What this system is
Israel's three offshore fields supply its power system and exported 13.2 bcm in 2024, about 10 bcm to Egypt and 3.1 bcm to Jordan, on Natural Gas Authority figures. Fields were shut in October 2023, June 2025 and February 2026, each time cutting the exports with the domestic supply.
Gas is the one economic channel that runs from Israel outward into the two Arab states whose peace treaties anchor the regional interface. When a war shuts a field, the cost lands in Egyptian and Jordanian power systems as well as Israel's.
Confidence: High As of 2026-07Reviewed 2026-10-12
The system
- Overview
- Tamar, Leviathan and Karish produced 27.38 bcm in 2024, and 49% of it was exported: 13.2 bcm on the Natural Gas Authority's figure (the ministry gives 13.11 bcm), up from 11.6 bcm in 2023, of which about 10 bcm went to Egypt and about 3.1 bcm to Jordan. Gas reaches Egypt by the subsea line from Ashkelon to Arish and through Jordan. The largest commitment is the Leviathan–Egypt agreement signed on 7 August 2025: about 130 bcm through 2040, valued at up to about $35 billion, with an export permit approved on 17 December 2025. Its first phase of about 20 bcm depends on new Israeli transmission and a third Leviathan gathering line; its second, about 110 bcm, on the Nitzana line and the field's expansion, expected in the second half of 2029 on NewMed's account. These are terms, not deliveries.
- What depends on it
- Jordan and Egypt depend on Israeli pipeline gas for part of their supply, and Israel's own power system on the same fields. When Leviathan and Karish were shut in 2026, Egypt turned to LNG: its first-quarter LNG imports tripled year on year on Kpler data reported by Argus.
- What disruption does
- Each shut-in removes Israeli supply and Egyptian and Jordanian imports at once. In 2026 Egypt bought more LNG, its first-quarter imports tripling year on year on Kpler data reported by Argus. The pattern — about three shut-ins in three years, each lasting weeks — makes Israeli gas a supply that stops with every regional war rather than one that is lost.
- Alternatives and redundancy
- For Israel's own grid, the three fields substitute for each other only in part, which is why Tamar's 2023 shut-in was absorbed while Leviathan kept running. For Egypt the alternative is imported LNG at a higher cost; for Jordan, other supply on shorter notice is limited. The receiving pipelines in Egypt and Jordan are not Levant locations and are described here only.
Nodes
In the order this record authors them — an authored sequence, not a route.
Israel's largest offshore gas field, in the eastern Mediterranean west of Haifa, and the source of the Leviathan–Egypt export agreement signed on 7 August 2025. A broad, deliberately imprecise marker for the field, not for any installation.
In this systemThe largest field and the export field; capacity about 14 bcm a year after the third gathering line on NewMed's account (Argus gives 12 bcm a year nameplate).
Why it mattersLeviathan is where a regional war becomes an energy shortfall in Egypt and Jordan. It was shut in June 2025 and again when the war with Iran began in 2026 — on 28 February on Energean's and press accounts, on 2 March on the ministry order Argus reports — and returned to regular production on 2 April 2026, with exports to Jordan and Egypt resuming with it.
What to watchMinistry shut-in and restart orders during escalations; whether the first phase of the Egypt agreement raises actual exports, which no published figure yet shows.
Mining area · broad region Confidence: High As of 2026-04 Show on the map →
An Israeli offshore gas field in the eastern Mediterranean, operated by Chevron. A broad, deliberately imprecise marker for the field, not for any installation.
In this systemOperated by Chevron; shut from 9 October to 13 November 2023.
Why it mattersTamar was the field shut at the start of the Gaza war: Chevron was ordered to close it on 9 October 2023 as a security measure, Leviathan kept running and exports were rerouted via Jordan, and the restart was ordered on 9 November, announced on 13 November, with flows to Egypt resuming on 14 November 2023.
What to watchMinistry shut-in and restart orders during escalations.
Mining area · broad region Confidence: Moderate As of 2023-11 Show on the map →
An Israeli offshore gas field in the eastern Mediterranean, operated by Energean, on Israel's side of the maritime boundary settled with Lebanon in October 2022. A broad, approximate marker for the field, not for any installation.
In this systemOperated by Energean; shut 41 days in 2026, restarted 9 April.
Why it mattersKarish shows how long a wartime shut-in lasts. It was shut on 13 June 2025 and on 28 February 2026; in 2026 it restarted on 9 April after 41 days and was reported fully operational on 13 April, and Energean cut its 2026 production guidance to 130–140 thousand barrels of oil equivalent a day.
What to watchMinistry shut-in and restart orders during escalations; the operator's production guidance.
Mining area · broad region Confidence: High As of 2026-04 Show on the map →
Chevron was ordered to shut Tamar on 9 October 2023 as a security measure, the field being within rocket range of Gaza. Leviathan kept running and exports were rerouted via Jordan. A restart was ordered on 9 November and announced on 13 November, and flows to Egypt resumed on 14 November 2023.
Leviathan and Karish were shut on 13 June 2025 when the June war with Iran began (recorded by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module). The ministry restarted surplus exports to Egypt and Jordan on 20 June, and the fields reopened after the ceasefire, around 24–25 June.
Leviathan and Karish were shut when the 2026 war with Iran began (the war is Iran–Gulf's record). Leviathan's halt is dated 28 February by Energean and the press and 2 March by the ministry order Argus reports; it received restart clearance on 31 March and returned to regular production on 2 April, with flows to Jordan and Egypt resuming. Karish, shut on 28 February, restarted on 9 April after 41 days and was fully operational on 13 April, and Energean cut its 2026 guidance to 130–140 thousand barrels of oil equivalent a day.
Political implications
The gas interface ties Egypt's and Jordan's energy security to decisions Israel's energy ministry takes for security reasons.
Economic implications
The Leviathan–Egypt agreement raises the stakes of each future shut-in: the more Egypt's supply rests on Israeli gas, the larger the gap a wartime order opens.
What remains unknown
- Actual 2026 export flows to Egypt and Jordan were not verified; only capacities and agreement terms are carried.
- A 2025 annual export total was not found.
- No Tamar shut-in was found for June 2025 or 2026; whether it ran throughout is not confirmed by a dated source.
Readings the evidence also supports
- The shut-ins were precautionary orders rather than damage: no strike on a field is recorded, so the disruption measures the state's risk tolerance as much as the threat.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
Shut-in and restart orders
Whether the energy ministry orders a field shut, and for how long, at the next escalation.
Phase 1 exports to Egypt
Whether company reports show exports to Egypt rising toward the agreement's first-phase level once the new transmission is complete.
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Assessed as of — 2026-07 Last reviewed — 2026-10-12