Non-state actor

Hamas

Political-armed organisations Political-armed organisation · party to the Gaza ceasefire

Assessed as of
2026-10-10
Last reviewed
2026-10-11

AssessmentModerate confidence

Figures carry their own uncertainty. Population, economic and military-spending data in wartime are estimates, often contested; every figure below shows its as-of date and a confidence grade, and leadership positions reflect the last review date and change without notice.

What this actor is

Hamas is the Palestinian Islamist organisation that has controlled Gaza since 2007, led the attack on Israel of 7 October 2023, and is a party — through mediators — to every Gaza arrangement since. Under the October 2025 ceasefire it returned the last living hostages by 13 October 2025 and the last deceased hostage's remains were recovered on 26 January 2026. The question left is its weapons. The US plan endorsed by resolution 2803 excludes it from any governance role and requires demilitarisation; the Board of Peace's first report names Hamas's refusal to accept verified decommissioning as the principal obstacle; Hamas approved the Board's 30 July 2026 roadmap, which links decommissioning to a phased Israeli withdrawal and which Israel has not signed. Hamas has said it will hand administration and policing to the Palestinian technocratic committee, which in October 2026 has still not entered Gaza.

Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-10-10Reviewed 2026-10-11

DesignationsEU: "'Hamas', including 'Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem'" (list reviewed by Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1882, 30 July 2026); UK: whole organisation proscribed since November 2021; US: Foreign Terrorist Organization effective 8 October 1997 (62 FR 52650). No UN listing.As of 2026-07-30 · Confidence: High The EU also runs a separate Hamas/PIJ sanctions regime, extended to 20 January 2027 and widened to Politburo members on 28 May 2026. The US date awaits confirmation against the State Department list. Sources: US / EU / UK sanctions designations
HostagesAll living hostages released by 13 October 2025; the last deceased hostage recovered on 26 January 2026; 168 of 251 returned aliveAs of 2026-05-15 · Confidence: High Board of Peace report to the Security Council, S/2026/418 §6. Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
DisarmamentNo verified decommissioning; Hamas approved the 30 July 2026 roadmap, Israel is not a signatory, and no document shows the verification committee constitutedAs of 2026-10 · Confidence: Moderate Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · Security Council Report — monthly forecasts↗

Objectives

Hamas's stated terms are an end to Israeli military operations, Israeli withdrawal and the transfer of Gaza's administration to a Palestinian technocratic body, with any decommissioning conditional on Israeli compliance; its official Ghazi Hamad described its acceptance of the roadmap in those conditional terms. In January 2026 it said it was willing to hand over administration, and in July 2026 it agreed to hand over policing, according to AP.

Sources: Statements by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and allied armed organisations · Associated Press↗ · Established international media reporting

Constraints

The plan resolution 2803 endorses states that Hamas will have no role in governance and requires demilitarisation under independent monitors, and the Board's May 2026 report is quoted as saying reconstruction cannot begin where weapons have not been laid down. Israeli forces hold most of the Strip behind the Gaza Yellow Line, and neither the technocratic committee that would receive heavy weapons under the roadmap nor the stabilization force that would support verification is inside Gaza.

Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Security Council Report — monthly forecasts↗

Position in the system

Hamas is the counterparty whose decommissioning every other step in Gaza waits on — the technocratic committee's entry, the force's deployment, Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction money. It negotiates through Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye, which with the United States developed the Board's roadmap as guarantors.

Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon

Objectives

What the actor says, kept apart from what Vigil assesses. Each stated entry cites where the position was made; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.

Stated by the actor

Acceptance of the Board of Peace roadmap of 30 July 2026, announced by the Board, with Hamas officials describing implementation as contingent on Israeli compliance.

As of 2026-07-31 Sources: Statements by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and allied armed organisations · US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · Established international media reporting

Handover of Gaza's administration (January 2026) and of policing (July 2026) to the Palestinian technocratic committee.

As of 2026-07 Sources: Statements by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and allied armed organisations · Associated Press↗

Assessed by Vigil

Trading weapons only against a guaranteed withdrawal sequence. The roadmap Hamas accepted links decommissioning to phased Israeli withdrawal and lets it begin only after the committee enters and the force deploys — conditions not yet met — so acceptance commits Hamas to little before Israel moves.

Confidence: Moderate Sources: US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · International Crisis Group↗

Retaining organisational survival through the transfer of civil functions: handing administration to a technocratic committee keeps Hamas outside governance as the plan requires without dissolving the organisation.

Confidence: Low Sources: International Crisis Group↗

Constraints

What limits this actor's options, with the kind of limit it is.

The annexed plan excludes Hamas from governance and conditions amnesty on decommissioning; resolution 2803 endorses it.

Legal Confidence: High Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗

Israeli forces control most of the Strip behind the Gaza Yellow Line, with strikes continuing during the ceasefire.

Military Confidence: Moderate Sources: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · Reuters↗

Gaza's economy contracted by 84 per cent according to the April 2026 damage and needs assessment, and reconstruction funds are conditioned on demilitarisation.

Economic Confidence: Moderate Sources: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗

Sources of leverage

What this actor can bring to bear, and how firmly each is established.

Its decommissioning is the condition on which the plan's later phases turn, so Hamas's consent — or refusal — sets the pace for the Board, the force and Israeli withdrawal alike.

Confidence: Moderate Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗

What remains unknown

  • Hamas's current leadership and internal decision-making are not established from a primary or wire source and are not stated.
  • The extent of Hamas's de facto control west of the yellow line is not established; it should not be inferred to have ceded it.
  • The Sharm el-Sheikh first-phase agreement has no published text.
  • Funding routes to Hamas after 2025: no primary evidence was found.
  • The 2026 status of the political bureau's presence in Doha, which Israel struck on 9 September 2025, is not established.

Posture as of 2026-10-10Posture reviewed 2026-10-11

Not published for HamasRed linesObservables

Confidence: Moderate The instruments and the Board's reporting are read in primary form. Hamas's internal decision-making, its current leadership and the extent of its control west of the yellow line are not established and are not stated. Sources: UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · Statements by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and allied armed organisations · US / EU / UK sanctions designations · Security Council Report — monthly forecasts↗ · International Crisis Group↗ Methodology Corrections Open in Explore

Last reviewed — 2026-10-11

Connected records

12 records that Hamas names, or that name it — every one an explicit reference in a published record, nothing inferred from subject matter.