Energy system · full record

East Mediterranean gas

Israel's three offshore gas fields — its own power supply and its exports to Egypt and Jordan — and the wartime shut-ins that stop both at once.

3 published markers 1 supply system 2 operators

Assessed as of
2026-07
Last reviewed
2026-10-12

AssessmentHigh confidence

Context, not targeting. A system record names published markers and published operators and states dependencies at the level a published institution does. It carries no facility-level capacity, vulnerability, protection or repair detail; the schema has no field for any of it.

Locator — land outline from Natural Earth 110m (public domain); 3 places this record names, at the coordinates the module already publishes. No routes, boundaries, control or activity are drawn.

What this system is

Leviathan, Tamar and Karish supply Israel's power system and exported 13.2 bcm in 2024, about 10 bcm to Egypt and 3.1 bcm to Jordan, on Natural Gas Authority figures. Each regional war since 2023 has shut fields for weeks, and the 2025 Leviathan–Egypt deal raises what a shut-in costs.

The physical basis of the module's one economic channel that runs from Israel outward: gas that keeps Israel's grid running and ties Egypt's and Jordan's energy supply to Israeli decisions. Because the fields are offshore and within range in every regional war, the system turns each war into an energy shortfall in three countries.

Confidence: High As of 2026-07Reviewed 2026-10-12

The system

Overview
Israel produced 27.38 bcm of gas in 2024 from three offshore fields and exported 49% of it: 13.2 bcm on the Natural Gas Authority's figure (the ministry gives 13.11 bcm), up from 11.6 bcm in 2023, about 10 bcm to Egypt and about 3.1 bcm to Jordan. Leviathan, the largest, is the export field; its partners put its capacity at about 14 bcm a year after a third gathering line, where Argus gives 12 bcm a year nameplate. Tamar is operated by Chevron and Karish by Energean. The Leviathan–Egypt agreement signed on 7 August 2025 covers about 130 bcm through 2040, worth up to about $35 billion, in two phases: about 20 bcm once new Israeli transmission and the third Leviathan line are complete, raising exports from about 4.7 to 6.7 bcm a year, and about 110 bcm, around 12 bcm a year, tied to the Nitzana line and the field's expansion, expected in the second half of 2029.
Current state · as of 2026-07
All three fields were producing as of April 2026. Leviathan returned to regular production on 2 April 2026 and Karish was fully operational on 13 April after a 41-day shut-in; Energean cut its 2026 production guidance to 130–140 thousand barrels of oil equivalent a day. The export permit for the Egypt agreement was approved on 17 December 2025, and in July 2026 the trade press reported new transmission paving the way for higher exports to Egypt. Actual 2026 export volumes were not verified.
Documented exposure
At the level the energy ministry and the operators publish: shut-in and restart dates, production guidance, export totals and agreement terms. No field is recorded as struck; no installation-level detail is published here.
Commodities and outputs
Natural gas

Nodes

The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.

Routes and operators

Supply systems running through it

  • East Mediterranean gas exportsGas & LNG · 3 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the recordIsrael's offshore gas powers its own grid and supplies Egypt and Jordan, and every war since 2023 has switched part of it off.

Organisations that run it

  • ChevronEnergy company · ActiveThe operator of Israel's Tamar gas field, ordered to shut it on 9 October 2023 as a security measure and to restart it in November 2023.
  • EnergeanEnergy company · ActiveThe operator of Israel's Karish gas field, shut for 41 days in 2026 and restarted on 9 April, after which the company cut its 2026 production guidance.

Dependencies and constraints

Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.

Depends onDocumented Confidence: High

Export markets in Egypt and Jordan. Nearly half of 2024 production was exported, about 10 bcm to Egypt and about 3.1 bcm to Jordan, on Natural Gas Authority figures. The importers depend on the fields in turn: when Leviathan and Karish were shut in 2026, Egypt's first-quarter LNG imports tripled year on year on Kpler data reported by Argus.

Sources: Globes (Israeli business daily, English edition)↗ · Argus Media — energy market reporting↗

Depends onDocumented Confidence: High

Shut-in orders from the energy ministry. Every wartime halt so far was a precautionary order — Tamar in October 2023 because it lay within rocket range of Gaza, Leviathan and Karish in June 2025 and February 2026 at the start of the wars with Iran — and every restart waited for the ministry's clearance.

Sources: Reuters↗ · S&P Global Commodity Insights↗ · Argus Media — energy market reporting↗ · MEES — Middle East Economic Survey↗

Recent structural changes

2026-02-28Closure Confidence: High

Leviathan and Karish were shut when the war with Iran began (the war is recorded by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module). Energean and the press date both halts to 28 February; Argus dates the ministry's order on Leviathan to 2 March.

Sources: Argus Media — energy market reporting↗ · MEES — Middle East Economic Survey↗ · East Mediterranean gas operators and partners — statements (Chevron, NewMed Energy, Energean)

What remains unknown

  • Actual export volumes to Egypt and Jordan in 2026 were not verified, and no 2025 annual export total was found.
  • No Tamar shut-in was found for June 2025 or February 2026; whether it produced throughout is not confirmed by a dated source.
  • The operator of Leviathan is not stated in the evidence read for this pass, so no operator edge is authored for it.

Readings the evidence also supports

  • The shut-ins measure the state's precaution as much as the threat: no field was struck, and a less cautious order would have kept exports flowing through the same wars.

Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.

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Assessed as of — 2026-07 Last reviewed — 2026-10-12