ACMAT Bastion
Armoured personnel carrierWheeled armoured personnel carrier of the army’s convoy and intervention units — protection against the war’s defining threat, the roadside bomb.
- Origin
- France
- Relevant to
- Mali
Major publicly documented systems relevant to the conflicts Vigil covers — a representative catalogue, not an exhaustive order of battle. One record per system: a system used in more than one conflict is shown against each module it is relevant to, never duplicated. Reviewed systems carry full profiles; the rest are structured stubs awaiting research.
35 full profiles · 33 partial · 104 stubs pending research · across 5 modules
Wheeled armoured personnel carrier of the army’s convoy and intervention units — protection against the war’s defining threat, the roadside bomb.
The standard Soviet-pattern eight-wheeled armoured personnel carrier — mobile, lightly protected, and still the default troop carrier of the armies that inherited or bought it.
The French infantry’s wheeled workhorse throughout Serval and Barkhane.
The ubiquitous mechanised-infantry workhorse on both sides of the front.
The most consequential Western infantry fighting vehicle of the war — protection and firepower that crews publicly credit with keeping them alive.
Wheeled infantry fighting vehicles that gave the French intervention its protected punch on the long desert axes.
Two fighters, one rifle, one motorcycle: the insurgency’s unit of manoeuvre, and the capability government motorcycle bans have tried and failed to suppress.
The pickup truck with a heavy weapon is the true main combat system of the Sahel war — on every side.
The principal Western-donated main battle tank family in Ukrainian service.
The American main battle tank in Ukrainian service — a small fleet whose political weight exceeds its battlefield mass.
The backbone of Ukraine's tank fleet — designed, built and overhauled in Kharkiv.
Core mechanised firepower fielded by both sides — one family record, two operators.
Russia's most modern tank in series production — priority equipment for its best formations, and a priority trophy when captured.
Mine-protected vehicles of MINUSMA contingents — the shape of a mission that fought, above all, the roadside bomb.
A Soviet amphibious scout car of 1960s design — long out of production, still in service across multiple wars from refurbished stock.
The standard Russian self-propelled 152 mm howitzer of the war — the workhorse of the artillery arm the invasion was built around.
Ukraine's domestically produced NATO-calibre howitzer — the symbol of its wartime artillery industry.
The French wheeled 155 mm howitzer — shoot-and-scoot survivability that kept it in the counter-battery fight where towed guns could not live.
The ubiquitous Soviet 122mm towed howitzer — simple, cheap and exported everywhere; the baseline of tube artillery in most armies that field it.
Truck-mounted rocket artillery in small numbers — area fires with all the accuracy problems that implies in a war among civilians.
Precision deep-strike rocket artillery that reshaped Russian logistics in 2022.
The upper tier of Ukraine's air defence — the system publicly credited with its routine ballistic-missile intercepts over the cities.
The upper layer of Taiwan's air and missile defence, and a central component of the integrated air-defence programme the 2026 special budget was written to fund.
The Soviet long-range SAM that anchored Armenian air defence — and whose documented destruction by drones in 2020 became the era's defining image of legacy air defence meeting the loitering-munition age.
Russia's premier strategic air-defence system — documented defending Crimea and the border regions throughout the war, and a priority target for Ukrainian deep strikes.
Taiwan's indigenous surface-to-air missile family — the domestically controlled element of its layered air defence, and the core of the integrated air-defence concept publicised as "T-Dome".
Twin 23mm cannon — nominally anti-air, in practice the heaviest direct-fire weapon on both sides’ gun trucks.
US-donated light surveillance aircraft from the pre-coup partnership era; current serviceability unclear.
Ukraine's first Western fighter — an air-defence workhorse and integration milestone rather than the silver bullet once advertised.
Taiwan's principal fighter and the aircraft most often meeting reported PLA activity — significant here as the visible instrument of a daily attrition problem, not as a war-winning capability.
A modernised bomber lineage used principally as a missile carrier — and one of the most politically legible aircraft in the theatre, because its appearance on a flight is itself a signal.
Taiwan's domestically developed fighter — militarily a capable second-tier type, and historically significant as the product of an arms embargo that forced self-reliance.
A heavy multirole fighter, and the type most frequently named in Taiwanese reporting of aircraft detected around the island — the workhorse of the routine pressure activity.
China's low-observable fighter — significant less for any single engagement than for what its production rate says about the trajectory of the regional air balance.
Jet trainers pressed into light-attack service, part of the 2022 Russian delivery packages.
The Soviet-era fighter fleet of Mali’s Cold War alignment — long inoperable, a reminder that the Russian relationship is a return, not a novelty.
The third type in Taiwan's 1990s fighter acquisition — capable in the interception role, and the clearest illustration of the sustainment cost of operating a small fleet of a type few others fly.
The strike aircraft of Serval and Barkhane — precision air power that the post-French order has not replaced.
The Soviet “flying tank” — a rugged, heavily armoured close-support jet built to operate low, from rough fields, and absorb hits.
The workhorse of the Russian glide-bomb campaign.
Russia's premier attack helicopter — from the Hostomel air assault to the standoff tank-killing screen that blunted the 2023 counteroffensive.
The Soviet gunship that outlived its era — armour, heavy firepower and a troop bay, flown in escort and fire-support roles decades after its designers expected.
The most widely used military helicopter ever built — assault transport, resupply and medevac, and the only way into places roads cannot safely reach.
European transport helicopters that gave MINUSMA its medevac and mobility edge — capabilities that left with them.
Light attack helicopters of the opening intervention — one crew took the first French loss of Serval in January 2013.
Barkhane’s attack helicopter — escort and strike across the Liptako until the 2022 withdrawal.
The naval strike drone credited with driving the Black Sea Fleet from the northwestern Black Sea.
Commercial quadcopters for reconnaissance, propaganda filming and, increasingly, improvised attack — the Ukraine playbook arriving in the Sahel at village scale.
The eyes of Russian artillery — the war's most ubiquitous reconnaissance drone, produced and expended in the thousands.
Heavy Turkish strike drone — a step up from the TB2 in payload and reach, and the aircraft whose loss to Algerian air defence ruptured Mali–Algeria relations.
The early-war icon whose strike role faded as Russian air defence coalesced — a case study in how fast adaptation cycles run in this war.
The defining weapon of the war's attritional phase — a category, not a model.
The loitering munition that announced the drone era in the Caucasus — Azerbaijani Harops destroyed Armenian air defences in 2016 and 2020, four years before the same technique became universal in Ukraine.
The mass one-way attack drone of the strategic strike campaign.
Russia's counter-battery loitering munition of choice — the standing threat to any gun, radar or air-defence vehicle within tens of kilometres of the front.
The largest coast guard vessels in the world — and arguably the most strategically effective platforms in this entire module, precisely because they are not warships.
Taiwan's indigenous submarine programme — an unusually ambitious industrial undertaking whose strategic value is genuinely disputed among analysts.
A small, fast, heavily armed catamaran corvette — the physical expression of Taiwan's shift from a few large warships toward many small ones.
China's largest and most capable surface combatant — significant primarily as evidence of shipbuilding capacity, which is the more consequential fact.
Large amphibious vessels — the ship class most often cited in invasion discussion, and one where the analytically interesting point runs against the popular framing.
The explosive threat that outlives the war twice over: remnant ISIS cells' roadside and vehicle-borne devices in the east, and fourteen years of mines and unexploded ordnance contaminating return areas nationwide — among the world's worst casualty environments for civilians, per demining organisations.
A capability-level record only: roadside and vehicle-borne bombs are the instrument that made Mali’s roads the front line. This record deliberately contains no technical detail.
The workhorse short-range ballistic missile of the strike campaign — and the hardest routine target Ukraine's air defences face.
The land-based conventional missile capability that features in every assessment of the regional balance — recorded here as a broad category only, with no targeting-relevant detail.
A large US coastal-defence missile order that became the test case for whether American arms actually arrive on schedule — the supply-chain question at the centre of the alliance-credibility file.
Taiwan's indigenous anti-ship missile family — the clearest expression of a sea-denial strategy, and the capability class most consistently recommended by advocates of asymmetric defence.
The domestically built anti-ship missile that sank the Moskva — since evolved into a land-attack weapon reaching deep into Russian rear areas.
The cheap wing-and-satnav kit that turned Russia's Soviet dumb-bomb stockpile into a standoff siege weapon — arguably its most consequential adaptation of the war.
Reactivated — limited use.
Ukraine operates captured examples in limited numbers.
Not presented as fielded equipment; conflict use not verified.
Reactivated from storage — limited/second-line use.
Reactivated T-62M/MV in second-line use.
Limited conflict use — status to be verified.
Integration category — Western missiles on Soviet launchers; not a single model.
Donated; operational status must be dated and sourced before promotion.
Planned donation — future capability, not currently fielded.
Limited, largely standoff employment — conflict use reported not confirmed at scale.
Distinguish sea trials, commissioning and operational status before promotion.
Kalibr-capable; Caspian and Black Sea strike role.
Black Sea Fleet flagship, lost April 2022 — recorded as a loss entry, never as active.
Individual losses (e.g. Saratov, Novocherkassk) recorded and dated separately.
Documented conflict-use claims must be sourced.
Supplied to Russia from 2023–24 and documented via debris analysis. Individual model identifications (KN-23-type) only where specifically sourced — the family record deliberately avoids per-model claims.
No systems match this filter set.