Humanitarian

Gaza — a population living in temporary shelter

As of 2026-10

There is no 2026 OCHA or IOM total of displaced people in Gaza; the April 2026 damage and needs assessment puts displacement at about 1.9 million over October 2023 to October 2025. The nearest present count is the Site Management Cluster's: 1,708,822 people in 1,591 displacement sites at its May 2026 baseline, in accessible areas west of the Israeli-held line only, with 83 per cent of sites makeshift and about 11 per cent collective centres. The Shelter Cluster, in OCHA's report of 25 September 2026, finds 65 per cent of households in tents or makeshift shelters and, from June surveys, 94 per cent in need of shelter or household assistance. Damage is counted on two methods kept apart: 371,888 housing units damaged or destroyed to October 2025 in the damage and needs assessment, and, on UNOSAT's June 2026 imagery as relayed by the press, 201,290 structures affected, with destroyed structures about 9 per cent above the October 2025 count — destruction continued after the ceasefire. Of 178,632 housing units inspected on the ground to August 2026, 60 per cent were severely damaged, destroyed or uninhabitable. For winter, the Shelter Cluster's response was 34 per cent funded on 5 October, with at least 500 truckloads of dual-use shelter items in the pipeline (NRC). Flood exposure is reported on four breakdowns that are not a trend: about 950,000 people in medium- or high-risk sites (Site Management Cluster, 21 September, via NRC), 464,402 in 451 high-risk sites (25 September), and about 279,000 in flood-prone sites and 235,000 in medium-to-high-risk sites in two parts of OCHA's 2 October report. A Board of Peace mobile-home pilot for Rafah was reported approved in principle by Israel in August 2026 and not implemented.

Sources: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · Palestinian Centre for Human Rights — relay of the Site Management Cluster baseline↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · UNOSAT satellite damage assessments (Gaza and Lebanon)↗ · Al Jazeera English↗ · Norwegian Refugee Council — Gaza shelter and access statements↗ · Established international media reporting

West Bank — the emptied northern camps

As of 2026-09

OCHA's monthly snapshot of 17 September 2026 carries UNRWA's count of 34,176 people still displaced from the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams camps as of August 2026. OCHA attributes the displacement from Jenin camp to operations by Palestinian and Israeli forces — the Palestinian Authority's operation in the camp from December 2024 preceded the Israeli one — and that from Tulkarm and Nur Shams to Israeli operations. OHCHR's thematic report of 4 September 2026 gave 33,362; UN News reported that figure as UNRWA's as of July 2026, which does not match the report's 31 January 2026 cut-off, so it is not given a date here. On UNOSAT's October 2025 assessment, 52 per cent of structures in Jenin camp, 48 per cent in Nur Shams and 36 per cent in Tulkarm were destroyed or damaged; that destruction is not part of OCHA's demolition count. Israel's Defence Minister said on 23 February 2025 that residents would not return. OCHA reported that a "Restriction of Movement and Traffic" order covering all three camps and surrounding neighbourhoods was extended on 1 February 2026 to 31 March, with entry and exit by permit. UNRWA reported on 13 August that the orders ran to 20 August for Jenin and 30 September for Tulkarm and Nur Shams; WAFA had reported on 29–30 July an extension of all three to the end of September, so the Jenin end date is in conflict, and no renewal after 30 September was found. On 28 July 2026, according to Haaretz, the Defence Minister instructed the army to prepare to take control of a further, unnamed camp and expel its residents on the "Tulkarm, Nur Shams and Jenin model", subject to operational plans and political approval; his office credits that model with a fall of about 80 per cent in what it calls terrorist activity. OCHA's data through August list only the three camps; a September operation in Balata temporarily displaced four families. OHCHR raises concerns of forcible transfer, a legal characterisation that is OHCHR's and is kept apart from the facts above.

Jenin camp (UNRWA, Aug 2026)

12,557 still displaced — OCHA attributes to Palestinian and Israeli forces' operations

Tulkarm camp (UNRWA, Aug 2026)

12,412 still displaced — Israeli operations

Nur Shams camp (UNRWA, Aug 2026)

9,207 still displaced — Israeli operations

Nur Shams demolition order (Dec 2025)

25 buildings, about 70 households; implementation frozen by Israel's Supreme Court (moderate)

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · UNRWA situation reports and statements↗ · OHCHR — occupied Palestinian territory reporting↗ · UN News — reporting on Israel, the occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon↗ · UNOSAT satellite damage assessments (Gaza and Lebanon)↗ · WAFA — Palestinian News and Info Agency↗ · Haaretz↗

West Bank — displacement by demolition, settler violence and operations

As of 2026-10

OCHA records West Bank displacement in separate categories, and the module keeps them separate. Between 1 January 2025 and 31 August 2026 OCHA counts 3,344 people displaced by demolitions — 3,050 for lack of building permits and 294 punitive and other — 4,279 by settler violence and access restrictions, and 152 by the destruction of homes in Israeli forces' operations; the northern-camp displacement is a fourth category. Structures are a different count: 2,702 demolished in the same window, 2,540 of them for lack of permits. OCHA reported more than 1,700 people displaced by lack-of-permit demolitions in 2025, the highest since its records began in 2009. In the week of 22–28 September 2026 OCHA recorded 12 structures demolished "pursuant to a military order", a category it keeps apart from lack-of-permit and punitive demolitions. In the Masafer Yatta firing zone, 122 people were displaced between 18 August and 23 September 2026, and the Jinba planning scheme was rejected on 18 August. More than 90 per cent of settler-violence displacement recorded in early 2026 was in the Jordan Valley, including about 600 people from Ras Ein al-Auja in January. No figure here is a difference between two windows.

Lack-of-permit demolitions (Jan 2025 – Aug 2026)

3,050 displaced; 2,540 structures

Punitive and other demolitions (Jan 2025 – Aug 2026)

294 displaced; 132 structures

Destruction in Israeli forces' operations (Jan 2025 – Aug 2026)

152 displaced; 30 structures

Settler violence and access restrictions (Jan 2025 – Aug 2026)

4,279 displaced

Military-order demolitions (22–28 Sep 2026)

12 structures, in a week of 73 demolished or sealed that displaced 93 people

Settler attacks with casualties or damage (Jan 2025 – Aug 2026)

3,459 incidents; 194–229 a month in 2026

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗

East Jerusalem — demolitions for lack of permit

As of 2026-10

In East Jerusalem the standing mechanism is demolition for lack of building permits, much of it carried out by owners after receiving orders. OCHA counted 98 structures demolished between 1 January and 27 April 2026, displacing more than 230 people, more than half of them owner-demolished. On 6 October 2026 one residential building was demolished at At Tur, displacing 69 people — the largest displacement from a single demolition in East Jerusalem since 2009, as OCHA's figures were relayed. Ir Amim's counts are a separate series and are not mixed with OCHA's. Court-backed evictions in Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan are a distinct category and are not counted here. The module draws no inference about sovereignty from these records.

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · Established international media reporting

Lebanon — mass displacement, then mass return

As of 2026-10

Two instruments count displacement in Lebanon and they are never combined. The Prime Minister's Disaster Risk Management Unit recorded 1,049,328 people who had self-registered as displaced by 1 April 2026, a cumulative registration figure the Secretary-General later relayed for the period to 20 June. IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix estimates, through key informants, how many remain displaced and how many have returned: in Round 118, as of 29 September 2026, 329,686 still displaced and 877,203 recorded as returned. The DTM's two figures together exceed the registration count because method and coverage differ, so no figure is derived by subtracting one instrument from the other. The DTM stock has been roughly flat at 330,000–350,000 since mid-August. In July, 91 per cent of the displaced came from five districts — Nabatieh, Bent Jbeil, Marjaayoun, Sour and Baabda. IOM states observed returns cannot be considered permanent. No official 2026 figure for displaced residents of northern Israel was found, and none is published here.

17 Jun 2026 (DTM)

844,243 internally displaced

22 Jul 2026 (DTM)

375,090

19 Aug 2026 (DTM)

348,898

9 Sep 2026 (DTM Round 116)

333,144; 818,288 recorded as returned

15 Sep 2026 (DTM Round 117)

341,228; 864,680 recorded as returned

29 Sep 2026 (DTM Round 118)

329,686; 877,203 recorded as returned

Sources: WHO — occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon emergency reporting↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix — Lebanon↗

Lebanon — collective shelters and schools used as shelters

As of 2026-09

Collective-shelter occupancy is a proxy for the most exposed displaced households, not a measure of displacement. It fell from a peak of 684 shelters in April to 14,277 people in 154 sites on 29 September 2026; site counts have risen as well as fallen as shelters closed and reopened. Before the school term opened on 15 September, the Education Ministry said about 80 public schools still sheltered displaced people, nine of them used entirely as shelters.

5 Mar 2026 (OCHA)

96,000 people in 441 sites

About 10 Apr 2026 (WHO)

684 shelters, the peak

25 May 2026 (OCHA)

129,724 in 635

28 Jun 2026 (OCHA)

52,243 in 479

23 Jul 2026 (WHO)

29,491 in 159

24 Aug 2026 (OCHA, moderate)

about 21,000 in 209

29 Sep 2026 (DTM Round 118)

14,277 in 154

Schools as shelters (Education Ministry via Reuters, 4 Sep 2026)

about 80 still sheltering before term; 9 fully used as shelters

Sources: UN OCHA Lebanon — humanitarian reporting↗ · WHO — occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon emergency reporting↗ · IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix — Lebanon↗ · Reuters↗ · Lebanese government statements and decisions (Presidency, Council of Ministers, ministries)↗

Lebanon — the appeal, its successor and cash for the displaced

As of 2026-09

The Flash Appeal for March–August 2026 was revised on 5 June to $639.9 million for 1.4 million people and was 52 per cent funded on 24 August; it closed in early September, with the UN relief chief saying it was only half funded. Its successor, the Lebanon Response Plan 2026 Addendum for September–December, seeks $385.88 million for about 732,000 people; its funding level was not found. Cash support for rent reached under a tenth of its annual target after the regular programme was interrupted in conflict areas from March.

Flash Appeal funding

$234.3m (36.6%) at 22 Jun; 52% at 24 Aug 2026 (moderate)

Cash for rent (LRP Cash Working Group, Aug 2026)

10,520 people reached, under 10% of the 106,813 annual target

Emergency multipurpose cash (Aug 2026)

905,386 people targeted at least once since March

Sources: UN OCHA Lebanon — humanitarian reporting↗ · L'Orient Today / L'Orient-Le Jour↗ · Lebanon Response Plan — Government of Lebanon and UN appeal documents↗

Gaza — casualty counts and who keeps them

As of 2026-10

Vigil publishes no casualty figure of its own for Gaza. The Ministry of Health in Gaza, administered by Hamas, counts 73,066 killed to 30 June 2026 as relayed by WHO — press relays of the ministry put the count at 73,783 around 13 September, and no UN-relayed figure after 30 June was found — and 1,431 killed and 5,026 injured since the October 2025 ceasefire as relayed by OCHA on 2 October 2026. Its weekly additions mix new deaths, deaths from wounds, bodies recovered from rubble and retroactive identifications (81 in the week to 2 October), so no weekly rate is derived from them. The ministry does not separate combatants from civilians; Israeli officials dispute its figures. An independent household survey in The Lancet Global Health estimates about 75,200 violent deaths and about 8,540 excess non-violent deaths from 7 October 2023 to 5 January 2025, on its own method and window. Reuters counted more than 1,400 people killed by Israeli forces since the ceasefire as of 7 October 2026. UN Mine Action records 274 people killed by explosive ordnance since October 2023, and the Civil Defence in Gaza estimates more than 8,000 missing. Of the 251 people taken hostage on 7 October 2023, 168 were returned alive; the remains of the last deceased hostage were recovered on 26 January 2026, per the Board of Peace's report. These counts are kept separate and never summed.

Sources: Ministry of Health in Gaza — casualty reporting and named lists↗ · WHO — occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon emergency reporting↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · Established international media reporting · Gaza Mortality Survey (Spagat et al.), The Lancet Global Health, February 2026↗ · Reuters↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗

Lebanon and northern Israel — casualty counts of the 2026 war

As of 2026-10

According to Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health, 4,387 people were killed and 12,424 wounded between 2 March and 10–11 October 2026, as relayed by the press; the ministry does not distinguish combatants from civilians. Its earlier figures — 4,106 killed and 12,153 injured to 20 June as relayed by the Secretary-General, and 4,346 killed to 17 August as relayed by OCHA — are kept as their own. Ministry data in WHO's update #30, to 22 July, record 1,822 killed and 4,315 injured after the 17 April truce, and 253 children and 392 women among 4,328 killed. WHO's surveillance system recorded 135 deaths and 408 injuries in attacks on health care between 2 March and about 22 July. The Secretary-General's report separately records 33 Lebanese soldiers killed, at least 3 Israeli civilians and 36 Israeli soldiers killed, and seven UNIFIL peacekeepers killed in four incidents, two of them attributed by the UN to the Israel Defense Forces and four to non-state actors, presumably Hezbollah, with one death undetermined. The counts are kept separate and never summed.

Sources: Lebanese Ministry of Public Health — casualty reporting↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · UN OCHA Lebanon — humanitarian reporting↗ · WHO — occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon emergency reporting↗ · Established international media reporting

Gaza — food security after famine

As of 2026-10

The IPC confirmed famine in Gaza Governorate in August 2025, a finding Israel rejected; its December 2025 analysis classified no area in famine. The special snapshot published on 23 July 2026 finds 1,239,657 people, 59 per cent of those analysed, in Phase 3 or above for April–June 2026, and projects 1,412,421, or 67 per cent, for July–December — a projection, not an observed figure; every governorate is Phase 3 and no one is classified in Phase 5. No later IPC product was found. The snapshot attributes the gains to humanitarian assistance and calls conditions highly fragile: 83 per cent of households report no income, food assistance reached 1.49 million people in May 2026 against 2.13 million in November 2025, and 74,200 children aged 6 to 59 months need treatment for acute malnutrition between May 2026 and April 2027. Its survey excluded about 17 per cent of the population living near the Israeli-held line. Assistance in September covered about half of minimum caloric needs through parcels, alongside 650,000 to 732,000 hot meals a day; on 2 October the Food Security Sector warned of significant reductions in meal production and monthly parcels from October — a warning, not an observed cut.

Sources: IPC — Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analyses for the Gaza Strip↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · Established international media reporting

Gaza — markets and prices

As of 2026-10

Food is available in Gaza's markets and access is constrained by income. Prices move weekly and are carried only with their date; the Cash Working Group's monthly inflation figure is the steadier measure.

Inflation against before October 2023 (Cash Working Group)

about 200% (18 Sep), about 207% (25 Sep), 204% September average (2 Oct)

Flour, 25 kg

ILS 63 average, up to 75 (18 Sep); ILS 52 (25 Sep)

Subsidised bread

about 90,000 2-kg bundles a day from 22 bakeries at NIS 3 a bundle (September)

Cash-out fees

fell to 0% (18 Sep)

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗

Gaza — child and maternal nutrition

As of 2026-10

The SMART survey of 31 May – 15 June 2026, released by UNICEF and the Nutrition Cluster on 24 August, covered accessible areas only and excluded about 17 per cent of the population. It describes acute malnutrition as low and records stunting at 12.2 per cent, overweight at 4.0 per cent, a minimum acceptable diet for 22.4 per cent of children aged 6–23 months, and diarrhoea in the prior two weeks for 37.1 per cent of children under five; its acute malnutrition point estimates were not read from the report and are not carried. Programme screening is a separate measure: the share of screened children admitted for treatment, not a prevalence, and read only over several rounds. On 24 August a strike damaged warehouses in Deir al-Balah and left virtually all stored nutrition supplies unusable (OCHA).

First half of August 2026 (screening)

2,613 of 36,240 children 6–59 months admitted (7.2%); 271 severe (0.75%)

First half of September 2026 (screening)

899 of 31,443 admitted (3%); 99 severe (0.31%)

Pregnant and breastfeeding women (screening)

838 of 23,811 admitted in August; 6,852 of 18,154 in September — a jump that reads as a change in admission criteria or programme, not established as deterioration

Sources: UNICEF State of Palestine — WASH situation updates and field reporting↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗

Gaza — a health system working at partial capacity

As of 2026-10

WHO's emergency situation update for the period to 30 June 2026 records 19 of 36 hospitals partially functional and none fully functional — one in North Gaza, twelve in Gaza governorate, three each in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, none in Rafah — with 13 field hospitals partially functional and 3,132 beds, 107 of them intensive care; no later WHO update was found. The dashboard shows 135 of 228 primary health care facilities functional; the Health Cluster reports 138 of 231, and its weekly reporting runs at 215 to 219 service sites, with about 280,000 consultations a week in September. Services are thin at the specialist end: in September OCHA reported chemotherapy, dialysis and insulin-analogue shortages and the suspension of mammography and CT at Al-Ahli. The Ministry of Health in Gaza reported 46 per cent of essential medicines at zero stock in March 2026, the latest percentage found. Medical evacuation runs through Rafah and Kerem Shalom: OCHA counts 3,172 patients since the ceasefire to 15 September, the EU border mission 2,224 patients among 5,977 Rafah exits between 2 February and 5 September, and WHO 12,913 since October 2023 at 11 August; the Ministry of Health says about 21,000 are waiting. WHO recorded 45 attacks affecting health care in 2026 by August, nearly half of them in Rafah.

Sources: WHO — occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon emergency reporting↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · EU External Action Service — CSDP mission and operation pages↗ · Ministry of Health in Gaza — casualty reporting and named lists↗ · Gisha — Legal Center for Freedom of Movement↗

Gaza — disease surveillance signals

As of 2026-09

Health Cluster surveillance as reported by OCHA. These are surveillance indicators, each with its own window; acute flaccid paralysis is a screening signal, and no 2026 polio confirmation was found.

Acute flaccid paralysis, cumulative 2026

21 (18 Sep) → 22 (25 Sep); no confirmed polio case found

Acute jaundice syndrome, weekly cases

52 (week of 27 Jul) → 74 (24–30 Aug)

Water samples, August 2026

more than 73% of 938 failed WHO free residual chlorine; 18% microbiologically contaminated

Reportable communicable cases, August–September

acute respiratory infection 52–54%, skin 26–29.5%, acute watery diarrhoea 20–21%

Impetigo

45,190 cases, 2 Aug – 12 Sep

Tuberculosis, 2026

6 confirmed cases (11 Sep)

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗

Lebanon — health and school facilities out of service

As of 2026-09

WHO's update #30, with data to 22 July 2026, records three hospitals fully non-operational — Bint Jbeil Public, Mays al-Jabal Public and Salah Ghandour — and 27 primary health care centres closed, against six hospitals and 55 centres around 10 April. No later WHO Lebanon update was found, so the present facility picture is not established. For schools, the Education Ministry reported in September about 50 public schools destroyed or severely damaged and more than 200 with lighter damage.

Hospitals fully non-operational (WHO, 22 Jul 2026)

3 — Bint Jbeil Public, Mays al-Jabal Public, Salah Ghandour; 17 hospitals damaged

Primary health care centres (WHO, 22 Jul 2026)

27 closed; 13 damaged

Pharmacies and warehouses (Order of Pharmacists via WHO)

118 damaged

Public schools (Education Ministry via Reuters, 4 Sep 2026)

about 50 destroyed or severely damaged; more than 200 moderate or minor damage

Sources: WHO — occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon emergency reporting↗ · Reuters↗ · Lebanese government statements and decisions (Presidency, Council of Ministers, ministries)↗

Gaza — water delivered by truck

As of 2026-10

OCHA's report of 2 October 2026 records 74 per cent of the population relying on trucked drinking water, about 24,995 cubic metres a day through 3,199 points, with southern desalination at its lowest output, affecting about 500,000 people, and lubricant and engine-oil shortages shutting generators down. Water, sanitation and health facilities in Gaza run on generators, so their capacity is tied to what fuel and spare parts cross into the Strip. The module states this dependency at Strip level and publishes no facility-level status.

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗

Gaza — water and sanitation at the household

As of 2026-09

The WASH Cluster's household monitoring is one series on one method, so its movement is a trend: moderate-to-high water insecurity rose from 84 per cent of households in June to 91 per cent in early August. Sanitation around shelters improved over the same months. No litres-per-person series for 2026 was found, and none is published here.

Households water-insecure (moderate to high)

84% (Jun) → 91% (early Aug)

Households with sewage within 10 m of the shelter

52% (Jun) → 43% (Aug)

Households with solid-waste piles nearby

43% (Jun) → 26% (Aug)

Untreated wastewater

more than 150,000 m³ a day discharged (4 Sep)

Dumpsites

Al Berka 2 at about 170% of capacity; Al Shallal ceased (18 Sep)

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗

Gaza — one cargo crossing and a moving line

As of 2026-10

Kerem Shalom is the only operational cargo crossing (OCHA, 2 October 2026), with offloading at 88 per cent that week after 52 per cent the week before. Zikim, which serves the north, reopened on 13 April 2026 after more than 40 days and has been closed since 24 May. Rafah reopened for pedestrians on 2 February 2026 under the EU border mission, closed from 28 February to 19 March during the war with Iran, and has opened intermittently since. No Erez goods terminal is open. The Board of Peace's May 2026 report records a commitment of 4,200 trucks a week and estimates diversion at about 1 per cent since November 2025. Inside the Strip, OCHA reports access restrictions on 65 per cent of the land. Israeli forces first withdrew to the Israeli military's Gaza "yellow line", which OCHA's June 2026 access map labels at 53 per cent of the Strip; the Israeli Prime Minister stated on 28 May 2026 that his instruction was to reach 70 per cent, a stated directive rather than a verified outcome. In October 2026 Israel put the area it holds at about 60 per cent (AFP, 8 October), and a senior US official was reported as saying the army had taken about 10 per cent beyond the agreed line; no independent measurement of the line was found.

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · EU External Action Service — CSDP mission and operation pages↗ · Gisha — Legal Center for Freedom of Movement↗ · IPC — Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analyses for the Gaza Strip↗ · Reuters↗ · Established international media reporting

Gaza — the registration regime for international NGOs

As of 2026-05

Israel introduced registration rules for international NGOs in March 2025 under the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, requiring lists of Palestinian staff with identity numbers. On 30 December 2025, 37 international NGOs were told their registrations expired on 31 December and that they had to stop operating by 1 March 2026; 24 were approved. A court's interim injunction on 27 February let them continue, with activities only partial, and on 19 May 2026 the Supreme Court rejected the petition, upholding the staff-identification requirement and giving non-compliant groups 30 days to comply. Which organisations complied, stopped, or operate under Palestinian Authority registration only after June is not established. Before deregistration, 53 international NGOs stated that they delivered more than half of food assistance and all treatment of severe acute malnutrition — their claim, not a verified share.

Sources: Israeli government statements and documents (PMO, MFA, Ministry of Defense)↗ · Established international media reporting

West Bank — movement as a standing restriction

As of 2026-09

OCHA counted 925 movement obstacles in the West Bank in December 2025 — 89 permanently staffed checkpoints, 218 partial checkpoints, 232 road gates, 114 linear closures, 167 earthmounds and 105 roadblocks — against 849 in February 2025 and a 20-year average of 647, with more than 120 new gates installed in 2025. The count excludes the closed camps and closed military zones, so it does not measure restriction there. Its service consequence is measured best for health: WHO's permit data show 36 per cent of 87,427 patient applications pending or denied in 2025 and 22 per cent of 51,444 in January–June 2026, a series WHO notes is incomplete because some East Jerusalem hospitals now apply directly. Makassed and Augusta Victoria together received 63 per cent of applications in the first half of 2026. No system-wide series of ambulance delays exists; OCHA's single cases are recorded as examples. The Allenby crossing to Jordan closed repeatedly in 2025 and reopened for goods in December 2025.

Patient permits, approval rate

86% (2021); 74% (2023); 56% (2024); 64% (2025) — WHO

Patient permits, pending or denied

36% of 87,427 (2025); 22% of 51,444 (Jan–Jun 2026) — WHO, incomplete series

Al 'Arrub camp gate, Road 60 (OCHA, 25 Sep 2026)

Fully closed since July 2025; hospital travel from 10–20 minutes to over an hour

Mobile clinics in Area C (OCHA, 25 Sep 2026)

11 partners at 227 locations; about 20 locations short of funding for services

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · WHO — occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon emergency reporting↗ · Established international media reporting

Lebanon — return to the border area and the Framework's sequence

As of 2026-07

Israeli forces hold an area the UN calls a "forward defence line": an IDF map of 19 April 2026 shows an area up to 10 km north of the Blue Line, including some territory north of the Litani and some 55 Lebanese villages, with a band at sea; the Secretary-General describes it as a direct violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and resolution 1701, and Israel's Defence Minister stated no intention of withdrawing from Beaufort. A Hezbollah–Israel ceasefire has been in effect since 19 June 2026. The Trilateral Framework of 26 June 2026 places civilian return, like reconstruction, in each pilot zone after disarmament there is confirmed; it records two initial zones agreed by the two armies, without naming them and without a timeline. Press reporting in July 2026 placed the first deployment of the Lebanese army in Froun, Srifa and Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh. UNIFIL ceases operations on 31 December 2026, and no successor arrangement had been decided by the Security Council as of 11 October.

Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · L'Orient Today / L'Orient-Le Jour↗

Southern Lebanon — what return comes back to

As of 2026-09

Two damage series describe the south and they are not one series. UNDP and CNRS-L, on imagery to 29 April 2026 released on 22 June, count 11,095 buildings destroyed south of the Litani, affecting 17,891 housing units, $1.38 billion in direct damage and about 3.1 million cubic metres of debris. A Lighthouse Reports and Financial Times investigation published on 21 August, citing CNRS-L, puts housing units damaged or destroyed in the south at about 85,000 and finds about 65 per cent of destruction signals after the mid-April truce; it reports local authorities' and CNRS-L's count of at least 2,500 km of water pipelines and related infrastructure destroyed. The UN describes an Israeli-held area up to 10 km deep containing about 55 villages. In Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, a pilot-zone village, about 100 of some 500 pre-war families had returned by 21 September, with five of nine planned prefabricated units delivered by the Council for the South and about 200 needed, per the mayor. No official count of people unable to return exists, and the DTM's remaining displaced figure is not one. No 2026 mine-action casualty or contamination figure was found; the army has reported clearing large unexploded bombs in southern villages.

Sources: UNDP Lebanon — damage assessments and recovery programming↗ · CNRS-L — National Council for Scientific Research, Lebanon (remote sensing)↗ · Lighthouse Reports — investigations (with the Financial Times)↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · L'Orient Today / L'Orient-Le Jour↗ · Lebanese Armed Forces — official communiqués↗

Gaza — UNRWA's operations under the 2024 Knesset laws

As of 2026-08

Two Knesset laws passed in October 2024 and in force from the end of January 2025 bar UNRWA from operating in territory Israel deems sovereign and Israeli officials from contact with it; their West Bank and East Jerusalem effects sit with the West Bank records. In Gaza, UNRWA states that no international staff have been granted visas or permits since the end of January 2025, and its services run on national staff. The latest UNRWA situation report located is No. 232, for 29 July – 11 August 2026; the agency's site was not reachable.

National staff in Gaza

about 12,000 (UNRWA Commissioner-General, press)

Health footprint, week of 10–16 August 2026

11 health centres and 24 medical points; about 72,000 consultations (OCHA)

Beach Camp Health Centre

reopened 21 July 2026

UNRWA colleagues killed since October 2023

391 (310 UNRWA personnel, 81 supporting), to 31 March 2026 (UNRWA)

Sources: UNRWA situation reports and statements↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · Established international media reporting

Gaza — schooling in temporary learning spaces

As of 2026-09

The 2026–27 school year began on 19 September in temporary and supported learning spaces. The Education Cluster counts about 495,000 children enrolled in supported spaces, a further 70,000 in community-led or private ones, and about 200,000 without access to any structured learning. The cluster has received 13 per cent of US$170.8 million and reports 687 temporary learning spaces at risk for lack of funding; 165 classrooms in 14 schools had been rehabilitated and 359 learning spaces were in preparation at the end of August. Grade 12 final examinations resumed in August for the first time since the war began. Earlier figures — 97 per cent of school buildings damaged or destroyed and about 439,000 children without school access in February 2026 — are on a different basis and are not a trend against these.

Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗

West Bank — Palestinian Authority services in reduced form

As of 2026-09

The fiscal chain — clearance revenue withheld, a cash shortfall, partial salaries — is documented by the World Bank, the PA Finance Ministry and MAS and is recorded in the economy section. What follows downstream is in most cases the PA's own account. Salaries continue part-paid and late: the June 2026 salary was paid on 23 September with a minimum of NIS 2,000. Schools opened on 6 September 2026 for 634,294 pupils; the public-school week was cut to four days in 2024/25 and to three in 2025/26, and the 2026/27 schedule was not found. The PA Ministry of Health reported about 180 of 520 essential medicines at zero stock on 4 June 2026 and attributes the shortfall to clearance withholding; an August statement reported more than 726 items at zero in central warehouses, on a different denominator, and the two are not compared. Suppliers stopping deliveries over unpaid debts is a documented intermediate step. The ministry reports more than 11,000 surgeries postponed in 2026. Hospitals struck on 21 April 2026, with unions citing unpaid salaries and supply shortages. These effects coincide with the shortfall; that the shortfall caused each of them is the PA's attribution and is not independently established.

Salaries (PA Finance Ministry via WAFA)

June 2026 salary paid 23 Sep 2026, minimum NIS 2,000, about three months late

School week (PA Ministry of Education, press)

4 days (2024/25); 3 days (2025/26); 2026/27 not confirmed

Medicines at zero stock (PA MoH, 4 Jun 2026)

about 180 of 520 essential medicines; 50 of 97 chemotherapy drugs

Items at zero stock (PA MoH, Aug 2026)

more than 726 items in central warehouses — different denominator (low–moderate)

Health debt (party estimates)

about NIS 3bn mostly to private and charitable hospitals (MoH, Dec 2025); about $900m of $1.3bn (Al-Quds, Jun 2026)

Medical strike (21 Apr 2026)

West Bank hospitals on general strike, lifesaving cases only (New Lines; unions not named)

East Jerusalem referrals (EEAS, 27 Apr 2026)

€9.29m from Finland, Italy, Luxembourg and Switzerland; over €225m since 2013; a further €20m from the EU budget planned for 2026

Sources: Palestinian Authority statements and documents · WAFA — Palestinian News and Info Agency↗ · Anadolu Agency — Gaza power plant reporting↗ · Al Jazeera English↗ · Agence France-Presse↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy — analysis↗ · European Union institutional texts and Council conclusions · Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) — economic and fiscal updates↗ · World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗