What this system is
About 98–99% of Israel's foreign trade moves through its seaports on the State Comptroller's figures. Eilat, the Red Sea port, lost its traffic after Houthi attacks began in November 2023 and halted in July 2025, so the trade now runs through Haifa and Ashdod, both within range of fire.
For a state whose land borders carry little trade, the seaports are the economy's connection to the world. The wars of 2023–26 have not closed them, but they have concentrated them: the Red Sea outlet is dormant, and the Mediterranean port areas that carry the rest lie within reach of fire from Lebanon and Iran.
Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07Reviewed 2026-10-12
The system
- Overview
- Israel's foreign trade is overwhelmingly seaborne: the State Comptroller put it at about 98% of foreign trade in 2020 and about 99% of import and export cargo by tonnage in January 2024. It moves through three port areas. Haifa, on the northern coast, includes the Adani–Gadot Haifa Port Company and the Bayport terminal run by SIPG; Ashdod, in the south, includes the Ashdod Port Company and the Southport terminal run by TIL. New private terminals took 43% of container handling in the first three quarters of 2023 and almost half in 2025, on trade-press figures. Eilat, on the Red Sea, handled about half of Israel's car imports before the war. Israeli ports handled 3.445 million TEU in 2025 on trade-press figures citing port data, and 29.52 million tonnes and 1.81 million TEU in the first half of 2026 on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
- What depends on it
- Near-total. About 99% of import and export cargo by tonnage passes through the seaports (State Comptroller, January 2024). With Eilat dormant since July 2025, Israeli seaborne trade depends on the Haifa and Ashdod port areas.
- What disruption does
- Disruption has not stopped Israeli seaborne trade — national cargo rose 4.6% in the first half of 2026 to 29.52 million tonnes, as relayed — but it has removed one of its three outlets and raised its cost. Car imports that once landed at Eilat now arrive at the Mediterranean ports, each escalation adds a war-risk premium and a carrier surcharge to every call, and the trade that remains is concentrated on two port areas exposed to fire.
- Alternatives and redundancy
- None of comparable scale. Air freight carries a small share of trade and the land crossings with Egypt and Jordan carry little. Eilat's function — Asian imports, above all cars, landed without passing Suez — moved to Haifa and Ashdod, with Asia trade reaching them by Suez or the Cape. No Israel-specific measurement of that diversion was found; the Red Sea rerouting itself is measured in Iran–Gulf's records.
Nodes
In the order this record authors them — an authored sequence, not a route.
One of Israel's two main Mediterranean cargo port areas, on Haifa Bay. The Haifa Port Company has been owned 70% by India's Adani Ports and 30% by the Israeli company Gadot since January 2023; the separate Bayport terminal has been run by China's SIPG on a 25-year concession since September 2021. In January to May 2026 the Haifa port area handled 3.36 million tonnes and Bayport 2.93 million tonnes, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
In this systemThe northern port area, including Bayport. 3.36 million tonnes (Haifa port area) and 2.93 million tonnes (Bayport) in January to May 2026, as relayed.
Why it mattersHaifa is one of the nodes through which the regional wars reached Israel's trade. In June 2025 shrapnel fell in its chemical terminal during Iranian missile attacks. After the Iranian strikes of 1 March 2026 Adani said the port was fully operational; around 19–20 March an Iranian missile hit the Haifa refinery with no significant damage reported; Hezbollah claimed rocket salvos toward Haifa in March 2026. No confirmed damage to the commercial port in 2026 was found.
What to watchPort operations during escalations as the operator and Israeli authorities report them; Israeli port cargo statistics by port area.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-05 Show on the map →
Israel's southern Mediterranean cargo port area, the nearest major port to the Gaza Strip. It includes the Ashdod Port Company's port and the private Southport terminal run by TIL, part of the MSC group. The Ashdod Port Company reported revenue of NIS 657 million in the first half of 2026, up 11%, and about 370,000 TEU of containers, up 2.6%, as reported. In January to May 2026 the Ashdod port area handled 8.56 million tonnes and Southport 3.26 million tonnes, on Ministry of Transport figures as relayed by the trade press.
In this systemThe southern port area, including Southport; the largest by tonnage in January to May 2026 (8.56 million tonnes, Southport a further 3.26 million), as relayed.
Why it mattersAshdod is both a node of Israel's trade and a stage in Gaza's aid supply: UN-pipeline consignments landed here travel on to Kerem Shalom, and OCHA tracks the Ashdod route separately — in one July 2026 week only 65% of its supplies were offloaded at the crossing. With Eilat dormant, Ashdod and Haifa carry almost all of Israel's seaborne trade.
What to watchCargo volumes by port area; the Ashdod route's share of UN2720-tracked consignments into Gaza; operations during escalations.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
Israel's only port on the Red Sea, at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, run under a concession held by the Nakash group since 2013. Before the war it handled about half of Israel's car imports. Its activity fell by about 85% by December 2023 after Houthi attacks on shipping began: on figures reported by Globes, more than 134 ships and about 150,000 vehicles called in 2023, 16 ships and no vehicles in 2024, and 6 ships in the first half of 2025, and revenue fell from NIS 212 million in 2023 to NIS 42 million in 2024. Commercial operations halted on 20 July 2025 after the municipality froze the port's accounts over unpaid municipal taxes.
In this systemThe Red Sea outlet; near-dormant since late 2023 and commercially halted since 20 July 2025.
Why it mattersEilat is where the Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping of 2023–2025, recorded in the Iran–Gulf module, becomes an Israeli economic fact: the country's southern sea outlet has been near-dormant since mid-2025, and its car imports moved to the Mediterranean ports. In January 2026 Globes reported the port still empty, a government plan unimplemented, the Knesset Finance Committee weighing an import order against direct aid, and the ministries deciding not to extend the concession, which expires around 2028, in favour of a new tender. No resumption of regular service in 2026 was found.
What to watchAny resumption of regular commercial calls; the outcome of the import-order debate and the concession tender; changes in Red Sea shipping risk recorded in the Iran–Gulf module.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-07 Show on the map →
Shipping avoided Eilat after Houthi attacks on Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea began in November 2023 (the Red Sea material is owned by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module). The port's chief executive reported an 85% drop in activity by December 2023, and management planned to lay off 60 of 120 staff in early 2024. On figures Globes reported from port management and the Knesset Finance Committee, calls fell from more than 134 ships and about 150,000 vehicles in 2023 to 16 ships and no vehicles in 2024, and revenue from NIS 212 million to NIS 42 million.
Eilat suspended operations after the municipality froze its accounts over unpaid municipal taxes; the chief executive said the port was in a state of bankruptcy, a statement and not a court filing. In October 2025 Eilat accounted for 26 of more than 4,000 cargo-ship movements at Israeli ports, with no car carriers. In January 2026 Globes reported it still empty; no resumption of regular service in 2026 was found.
War-risk insurance for calls at Israeli ports rose with each escalation: above 2% of hull value at the November 2023 peak and 0.7–1.0% for a seven-day call in June 2025, from 0.2% a week earlier, on brokers' figures reported by Reuters. On 9 March 2026 ZIM announced that insurers had raised the premium on all calls at Israeli ports and imposed a surcharge of $100 or $75 per TEU from 12 March.
Haifa came under fire without closing. In June 2025 shrapnel fell in the port's chemical terminal during Iranian missile attacks; after the Iranian strikes of 1 March 2026 Adani said the port was fully operational. Hezbollah claimed rocket salvos toward Haifa in March 2026. The Iranian strikes belong to the wars Iran–Gulf records; no confirmed 2026 damage to the commercial port was found.
Political implications
Whether to support Eilat by an import order, by direct aid or by a new concession is a domestic decision still open in 2026.
Economic implications
The cost of the wars to Israeli trade shows up as concentration and insurance rather than as closure; Eilat's loss is a local economic loss for the town and a redundancy loss for the country.
Actors with a stake
Transmission chains through this system
What remains unknown
- The outcome of the Knesset Finance Committee's import-order debate on Eilat was not verified.
- The reported reactivation of the state cargo war-risk insurance scheme from 1 September 2026 rests on a search snippet and is not carried.
- No Israel-specific figure for cargo diverted from the Red Sea was found.
Readings the evidence also supports
- Eilat's 2025 halt was triggered by municipal debt, not by an attack; the Red Sea campaign emptied the port, but the halt itself was financial.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
Eilat resumes regular calls
Whether the ministry or operator announces scheduled commercial calls, above all car carriers, or a concession tender is awarded.
Haifa operations under fire
Whether an escalation produces a confirmed interruption of commercial operations at Haifa, as distinct from strikes on the city or the bay.
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Assessed as of — 2026-07 Last reviewed — 2026-10-12