Armenia
Armenian Armed Forces
The national military of Armenia — rebuilt around the lessons of the 2020 defeat, under a state repositioning its security away from a frozen Russian alliance.
Context, not targeting. This atlas describes structure and history. It deliberately excludes current locations, live strength, unit movements and anything operationally sensitive — the content model has no fields for them. Branch depth reflects what can be established from public sources, not the size, capability or importance of a force: a thin branch means a state publishes little, and record counts are never a measure of strength.
Current state
Records assessed as of 2026-08
How the forces on each side are organised — formations, lineage and subordination, never locations or strength.
Armenia
The national military of Armenia — rebuilt around the lessons of the 2020 defeat, under a state repositioning its security away from a frozen Russian alliance.
Armenia
The border troops of Armenia's National Security Service — the structure responsible for a frontier of which two of four sections are closed, and one of the few places in Europe where a neighbouring state's border guards have long served alongside the host's own.
Azerbaijan & partners
The national military of Azerbaijan — the region's best-funded force, proven in 2020 and 2023, built on oil revenue, Turkish partnership and Israeli precision systems.
Azerbaijan & partners
Azerbaijan's separate border agency, responsible for the undelimited frontier with Armenia and for the crossings that any future transport arrangement would run through — which makes it a party to the delimitation process rather than only a policing body.
Azerbaijan & partners
The gendarmerie-type force of the Ministry of Internal Affairs — outside the armed forces, holding the internal-security and rear-area role, and the structure that took over policing in the former Karabakh territory after 2023; authored so the Azerbaijani security structure is complete, at structural level only.
Azerbaijan & partners
Türkiye's security relationship with Azerbaijan — the Shusha Declaration alliance framework, joint exercises, training and defence-industrial ties that were decisive in 2020. Structural description of a partnership, not a deployed force.
Georgia
Georgia's national military — NATO-partnered and Western-trained through two decades, under a government whose westward orientation is now in question.
Georgia
Georgia's border agency under the Interior Ministry, responsible for the international frontiers and — in practice though not in law — for policing the administrative boundary lines with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where most recorded detentions occur.
De facto & historical entities
The armed and interior structures of the de facto Abkhaz authorities — built in the 1992–93 war, operating alongside a Russian garrison whose presence defines the entity's security. Internationally, the territory is recognised as part of Georgia.
De facto & historical entities
The small armed and interior structures of the de facto South Ossetian authorities — closely integrated with the Russian garrison and, under the May 2026 treaty, moving toward formal openness to Russian personnel. Internationally, the territory is recognised as part of Georgia.
De facto & historical entities
The armed force of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian authorities — victorious in the first war, broken in the second, disarmed after the September 2023 offensive and dissolved with the entity it defended. Historical record.
Russia & aligned structures
A navigation grouping, not a command: Russia's publicly documented military presence in the region — the Gyumri base in Armenia, held to 2044; the garrisons in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose legal basis deepened with the May 2026 South Ossetia treaty; the withdrawn Karabakh peacekeepers; and the border-troop arrangement in Armenia, now ended at every checkpoint. Taken together the grouping shows the shape of the change: Russia's presence has contracted where Armenia could end it by agreement and extended where the de facto authorities invited it. Described at structural level only.
External missions
The EU's unarmed civilian monitoring mission, deployed since 2008 with a mandate covering all of Georgia — and denied access, throughout, to the two territories it most needs to see.
External missions
The EU's unarmed civilian monitoring mission on the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan, deployed in February 2023 after the 2022 incursions — mandated to February 2027, with about 165 international observers from 25 member states and Canada, and the international presence that the ending of the Russian border-troop arrangement left as the only one on that frontier.
Structure. Each side is a set of trees: state military, interior forces, and browsing groups. A record marked “Grouping · not a command” exists only so related organisations can be found together — its members do not share a command, and each states its real parent institution.
Record states. A full profile has passed source review. A stub is an honest structural placeholder — name, place in the tree, broad role, and a dated status — awaiting research. Records that cannot yet meet even that threshold are held internally and do not appear on the site at all.
Subordination grades. Parent links are graded:confirmed, reported, disputed,historical, or unknown. Where a current parent cannot be verified — as with brigades amid Ukraine's rolling corps reform — the record says unknown rather than inventing precision.
Lineage, not amnesia. Reorganised, merged or disbanded organisations keep their records, marked with dated predecessor and successor links — Wagner's absorption after 2023 and the Donetsk and Luhansk corps are carried this way, never as if unchanged.
Every record carries a status as of date for its claims and a separate reviewed date for editorial checks — a review never silently refreshes a status date.