Campaign

The Lebanon front, 2023–2024

Eleven months of cross-border fire tied to Gaza, then ten weeks of Israeli escalation that broke Hezbollah's leadership and ended in a cessation Hezbollah did not sign.

8 October 2023 – 27 November 2024 Israel–Lebanon / Blue Line

Concluded
Assessed as of
2026-10
Last reviewed
2026-10-12

AssessmentHigh confidence

Context, not targeting. Campaign records describe objectives, participants, phases and outcomes at the level of published analysis; they contain no current positions, force ratios, unit locations or strengths.

Locator — land outline from Natural Earth 110m (public domain); 6 places this record names, at the coordinates the module already publishes. No routes, boundaries, control or activity are drawn.

What this campaign was

The Israel–Hezbollah war from Hezbollah's "support front" of 8 October 2023 to the cessation of 27 November 2024: a year of cross-border fire, then Israel's Northern Arrows campaign and ground operation. It set the terms — arms monopoly, phased withdrawal — that carried into 2026.

The campaign broke the linkage between the Lebanon front and Gaza that Hezbollah had maintained for a year, removed much of its senior leadership, and produced the 2024 cessation — the text whose terms the Lebanese cabinet decisions of 2025 and the 2026 instruments carried forward. The five positions Israel retained after February 2025 became Hezbollah's stated reason not to disarm and Lebanon's first demand in every later round.

Confidence: High As of 2026-10Reviewed 2026-10-12

Summary

Hezbollah began firing on Israeli positions in the Shebaa Farms area on 8 October 2023, stating it acted in support of Gaza. Nearly a year of cross-border exchanges followed, and communities on both sides of the Blue Line were evacuated. In September 2024 Israel's security cabinet made the return of northern residents a war aim, and on 23 September Israel launched an air campaign across Lebanon under the name "Northern Arrows". Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli strike in Beirut's southern suburbs on 27 September, and Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon began on 1 October, which the IDF described as limited and targeted. The United States and France announced a cessation of hostilities effective 27 November 2024, under which Lebanon undertook to confine arms to official forces, starting south of the Litani, and Israel to withdraw within 60 days as the Lebanese army deployed, with a US-chaired Mechanism to monitor it. Hezbollah was not a party.

Stated objectives

What the participants say. Each entry cites where the position was stated; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.

Primary forces

  • IDF Northern Command Primary force · Confidence: High · as of 2024-11

    The IDF regional command responsible for the Lebanon front throughout.

Opposing forces

  • Hezbollah's military organisation Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2024-11
  • Radwan Force Opposing force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2024-09

    Named in IDF statements as the target of the 20 September 2024 strike in Beirut's southern suburbs that killed the Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Aqil, whose death Hezbollah acknowledged. Its structure and strength are not established in open sources and are not described here.

Supporting & external

  • 91st Galilee Division Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2024-10

    The territorial division on the Lebanon border; held the line during the year of cross-border fire and began operations inside Lebanon in early October 2024, according to IDF statements.

  • 98th Division Supporting force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2024-10

    Reported by the IDF among the first formations in the ground operation from 1 October 2024.

  • 36th Division Supporting force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2024-10

    Reported by the IDF as joining the ground operation in early October 2024.

  • 146th Division Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2024-10

    The IDF announced on 8 October 2024 that the 146th, a reserve division, had begun operations in southern Lebanon — the first reserve division to do so in that campaign.

  • Israeli Air Force Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2024-11

    Northern Arrows opened as an air campaign across Lebanon on 23 September 2024. No strike-target detail is carried.

Affected parties

  • United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Affected party · Confidence: High · as of 2024-11

    Deployed between the Blue Line and the Litani throughout. UNIFIL reported its positions hit and peacekeepers injured during the ground operation in October 2024. The cessation of November 2024 placed it in the Mechanism.

  • Lebanese Armed Forces Affected party · Confidence: High · as of 2024-11

    Not a party to the fighting; lost personnel to Israeli strikes during the campaign, and under the cessation became the force meant to deploy south of the Litani as Israel withdrew.

Phases

8 October 2023 – September 2024 Confidence: High

Hezbollah's support front

Hezbollah opened fire on 8 October 2023, stating it acted in support of Gaza. Nearly a year of cross-border exchanges followed, largely within the border belt, and communities on both sides of the Blue Line were evacuated, which made their return a war aim and a negotiating term.

Sources: Statements by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and allied armed organisations · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Reuters↗

23 September – 26 November 2024 Confidence: High

Northern Arrows and the ground operation

Israel launched an air campaign across Lebanon on 23 September 2024 under the name "Northern Arrows". Hassan Nasrallah was killed on 27 September, and ground operations in southern Lebanon began on 1 October, which the IDF described as limited, targeted and geographically confined.

Sources: Israel Defense Forces — Spokesperson's Unit announcements↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Reuters↗

27 November 2024 – 18 February 2025 Confidence: High

The cessation and the positions Israel retained

The cessation took effect on 27 November 2024 with a 60-day withdrawal period, later extended to 18 February 2025. Israel then withdrew from most of southern Lebanon but kept five hilltop positions north of the Blue Line, and the UN reports it also maintained two "buffer zones" there.

Sources: Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗ · Israel Defense Forces — Spokesperson's Unit announcements↗

Outcome and present status

Concluded by the cessation of hostilities of 27 November 2024. Hezbollah lost much of its senior leadership and its linkage of the front to Gaza, and the Lebanese state took on an obligation to confine arms to official forces. Israel withdrew in February 2025 except from five positions, and the front reopened in March 2026, when the cessation was overtaken without being formally terminated.

Political implications

A weakened Hezbollah and a new Lebanese government made the 2025 cabinet decisions on the monopoly of arms possible.

Military implications

The cessation's sequence — Lebanese deployment matched by Israeli withdrawal under a US-chaired monitor — is the template the 2026 Framework reworked.

What remains unknown

  • Whether the cessation's disarmament obligation covers all of Lebanon or only the area south of the Litani is disputed between Israel and Hezbollah.
  • Casualty figures for the period vary between Lebanese, Israeli and UN sources and are not combined in this record.
  • The full order of battle on either side is not published; the formations named are those named in official statements.

Readings the evidence also supports

  • The cessation can be read as Hezbollah's defeat on the front it opened, or as a pause that left both its arms north of the Litani and its political position intact. The record of 2025–2026 is consistent with elements of both.

Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.

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Assessed as of — 2026-10 Last reviewed — 2026-10-12

Connected records

15 records that this campaign names, or that name it — every one an explicit reference in a published record, nothing inferred from subject matter.