Czym jest ten system
Around 20 million barrels a day of crude and products moved through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline, roughly a third of global crude trade; every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea with one outlet. Every bypass combined is a 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d ceiling, and gas has no bypass at all.
The physical basis of the module's central finding: that the Gulf's exposure is a matter of outlets and liquefaction, not of oil in the ground, and that the bypass argument which applies to crude in part applies to gas not at all.
Pewność: wysoka Stan na 2026-09-22Przejrzano 2026-10-03
System
- Omówienie
- The system runs from the fields — the shared North Dome / South Pars gas field, Saudi and Emirati crude — through processing at Abqaiq and Habshan, liquefaction at Ras Laffan, and the terminals at Ras Tanura, Kharg, Mina al-Ahmadi, Sitra and Mina al-Fahal, every one of which loads into the Gulf. The partial alternatives are the Saudi East–West (Petroline) system to Yanbu, with a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019 that was never a demonstrated sustained rate, and the UAE's ADCOP line to Fujairah at just under 2 million b/d; Iraq's line to Türkiye reopened in September 2025 at a fraction of pre-war exports; Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman have no bypass. Gas is different in kind: Qatar exported close to a fifth of global LNG through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline and has no pipeline and no terminal that avoids the strait, so the constraint is liquefaction rather than the route.
- Current state · as of 2026-09-22
- Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen trains were damaged on 18 March 2026 — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure — with the operator's own repair estimate at up to five years; Qatar's 2026 exports are forecast at roughly half the pre-conflict level. Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity on 10–11 March 2026, and an Iranian drone strike in April temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated handling. The crude-export record was last assessed on 22 September 2026.
- Documented exposure
- At the level the IEA, the EIA and the operators publish: the capacity and ceiling figures above, the share of Qatari export capacity damaged, and the commercial estimate of Yanbu handling. No facility-level state is published here.
- Commodities and outputs
- Crude oil and refined products · Liquefied natural gas · Refined product imports and power fuel
Węzły
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- FudżajraPort
The UAE's outlet beyond the strait, fed by the ADCOP line at just under 2 million b/d of capacity.
- Wyspa CharkPort
Iran's principal crude outlet, inside the enclosed sea like every other.
- Ras LaffanPort
The liquefaction and export complex with no substitute; two of fourteen trains damaged in March 2026.
- Ras TanuraPort
Saudi Arabia's principal Gulf terminal, loading into the enclosed sea.
- SoharPort
- JanbuPort
The Red Sea end of the East–West system — the largest partial bypass, and a ceiling rather than a flow.
- AbqaiqOśrodek przemysłowy
- Korytarz rurociągu naftowego Abu ZabiKorytarz · arteria zaopatrzenia i handlu
- Korytarz rurociągu wschód–zachód (Petroline)Korytarz · arteria zaopatrzenia i handlu
- Korytarz rurociągu Goreh–JaskKorytarz · arteria zaopatrzenia i handlu
- HabshanOśrodek przemysłowy
- JaskPort
- DżazanRafineria
- Mina al-AhmadiPort
- Mina al-FahalPort
- Złoże gazowe North Dome / South ParsObszar wydobycia · szeroki region
- DuqmPort
- RuwaisRafineria
- SalalaPort
- SitraPort
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- System eksportu ropy i produktów zależny od OrmuzuMineral export · 8 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the recordSystem, za którego pośrednictwem sześć z siedmiu kluczowych państw Zatoki wysyła ropę na rynek, zbiegający się w jednej cieśninie.
- Katarski system eksportu LNGGas & LNG · 3 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the recordNajczystsza zależność w module: blisko jedna piąta światowego LNG, jeden kompleks, jedna cieśnina i żadnej alternatywy o istotnej skali.
- Saudyjski tranzyt ropy wschód–zachódMineral export · 4 nodes · 6 documented disruptions · named by the recordNajwiększa istniejąca alternatywa dla Ormuzu, ograniczona przez swój terminal, a nie przez rurociąg, i wychodząca na drugą sporną cieśninę.
- Alternatywny dostęp eksportowy ZEAMineral export · 3 nodes · 1 documented disruption · named by the recordJedyne duże obejście wychodzące bezpośrednio na otwarty ocean — mniejsze, niż się powszechnie zakłada, i samo w zasięgu ataku.
- Irański system eksportu ropyMineral export · 4 nodes · 2 documented disruptions · named by the recordJeden terminal wewnątrz cieśniny i obejście, które zbudowano i prawie nie wykorzystano.
Organisations that run it
- Saudi AramcoState enterprise · ActiveThe state oil company that operates the East–West pipeline system to Yanbu — the largest of the partial alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz, and a capacity figure rather than a demonstrated sustained rate.
- QatarEnergyState enterprise · ActiveThe state operator of Ras Laffan and of close to a fifth of global LNG supply, every tonne of which leaves through the Strait of Hormuz because no pipeline or alternative terminal exists.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
The Strait of Hormuz. Every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea whose only outlet is the strait; every alternative combined is estimated at 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d against a normal strait volume of about 20 million — a capacity comparison, not a measurement of what moved.
Liquefaction capacity at Ras Laffan. LNG has no pipeline substitute and no alternative terminal; capacity destroyed is capacity destroyed, and no rerouting shortens it.
The East–West pipeline and Yanbu. The largest partial bypass, carrying a 2019 emergency ceiling never demonstrated as a sustained rate; wartime handling at Yanbu is a commercial estimate, of which roughly two thirds feeds Aramco's own Red Sea refineries before export crude can load.
Marine war-risk cover. The mechanism that stopped the traffic: cover, not capacity, decides whether a loaded tanker sails. Documented on the commercial-closure chain.
A second ADCOP line targeting 3.6 million b/d by mid-2027 is a plan, not an asset.
The repair timeline at Ras Laffan is the operator's own estimate; no independent assessment of it was read.
An Iranian drone strike temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated wartime handling.
Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen liquefaction trains were damaged — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure, roughly 12.8 Mtpa — with repairs estimated by the operator at up to five years.
Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity, against a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019.
Łańcuchy transmisji przez ten system
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- Zakłócenia w Ormuzie i granice obejściaEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset Potwierdzone
- disruption Potwierdzone
- exposure Wiarygodne narażenie
- significance Wiarygodne narażenie
- Katarski LNG i brak alternatywyEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset Potwierdzone
- disruption Potwierdzone
- exposure Potwierdzone
- significance Wiarygodne narażenie
- Port obejścia i druga wąska cieśninaEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset Potwierdzone
- disruption Potwierdzone
- exposure Wiarygodne narażenie
- significance Wiarygodne narażenie
- Wycofanie się rynku komercyjnego zamknęło cieśninęEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset Potwierdzone
- disruption Potwierdzone
- exposure Potwierdzone
- significance Potwierdzone
- Gdzie energia i woda są jednym systememCivilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset Potwierdzone
- disruption Potwierdzone
- exposure Wiarygodne narażenie
- significance Wiarygodne narażenie
- Załogi na pokładach statków, które nie mogły wypłynąćCivilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset Potwierdzone
- disruption Potwierdzone
- exposure Potwierdzone
- significance Potwierdzone
Watch questions bearing on it
- Czy Cieśnina Ormuz znów nadaje się do użytku komercyjnego?active · Assessment changed 2026-09-27
- Czy stałe węzły energetyczne Zatoki są odbudowywane szybciej, niż są ponownie atakowane?active · Assessment changed 2026-09-27
- Czy obrona powietrzna i przeciwrakietowa Zatoki zostanie zintegrowana instytucjonalnie?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
- Czy Porozumienie mekkańskie stanie się operacyjnym mechanizmem obronnym?active · Assessment changed 2026-09-27
- Czy front saudyjsko-huticki ustabilizuje się w wynegocjowanym układzie, czy przerodzi się w saudyjską kampanię w Jemenie?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
- Czy Bab al-Mandab wciąż nadaje się do użytku i dla kogo?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
- Kto zaatakował Ras Tanurę?active · No material change 2026-09-27
Events at its nodes
Economic exposures it underlies
Actors and arrangements
Co pozostaje nieznane
- No sustained wartime throughput for the East–West system has been published; the record carries ceilings and a commercial estimate.
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Ocena na dzień — 2026-09-22 Ostatni przegląd — 2026-10-03