What this system is
Fuel reaches Gaza only through Kerem Shalom, mostly as UN-facilitated diesel, and runs the generators, wells and desalination that replaced the grid. Entry is dated and partial: OCHA called 550,000 litres on 22 September 2026 far from sufficient, and commercial fuel and the power plant's restart await Israeli approval.
Fuel is the input that converts Gaza's access regime into electricity and water. The World Bank reported in May 2026 that prioritised humanitarian facilities run on diesel generators with UNOPS-supplied fuel, wells are generator- and fuel-dependent (UNICEF), and the southern desalination plant falls back to diesel when its one feeder fails. Each approval decision on fuel or oil is therefore also a decision about water production.
Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10-02Reviewed 2026-10-12
The system
- Overview
- With the Gaza Power Plant shut since October 2023 and one Israeli feeder line operating, fuel is what Gaza's remaining electricity and water run on. Diesel enters through Kerem Shalom and is collected under UNOPS facilitation; OCHA's situation reports give it in dated windows that are not comparable with one another: about 1.57 million litres of diesel plus about 46,000 litres of benzine on 6–16 March 2026, about 560,750 litres on 1–7 April, over 500,000 litres on 16–21 April, 730,000 litres on 22–29 April and just over 1 million litres on 1–9 June. On 22 September OCHA reported 550,000 litres allowed in and called it "far from sufficient". A weekly index compiled by the Next Century Foundation, citing Gaza's de facto Crossings and Borders Authority, counted 48 fuel tankers of diesel and cooking gas through Kerem Shalom on 2–8 October. Engine oil is a separate bottleneck: OCHA recorded 13,445 litres approved against 92,778 litres pending between 1 March and early September, and a water-sector partner brought in 882 litres on 16 September. On 23 September OCHA listed commercial fuel entry and the power plant's resumption among critical approvals still pending.
- What depends on it
- Near-total. There is no domestic fuel production, the power plant is shut, and only one Israeli feeder line operates, so almost every working pump, well and generator in the Strip depends on fuel entering through one crossing. The Palestinian Water Authority says it has provided about 14 million litres of fuel to run about 240 water facilities, a cumulative figure over an unstated period.
- What disruption does
- When fuel or oil falls short, generators stop and wells and desalination produce less; OCHA names restricted engine oil, spare parts and generators among the constraints on water production, and reported the two southern seawater plants at their lowest recorded output on 2 October 2026. The water and health consequences for people are recorded in the module's humanitarian objects, not here.
- Alternatives and redundancy
- None at the perimeter: fuel enters through one crossing, and commercial fuel entry was still awaiting approval on 23 September 2026 (OCHA). Inside the Strip, solar is the only partial substitute; most of it was damaged (World Bank–EU–UN assessment), solar panels were themselves a pending approval in September 2026 (OCHA), and a Board of Peace recovery plan reported by Axios proposes portable solar kits in a document that is not public.
Nodes
In the order this record authors them — an authored sequence, not a route.
The crossing at the junction of the Gaza Strip, Israel and Egypt through which goods enter Gaza. Since 24 May 2026, when Zikim closed, it has been the only cargo entry into the Strip, according to OCHA and Gisha. Israel closed all Gaza crossings on 28 February 2026, at the start of the war with Iran, and reopened Kerem Shalom gradually from 3 March.
In this systemThe only working cargo crossing since 24 May 2026 (OCHA), and the entry for diesel and cooking gas.
Why it mattersKerem Shalom is where Gaza's access regime is measured, and an operating crossing is not the same thing as aid arriving. In mid-March 2026 the UN reported near-total denial of its movements while the crossing operated; in one July 2026 week OCHA recorded that only 42% of supplies on the Egypt route and 65% on the Ashdod route were offloaded. Israel's COGAT and the UN count different things — COGAT counts all trucks and, according to Gisha, has counted 12 pallets as one truck since early 2026 — so every volume figure carries its publisher's definition.
What to watchDated changes in operating status; UN2720 offload and collection figures for UN-pipeline consignments; OCHA counts of denied and impeded movements; any second cargo entry reopening.
Border crossing Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10 Show on the map →
The Gaza Strip's power plant, in the Nuseirat area of central Gaza. It has been shut since October 2023 for lack of fuel. On 23 September 2026 OCHA listed the resumption of its operations among the critical approvals still pending.
In this systemShut since October 2023 for lack of fuel; its resumption was a pending approval on 23 September 2026 (OCHA).
Why it mattersWhether the plant runs is the clearest single reading of Gaza's electricity system, because almost everything else in it is either destroyed or improvised: the World Bank reported in May 2026 that one Israeli feeder line was operating, supplying a single desalination plant, and that prioritised humanitarian facilities run on diesel generators. A restart depends on fuel entering through Kerem Shalom and on an Israeli approval, not on the plant alone.
What to watchAn approval of the plant's resumption and the fuel arrangement attached to it, as stated by OCHA, the World Bank or COGAT; any dated report of the plant generating. The head of Gaza's National Committee said in January 2026 that a restart "seems on track"; no restart had been reported by October.
Power plant Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09-23 Show on the map →
A seawater desalination plant in the southern Gaza Strip, placed here at the Deir al-Balah area because no source read gives its exact site. The sources name it differently: the World Bank's "southern Short-Term Low-Volume Desalination Plant", UNICEF's "Southern Gaza Seawater Desalination Plant"; OCHA also reports an "Al Basa" plant in Deir al-Balah that may or may not be the same facility. According to the World Bank (May 2026), it is the only facility supplied by the one Israeli power line still operating into Gaza.
In this systemRuns on the single Israeli feeder and falls back to diesel when it fails, as on 25 March 2026 (UNICEF).
Why it mattersThe plant is where Gaza's power and water systems meet: it runs on the single 4 MW Kissufim feeder (World Bank, May 2026), and when cable connectors were damaged on 25 March 2026 it fell back to diesel at under 20% of output until it was back on the grid within days (UNICEF). OCHA reported on 2 October 2026 that the two southern seawater plants were at their lowest recorded output.
What to watchOCHA and WASH Cluster reporting on southern desalination output; any change to the feeder supplying the plant; entry of treatment chemicals, membranes and spare parts; a source that reconciles the plant's names.
Plant · production or assembly Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10-02 Show on the map →
The Gaza Power Plant shut for lack of fuel and has not been reported operating since; its resumption was among OCHA's pending approvals on 23 September 2026.
Engine oil for generators approved far below requests: 13,445 litres approved against 92,778 litres pending (OCHA, 11 September 2026).
OCHA reported 550,000 litres allowed in, "far from sufficient", and listed commercial fuel entry among critical approvals still pending.
Economic implications
Commercial fuel entry, still awaiting approval in September 2026, is the difference between a fuel supply that runs only prioritised humanitarian facilities and one that reaches businesses and households.
Humanitarian implications
Water and health services run on the same diesel, so a fuel decision reaches them directly; see the water and health records.
Actors with a stake
Transmission chains through this system
What remains unknown
- OCHA's fuel figures come in windows of different lengths and the series is not continuous after June 2026 apart from the 22 September statement; no total is computed.
- No COGAT fuel-entry figure for September–October 2026 was found.
- The 48-tanker count for 2–8 October is a tertiary compilation of a de facto authority's bulletin and is not confirmed by OCHA.
Readings the evidence also supports
- The engine-oil gap can be read as a dual-use restriction applied to lubricants, or as an approvals backlog; OCHA reports the numbers without the reason.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
Commercial fuel approval (candidate)
An OCHA or COGAT statement that commercial fuel entry is approved and operating, as distinct from UN-facilitated humanitarian fuel.
Power plant resumption approved (candidate)
A dated statement that the Gaza Power Plant's resumption is approved, and the fuel arrangement attached to it.
Watch questions this system bears on
Standing analytical questions whose evidence runs through this system, each with its latest review. Derived from the Watch object, never restated here.
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Assessed as of — 2026-10-02 Last reviewed — 2026-10-12