此系統是什麼
Leviathan, Tamar and Karish supply Israel's power system and exported 13.2 bcm in 2024, about 10 bcm to Egypt and 3.1 bcm to Jordan, on Natural Gas Authority figures. Each regional war since 2023 has shut fields for weeks, and the 2025 Leviathan–Egypt deal raises what a shut-in costs.
The physical basis of the module's one economic channel that runs from Israel outward: gas that keeps Israel's grid running and ties Egypt's and Jordan's energy supply to Israeli decisions. Because the fields are offshore and within range in every regional war, the system turns each war into an energy shortfall in three countries.
信心：高 截至2026-07檢視於2026-10-12
系統
- 概覽
- Israel produced 27.38 bcm of gas in 2024 from three offshore fields and exported 49% of it: 13.2 bcm on the Natural Gas Authority's figure (the ministry gives 13.11 bcm), up from 11.6 bcm in 2023, about 10 bcm to Egypt and about 3.1 bcm to Jordan. Leviathan, the largest, is the export field; its partners put its capacity at about 14 bcm a year after a third gathering line, where Argus gives 12 bcm a year nameplate. Tamar is operated by Chevron and Karish by Energean. The Leviathan–Egypt agreement signed on 7 August 2025 covers about 130 bcm through 2040, worth up to about $35 billion, in two phases: about 20 bcm once new Israeli transmission and the third Leviathan line are complete, raising exports from about 4.7 to 6.7 bcm a year, and about 110 bcm, around 12 bcm a year, tied to the Nitzana line and the field's expansion, expected in the second half of 2029.
- Current state · as of 2026-07
- All three fields were producing as of April 2026. Leviathan returned to regular production on 2 April 2026 and Karish was fully operational on 13 April after a 41-day shut-in; Energean cut its 2026 production guidance to 130–140 thousand barrels of oil equivalent a day. The export permit for the Egypt agreement was approved on 17 December 2025, and in July 2026 the trade press reported new transmission paving the way for higher exports to Egypt. Actual 2026 export volumes were not verified.
- Documented exposure
- At the level the energy ministry and the operators publish: shut-in and restart dates, production guidance, export totals and agreement terms. No field is recorded as struck; no installation-level detail is published here.
- Commodities and outputs
- 天然氣
節點
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- 利維坦氣田礦區 · 廣泛區域
The export field; shut 28 February or 2 March 2026 (sources differ), regular production again from 2 April.
- 卡里什氣田礦區 · 廣泛區域
Shut 41 days in 2026, restarted 9 April and fully operational 13 April.
- 塔馬爾氣田礦區 · 廣泛區域
Shut from 9 October to 13 November 2023, the Gaza war's gas shut-in.
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- 東地中海天然氣出口Gas & LNG · 3 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the record以色列的離岸天然氣供應其本國電網，並供應埃及與約旦，而自2023年以來的每一場戰爭都使其中一部分停擺。
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
Export markets in Egypt and Jordan. Nearly half of 2024 production was exported, about 10 bcm to Egypt and about 3.1 bcm to Jordan, on Natural Gas Authority figures. The importers depend on the fields in turn: when Leviathan and Karish were shut in 2026, Egypt's first-quarter LNG imports tripled year on year on Kpler data reported by Argus.
Shut-in orders from the energy ministry. Every wartime halt so far was a precautionary order — Tamar in October 2023 because it lay within rocket range of Gaza, Leviathan and Karish in June 2025 and February 2026 at the start of the wars with Iran — and every restart waited for the ministry's clearance.
New transmission for the Egypt agreement. The first phase depends on an Israeli Ashdod–Ashkelon transmission line and Leviathan's third gathering line, the second on the Nitzana line and the field's expansion; the agreement's volumes cannot move until they exist.
The Egypt agreement's 130 bcm and $35 billion are terms, not deliveries, and no actual 2026 export volume was verified.
Each regional war so far has produced a shut-in of weeks, not days — about five weeks for Tamar in 2023 and for Leviathan in 2026, 41 days for Karish in 2026 — so supply to Egypt and Jordan is interrupted for a matter of weeks whenever the region escalates.
Karish restarted after 41 days and was reported fully operational on 13 April; Energean cut its 2026 guidance to 130–140 thousand barrels of oil equivalent a day.
Leviathan returned to regular production after restart clearance on 31 March, on NewMed's account via Argus; flows to Jordan and Egypt resumed.
Leviathan and Karish were shut when the war with Iran began (the war is recorded by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module). Energean and the press date both halts to 28 February; Argus dates the ministry's order on Leviathan to 2 March.
The Israeli government approved the export permit for the Leviathan–Egypt agreement.
The Leviathan partners signed an agreement to supply Egypt with about 130 bcm through 2040, worth up to about $35 billion, in two phases. An announcement and a contract, not a delivery.
Leviathan and Karish were shut at the start of the June war with Iran (recorded by Vigil's Iran–Gulf module); surplus exports to Egypt and Jordan restarted on 20 June, and the fields reopened after the ceasefire, around 24–25 June.
Chevron was ordered to shut Tamar as a security measure; Leviathan kept running and exports were rerouted via Jordan. The restart was ordered on 9 November, announced on 13 November, and flows to Egypt resumed on 14 November 2023.
Economic exposures it underlies
仍然未知的事項
- Actual export volumes to Egypt and Jordan in 2026 were not verified, and no 2025 annual export total was found.
- No Tamar shut-in was found for June 2025 or February 2026; whether it produced throughout is not confirmed by a dated source.
- The operator of Leviathan is not stated in the evidence read for this pass, so no operator edge is authored for it.
證據同樣支持的其他解讀
- The shut-ins measure the state's precaution as much as the threat: no field was struck, and a less cautious order would have kept exports flowing through the same wars.
列出這些解讀，是因為該紀錄本身的評估並非其來源所允許的唯一評估 — 而不是對上述評估的保留。
在探索中開啟互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。
評估截至 — 2026-07 最近檢視 — 2026-10-12