Formations

The state military establishment — army, air force, national guard and gendarmerie — under the transitional military government.

The land force — the bulk of the FDS, carrying the war in every region.

A small but consequential air arm — the drone and strike capability that changed the northern war in 2023.

Burkina Faso’s state-armed civilian auxiliary force — created by law in 2020, central to the government’s “total war” since 2022, and the subject of a documented record of abuses against Fulani communities.

The Wagner Group’s Mali deployment, 2021–2025 — the junta’s first Russian partner, reorganised into the Africa Corps.

The Russian defence ministry’s expeditionary force in Mali — successor to the Wagner deployment since June 2025, fighting alongside the FDS.

The unified Azawad separatist movement formed in November 2024 from the CMA’s components; holder of Kidal since April 2026.

The al-Qaeda-aligned insurgent coalition formed in 2017 under Iyad Ag Ghaly — the strongest non-state force in the war.

JNIM’s central-Mali wing under Amadou Koufa — the engine of the insurgency’s spread into the centre, west and south.

The Islamic State’s Sahel province — a separate project from JNIM and at war with it; strongest in the tri-border zone.

France’s Sahel-wide counterterrorism operation, 2014–2022 — left Mali in August 2022 and ended that November.

The UN stabilisation mission in Mali, 2013–2023 — the organisation’s deadliest of its era, expelled at Bamako’s demand.

Territorial and camel-corps force with a defence-ministry mandate — historically the state’s presence in the deep north.

The national armed forces of Burkina Faso — the institution that has produced two coups and governs through the second, fighting an insurgency across most of the country with a mass civilian auxiliary alongside it.

The national armed forces of Niger — the institution that took power in 2023, expelled two Western partners, and in August 2026 fought a mutiny drawn from its own western garrisons.

The confederation's joint military command — inaugurated in December 2025 with a named commander and a stated strength, and not yet observed operating.

Dogon self-defence movement of the Bandiagara plateau — central to the communal dimension of the war, implicated in the Ogossagou massacre.

Imghad Tuareg armed movement founded in 2014 — historically Bamako’s northern proxy against the CMA, later fragmented.

An instructor-scale Russian presence whose announced expansion collapsed — the smallest and least documented of the three Sahel deployments.

The Russian presence at Base 101 in Niamey — officially credited by Moscow with helping repel a jihadist assault, and of unresolved role in a mutiny seven months later.

Coordination framework joining the CMA movements with parts of the Platform, 2021–2024 — the war-fighting coalition that lost Kidal and won Tinzaouatène.

The separatist signatory coalition of the 2015 Algiers Agreement, which governed Kidal de facto for a decade; dissolved into the FLA in 2024.

The secular-nationalist separatist movement that launched the 2012 rebellion and declared Azawad — then lost it to its jihadist allies.

Iyad Ag Ghaly’s movement of the 2012 war — jihadist co-belligerent of the MNLA rebellion, then its expeller; merged into JNIM in 2017.

The Burkinabè-origin jihadist movement that emerged in 2016 and was absorbed into JNIM — the vehicle through which the coalition became a Burkinabè and Nigerien organisation as well as a Malian one.

AQIM offshoot that ruled Gao during the 2012 occupation; both of today’s rival jihadist lineages trace through its remnants.

The French intervention of January 2013 that broke the jihadist occupation of northern Mali; folded into Barkhane in 2014.

Military police force with rural policing and territorial duties under the defence ministry. Its posts are often the state's only armed presence outside the garrison towns — which makes them both the face of state authority in the countryside and among the insurgency's most frequently attacked targets.

A navigation grouping, not a command: armed movements and communal self-defence forces that have fought alongside or in parallel with the state. Each member’s real relationship to the government differs and is stated on its record.

Traditional hunter societies mobilised as village self-defence forces across central and southern Mali — locally organised, without unified command.

The pro-government signatory coalition of the Algiers Agreement, coordinating GATIA and loyalist MAA factions against the CMA.

A navigation grouping, not a command: the Russian deployments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger differ in scale, posture and evidence, and are recorded separately for that reason.

A navigation grouping, not a command: the separatist and allied movements of northern Mali, from the 2012 rebellion through the coalitions to today’s unified FLA. Lineage relationships are stated on each record.

Ifoghas-led movement formed in 2013, drawing heavily on former Ansar Dine members repositioning for the peace process; the strongest CMA component in Kidal.

Arab-community movement that split into CMA-aligned and Platform-aligned factions — a reminder that “Azawad” was never a single community or side. The CMA-aligned faction joined the FLA in 2024.

Daoussahak-based movement of the Ménaka region, split from the MNLA in 2016; best known for fighting Islamic State Sahel in the tri-border zone.

The Saharan command of al-Qaeda’s Maghreb affiliate — kidnap economy, desert logistics and the doctrinal core that trained the 2012 generation; folded into JNIM in 2017.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s formation, merging his katiba with MUJAO remnants; author of the era’s major urban terror attacks (Bamako 2015) before joining JNIM. An ISGS-bound faction split away in 2015.

JNIM unit operating in the Serma forest zone between Mopti and Gao regions — one of the named katibas behind attacks on the RN16 corridor.

A navigation grouping, not a command: the French, UN, European and regional forces of the intervention era, 2013–2024. All are ended or withdrawn from Mali; each record states its own mandate and dates.

European special-operations task force advising Malian units in the Liptako under Barkhane’s umbrella; ended with the French withdrawal in mid-2022.

EU mission that trained a large share of the Malian army from 2013; suspended operational training after the Wagner deployment, its mandate lapsed in May 2024.

Joint counterterrorism force of the five Sahel states. Mali quit in 2022; the framework dissolved in December 2023 after Burkina Faso and Niger followed — succeeded in practice by AES defence cooperation.