Ce qu’est ce système
Around 20 million barrels a day of crude and products moved through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline, roughly a third of global crude trade; every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea with one outlet. Every bypass combined is a 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d ceiling, and gas has no bypass at all.
The physical basis of the module's central finding: that the Gulf's exposure is a matter of outlets and liquefaction, not of oil in the ground, and that the bypass argument which applies to crude in part applies to gas not at all.
Confiance : élevée Au 2026-09-22Revu le 2026-10-03
Le système
- Vue d’ensemble
- The system runs from the fields — the shared North Dome / South Pars gas field, Saudi and Emirati crude — through processing at Abqaiq and Habshan, liquefaction at Ras Laffan, and the terminals at Ras Tanura, Kharg, Mina al-Ahmadi, Sitra and Mina al-Fahal, every one of which loads into the Gulf. The partial alternatives are the Saudi East–West (Petroline) system to Yanbu, with a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019 that was never a demonstrated sustained rate, and the UAE's ADCOP line to Fujairah at just under 2 million b/d; Iraq's line to Türkiye reopened in September 2025 at a fraction of pre-war exports; Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman have no bypass. Gas is different in kind: Qatar exported close to a fifth of global LNG through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline and has no pipeline and no terminal that avoids the strait, so the constraint is liquefaction rather than the route.
- Current state · as of 2026-09-22
- Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen trains were damaged on 18 March 2026 — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure — with the operator's own repair estimate at up to five years; Qatar's 2026 exports are forecast at roughly half the pre-conflict level. Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity on 10–11 March 2026, and an Iranian drone strike in April temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated handling. The crude-export record was last assessed on 22 September 2026.
- Documented exposure
- At the level the IEA, the EIA and the operators publish: the capacity and ceiling figures above, the share of Qatari export capacity damaged, and the commercial estimate of Yanbu handling. No facility-level state is published here.
- Commodities and outputs
- Crude oil and refined products · Liquefied natural gas · Refined product imports and power fuel
Nœuds
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- FujairahPort
The UAE's outlet beyond the strait, fed by the ADCOP line at just under 2 million b/d of capacity.
- Île de KhargPort
Iran's principal crude outlet, inside the enclosed sea like every other.
- Ras LaffanPort
The liquefaction and export complex with no substitute; two of fourteen trains damaged in March 2026.
- Ras TanuraPort
Saudi Arabia's principal Gulf terminal, loading into the enclosed sea.
- SoharPort
- YanbuPort
The Red Sea end of the East–West system — the largest partial bypass, and a ceiling rather than a flow.
- AbqaiqCentre industriel
- Corridor de l’oléoduc de brut d’Abou DhabiCorridor · artère d’approvisionnement et d’échanges
- Corridor de l’oléoduc est–ouest (Petroline)Corridor · artère d’approvisionnement et d’échanges
- Corridor de l’oléoduc Goreh–JaskCorridor · artère d’approvisionnement et d’échanges
- HabshanCentre industriel
- JaskPort
- JazanRaffinerie
- Mina al-AhmadiPort
- Mina al-FahalPort
- Gisement gazier North Dome / South ParsZone d’extraction · région étendue
- DuqmPort
- RuwaisRaffinerie
- SalalahPort
- SitraPort
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- Système d’exportation de brut et de produits dépendant d’OrmuzMineral export · 8 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the recordLe système par lequel six des sept États centraux du Golfe envoient leur pétrole vers les marchés, convergeant vers un seul détroit.
- Système d’exportation de GNL du QatarGas & LNG · 3 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the recordLa dépendance la plus nette du module : près d’un cinquième du GNL mondial, un complexe, un détroit, et aucune alternative d’envergure.
- Transit saoudien du brut est–ouestMineral export · 4 nodes · 6 documented disruptions · named by the recordLa plus grande alternative à Ormuz qui existe, limitée par son terminal plutôt que par son oléoduc, et débouchant sur un second détroit contesté.
- Accès alternatif des Émirats aux exportationsMineral export · 3 nodes · 1 documented disruption · named by the recordLe seul grand contournement atteignant directement la haute mer — plus modeste qu’on ne le suppose généralement, et lui-même à portée.
- Système d’exportation de brut iranienMineral export · 4 nodes · 2 documented disruptions · named by the recordUn unique terminal à l’intérieur du détroit, et un contournement qui a été construit et n’a pratiquement pas servi.
Organisations that run it
- Saudi AramcoState enterprise · ActiveThe state oil company that operates the East–West pipeline system to Yanbu — the largest of the partial alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz, and a capacity figure rather than a demonstrated sustained rate.
- QatarEnergyState enterprise · ActiveThe state operator of Ras Laffan and of close to a fifth of global LNG supply, every tonne of which leaves through the Strait of Hormuz because no pipeline or alternative terminal exists.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
The Strait of Hormuz. Every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea whose only outlet is the strait; every alternative combined is estimated at 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d against a normal strait volume of about 20 million — a capacity comparison, not a measurement of what moved.
Liquefaction capacity at Ras Laffan. LNG has no pipeline substitute and no alternative terminal; capacity destroyed is capacity destroyed, and no rerouting shortens it.
The East–West pipeline and Yanbu. The largest partial bypass, carrying a 2019 emergency ceiling never demonstrated as a sustained rate; wartime handling at Yanbu is a commercial estimate, of which roughly two thirds feeds Aramco's own Red Sea refineries before export crude can load.
Marine war-risk cover. The mechanism that stopped the traffic: cover, not capacity, decides whether a loaded tanker sails. Documented on the commercial-closure chain.
A second ADCOP line targeting 3.6 million b/d by mid-2027 is a plan, not an asset.
The repair timeline at Ras Laffan is the operator's own estimate; no independent assessment of it was read.
An Iranian drone strike temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated wartime handling.
Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen liquefaction trains were damaged — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure, roughly 12.8 Mtpa — with repairs estimated by the operator at up to five years.
Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity, against a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019.
Chaînes de transmission passant par ce système
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- La perturbation d’Ormuz et les limites du contournementEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Exposition plausible
- significance Exposition plausible
- Le GNL qatari et l’absence d’alternativeEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Confirmé
- significance Exposition plausible
- Le débouché de contournement et le second goulet d’étranglementEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Exposition plausible
- significance Exposition plausible
- Le retrait commercial a fermé le détroitEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Confirmé
- significance Confirmé
- Là où l’électricité et l’eau forment un même systèmeCivilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Exposition plausible
- significance Exposition plausible
- Des équipages à bord de navires qui ne pouvaient pas bougerCivilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Confirmé
- significance Confirmé
Watch questions bearing on it
- Le détroit d’Ormuz est-il de nouveau utilisable commercialement ?active · Assessment changed 2026-09-27
- Les nœuds énergétiques fixes du Golfe sont-ils remis en état plus vite qu’ils ne sont de nouveau frappés ?active · Assessment changed 2026-09-27
- La défense aérienne et antimissile du Golfe devient-elle intégrée sur le plan institutionnel ?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
- L’accord de Makkah devient-il un mécanisme de défense opérationnel ?active · Assessment changed 2026-09-27
- Le front saoudo-houthi se stabilise-t-il en un arrangement négocié, ou débouche-t-il sur une campagne saoudienne au Yémen ?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
- Bab el-Mandeb est-il encore utilisable, et pour qui ?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
- Qui a attaqué Ras Tanura ?active · No material change 2026-09-27
Events at its nodes
Economic exposures it underlies
Notes d’analyse
Actors and arrangements
Ce qui reste inconnu
- No sustained wartime throughput for the East–West system has been published; the record carries ceilings and a commercial estimate.
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Évalué au — 2026-09-22 Dernière revue — 2026-10-03