Context, not targeting. This atlas describes structure and history. It deliberately excludes current locations, live strength, unit movements and anything operationally sensitive — the content model has no fields for them. Branch depth reflects what can be established from public sources, not the size, capability or importance of a force: a thin branch means a state publishes little, and record counts are never a measure of strength.
The new national military being assembled since January 2025 from the victorious factions, HTS-derived formations, integrating SDF divisions and vetted personnel — replacing the dissolved Assad-era army rather than inheriting it. Described at structural level only.
The national land force the Ministry of Defence has assembled since January 2025 from the factions that won the war — some twenty numbered divisions built on those factions and deployed to their regions of origin, grouped in June 2026 into five regional corps, with the former SDF brigades inside one division; described at corps and division level and never below.
Land · under Syrian state forces (Ministry of Defence)
The corps for the east — Deir ez-Zor, al-Bukamal, Raqqa, Hasakah and the Iraqi border — grouping the 42nd, 66th, 72nd and 86th Divisions, commanded by a former HTS eastern-sector commander, and the corps into whose area the January 2026 fighting brought the Arab-majority northeast.
The HTS-based division of the east, stood up in spring 2025 for the Euphrates valley and the Iraqi border — the formation through which the victorious faction's own fighters, rather than its Turkish-backed allies, hold a share of Deir ez-Zor under the eastern corps, whose commander is the division's own.
The eastern division commanded by Abu Hatem Shaqra, whose Turkish-backed Ahrar al-Sharqiya faction carries the abuse record of the 2019 Peace Spring operation — assigned to Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah, the region its fighters come from and the region the January 2026 fighting brought to the state.
The corps for Aleppo, Afrin, Manbij and the Turkish border — the 60th, 62nd, 76th and 80th Divisions, three of them built from Turkish-backed factions, commanded by a former Nusra and HTS Aleppo-sector commander, and the corps that inherits the northern zones Türkiye's operations created.
The division into which the Syrian Democratic Forces' brigades were integrated under the January 2026 agreement — the Hasakah, Derik and Qamishli brigades, per the ministry's own announcement — and therefore the formation in which the northeast's Kurdish-led force now exists inside the state.
The division built mostly from the Turkish-backed Sultan Suleiman Shah Division — the faction known as the Amshat, whose commander was sanctioned for abuses in Afrin — assigned to Hama, where most of its fighters originate, and filed under the northern corps by the compilations.
The corps for Homs, Hama and the desert — the 40th, 52nd, 54th and 82nd Divisions, commanded by a former Nusra and HTS senior commander, and the corps whose area holds the Badia where the ISIS remnant lives and the airbases Israel struck in 2025.
The southern division built from the National Liberation Front and the Daraa factions of the 2024 southern operations room — assigned to Daraa by the division listings and to the central corps by the corps mapping, a discrepancy this record carries rather than resolves.
The corps for the capital and the south — Damascus, Rif Dimashq, Daraa, Quneitra and the Israeli and Lebanese borders — the 44th, 64th and 70th Divisions, commanded by a founder of Nusra with Turkish citizenship, and the corps whose area is the Israeli security negotiation and the Sweida impasse.
The division for the eastern Damascus countryside, built from Jaysh al-Islam — the faction that ruled Douma and the Eastern Ghouta until 2018, spent years displaced in the north under Turkish patronage, and returned to its home ground as a division of the new army.
The corps for Latakia, Tartus, Jableh and the Alawite mountains — the 50th, 56th, 74th and 84th Divisions, commanded by a former Nusra and HTS commander of the north-western sectors, and the corps whose area is the coast of the March 2025 massacres and of the Russian bases.
The air arm the transitional state is rebuilding from almost nothing — the Assad-era fleet and most of its air defences were destroyed by Israel in the days after Damascus fell — with a first class of cadets graduated in July 2026, restored Su-22s flying in August, and an Israeli strike on the base they flew from days later.
Air · under Syrian state forces (Ministry of Defence)
The Islamist armed movement that ruled Idlib, led the offensive that toppled the Assad government, and dissolved itself into the new state in January 2025 — the institutional predecessor of the transitional government's core forces. Historical record.
Volunteer / irregular · under Syrian state forces (Ministry of Defence)
The transitional state's interior security structures — successor space to the Assad era's police and feared intelligence branches, rebuilt around the General Security Service, and the destination of the Asayish under the integration agreement's interior file. Structural description only.
The Kurdish-led, multi-ethnic force that defeated the ISIS caliphate — commanded by Mazloum Abdi, integrating into the Ministry of Defence under the January 2026 agreement as one division formed from three SDF brigades, with a Kobani brigade attached to an Aleppo-affiliated division. Structural level only.
The Kurdish militia core of the SDF — the YPG and its women's units, the YPJ — rooted in the PYD movement family. Türkiye considers them a PKK extension and demands their dissolution; the units reject the equation. Component and historical context.
Volunteer / irregular · under Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Status uncertainProfile under reviewAs of 2026-08→
The SDF's Arab-majority regional council for Deir ez-Zor — the structure through which the Kurdish-led force held the Euphrates valley after 2017, and whose tribal components defected in the January 2026 fighting, taking the Arab-majority east out of the SDF and into the state. Historical record.
The Autonomous Administration's internal security force — police, checkpoints and detention responsibilities across the northeast for a decade, including guard roles in the ISIS detention system. Entering Interior Ministry structures under the January 2026 agreement. Structural description only.
Türkiye's military presence in northern Syria since 2016 — the garrisons, observation arrangements and patronage structures built through operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring, now recalibrating around partnership with the transitional government. Broad structural description only.
The factions organised under Turkish patronage from 2016 as the "Syrian National Army" — garrison and administration forces of the northern zones with a heavily documented abuse record in Afrin, now folding unevenly into the new national military. Structural level only.
Volunteer / irregular · under Turkish Armed Forces — northern Syria role
The Turkish field army headquartered at Malatya whose area is the Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian frontiers — the command whose corps conducted Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring and hold the garrisons inside northern Syria, and the state organisation behind Türkiye's presence in the module.
Land · under Turkish Armed Forces — northern Syria role
The Druze-led armed factions of Sweida province — local self-defence structures hardened by the July 2025 violence into the de facto security authority of most of the province, outside state control and without unified command. Structural description only; listing is description, not recognition.
The consolidated armed body of Sweida's Druze factions, formed on 23 August 2025 under Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri from some thirty to forty factions — the force holding most of the province outside state authority, and the one that fought the Interior Ministry's forces again on 31 August 2026.
Volunteer / irregular · under Sweida Druze factions
The oldest and, for a decade, the largest of Sweida's Druze factions — founded in 2013 to keep the community's sons out of the Assad-era army, a long-time opponent of merging under al-Hijri, which joined his National Guard in August 2025 after a leadership change; whether it remained inside it a year later is something sources differ on, and the status is recorded as uncertain for that reason.
Volunteer / irregular · under Sweida Druze factions
Status uncertainProfile under reviewAs of 2026-08→
The insurgent remnant of the Islamic State after the 2019 territorial defeat — desert cells and attack networks concentrated in Deir ez-Zor and the central Badia, reduced and recalibrating since the January 2026 settlement of the east.
The US military presence that anchored the anti-ISIS campaign and the SDF partnership from 2015 — ended with the handover of the last major base to the Syrian government on 16 April 2026. Historical record, broad structural level only.
Russia's remaining publicly documented presence — the Khmeimim air base and the Tartus naval facility, hubs of the 2015–2024 intervention — whose future the memorandum of 9 August 2026 settled: civilian facilities to Syrian management, military ones repurposed as joint training centres within three months. Broad structural level only; no current dispositions represented.
The Aerospace Forces' expeditionary air group at Khmeimim — the base the 2015–2024 intervention was flown from, contracted onto after the government it defended fell, and now to be repurposed as a joint training centre under the memorandum of 9 August 2026.
The Russian Navy's material-technical support point at Tartus — a berth and a depot rather than a fleet base, Russia's only Mediterranean naval foothold, whose commercial berth passes to Syrian management and whose military facility becomes a training centre under the August 2026 memorandum.
Israel's regional posture bearing on Syria — the strike campaign of December 2024, presence in and beyond the Golan buffer zone, and recurring operations in the south alongside the security negotiation. Broad strategic description only; no positions or operational detail represented.
The IDF regional command for the Lebanese and Syrian fronts — the command whose forces entered the Golan buffer zone and positions beyond it in December 2024 and have operated in southern Syria since, and the organisation that executes the Israeli posture this module records above it.
Land · under Israeli military posture toward Syria
The Northern Command's territorial division for the Golan Heights — the formation holding the Syrian front, whose area since December 2024 includes the buffer zone and the positions beyond it, and the IDF formation most directly party to the southern security file.
A navigation grouping, not a command: the Iranian-coordinated militia, logistics and financing structures of the Assad era — Hezbollah's Syrian role, aligned foreign militias, the Iraq–Lebanon corridor — dismantled or dispersed since December 2024, with residual smuggling and cell activity reported by the Syrian government, Israel and others and hard to verify. Each element's real parent institutions differed; historical and strategic scale only.
Joint
Status uncertainProfile under reviewAs of 2026-06→
An Aleppo division built from Syrian National Army factions — one of the Turkish-backed formations grouped under the northern corps in June 2026, whose area is Aleppo, Afrin, Manbij and the Turkish border; its first recruit intake graduated at the Aleppo military academy in July 2025, and its commander changed later that year.
An Aleppo division built from Syrian National Army and National Liberation Front factions — the second of the northern corps' Turkish-backed formations, sharing with the 76th an area of Aleppo, Afrin, Manbij and the Turkish border, and with it the state's inheritance of the northern zones; its commander is reported to come from the Nour al-Din al-Zenki lineage.
One of the four divisions the June 2026 reorganisation grouped under the western and coastal corps, whose area is Latakia, Tartus, Jableh and the Alawite mountains — the region where UN investigators found members of interim-government forces among the perpetrators of the March 2025 violence; its origin faction and commander are not established in the compilation this atlas relies on.
A naval service in name — the Assad-era fleet was destroyed at Latakia by Israeli strikes in December 2024 — whose reconstruction, if any, runs through the Turkish defence agreement and the August 2026 settlement of the Tartus facility's future; status uncertain, and recorded so a reader does not assume a navy exists. No Syrian announcement of a service, commander or structure has been read.
Naval · under Syrian state forces (Ministry of Defence)
Status uncertainStub · pending researchAs of 2026-08→