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Mineral export · supply system

伊朗原油出口系統

海峽內側的單一碼頭,以及一條已建成卻幾乎未被使用的繞道管線。

3次有紀錄的中斷

評估截至
2026-09-30
最後檢視
2026-10-04

評估中等信心

僅限戰略層級。此紀錄描述哪些事物依賴此系統,以及有哪些有據可查的事件曾使其中斷。它不公布運能、班表、車隊組成、護衛安排、儲存或設施細節;替代方案一節說明的是是否存在冗餘——絕不說明應使用哪條路線。

定位圖 — 陸地輪廓取自Natural Earth 110m(公有領域);此紀錄提及的4個地點,標於本模組已公布的座標。圖中未繪製任何路線、邊界、控制範圍或活動。

此系統是什麼

Iran's crude exports are concentrated on Kharg Island inside the Gulf, reported at up to around 90% of the total. The Goreh–Jask line was built to reach the Gulf of Oman and, designed for about a million barrels a day, has been reported carrying under seventy thousand.

This is the fact most often missing from accounts that treat the strait as an Iranian lever: closing it costs Iran its own exports too. Iran holds the same dependence as the states it can constrain, and the bypass it built to escape that dependence has never functioned at a scale that would relieve it.

信心:中等 截至2026-09-30檢視於2026-10-04

系統

概覽
Iran's export position is structurally the same as its neighbours': one principal terminal, inside an enclosed sea, upstream of the Strait of Hormuz. Kharg Island is reported as handling up to around ninety per cent of Iranian crude exports. The Goreh–Jask pipeline was built precisely to change that, reaching a terminal on the Gulf of Oman outside the strait — and it has carried a small fraction of what it was designed for, reported at under seventy thousand barrels a day against a design of about a million, with a single tanker loading at Jask during the 2026 war. Since mid-April 2026 flows from Kharg have been reported disrupted by a naval interdiction of Iranian exports, a military measure distinct from the sanctions architecture that constrains the same system by other means.
依賴它的事物
Near-total on Kharg Island and therefore on the strait. Downstream the dependence is on a single customer: reporting places around ninety per cent of Iranian oil exports as going to China, which is the practical ceiling on what the sanctions architecture achieves.
中斷造成的影響
Iranian export revenue is compressed by two mechanisms operating at once — a restrictive architecture that limits who may buy, and a physical constraint on loading and moving cargo. They are separate causes with separate remedies, and the module does not merge them into a single figure or a single story.
替代方案與冗餘
Nominally the Goreh–Jask route; in practice almost none. The distinction between design capacity and realised capacity is the whole of the finding here, and this module never treats the first as the second. A pipeline that has carried under seven per cent of its design throughput is not a bypass in any operational sense, whatever its nameplate says.

節點

依此紀錄撰寫時的順序排列 — 這是撰寫的次序,而非路線。

  1. 伊朗的主要原油出口碼頭,位於海灣北部。據報處理高達約九成的伊朗原油出口。

    在此系統中據報處理高達約90%的伊朗原油出口。

    為何重要伊朗本身的出口集中度與區域內任何國家一樣極端,其位置也與鄰國相同:位於海灣內側、海峽上游。關閉荷莫茲海峽同樣會限制伊朗的出口——那些把海峽當作伊朗無須付出代價之槓桿的說法,最常遺漏的正是這一事實。

    觀察重點裝載的連續性,以及經由此碼頭與經由任何替代路線運出的伊朗出口各占的比例。

    港口 信心:中等 截至2026-09 在地圖上顯示 →

  2. 從Goreh地區延伸至阿曼灣沿岸Jask的伊朗原油管線系統。這是代表整個系統的單一概略標記,並非其路線的描繪。

    在此系統中代表管線系統的單一概略標記。設計運量約每日1百萬桶;據報實際運量低於每日70,000桶。未繪製路線幾何。

    為何重要伊朗修建這條管線,是為了在荷莫茲海峽以外輸送原油,卻幾乎未曾使用:其設計運量約為每日一百萬桶,據報實際運量不到七萬桶,在2026年戰爭期間僅有一艘油輪在Jask裝載。這是本模組中設計產能不等於可用產能最清楚的案例。

    觀察重點運量是否大幅上升——這是能讓名義上的繞道路線變成真正繞道路線的觀察指標。

    走廊 · 補給與貿易動脈 信心:中等 截至2026-09 在地圖上顯示 →

  3. 伊朗位於阿曼灣、荷莫茲海峽以外的出口碼頭,也是Goreh–Jask管線的向海端。

    在此系統中位於海峽之外。據報在2026年戰爭期間有一艘油輪在此裝載。

    為何重要這是伊朗修建卻未使用的繞道路線。管線設計運量約每日一百萬桶,據報實際運量不到七萬桶,在2026年戰爭期間僅有一艘油輪在此裝載。設計產能與可用產能是不同的量,而此碼頭是本模組中呈現兩者差異最清楚的例子。

    觀察重點Jask的裝載量是否大幅上升——這是能顯示繞道路線由名義變為真實的觀察指標。

    港口 信心:中等 截至2026-09 在地圖上顯示 →

  4. 連接海灣與阿曼灣及外海的水道,由伊朗與阿曼的領海組成。在2025年基準期間,每日約有20百萬桶原油與石油產品通過此處,另有接近全球五分之一的液化天然氣出口。

    在此系統中絕大多數伊朗出口的出口通道。

    為何重要除阿曼以外的每個海灣阿拉伯產油國都必須通過這片水域才能抵達買家,伊朗也是如此。它是該區域出口經濟、以及世界出口經濟中相當大一部分所匯聚的單一節點。其替代路線所承載的量,介於它平常運量的六分之一到四分之一之間,而就液化天然氣而言,替代路線完全無法承載。

    觀察重點商業通行是否大規模恢復,以及依何種保險條件恢復——海峽的可用狀態一直是由商業風險決定,而非由實體封鎖決定。

    海域/海峽 · 廣域背景 信心:高 截至2026-09 在地圖上顯示 →

有據可查的中斷歷史

2026-03-13/14, 2026-04-07武裝攔截 信心:低

據報美國對哈爾克島的打擊以軍事設施為目標,並刻意避開石油與天然氣基礎設施,據報裝載仍在持續。

來源: Established international media reporting

2026-09(截至2026-09-30的統計)武裝攔截 信心:中等

美國中央司令部截至2026年9月30日的數字為:在執行對伊朗港口的封鎖中,已使125艘商船改道、三艘失去作業能力、兩艘遭登臨。業界媒體將該封鎖描述為已恢復實施,而此計數似乎是從恢復實施時起算。其日期在此並未確立,該數字也無法與上文較早的計數相比較,後者維持不變。Kpler分析師報告伊朗正在減產,且不再裝載浮動儲油。

來源: UK Maritime Trade Operations and Joint Maritime Information Center advisories↗ · Public market and insurance data · Established international media reporting

經濟意涵

Export earnings concentrated on one terminal and one customer are unusually sensitive to interruption at either point.

仍然未知的事項

  • Iranian export volumes are disputed. The Congressional Research Service recorded exports exceeding two million barrels a day in early March 2026, while a commercial tracker gives 1.65 to 1.80 million for the same period. Neither is treated as verified and no figure is published on this record as a current flow.
  • The present status of loadings at Kharg is not established.
  • The naval interdiction is reported consistently but has not been confirmed from an official source; the CENTCOM ship and vessel figures are self-reported and carried as such.

證據同樣支持的其他解讀

  • Reduced Iranian exports are consistent with physical interdiction and equally with buyers withdrawing under sanctions pressure. Both operated in the same period and the record attributes observed volumes to neither.

列出這些解讀,是因為該紀錄本身的評估並非其來源所允許的唯一評估 — 而不是對上述評估的保留。

觀察重點

Jask吞吐量

Whether loadings rise materially — the observable that would turn a nominal bypass into a real one.

哈爾克島裝載作業的延續

Whether loadings resume, and whether any resumption reflects an easing of interdiction or of restriction.

在探索中開啟互動式:選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。

評估截至 — 2026-09-30 最近檢視 — 2026-10-04 已在簡報中變更 — 2026-10-04 · 經濟已更新