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Strategic system · full record

Energiesystem

The Gulf's oil and gas export system — fields, processing, terminals and the pipelines that partially bypass Hormuz — and the one part of it, LNG, that cannot be bypassed at all.

20 published markers 5 supply systems 2 operators

Eingeschätzt zum Stand
2026-09-22
Zuletzt überprüft
2026-10-03

EinschätzungHohe Konfidenz

Context, not targeting. A system record names published markers and published operators and states dependencies at the level a published institution does. It carries no facility-level capacity, vulnerability, protection or repair detail; the schema has no field for any of it.

Übersichtskarte — Landumriss aus Natural Earth 110m (gemeinfrei); 20 Orte, die dieser Eintrag nennt, an den Koordinaten, die das Modul bereits veröffentlicht. Es sind keine Routen, Grenzen, Kontrolle oder Aktivität eingezeichnet.

Was dieses System ist

Around 20 million barrels a day of crude and products moved through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline, roughly a third of global crude trade; every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea with one outlet. Every bypass combined is a 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d ceiling, and gas has no bypass at all.

The physical basis of the module's central finding: that the Gulf's exposure is a matter of outlets and liquefaction, not of oil in the ground, and that the bypass argument which applies to crude in part applies to gas not at all.

Konfidenz: hoch Stand 2026-09-22Überprüft am 2026-10-03

Das System

Überblick
The system runs from the fields — the shared North Dome / South Pars gas field, Saudi and Emirati crude — through processing at Abqaiq and Habshan, liquefaction at Ras Laffan, and the terminals at Ras Tanura, Kharg, Mina al-Ahmadi, Sitra and Mina al-Fahal, every one of which loads into the Gulf. The partial alternatives are the Saudi East–West (Petroline) system to Yanbu, with a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019 that was never a demonstrated sustained rate, and the UAE's ADCOP line to Fujairah at just under 2 million b/d; Iraq's line to Türkiye reopened in September 2025 at a fraction of pre-war exports; Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman have no bypass. Gas is different in kind: Qatar exported close to a fifth of global LNG through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline and has no pipeline and no terminal that avoids the strait, so the constraint is liquefaction rather than the route.
Current state · as of 2026-09-22
Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen trains were damaged on 18 March 2026 — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure — with the operator's own repair estimate at up to five years; Qatar's 2026 exports are forecast at roughly half the pre-conflict level. Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity on 10–11 March 2026, and an Iranian drone strike in April temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated handling. The crude-export record was last assessed on 22 September 2026.
Documented exposure
At the level the IEA, the EIA and the operators publish: the capacity and ceiling figures above, the share of Qatari export capacity damaged, and the commercial estimate of Yanbu handling. No facility-level state is published here.
Commodities and outputs
Crude oil and refined products · Liquefied natural gas · Refined product imports and power fuel

Knoten

The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.

Routes and operators

Supply systems running through it

  • Von Hormus abhängiges Exportsystem für Rohöl und ÖlprodukteMineral export · 8 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the recordDas System, über das sechs der sieben Kern-Golfstaaten ihr Öl auf den Markt bringen, zusammenlaufend in einer Meerenge.
  • Katarisches LNG-ExportsystemGas & LNG · 3 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the recordDie klarste Abhängigkeit im Modul: fast ein Fünftel des weltweiten LNG, ein Komplex, eine Meerenge und keine Alternative von nennenswerter Größe.
  • Saudischer Ost-West-Transit von RohölMineral export · 4 nodes · 6 documented disruptions · named by the recordDie größte existierende Alternative zu Hormus, begrenzt durch ihr Terminal und nicht durch ihre Pipeline, und mündend in eine zweite umkämpfte Meerenge.
  • Alternativer Exportzugang der VAEMineral export · 3 nodes · 1 documented disruption · named by the recordDie einzige große Umgehung, die direkt den offenen Ozean erreicht — kleiner als gemeinhin angenommen und selbst erreichbar.
  • Iranisches RohölexportsystemMineral export · 4 nodes · 2 documented disruptions · named by the recordEin einzelnes Terminal innerhalb der Meerenge und eine Umgehung, die gebaut und kaum genutzt wurde.

Organisations that run it

  • Saudi AramcoState enterprise · ActiveThe state oil company that operates the East–West pipeline system to Yanbu — the largest of the partial alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz, and a capacity figure rather than a demonstrated sustained rate.
  • QatarEnergyState enterprise · ActiveThe state operator of Ras Laffan and of close to a fifth of global LNG supply, every tonne of which leaves through the Strait of Hormuz because no pipeline or alternative terminal exists.

Dependencies and constraints

Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.

Depends onDokumentiert Konfidenz: hoch

The Strait of Hormuz. Every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea whose only outlet is the strait; every alternative combined is estimated at 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d against a normal strait volume of about 20 million — a capacity comparison, not a measurement of what moved.

Quellen: IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

Depends onDokumentiert Konfidenz: mittel

The East–West pipeline and Yanbu. The largest partial bypass, carrying a 2019 emergency ceiling never demonstrated as a sustained rate; wartime handling at Yanbu is a commercial estimate, of which roughly two thirds feeds Aramco's own Red Sea refineries before export crude can load.

Quellen: IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

Depends onDokumentiert Konfidenz: hoch

Marine war-risk cover. The mechanism that stopped the traffic: cover, not capacity, decides whether a loaded tanker sails. Documented on the commercial-closure chain.

Quellen: Public market and insurance data · Reuters↗

BeschränkungEingeschätzt Konfidenz: mittel

The repair timeline at Ras Laffan is the operator's own estimate; no independent assessment of it was read.

Quellen: Gulf state official government sources

Jüngste strukturelle Änderungen

2026-03-18Damage Konfidenz: hoch

Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen liquefaction trains were damaged — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure, roughly 12.8 Mtpa — with repairs estimated by the operator at up to five years.

Quellen: IEA electricity and energy-security analysis · US EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook and Today in Energy↗ · Gulf state official government sources

Übertragungsketten durch dieses System

Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.

Was unbekannt bleibt

  • No sustained wartime throughput for the East–West system has been published; the record carries ceilings and a commercial estimate.

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Eingeschätzt zum Stand — 2026-09-22 Zuletzt überprüft — 2026-10-03