VIGIL CONSILIUM
Контекст, а не заголовки.
Частину цієї сторінки подано в канонічній англійській версії: її переклад поки що недоступний. Англійська версія

Strategic system · full record

Енергетична система

The Gulf's oil and gas export system — fields, processing, terminals and the pipelines that partially bypass Hormuz — and the one part of it, LNG, that cannot be bypassed at all.

20 published markers 5 supply systems 2 operators

Оцінено станом на
2026-09-22
Востаннє переглянуто
2026-10-03

ОцінкаВпевненість: висока

Context, not targeting. A system record names published markers and published operators and states dependencies at the level a published institution does. It carries no facility-level capacity, vulnerability, protection or repair detail; the schema has no field for any of it.

Локатор — контури суші з Natural Earth 110m (суспільне надбання); місць, які називає цей запис: 20, — за координатами, які модуль уже публікує. Маршрути, кордони, контроль чи активність не нанесено.

Що це за система

Around 20 million barrels a day of crude and products moved through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline, roughly a third of global crude trade; every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea with one outlet. Every bypass combined is a 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d ceiling, and gas has no bypass at all.

The physical basis of the module's central finding: that the Gulf's exposure is a matter of outlets and liquefaction, not of oil in the ground, and that the bypass argument which applies to crude in part applies to gas not at all.

Впевненість: висока Станом на 2026-09-22Переглянуто 2026-10-03

Система

Огляд
The system runs from the fields — the shared North Dome / South Pars gas field, Saudi and Emirati crude — through processing at Abqaiq and Habshan, liquefaction at Ras Laffan, and the terminals at Ras Tanura, Kharg, Mina al-Ahmadi, Sitra and Mina al-Fahal, every one of which loads into the Gulf. The partial alternatives are the Saudi East–West (Petroline) system to Yanbu, with a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019 that was never a demonstrated sustained rate, and the UAE's ADCOP line to Fujairah at just under 2 million b/d; Iraq's line to Türkiye reopened in September 2025 at a fraction of pre-war exports; Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman have no bypass. Gas is different in kind: Qatar exported close to a fifth of global LNG through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline and has no pipeline and no terminal that avoids the strait, so the constraint is liquefaction rather than the route.
Current state · as of 2026-09-22
Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen trains were damaged on 18 March 2026 — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure — with the operator's own repair estimate at up to five years; Qatar's 2026 exports are forecast at roughly half the pre-conflict level. Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity on 10–11 March 2026, and an Iranian drone strike in April temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated handling. The crude-export record was last assessed on 22 September 2026.
Documented exposure
At the level the IEA, the EIA and the operators publish: the capacity and ceiling figures above, the share of Qatari export capacity damaged, and the commercial estimate of Yanbu handling. No facility-level state is published here.
Commodities and outputs
Crude oil and refined products · Liquefied natural gas · Refined product imports and power fuel

Вузли

The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.

Routes and operators

Supply systems running through it

Organisations that run it

  • Saudi AramcoState enterprise · ActiveThe state oil company that operates the East–West pipeline system to Yanbu — the largest of the partial alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz, and a capacity figure rather than a demonstrated sustained rate.
  • QatarEnergyState enterprise · ActiveThe state operator of Ras Laffan and of close to a fifth of global LNG supply, every tonne of which leaves through the Strait of Hormuz because no pipeline or alternative terminal exists.

Dependencies and constraints

Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.

Depends onЗадокументовано Впевненість: висока

The Strait of Hormuz. Every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea whose only outlet is the strait; every alternative combined is estimated at 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d against a normal strait volume of about 20 million — a capacity comparison, not a measurement of what moved.

Джерела: IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

Depends onЗадокументовано Впевненість: помірна

The East–West pipeline and Yanbu. The largest partial bypass, carrying a 2019 emergency ceiling never demonstrated as a sustained rate; wartime handling at Yanbu is a commercial estimate, of which roughly two thirds feeds Aramco's own Red Sea refineries before export crude can load.

Джерела: IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

Depends onЗадокументовано Впевненість: висока

Marine war-risk cover. The mechanism that stopped the traffic: cover, not capacity, decides whether a loaded tanker sails. Documented on the commercial-closure chain.

Джерела: Public market and insurance data · Reuters↗

ОбмеженняЗадокументовано Впевненість: висока

A second ADCOP line targeting 3.6 million b/d by mid-2027 is a plan, not an asset.

Джерела: IEA electricity and energy-security analysis

ОбмеженняОцінено Впевненість: помірна

The repair timeline at Ras Laffan is the operator's own estimate; no independent assessment of it was read.

Джерела: Gulf state official government sources

Останні структурні зміни

2026-03-18Damage Впевненість: висока

Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen liquefaction trains were damaged — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure, roughly 12.8 Mtpa — with repairs estimated by the operator at up to five years.

Джерела: IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · US EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook and Today in Energy↗ · Gulf state official government sources

Ланцюги передачі через цю систему

Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.

Events at its nodes

16 – 24 вер. 2026Велика Британія та Франція виділяють сили для оборони Саудівської Аравії поза будь-яким альянсом22 вер. 2026Трубопровід Схід–Захід, за повідомленнями, знову запущено на низькій потужностівер. 2026; встановлено в повідомленнях 17 – 18 вер.Саудівська нафта повертається через протоку, в обхід якої було побудовано трубопровід13 – 16 вер. 2026Стіл переговорів щодо судноплавства в Ормузі накрито, але за нього не сідають10 вер. 2026Трубопровід Схід–Захід атаковано дронами з Іраку, і його зупинено з обережності8 вер. 2026, з продовженням до 26 вер.Найпотужніша в цьому раунді хвиля атак хуситів на територію Саудівської Аравіїсередина квіт. 2026Починається військово-морське перекриття іранського нафтового експорту18 берез. 2026У Рас-Лаффані пошкоджено дві лінії зрідження2 – 3 берез. 2026Удари по енергетичних і судноплавних цілях у чотирьох державах Затоки2 берез. 2026Саудівська Аравія зупиняє НПЗ у Рас-Тануре після атаки дрона14 вер. 2019Атака на саудівський нафтопереробний об’єкт в Абкайку

Що залишається невідомим

  • No sustained wartime throughput for the East–West system has been published; the record carries ceilings and a commercial estimate.

Відкрити в режимі «Досліджувати» Інтерактивно: виберіть цей запис і простежте, що з ним пов’язано.

Оцінено станом на — 2026-09-22 Востаннє переглянуто — 2026-10-03