此系統是什麼
Around 20 million barrels a day of crude and products moved through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline, roughly a third of global crude trade; every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea with one outlet. Every bypass combined is a 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d ceiling, and gas has no bypass at all.
The physical basis of the module's central finding: that the Gulf's exposure is a matter of outlets and liquefaction, not of oil in the ground, and that the bypass argument which applies to crude in part applies to gas not at all.
信心：高 截至2026-10-01檢視於2026-10-04
系統
- 概覽
- The system runs from the fields — the shared North Dome / South Pars gas field, Saudi and Emirati crude — through processing at Abqaiq and Habshan, liquefaction at Ras Laffan, and the terminals at Ras Tanura, Kharg, Mina al-Ahmadi, Sitra and Mina al-Fahal, every one of which loads into the Gulf. The partial alternatives are the Saudi East–West (Petroline) system to Yanbu, with a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019 that was never a demonstrated sustained rate, and the UAE's ADCOP line to Fujairah at just under 2 million b/d; Iraq's line to Türkiye reopened in September 2025 at a fraction of pre-war exports; Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman have no bypass. Gas is different in kind: Qatar exported close to a fifth of global LNG through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline and has no pipeline and no terminal that avoids the strait, so the constraint is liquefaction rather than the route.
- Current state · as of 2026-10-01
- Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen trains were damaged on 18 March 2026 — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure — with the operator's own repair estimate at up to five years; Qatar's 2026 exports are forecast at roughly half the pre-conflict level. Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity on 10–11 March 2026, and an Iranian drone strike in April temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated handling. In September 2026 Gulf crude exports excluding Iran regained the pre-war level by route rather than by reopening: about 60 per cent crossed the strait on shuttle tankers and the rest left from Fujairah and the Red Sea (Kpler). The East–West line, restarted after the 10 September attack, is estimated at 2 to 2.65 million b/d by trackers, with no operator figure.
- Documented exposure
- At the level the IEA, the EIA and the operators publish: the capacity and ceiling figures above, the share of Qatari export capacity damaged, and the commercial estimate of Yanbu handling. No facility-level state is published here.
- Commodities and outputs
- Crude oil and refined products · Liquefied natural gas · Refined product imports and power fuel
節點
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- 富查伊拉港口
The UAE's outlet beyond the strait, fed by the ADCOP line at just under 2 million b/d of capacity.
- 哈爾克島港口
Iran's principal crude outlet, inside the enclosed sea like every other.
- Ras Laffan港口
The liquefaction and export complex with no substitute; two of fourteen trains damaged in March 2026.
- Ras Tanura港口
Saudi Arabia's principal Gulf terminal, loading into the enclosed sea.
- Sohar港口
- 延布港口
The Red Sea end of the East–West system — the largest partial bypass, and a ceiling rather than a flow.
- Abqaiq工業中心
- 阿布達比原油管線走廊走廊 · 補給與貿易動脈
- 東西向輸油管走廊（Petroline）走廊 · 補給與貿易動脈
- Goreh–Jask輸油管走廊走廊 · 補給與貿易動脈
- Habshan工業中心
- Jask港口
- Jazan煉油廠
- Mina al-Ahmadi港口
- Mina al-Fahal港口
- North Dome / 南帕爾斯氣田礦區 · 廣泛區域
- Duqm港口
- Ruwais煉油廠
- Salalah港口
- Sitra港口
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- 依賴荷莫茲的原油與成品油出口系統Mineral export · 8 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the record七個核心海灣國家中有六個透過此系統將石油送往市場，全部匯聚於一個海峽。
- 卡達液化天然氣出口系統Gas & LNG · 3 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the record本模組中最清晰的依賴關係：接近全球液化天然氣的五分之一、一座綜合設施、一個海峽，且沒有任何具規模的替代方案。
- 沙烏地東西向原油過境運輸Mineral export · 4 nodes · 7 documented disruptions · named by the record現存最大的荷莫茲替代路線，受限於其碼頭而非管線，且通往第二個有爭議的海峽。
- 阿聯的替代出口通道Mineral export · 3 nodes · 1 documented disruption · named by the record唯一直接通往外海的主要繞道路線——比一般認為的小，而且本身也在打擊範圍之內。
- 伊朗原油出口系統Mineral export · 4 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the record海峽內側的單一碼頭，以及一條已建成卻幾乎未被使用的繞道管線。
Organisations that run it
- Saudi AramcoState enterprise · ActiveThe state oil company that operates the East–West pipeline system to Yanbu — the largest of the partial alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz, and a capacity figure rather than a demonstrated sustained rate.
- QatarEnergyState enterprise · ActiveThe state operator of Ras Laffan and of close to a fifth of global LNG supply, every tonne of which leaves through the Strait of Hormuz because no pipeline or alternative terminal exists.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
The Strait of Hormuz. Every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea whose only outlet is the strait; every alternative combined is estimated at 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d against a normal strait volume of about 20 million — a capacity comparison, not a measurement of what moved.
Liquefaction capacity at Ras Laffan. LNG has no pipeline substitute and no alternative terminal; capacity destroyed is capacity destroyed, and no rerouting shortens it.
The East–West pipeline and Yanbu. The largest partial bypass, carrying a 2019 emergency ceiling never demonstrated as a sustained rate; wartime handling at Yanbu is a commercial estimate, of which roughly two thirds feeds Aramco's own Red Sea refineries before export crude can load.
Marine war-risk cover. The mechanism that stopped the traffic: cover, not capacity, decides whether a loaded tanker sails. Documented on the commercial-closure chain.
A second ADCOP line targeting 3.6 million b/d by mid-2027 is a plan, not an asset.
The repair timeline at Ras Laffan is the operator's own estimate; no independent assessment of it was read.
An Iranian drone strike temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated wartime handling.
Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen liquefaction trains were damaged — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure, roughly 12.8 Mtpa — with repairs estimated by the operator at up to five years.
Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity, against a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019.
經由此系統的傳導鏈
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- 荷莫茲中斷與繞道的極限Economic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 合理可信的曝險
- significance 合理可信的曝險
- 卡達液化天然氣與替代方案的缺乏Economic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 已證實
- significance 合理可信的曝險
- 繞道出口與第二個咽喉點Economic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 合理可信的曝險
- significance 合理可信的曝險
- 商業撤出封閉了海峽Economic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 已證實
- significance 已證實
- 電力與供水本是同一體系之處Civilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 合理可信的曝險
- significance 合理可信的曝險
- 受困於無法移動之船隻上的船員Civilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 已證實
- significance 已證實
Watch questions bearing on it
- 荷莫茲海峽是否已恢復商業可用？active · Assessment changed 2026-10-04
- 海灣的固定能源節點，修復速度是否快於再次遭襲的速度？active · Movement observed 2026-10-04
- 海灣的防空與飛彈防禦是否會實現制度性整合？active · No material change 2026-10-04
- 麥加協議是否會成為一個實際運作的防禦機制？active · No material change 2026-10-04
- 沙烏地–胡塞戰線會沉澱為經談判的安排，還是升級為沙烏地在葉門的軍事行動？active · Assessment changed 2026-10-04
- 曼德海峽是否仍可通行？對誰而言？active · Movement observed 2026-10-04
- 誰攻擊了Ras Tanura？active · No material change 2026-10-04
Events at its nodes
Economic exposures it underlies
分析札記
仍然未知的事項
- No sustained wartime throughput for the East–West system has been published; the record carries ceilings and a commercial estimate.
在探索中開啟互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。
評估截至 — 2026-10-01 最近檢視 — 2026-10-04