company has been owned 70% by India's Adani Ports and 30% by the Israeli company Gadot since January 2023; the separate Bayport terminal has been run by China's SIPG on a 25-year concession since September 2021. In January to May 2026 the Haifa port area handled 3.36 million tonnes and Bayport 2.93 million tonnes, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
In this systemThe northern port area, including Bayport. 3.36 million tonnes (Haifa port area) and 2.93 million tonnes (Bayport) in January to May 2026, as relayed.
Why it mattersHaifa is one of the nodes through which the regional wars reached Israel's trade. In June 2025 shrapnel fell in its chemical terminal during Iranian missile attacks. After the Iranian strikes of 1 March 2026 Adani said the port was fully operational; around 19–20 March an Iranian missile hit the Haifa refinery with no significant damage reported; Hezbollah claimed rocket salvos toward Haifa in March 2026. No confirmed damage to the commercial port in 2026 was found.
What to watchPort operations during escalations as the operator and Israeli authorities report them; Israeli port cargo statistics by port area.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-05 Show on the map →
Israel's southern Mediterranean cargo port area, the nearest major port to the Gaza Strip. It includes the Ashdod Port Company's port and the private Southport terminal run by TIL, part of the MSC group. The Ashdod Port Company reported revenue of NIS 657 million in the first half of 2026, up 11%, and about 370,000 TEU of containers, up 2.6%, as reported. In January to May 2026 the Ashdod port area handled 8.56 million tonnes and Southport 3.26 million tonnes, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
In this systemThe southern port area, including Southport; the largest by tonnage in January to May 2026 (8.56 million tonnes, Southport a further 3.26 million), as relayed.
Why it mattersAshdod is both a node of Israel's trade and a stage in Gaza's aid supply: UN-pipeline consignments landed here travel on to Kerem Shalom, and OCHA tracks the Ashdod route separately — in one July 2026 week only 65% of its supplies were offloaded at the crossing. With Eilat dormant, Ashdod and Haifa carry almost all of Israel's seaborne trade.
What to watchCargo volumes by port area; the Ashdod route's share of UN2720-tracked consignments into Gaza; operations during escalations.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
Israel's only port on the Red Sea, at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, run under a concession held by the Nakash group since 2013. Before the war it handled about half of Israel's car imports. Its activity fell by about 85% by December 2023 after Houthi attacks on shipping began: on figures reported by Globes, more than 134 ships and about 150,000 vehicles called in 2023, 16 ships and no vehicles in 2024, and 6 ships in the first half of 2025, and revenue fell from NIS 212 million in 2023 to NIS 42 million in 2024. Commercial operations halted on 20 July 2025 after the municipality froze the port's accounts over unpaid municipal taxes.
In this systemThe Red Sea outlet; near-dormant since late 2023 and commercially halted since 20 July 2025.
Why it mattersEilat is where the Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping of 2023–2025, recorded in the Iran–Gulf module, becomes an Israeli economic fact: the country's southern sea outlet has been near-dormant since mid-2025, and its car imports moved to the Mediterranean ports. In January 2026 Globes reported the port still empty, a government plan unimplemented, the Knesset Finance Committee weighing an import order against direct aid, and the ministries deciding not to extend the concession, which expires around 2028, in favour of a new tender. No resumption of regular service in 2026 was found.
What to watchAny resumption of regular commercial calls; the outcome of the import-order debate and the concession tender; changes in Red Sea shipping risk recorded in the Iran–Gulf module.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
DependenceNear-total. About 99% of import and export cargo by tonnage passes through the seaports (State Comptroller, January 2024). With Eilat dormant since July 2025, Israeli seaborne trade depends on the Haifa and Ashdod port areas.
Why it mattersFor a state whose land borders carry little trade, the seaports are the economy's connection to the world. The wars of 2023–26 have not closed them, but they have concentrated them: the Red Sea outlet is dormant, and the Mediterranean port areas that carry the rest lie within reach of fire from Lebanon and Iran.
Documented pressure
2023-11 onwardArmed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Shipping avoided Eilat after Houthi attacks on Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea began in November 2023 (the Red Sea material is owned by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module). The port's chief executive reported an 85% drop in activity by December 2023, and management planned to lay off 60 of 120 staff in early 2024. On figures Globes reported from port management and the Knesset Finance Committee, calls fell from more than 134 ships and about 150,000 vehicles in 2023 to 16 ships and no vehicles in 2024, and revenue from NIS 212 million to NIS 42 million.
2025-07-20 onwardMixed or other Confidence: Moderate
Eilat suspended operations after the municipality froze its accounts over unpaid municipal taxes; the chief executive said the port was in a state of bankruptcy, a statement and not a court filing. In October 2025 Eilat accounted for 26 of more than 4,000 cargo-ship movements at Israeli ports, with no car carriers. In January 2026 Globes reported it still empty; no resumption of regular service in 2026 was found.
2023-11; 2025-06; 2026-03Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
War-risk insurance for calls at Israeli ports rose with each escalation: above 2% of hull value at the November 2023 peak and 0.7–1.0% for a seven-day call in June 2025, from 0.2% a week earlier, on brokers' figures reported by Reuters. On 9 March 2026 ZIM announced that insurers had raised the premium on all calls at Israeli ports and imposed a surcharge of $100 or $75 per TEU from 12 March.
2025-06; 2026-03Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Haifa came under fire without closing. In June 2025 shrapnel fell in the port's chemical terminal during Iranian missile attacks; after the Iranian strikes of 1 March 2026 Adani said the port was fully operational. Hezbollah claimed rocket salvos toward Haifa in March 2026. The Iranian strikes belong to the wars Iran–Gulf records; no confirmed 2026 damage to the commercial port was found.
What disruption doesDisruption has not stopped Israeli seaborne trade — national cargo rose 4.6% in the first half of 2026 to 29.52 million tonnes, as relayed — but it has removed one of its three outlets and raised its cost. Car imports that once landed at Eilat now arrive at the Mediterranean ports, each escalation adds a war-risk premium and a carrier surcharge to every call, and the trade that remains is concentrated on two port areas exposed to fire.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-07 Reviewed 2026-10-12 Open the full record →
Five gates on the map and one in use: every aid corridor and all commercial cargo now converge on Kerem Shalom, under an Israeli inspection regime whose item rules are unpublished.
Israel's southern Mediterranean cargo port area, the nearest major port to the Gaza Strip. It includes the Ashdod Port Company's port and the private Southport terminal run by TIL, part of the MSC group. The Ashdod Port Company reported revenue of NIS 657 million in the first half of 2026, up 11%, and about 370,000 TEU of containers, up 2.6%, as reported. In January to May 2026 the Ashdod port area handled 8.56 million tonnes and Southport 3.26 million tonnes, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
In this systemThe sea route for UN cargo, directly and via the Cyprus maritime corridor; consignments travel on to Kerem Shalom. A second German scanner is due here by end-2026 (BMVg).
Why it mattersAshdod is both a node of Israel's trade and a stage in Gaza's aid supply: UN-pipeline consignments landed here travel on to Kerem Shalom, and OCHA tracks the Ashdod route separately — in one July 2026 week only 65% of its supplies were offloaded at the crossing. With Eilat dormant, Ashdod and Haifa carry almost all of Israel's seaborne trade.
What to watchCargo volumes by port area; the Ashdod route's share of UN2720-tracked consignments into Gaza; operations during escalations.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
The Jordan River crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and the West Bank's main gateway abroad for Palestinians; Israel controls the West Bank side. It was closed after a shooting on 8 September 2024. After a Jordanian truck driver killed two Israeli soldiers there on 18 September 2025, Israel closed it again; passenger traffic resumed within days, and goods and aid traffic reopened around 10 December 2025 with a new dedicated security force.
In this systemThe Jordan corridor's crossing from Jordan; its cargo reaches Gaza through Kerem Shalom. NRC reported a cap of 15 trucks a week of dual-use items from Jordan across all humanitarian sectors (5 October 2026).
Why it mattersThe crossing is the West Bank's link to Jordan for people, trade and aid destined for Gaza, so every closure is felt at once in Palestinian movement and commerce. Its hours and closures are set on the Israeli side and are not logged in any official published series.
What to watchClosures and changes to operating hours, for passengers and goods separately; the Jordan aid corridor into Gaza; Israeli and Jordanian statements after any security incident.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
The crossing at the junction of the Gaza Strip, Israel and Egypt through which goods enter Gaza. Since 24 May 2026, when Zikim closed, it has been the only cargo entry into the Strip, according to OCHA and Gisha. Israel closed all Gaza crossings on 28 February 2026, at the start of the war with Iran, and reopened Kerem Shalom gradually from 3 March.
In this systemThe only operational cargo crossing since 24 May 2026 (OCHA, Gisha), where every corridor converges; Israeli inspection is carried out here.
Why it mattersKerem Shalom is where Gaza's access regime is measured, and an operating crossing is not the same thing as aid arriving. In mid-March 2026 the UN reported near-total denial of its movements while the crossing operated; in one July 2026 week OCHA recorded that only 42% of supplies on the Egypt route and 65% on the Ashdod route were offloaded. Israel's COGAT and the UN count different things — COGAT counts all trucks and, according to Gisha, has counted 12 pallets as one truck since early 2026 — so every volume figure carries its publisher's definition.
What to watchDated changes in operating status; UN2720 offload and collection figures for UN-pipeline consignments; OCHA counts of denied and impeded movements; any second cargo entry reopening.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10 Show on the map →
A crossing on the northern edge of the Gaza Strip, near the coast, used for goods into the north of the Strip. It closed with all Gaza crossings on 28 February 2026, reopened on 13 April after more than 40 days, and closed again on 24 May 2026 "until further notice", according to OCHA. Gisha recorded it still closed on 8 October 2026.
In this systemThe northern goods gate, closed since 24 May 2026 "until further notice" (OCHA); no Israeli statement of the reason was found.
Why it mattersWith Zikim closed, goods for northern Gaza, Gaza City included, enter through Kerem Shalom at the Strip's southern end. The crossing's state is therefore a direct reading of how supply reaches the north.
What to watchAny reopening announcement and its stated conditions; OCHA reporting on supplies reaching northern Gaza.
Border crossing Confidence: High As of 2026-10 Show on the map →
A crossing on the eastern edge of the central Gaza Strip, used during the war as an aid and military route. A weekly snapshot of 18 September 2026 compiled by the Next Century Foundation recorded it closed; no OCHA or COGAT statement confirming its state was found. Since 24 May 2026 OCHA has called Kerem Shalom the only available crossing for approved cargo; it has not stated Kissufim's own status.
In this systemUsed intermittently after the October 2025 ceasefire (OCHA); its 2026 status is not established, and OCHA's "only available crossing" wording is not a closure statement.
Why it mattersIt is one of the crossings the Gaza access picture is read across, and its state is the least well documented of them.
What to watchAn OCHA or COGAT statement of its current state; any use as an aid entry.
Border crossing Confidence: Low As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The crossing at the northern end of the Gaza Strip, historically the passage for people between Gaza and Israel. A goods terminal has been proposed there. Germany's defence ministry announced on 21 August 2026 the loan of two cargo scanners, one of them expected at Erez from September 2026; Gisha, citing the German ambassador, reported a scanner installed. Israel's deputy UN ambassador gave 1 September as a target date, after which the Prime Minister's Office said no decision had been made (Ynet). Israeli leaders have said there will be no rebuilding before disarmament, and Gisha recorded the terminal still unopened on 8 October 2026.
In this systemProposed goods terminal; a scanner was expected from September 2026 (BMVg) and a 1 September target was announced, but it had not opened by 8 October (Gisha).
Why it mattersWhether Erez opens is a direct reading of the link Israel draws between access and disarmament, which is also the sequencing dispute at the centre of the Board of Peace's July 2026 roadmap.
What to watchA decision to open the terminal and the conditions attached; Israeli statements tying the opening to disarmament.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10 Show on the map →
The Gaza Strip's crossing with Egypt, used for people. Israeli forces took it in May 2024. It reopened for people on 2 February 2026 with the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Rafah) redeployed, closed on 28 February when the war with Iran began, and has opened intermittently since. EUBAM recorded 11,684 crossings between 2 February and 5 September 2026: 5,977 exits, including 2,224 patients, and 5,707 entries.
In this systemPassengers only, with EUBAM; Egypt-route goods are routed to Kerem Shalom rather than through Rafah.
Why it mattersRafah is the Strip's only exit that does not pass through Israel, and the route for medical evacuation. Its opening depends on Israeli and Egyptian scheduling that is not systematically published, and it carries people only — goods enter through Kerem Shalom. It also sits on the border strip governed by the 1979 Egypt–Israel treaty's security annex and the 2005 Agreed Arrangements.
What to watchDays open per week; EUBAM's cumulative counts; any opening to goods; Egyptian or Israeli statements about the border arrangements under the 1979 treaty.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The Gaza Strip's largest city and its administrative centre before the war. The IPC confirmed famine (Phase 5) in Gaza Governorate on 22 August 2025, the first famine classification in the Middle East — a finding Israel contested on methodology. The IPC's December 2025 analysis found no area of the Strip in famine, and its July 2026 projection placed all five governorates in Crisis (Phase 3).
In this systemThe north's main city, supplied from the southern crossing since Zikim closed.
Why it mattersUnder the October 2025 ceasefire Israeli forces pulled back to a line their military calls the "Yellow Line", and most of the city lies on its western side, as reported. The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, formed in January 2026 to take over civil administration, was still based in Cairo and not governing inside Gaza as of October 2026, as reported. Supplies for the north depend on Zikim, closed since 24 May 2026.
What to watchIPC analyses for Gaza Governorate; whether the National Committee enters Gaza and takes over civil institutions; Zikim's reopening; debris clearance and reconstruction under the World Bank–EU–UN damage assessment.
Major city Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10 Show on the map →
DependenceTotal for goods. Gaza has no port and no airport, and since 24 May 2026 no other working cargo gate, so the whole Strip's aid, commercial imports and fuel pass through one crossing. Redundancy exists only between the corridors that feed it, not at the point of entry.
Why it mattersConvergence on one crossing turns every inspection decision, scanner fault and closed day into a Strip-wide supply event, and it means goods for northern Gaza now enter at the southern end. Week-to-week offloading varies sharply: OCHA reported Kerem Shalom offloading at 52% of planned truckloads in 14–20 September and 88% a week later, with the Ashdod route at 17% during a scanner problem and 94% the following week. Because the item rules are unpublished, what may enter is known mainly from what agencies report denied.
Documented pressure
24 May 2026 – presentPolitical closure Confidence: High
Zikim closed "until further notice", leaving Kerem Shalom the only operational cargo crossing (OCHA, 25 September and 2 October 2026; Gisha, 8 October 2026).
26 August and 2 September 2026Political closure Confidence: High
Israel rejected IOM shelter cargo at Kerem Shalom — about 37,000 pieces of timber and 660 shelter kits (OCHA, 11 September 2026).
14–20 September 2026Mixed or other Confidence: High
Offloading at Kerem Shalom fell to 52% of planned truckloads; the Egypt corridor offloaded 21%, with no reason given for 72% of returns, and the Ashdod route 17% because of a scanner problem (OCHA, 25 September 2026).
1 September 2026Political closure Confidence: Moderate
A target date for opening the Erez goods terminal, given by Israel's deputy UN ambassador, passed after the Prime Minister's Office said no decision had been made (Ynet); Gisha recorded Erez unopened on 8 October.
What disruption doesCargo arrives in Gaza at the rate one crossing, its inspection regime and its operating days allow. The Next Century Foundation's weekly index, citing Gaza's de facto Crossings and Borders Authority, recorded Kerem Shalom open five of seven days in 2–8 October; NRC reported that dual-use shelter items can be offloaded there only one day a week and that the shelter backlog would take more than seven months to clear. Inside the Strip, distribution is constrained by the 65% of land OCHA reported under access restrictions on 2 October 2026, much of it east of the Israeli military's "Yellow Line".
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-10-08 Reviewed 2026-10-12 Open the full record →
Diesel, cooking gas and engine oil entering through one crossing, under UN facilitation and Israeli approval, on which Gaza's generators, wells and desalination run.
The crossing at the junction of the Gaza Strip, Israel and Egypt through which goods enter Gaza. Since 24 May 2026, when Zikim closed, it has been the only cargo entry into the Strip, according to OCHA and Gisha. Israel closed all Gaza crossings on 28 February 2026, at the start of the war with Iran, and reopened Kerem Shalom gradually from 3 March.
In this systemThe only working cargo crossing since 24 May 2026 (OCHA), and the entry for diesel and cooking gas.
Why it mattersKerem Shalom is where Gaza's access regime is measured, and an operating crossing is not the same thing as aid arriving. In mid-March 2026 the UN reported near-total denial of its movements while the crossing operated; in one July 2026 week OCHA recorded that only 42% of supplies on the Egypt route and 65% on the Ashdod route were offloaded. Israel's COGAT and the UN count different things — COGAT counts all trucks and, according to Gisha, has counted 12 pallets as one truck since early 2026 — so every volume figure carries its publisher's definition.
What to watchDated changes in operating status; UN2720 offload and collection figures for UN-pipeline consignments; OCHA counts of denied and impeded movements; any second cargo entry reopening.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10 Show on the map →
The Gaza Strip's power plant, in the Nuseirat area of central Gaza. It has been shut since October 2023 for lack of fuel. On 23 September 2026 OCHA listed the resumption of its operations among the critical approvals still pending.
In this systemShut since October 2023 for lack of fuel; its resumption was a pending approval on 23 September 2026 (OCHA).
Why it mattersWhether the plant runs is the clearest single reading of Gaza's electricity system, because almost everything else in it is either destroyed or improvised: the World Bank reported in May 2026 that one Israeli feeder line was operating, supplying a single desalination plant, and that prioritised humanitarian facilities run on diesel generators. A restart depends on fuel entering through Kerem Shalom and on an Israeli approval, not on the plant alone.
What to watchAn approval of the plant's resumption and the fuel arrangement attached to it, as stated by OCHA, the World Bank or COGAT; any dated report of the plant generating. The head of Gaza's National Committee said in January 2026 that a restart "seems on track"; no restart had been reported by October.
Power plant Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09-23 Show on the map →
A seawater desalination plant in the southern Gaza Strip, placed here at the Deir al-Balah area because no source read gives its exact site. The sources name it differently: the World Bank's "southern Short-Term Low-Volume Desalination Plant", UNICEF's "Southern Gaza Seawater Desalination Plant"; OCHA also reports an "Al Basa" plant in Deir al-Balah that may or may not be the same facility. According to the World Bank (May 2026), it is the only facility supplied by the one Israeli power line still operating into Gaza.
In this systemRuns on the single Israeli feeder and falls back to diesel when it fails, as on 25 March 2026 (UNICEF).
Why it mattersThe plant is where Gaza's power and water systems meet: it runs on the single 4 MW Kissufim feeder (World Bank, May 2026), and when cable connectors were damaged on 25 March 2026 it fell back to diesel at under 20% of output until it was back on the grid within days (UNICEF). OCHA reported on 2 October 2026 that the two southern seawater plants were at their lowest recorded output.
What to watchOCHA and WASH Cluster reporting on southern desalination output; any change to the feeder supplying the plant; entry of treatment chemicals, membranes and spare parts; a source that reconciles the plant's names.
Plant · production or assembly Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10-02 Show on the map →
DependenceNear-total. There is no domestic fuel production, the power plant is shut, and only one Israeli feeder line operates, so almost every working pump, well and generator in the Strip depends on fuel entering through one crossing. The Palestinian Water Authority says it has provided about 14 million litres of fuel to run about 240 water facilities, a cumulative figure over an unstated period.
Why it mattersFuel is the input that converts Gaza's access regime into electricity and water. The World Bank reported in May 2026 that prioritised humanitarian facilities run on diesel generators with UNOPS-supplied fuel, wells are generator- and fuel-dependent (UNICEF), and the southern desalination plant falls back to diesel when its one feeder fails. Each approval decision on fuel or oil is therefore also a decision about water production.
Documented pressure
October 2023 – 2026Political closure Confidence: High
The Gaza Power Plant shut for lack of fuel and has not been reported operating since; its resumption was among OCHA's pending approvals on 23 September 2026.
1 March – September 2026Political closure Confidence: High
Engine oil for generators approved far below requests: 13,445 litres approved against 92,778 litres pending (OCHA, 11 September 2026).
22–23 September 2026Political closure Confidence: High
OCHA reported 550,000 litres allowed in, "far from sufficient", and listed commercial fuel entry among critical approvals still pending.
What disruption doesWhen fuel or oil falls short, generators stop and wells and desalination produce less; OCHA names restricted engine oil, spare parts and generators among the constraints on water production, and reported the two southern seawater plants at their lowest recorded output on 2 October 2026. The water and health consequences for people are recorded in the module's humanitarian objects, not here.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-10-02 Reviewed 2026-10-12 Open the full record →
An economy that sells almost everything to one neighbour, imports through that neighbour's ports and customs, and once earned a large share of its wages there.
The Jordan River crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and the West Bank's main gateway abroad for Palestinians; Israel controls the West Bank side. It was closed after a shooting on 8 September 2024. After a Jordanian truck driver killed two Israeli soldiers there on 18 September 2025, Israel closed it again; passenger traffic resumed within days, and goods and aid traffic reopened around 10 December 2025 with a new dedicated security force.
In this systemThe West Bank's land gateway to Jordan for people and goods. Israel closed it after an attack in September 2025; passenger traffic resumed within days and cargo about ten weeks later.
Why it mattersThe crossing is the West Bank's link to Jordan for people, trade and aid destined for Gaza, so every closure is felt at once in Palestinian movement and commerce. Its hours and closures are set on the Israeli side and are not logged in any official published series.
What to watchClosures and changes to operating hours, for passengers and goods separately; the Jordan aid corridor into Gaza; Israeli and Jordanian statements after any security incident.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
One of Israel's two main Mediterranean cargo port areas, on Haifa Bay. The Haifa Port Company has been owned 70% by India's Adani Ports and 30% by the Israeli company Gadot since January 2023; the separate Bayport terminal has been run by China's SIPG on a 25-year concession since September 2021. In January to May 2026 the Haifa port area handled 3.36 million tonnes and Bayport 2.93 million tonnes, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
In this systemOne of the Israeli ports through which third-country imports for the West Bank arrive and clear customs under the Paris Protocol. No published figure gives the West Bank share of its cargo.
Why it mattersHaifa is one of the nodes through which the regional wars reached Israel's trade. In June 2025 shrapnel fell in its chemical terminal during Iranian missile attacks. After the Iranian strikes of 1 March 2026 Adani said the port was fully operational; around 19–20 March an Iranian missile hit the Haifa refinery with no significant damage reported; Hezbollah claimed rocket salvos toward Haifa in March 2026. No confirmed damage to the commercial port in 2026 was found.
What to watchPort operations during escalations as the operator and Israeli authorities report them; Israeli port cargo statistics by port area.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-05 Show on the map →
Israel's southern Mediterranean cargo port area, the nearest major port to the Gaza Strip. It includes the Ashdod Port Company's port and the private Southport terminal run by TIL, part of the MSC group. The Ashdod Port Company reported revenue of NIS 657 million in the first half of 2026, up 11%, and about 370,000 TEU of containers, up 2.6%, as reported. In January to May 2026 the Ashdod port area handled 8.56 million tonnes and Southport 3.26 million tonnes, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
In this systemAn Israeli port inside the same customs envelope for Palestinian imports. No published share figure was found.
Why it mattersAshdod is both a node of Israel's trade and a stage in Gaza's aid supply: UN-pipeline consignments landed here travel on to Kerem Shalom, and OCHA tracks the Ashdod route separately — in one July 2026 week only 65% of its supplies were offloaded at the crossing. With Eilat dormant, Ashdod and Haifa carry almost all of Israel's seaborne trade.
What to watchCargo volumes by port area; the Ashdod route's share of UN2720-tracked consignments into Gaza; operations during escalations.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
The seat of the Palestinian Authority's presidency and government in the West Bank, in Area A — the zone of Palestinian civil and security control under the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II). The PLO created a vice-presidency in April 2025, and a presidential decree of 2 February 2026 set elections to the Palestinian National Council for 1 November 2026, the first by direct vote.
In this systemSeat of the PA ministries, including the Finance Ministry that reports clearance revenue and deductions.
Why it mattersRamallah is where the Palestinian Authority's capacity is decided: its revenues depend on the clearance taxes Israel collects for it under the 1994 Paris Protocol, its succession arrangements were rewritten in 2025, and any role for it in Gaza's governance under the Board of Peace plan runs through it.
What to watchWhether the 1 November 2026 National Council elections take place on schedule; monthly clearance-revenue transfers and deductions; succession arrangements; the Authority's security operations in the northern West Bank.
Major city Confidence: High As of 2026-02 Show on the map →
One of the largest cities of the northern West Bank, in Area A, ringed by Israeli checkpoints and road gates. It was the base of the Lions' Den, a local armed group that emerged in 2022–2023.
In this systemThe northern West Bank's commercial centre.
Why it mattersNablus shows the West Bank's movement regime at the scale of one city: OCHA counted 925 movement obstacles across the West Bank in December 2025, against a 20-year average of 647, and access to and from the northern cities depends on them.
What to watchOCHA's movement-obstacle counts; Israeli operations inside Area A; Palestinian Authority security deployment.
Major city Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-04 Show on the map →
The largest city in the southern West Bank and the only one divided by agreement: under the 1997 Hebron Protocol, H1 passed to the Palestinian Authority while H2, which includes the Old City and the Israeli settlements in the city centre, stayed under Israeli control.
In this systemThe principal city of the southern West Bank.
Why it mattersH2 concentrates the West Bank's movement regime in a few streets: OCHA counted 101 movement obstacles there in December 2025, 34 of them checkpoints. On 8 February 2026 Israel's security cabinet decided to move building-permit authority in Hebron to its Civil Administration, as reported; the military orders implementing it have not been verified.
What to watchOCHA's obstacle counts for H2; Israeli decisions on planning and civil authority in Hebron; Palestinian access to the Old City.
Major city Confidence: High As of 2026-04 Show on the map →
DependenceNear-total. Registered exports depend on the Israeli market for most of their value, third-country imports depend on Israeli ports and customs, and the only land gateway abroad that does not pass through Israel proper is the Allenby crossing, whose West Bank side Israel controls. Labour income from Israel is a standing mechanism that has been suppressed rather than replaced: the number employed in Israel and the settlements fell from about 177,400 (Q3 2023) to about 24,000 (Q4 2023) and recovered to 51,800 (Q4 2025), largely without permits (PCBS via the World Bank).
Why it mattersTrade, customs revenue and labour income all pass through Israeli- controlled points, so a single Israeli decision — a crossing closure, a permit suspension, a customs or clearance measure — reaches Palestinian firms, the PA budget and household income at once. The record is the physical counterpart of the fiscal dependency carried in the clearance relationship.
Documented pressure
October 2023 – 2026Political closure Confidence: Moderate
Most work permits for Palestinians in Israel were revoked or suspended after 7 October 2023. The number of West Bank residents employed in Israel and the settlements fell from about 177,400 in Q3 2023 to about 24,000 in Q4 2023 and recovered to 51,800 in Q4 2025, a rise largely without permits (PCBS via the World Bank). PCBS put the figure at about 53,000 in Q2 2026, of whom about 35,000 worked in Israel (as reported by the Jerusalem Post). The roughly 18,500 permits held by Gaza residents before October 2023 (COGAT, via AFP) ended with the war; Gaza labour in Israel is historical.
24 September – about 10 December 2025Political closure Confidence: High
After an attack at the crossing on 18 September 2025 in which two Israeli soldiers were killed, Israel closed the Allenby / King Hussein Bridge in both directions from 24 September "until further notice" (the Palestinian General Authority for Crossings, as reported). Passenger traffic resumed from about 26 September; goods and aid traffic reopened around 10 December 2025, as reported by the Times of Israel. The EU High Representative issued a statement on the closure on 27 September 2025.
2025Mixed or other Confidence: High
OCHA counted 849 movement obstacles in its January–February 2025 survey and 925 as of December 2025, with more than 120 new road gates in 2025; gates rose from 34 to 41 per cent of all obstacles. The count excludes checkpoints on the Green Line, closed military zones and camp closures, and covers the territory as a whole.
What disruption doesA crossing closure cuts the only land export route to Arab markets; a permit suspension removes wage income from tens of thousands of households at once; and every import that clears Israeli customs adds to revenue that the PA has not received since May 2025. Inside the territory, the growth in road gates and closures raises the cost of moving goods between the cities that act as regional hubs. As counterfactual context only, the World Bank estimated in October 2013 that lifting restrictions in Area C — about 61 per cent of the West Bank — could add $3.4bn a year of value-added, about 35 per cent of 2011 GDP; that is a dated estimate of potential, not a measured loss.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-08-12 Reviewed 2026-10-12 Open the full record →
How a corridor fails
- Mixed or otherDoes not resolve cleanly into one cause on the available evidence.
- Armed interdictionTraffic attacked on the route. Reversed, if at all, by security effort or by the attacker’s choice.
- Political closureThe route shut by a state decision rather than by violence. Reversed by agreement, not by force.
Kept apart deliberately. A road that is dangerous and a border that is shut both stop the goods, and nothing else about them is alike — including who is able to reverse it.
The chain ends where the records do. Vigil publishes no location records for the coastal ports these corridors run to, so the external terminus is carried by the primary-corridor node — which is named for its port pair — rather than drawn as a node that does not exist. Nothing here shows routes, distances, capacities or schedules.
What the nodes are not Qualifiers the records themselves carry. A node named on a corridor is not necessarily a working one — several are proposed, closed, seasonal or legacy, and each says so in the record's own words.
- Kerem Shalom / Karem Abu Salem crossing — The only working cargo crossing since 24 May 2026 (OCHA), and the entry for diesel and cooking gas.
- Gaza Power Plant — Shut since October 2023 for lack of fuel; its resumption was a pending approval on 23 September 2026 (OCHA).
- Southern Gaza seawater desalination plant (Deir al-Balah area) — Runs on the single Israeli feeder and falls back to diesel when it fails, as on 25 March 2026 (UNICEF).
East Mediterranean gas exports
- Leviathan gas field — The largest field and the export field; capacity about 14 bcm a year after the third gathering line on NewMed's account (Argus gives 12 bcm a year nameplate).
- Tamar gas field — Operated by Chevron; shut from 9 October to 13 November 2023.
- Karish gas field — Operated by Energean; shut 41 days in 2026, restarted 9 April.
- Haifa port — The northern port area, including Bayport. 3.36 million tonnes (Haifa port area) and 2.93 million tonnes (Bayport) in January to May 2026, as relayed.
- Ashdod port — The southern port area, including Southport; the largest by tonnage in January to May 2026 (8.56 million tonnes, Southport a further 3.26 million), as relayed.
- Eilat port — The Red Sea outlet; near-dormant since late 2023 and commercially halted since 20 July 2025.
- Allenby Bridge / King Hussein Bridge (al-Karameh crossing) — The West Bank's land gateway to Jordan for people and goods. Israel closed it after an attack in September 2025; passenger traffic resumed within days and cargo about ten weeks later.
- Haifa port — One of the Israeli ports through which third-country imports for the West Bank arrive and clear customs under the Paris Protocol. No published figure gives the West Bank share of its cargo.
- Ashdod port — An Israeli port inside the same customs envelope for Palestinian imports. No published share figure was found.
- Ramallah — Seat of the PA ministries, including the Finance Ministry that reports clearance revenue and deductions.
- Nablus — The northern West Bank's commercial centre.
- Hebron — The principal city of the southern West Bank.
- Ashdod port — The sea route for UN cargo, directly and via the Cyprus maritime corridor; consignments travel on to Kerem Shalom. A second German scanner is due here by end-2026 (BMVg).
- Allenby Bridge / King Hussein Bridge (al-Karameh crossing) — The Jordan corridor's crossing from Jordan; its cargo reaches Gaza through Kerem Shalom. NRC reported a cap of 15 trucks a week of dual-use items from Jordan across all humanitarian sectors (5 October 2026).
- Kerem Shalom / Karem Abu Salem crossing — The only operational cargo crossing since 24 May 2026 (OCHA, Gisha), where every corridor converges; Israeli inspection is carried out here.
- Zikim crossing (Erez West) — The northern goods gate, closed since 24 May 2026 "until further notice" (OCHA); no Israeli statement of the reason was found.
- Kissufim crossing — Used intermittently after the October 2025 ceasefire (OCHA); its 2026 status is not established, and OCHA's "only available crossing" wording is not a closure statement.
- Erez / Beit Hanoun crossing — Proposed goods terminal; a scanner was expected from September 2026 (BMVg) and a 1 September target was announced, but it had not opened by 8 October (Gisha).
- Rafah crossing (Gaza–Egypt) — Passengers only, with EUBAM; Egypt-route goods are routed to Kerem Shalom rather than through Rafah.
- Gaza City — The north's main city, supplied from the southern crossing since Zikim closed.
Evidence and grading
- Scope
- These records describe strategic dependence and documented disruption history. The schema has no fields for capacities, schedules, convoy composition, escort arrangements, storage or facility layout, and the alternatives section describes whether redundancy exists — never which route to use.
- Confidence
- How well established Vigil considers this assessment to be. It is not a measure of how severe the situation is.