ACMAT Bastion
Armoured personnel carrierWheeled armoured personnel carrier of the army’s convoy and intervention units — protection against the war’s defining threat, the roadside bomb.
- Origin
- France
- Relevant to
- Sahel
No inventories. The catalogue records what systems are and how their presence is evidenced — never quantities, availability, readiness or current allocations. Future and pledged systems are marked distinctly and hidden by default.
104 documented records across 6 modules
58 full, 46 under review. 101 further systems indexed as stubs. Grades, dates and sources are on each record.
Wheeled armoured personnel carrier of the army’s convoy and intervention units — protection against the war’s defining threat, the roadside bomb.
The standard Soviet-pattern eight-wheeled armoured personnel carrier — mobile, lightly protected, and still the default troop carrier of the armies that inherited or bought it.
The French infantry’s wheeled workhorse throughout Serval and Barkhane.
The ubiquitous mechanised-infantry workhorse on both sides of the front.
The most consequential Western infantry fighting vehicle of the war — protection and firepower that crews publicly credit with keeping them alive.
Wheeled infantry fighting vehicles that gave the French intervention its protected punch on the long desert axes.
Two fighters, one rifle, one motorcycle: the insurgency’s unit of manoeuvre, and the capability government motorcycle bans have tried and failed to suppress.
The pickup truck with a heavy weapon is the true main combat system of the Sahel war — on every side.
The principal Western-donated main battle tank family in Ukrainian service.
The American main battle tank in Ukrainian service — a small fleet whose political weight exceeds its battlefield mass.
The backbone of Ukraine's tank fleet — designed, built and overhauled in Kharkiv.
Core mechanised firepower fielded by both sides — one family record, two operators.
Russia's most modern tank in series production — priority equipment for its best formations, and a priority trophy when captured.
Mine-protected vehicles of MINUSMA contingents — the shape of a mission that fought, above all, the roadside bomb.
A Soviet amphibious scout car of 1960s design — long out of production, still in service across multiple wars from refurbished stock.
The standard Russian self-propelled 152 mm howitzer of the war — the workhorse of the artillery arm the invasion was built around.
Ukraine's domestically produced NATO-calibre howitzer — the symbol of its wartime artillery industry.
The French wheeled 155 mm howitzer — shoot-and-scoot survivability that kept it in the counter-battery fight where towed guns could not live.
The ubiquitous Soviet 122mm towed howitzer — simple, cheap and exported everywhere; the baseline of tube artillery in most armies that field it.
Truck-mounted rocket artillery in small numbers — area fires with all the accuracy problems that implies in a war among civilians.
Precision deep-strike rocket artillery that reshaped Russian logistics in 2022.
The wheeled rocket launcher that gave Taiwan a mobile long-range fires capability it did not previously have — and the clearest single measure of whether US arms transfers are actually arriving.
The Indian rocket artillery system Armenia bought in its first post-2020 arms package from Delhi — the counter-battery and deep-fires capability the 2020 war showed the army lacked, sourced from a supplier chosen for not being Russia.
The Indian medium-range air-defence system that is the first foreign export of the type and the clearest single object of Armenia's post-2020 supplier realignment — a replacement for the Russian layer the drones destroyed, bought from a country that had never sold Armenia anything before 2020.
The Israeli medium-range air-defence system that modernised Azerbaijan's ground-based defence in the years before 2020 — the layer that, together with the S-300, meant Armenia's small air arm played almost no part in the war.
Iran's domestically built long-range air-defence system — developed after the S-300 sale was frozen in 2010 and fielded beside the S-300PMU-2 that eventually arrived, and the clearest statement of the Air Defence Force's claim to self-sufficiency.
The German-supplied medium-range layer — the system Ukraine relies on against cruise missiles, sitting between cheap counter-drone defences and the scarce anti-ballistic tier.
The three-tier shield — Iron Dome against rockets and drones, David's Sling against medium-range threats, Arrow against ballistic missiles in and beyond the atmosphere — that engaged the Iranian retaliation of both wars, and the most tested multi-layer missile defence in the world.
The upper tier of Ukraine's air defence — the system publicly credited with its routine ballistic-missile intercepts over the cities.
The other half of Ukraine's medium-range layer — a ground-launched system firing air-to-air missiles, used against cruise missiles and drones rather than against ballistic threats.
The upper layer of Taiwan's air and missile defence, and a central component of the integrated air-defence programme the 2026 special budget was written to fund.
The Soviet long-range SAM that anchored Armenian air defence — and whose documented destruction by drones in 2020 became the era's defining image of legacy air defence meeting the loitering-munition age.
Russia's premier strategic air-defence system — documented defending Crimea and the border regions throughout the war, and a priority target for Ukrainian deep strikes.
The phased-array radar that gives Taiwan its ballistic-missile warning — the origin of every published figure for how many minutes the island would have.
The upper tier of the Gulf's missile defence — the American system that intercepts ballistic missiles in their terminal phase at altitudes Patriot cannot reach, first used in combat by the Emirates in 2022 and deployed across the region as the 2026 war made the layer necessary.
Taiwan's indigenous surface-to-air missile family — the domestically controlled element of its layered air defence, and the core of the integrated air-defence concept publicised as "T-Dome".
The Russian short-range air-defence system that is the Ground Forces' standard point-defence layer in the war against Ukraine — and, in Armenian service, the survivable layer of the country's air defence: bought before 2020, credited with some of the few Armenian drone intercepts of the war, and retained under the post-war rebuild alongside the Indian and French systems bought to replace what was lost.
Twin 23mm cannon — nominally anti-air, in practice the heaviest direct-fire weapon on both sides’ gun trucks.
US-donated light surveillance aircraft from the pre-coup partnership era; current serviceability unclear.
Taiwan's airborne radar picket — a handful of aircraft carrying the only sensor that can see beyond the island's horizon, and therefore a capability whose small number is itself the analytical point.
The PLA's standard airborne radar aircraft — the thing that makes a package of fighters into a system, and the aircraft type whose presence changes what a day's activity around Taiwan actually means.
The French fighter through which Qatar and the Emirates diversified away from American types — and, in the Emirati case, the largest single export order the aircraft has had.
The European fighter that four Gulf air forces chose as their second supplier — the political hedge, in aircraft form, against dependence on a single ally.
The heavy American fighter that is the common thread of the region's most capable air forces — the Saudi F-15SA, the Qatari F-15QA and the Israeli F-15I — and the type most associated with strike at the ranges this system is fought across.
Ukraine's first Western fighter — an air-defence workhorse and integration milestone rather than the silver bullet once advertised.
Taiwan's principal fighter and the aircraft most often meeting reported PLA activity — significant here as the visible instrument of a daily attrition problem, not as a war-winning capability.
Israel's stealth fighter, modified to an Israeli specification — the aircraft most associated in reporting with the deep strikes on Iran in 2024, 2025 and 2026, and with the December 2024 campaign that destroyed most of Syria's air defences and aircraft in days.
A modernised bomber lineage used principally as a missile carrier — and one of the most politically legible aircraft in the theatre, because its appearance on a flight is itself a signal.
Taiwan's domestically developed fighter — militarily a capable second-tier type, and historically significant as the product of an arms embargo that forced self-reliance.
The fighter force the Shah bought and the revolution kept — F-14s, F-4s and F-5s flying half a century on, with Soviet types added and a domestic reverse-engineering industry behind them — recorded as one capability because its analytical meaning is the whole fleet's obsolescence, not any type's characteristics.
A heavy multirole fighter, and the type most frequently named in Taiwanese reporting of aircraft detected around the island — the workhorse of the routine pressure activity.
China's low-observable fighter — significant less for any single engagement than for what its production rate says about the trajectory of the regional air balance.
Jet trainers pressed into light-attack service, part of the 2022 Russian delivery packages.
The Soviet-era fighter fleet of Mali’s Cold War alignment — long inoperable, a reminder that the Russian relationship is a return, not a novelty.
The third type in Taiwan's 1990s fighter acquisition — capable in the interception role, and the clearest illustration of the sustainment cost of operating a small fleet of a type few others fly.
The strike aircraft of Serval and Barkhane — precision air power that the post-French order has not replaced.
The Soviet “flying tank” — a rugged, heavily armoured close-support jet built to operate low, from rough fields, and absorb hits.
The workhorse of the Russian glide-bomb campaign.
The Russian multirole fighter that is a mainstay of the Aerospace Forces' war against Ukraine — and, in a fleet of four, the only modern fighter Armenia has ever operated, bought in 2019 and by published accounts unused in the 2020 war for want of the missiles to arm it, now the subject of an Indian-assisted upgrade discussion that says more about Armenia's supplier realignment than about the aircraft.
Russia's premier attack helicopter — from the Hostomel air assault to the standoff tank-killing screen that blunted the 2023 counteroffensive.
The Soviet gunship that outlived its era — armour, heavy firepower and a troop bay, flown in escort and fire-support roles decades after its designers expected.
The most widely used military helicopter ever built — assault transport, resupply and medevac, and the only way into places roads cannot safely reach.
European transport helicopters that gave MINUSMA its medevac and mobility edge — capabilities that left with them.
Light attack helicopters of the opening intervention — one crew took the first French loss of Serval in January 2013.
Barkhane’s attack helicopter — escort and strike across the Liptako until the 2022 withdrawal.
A large transport and tanker aircraft — unglamorous, and among the more meaningful indicators in the theatre, because reach depends on refuelling and airlift far more than on fighters.
The naval strike drone credited with driving the Black Sea Fleet from the northwestern Black Sea.
Commercial quadcopters for reconnaissance, propaganda filming and, increasingly, improvised attack — the Ukraine playbook arriving in the Sahel at village scale.
The eyes of Russian artillery — the war's most ubiquitous reconnaissance drone, produced and expended in the thousands.
The uncrewed aircraft that circle Taiwan and appear by type in its daily detection reports — the cheapest way to sustain pressure, and the one a fighter scramble answers least well.
Heavy Turkish strike drone — a step up from the TB2 in payload and reach, and the aircraft whose loss to Algerian air defence ruptured Mali–Algeria relations.
The early-war icon whose strike role faded as Russian air defence coalesced — a case study in how fast adaptation cycles run in this war.
The defining weapon of the war's attritional phase — a category, not a model.
The loitering munition that announced the drone era in the Caucasus — Azerbaijani Harops destroyed Armenian air defences in 2016 and 2020, four years before the same technique became universal in Ukraine.
The mass one-way attack drone of the strategic strike campaign.
The cheap expendable strike systems Taiwan's asymmetric-defence advocates argue for most consistently — and, for the first time, a category where procurement is visibly following the argument.
Russia's counter-battery loitering munition of choice — the standing threat to any gun, radar or air-defence vehicle within tens of kilometres of the front.
The American destroyer that is the Gulf's actual missile-defence-at-sea — the Aegis ships that have intercepted Houthi missiles and drones in the Red Sea since 2023 and Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Israel, and the vessels behind the naval interdiction of Iranian exports in 2026.
The largest coast guard vessels in the world — and arguably the most strategically effective platforms in this entire module, precisely because they are not warships.
Iran's domestically built midget submarines of North Korean lineage — small, numerous, shallow-water boats designed for the strait itself rather than for the open sea, and the underwater counterpart of the Guard Navy's small-craft mass.
Taiwan's indigenous submarine programme — an unusually ambitious industrial undertaking whose strategic value is genuinely disputed among analysts.
The hundreds of fast, small, missile- and rocket-armed craft that are the Guard Navy's method — swarming boats built for a narrow, shallow, crowded sea in which mass and dispersion matter more than tonnage, and the vessels behind every tanker seizure and harassment incident reported in the Gulf.
The three Russian-built boats acquired in the 1990s — the only conventional submarines of consequence in the Gulf's littoral states, and the Artesh Navy's most survivable and least visible asset, whose condition after three decades and two wars is not established.
Small purpose-built minelayers — the Republic of China Navy's first, and the most literal expression of a denial strategy in the whole Taiwanese inventory.
The domestically built light frigates that carry the Artesh Navy's outward-facing role — the ships that make its long-range deployments and naval diplomacy possible — and the class most concerned by United States claims in March 2026 to have destroyed much of Iran's regular surface fleet.
A small, fast, heavily armed catamaran corvette — the physical expression of Taiwan's shift from a few large warships toward many small ones.
The PLA Navy's general-purpose frigate, and the class that does most of the routine work around Taiwan — the ordinary ship, which is why it matters more than the impressive ones.
China's largest and most capable surface combatant — significant primarily as evidence of shipbuilding capacity, which is the more consequential fact.
The PLA Navy's amphibious workhorse — less discussed than the big assault ships and considerably more relevant to how amphibious lift actually works.
Large amphibious vessels — the ship class most often cited in invasion discussion, and one where the analytically interesting point runs against the popular framing.
Cheap propeller-driven drones built to destroy other drones — the layer that let Ukraine answer mass with mass instead of spending scarce missiles on cheap targets.
The explosive threat that outlives the war twice over: remnant ISIS cells' roadside and vehicle-borne devices in the east, and fourteen years of mines and unexploded ordnance contaminating return areas nationwide — among the world's worst casualty environments for civilians, per demining organisations.
A capability-level record only: roadside and vehicle-borne bombs are the instrument that made Mali’s roads the front line. This record deliberately contains no technical detail.
The capability most discussed and least used in the Gulf: a stock of naval mines, estimated in the low thousands in published assessments that disagree widely, and the small craft and submarines to lay them — a threat that has shaped the strait's insurance and routing for four decades without once closing it.
The workhorse short-range ballistic missile of the strike campaign — and the hardest routine target Ukraine's air defences face.
The land-based conventional missile capability that features in every assessment of the regional balance — recorded here as a broad category only, with no targeting-relevant detail.
A large US coastal-defence missile order that became the test case for whether American arms actually arrive on schedule — the supply-chain question at the centre of the alliance-credibility file.
Taiwan's indigenous anti-ship missile family — the clearest expression of a sea-denial strategy, and the capability class most consistently recommended by advocates of asymmetric defence.
The shore- and craft-launched anti-ship missiles — Chinese C-802 derivatives produced domestically, joined by an anti-ship ballistic missile — that give Iran's coast a reach across the whole strait, and whose Houthi derivatives have been fired at merchant ships in the Red Sea.
The medium-range families — liquid-fuel descendants of the North Korean Nodong and Iran's own solid-fuel designs — that give the Aerospace Force reach to Israel and to every Gulf state, and whose numbers and accuracy are the most contested figures in the module.
The solid-fuel short-range families that account for most of what Iran fires — road-mobile, quick to launch, and improved generation by generation from a 2000s rocket into precision-guided missiles with ranges published in the hundreds of kilometres.
The Israeli quasi-ballistic missile that gave Azerbaijan a precision deep-strike capability in 2020 — used, on Baku's own footage, against the bridge on the Armenian supply route into Karabakh — and the other half, with the drones, of the Israeli contribution to the 2020 outcome.
The domestically built anti-ship missile that sank the Moskva — since evolved into a land-attack weapon reaching deep into Russian rear areas.
The cheap wing-and-satnav kit that turned Russia's Soviet dumb-bomb stockpile into a standoff siege weapon — arguably its most consequential adaptation of the war.
Reactivated — limited use.
Ukraine operates captured examples in limited numbers.
Not presented as fielded equipment; conflict use not verified.
Reactivated from storage — limited/second-line use.
Reactivated T-62M/MV in second-line use.
Limited conflict use — status to be verified.
Integration category — Western missiles on Soviet launchers; not a single model.
One of two system families identified as carrying the anti-ballistic layer, with Patriot. Deployed quantity not established; the SAMP/T NG variant is reported as a future delivery and must not be recorded as fielded.
Donated; operational status must be dated and sourced before promotion.
Planned donation — future capability, not currently fielded.
Limited, largely standoff employment — conflict use reported not confirmed at scale.
Distinguish sea trials, commissioning and operational status before promotion.
Kalibr-capable; Caspian and Black Sea strike role.
Black Sea Fleet flagship, lost April 2022 — recorded as a loss entry, never as active.
Individual losses (e.g. Saratov, Novocherkassk) recorded and dated separately.
Documented conflict-use claims must be sourced.
Supplied to Russia from 2023–24 and documented via debris analysis. Individual model identifications (KN-23-type) only where specifically sourced — the family record deliberately avoids per-model claims.
No systems match the current filters.
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