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Coverage · Levant

Relationship record

Egypt and the Levant → Israel and the Levant

Egypt's gas imports from Israel's offshore fields — expanded by a $35bn deal in December 2025, interrupted on the first day of the 2026 war.

Economic dependency Since 2020-01

Active
Assessed as of
2026-04
Last reviewed
2026-10-11

AssessmentModerate confidence

A described arrangement, not a rating. Vigil publishes no measure of how strong, warm or hostile a relationship is, and no relationship on this site carries a score, a trend or a direction of travel. What is recorded is what the arrangement covers, when it began, what has changed it, and how firmly each of those is established.

Egypt and the LevantEconomically dependent onIsrael and the LevantRelied on economically by
In short

Egypt imports gas from Israel's Leviathan and Tamar fields. A deal for about 130 bcm through 2040 won Israeli approval in December 2025. When Israel shut Leviathan and Karish on 28 February 2026, the shortfall reached Egypt's grid — the dependency the war made visible.

Israel and the Levant relied on economically by Egypt and the Levant. A directional arrangement: the two parties do not hold the same position in it. Authored once and read from both ends.

The arrangement

Status
ActiveIn force and operating. Says nothing about how well it is working, or about which way it is heading.Last material change: 2025-12-17.
What it covers
EnergyTradeInfrastructureCategories the arrangement is documented to include. Not a measure: a relationship covering more of them is described in more detail, not held more firmly.

Summary

Israeli gas has flowed to Egypt since 2020. In August 2025 the Leviathan partners agreed with Egyptian buyers to supply about 130 bcm through 2040, worth about $35bn: a first phase of 20 bcm from 2026, and a second of 110 bcm that depends on expanding Leviathan's output. Israel's government approved the export on 17 December 2025. On 28 February 2026, the opening day of the war with Iran, Israel shut the Leviathan and Karish fields as a precaution; Leviathan restarted after about a month. Power shortfalls were reported in Egypt and Jordan, which both import Israeli gas. The same precaution had shut the fields during the June 2025 war.

Why it matters

Egypt is a ceasefire guarantor and Gaza's southern neighbour, and it also depends on Israeli gas that Israel switches off when it is attacked. The dependency runs through every regional escalation, and it is one reason Cairo's interest in stability on Israel's fronts is material as well as political.

Related events

What remains unknown

  • The supply contract is commercial and unpublished; the volumes and value are those reported at signature.
  • Whether Karish restarted after April 2026, and whether the fields were shut again later in the war, is not established.
  • The scale of Egypt's dependence relative to its other sources, including liquefied gas imports, is not measured here.

Readings the evidence also supports

  • The shutdowns can be read as evidence of Egypt's exposure, or as the reason Egypt diversifies its supply; the record states the dependency and its interruption, not its future weight.

Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.

All Levant relationships Open in Explore

Sensitivity: public-contextual Confidence: Moderate Sources: Israeli government statements and documents (PMO, MFA, Ministry of Defense)↗ · Established international media reporting · Established historical record Methodology Corrections

Assessed as of — 2026-04 Last reviewed — 2026-10-11