2026年國家間戰爭

宣示目標

參與方所說的內容。每一條目都註明立場的提出出處；Vigil記錄的是該立場曾被提出，而非其為真。

• United States and Israeli statements have framed the campaign around Iran's nuclear programme, its missile forces and its regional partner networks.

  來源： Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

• Iran has framed its response as retaliation and as pressure on the states hosting the forces conducting the campaign.

  來源： Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz · Al Jazeera English↗

經評估的目標

Vigil的解讀，附等級。在結構上與宣示立場分開，因此評估永遠不會被當作某一方的宣示目標發布。

• The campaign's effects on the regional system are better established than its objectives. Vigil records what has changed and does not characterise what either side is trying to achieve beyond what it says.

  信心：中等 來源： Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

主要部隊

• 美軍中央司令部 主要部隊 · 信心：高 · 截至2026-09

  The command conducting the American campaign. CRS carries CENTCOM's own reporting of the target totals and of the maritime interdiction, naming the command directly. No authorisation for the use of military force was obtained.

• 以色列國防軍 主要部隊 · 信心：中等 · 截至2026-09

  A co-belligerent from the opening day; CRS attributes the killing of Ali Khamenei to Israel. The source names the state, not a service, so the organisational identification is Vigil's. No joint command, shared target selection or unified planning with the United States is asserted anywhere in this module — none is established.

• 以色列空軍 主要部隊 · 信心：中等 · 截至2026-09

  The Israeli service that conducted the opening strike; identification below the state is Vigil's.

• 美國中央空軍司令部 主要部隊 · 信心：中等 · 截至2026-09

  CENTCOM's air component, from whose Gulf bases the campaign's air element is flown; identification below command level is Vigil's.

對立部隊

• 伊斯蘭革命衛隊 對立部隊 · 信心：高 · 截至2026-09

  The Iranian institution that holds the missile and drone programmes and the Gulf maritime mission — the two things Iran has actually done in this war. CRS records US strikes on command and control centres associated with the IRGC specifically.

• 伊朗正規軍 對立部隊 · 信心：中等 · 截至2026-09

  A separate belligerent institution rather than a branch of the same one. US officials claimed the destruction of much of Iran's regular naval surface fleet, which is the Artesh Navy and not the Guard's.

• 伊斯蘭革命衛隊空天軍 對立部隊 · 信心：高 · 截至2026-09

  The service holding the missile and drone programmes that carried the retaliation; the launch aggregate on this campaign is its output.

• 伊斯蘭革命衛隊海軍 對立部隊 · 信心：中等 · 截至2026-09

  The Gulf-facing service whose mission the closure of the strait and the pressure on shipping concern; no specific operation is attributed.

受影響方

• 阿聯武裝部隊 Affected party · Confidence: High · as of 2026-05

  Nearly half of all Iranian launches at the Gulf states were directed at the UAE, making its air and missile defence a continuously engaged function rather than an occasional one.

• 科威特武裝部隊 受影響方 · 信心：中等 · 截至2026-09

  Kuwait reported its air defences engaging drones and missiles during the 1–2 September exchange — the only Gulf state besides the UAE whose forces' own conduct this module has established.

結果與目前狀態

Ongoing at the research cutoff of 4 September 2026, with no agreement in force. Vigil states where the campaign stands and makes no claim about how it ends.

經濟意涵

Production shut-ins peaked above eleven million barrels a day, OECD inventories fell to their lowest level since 2003, and Qatar lost around 17% of its liquefaction capacity for a period its operator estimates at up to five years.

人道意涵

A United States strike on a school at Minab killed 168 people, most of them children, on the opening day. Approximately 20,000 seafarers were stranded aboard vessels unable to move, and the maritime regulator has confirmed 17 seafarer deaths.

關聯事件

地點

本模組已作為地圖標記發布的地點，因戰役與其相關而列出。並非作戰區域。

參考圖層

仍然未知的事項

• Participation is recorded at the level the evidence names. Sources name CENTCOM and the IRGC as organisations, but name Israel and the United States as states elsewhere, so no Israeli or American service appears as a participant and no Iranian service does either — even though the launches are by institutional definition the Revolutionary Guard Aerospace Force's work. That absence is an evidence boundary, not a judgement about who fired.
• Casualty and damage figures from every party are treated as claims. The module publishes no total for either side, and attacker battle-damage assessment is never carried as established damage.
• The memorandum's fourteen reported points have not been read in an official text and are not authored.
• Whether United States and Israeli operations were jointly planned or separately conducted is not established, and no joint command is asserted.
• THE RAS TANURA ATTRIBUTION IS DISPUTED AND THIS MODULE DOES NOT RESOLVE IT. The physical event is confirmed: an interception, a debris fire, a terminal shutdown and a reopening in March 2026. The attribution is not. Saudi Arabia attributed the attack to Iran; Iranian officials publicly denied targeting Gulf energy facilities; and on the same day Iran’s defence ministry reported attacks on Qatari facilities while the Revolutionary Guard claimed a tanker strike, so the Iranian denial was not uniform. No canonical record in this module names an attacker at Ras Tanura as a matter of fact, and the greater detail of one account is not treated as evidence for it.
• THE 1–2 SEPTEMBER CASUALTY CLAIMS ARE DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY AND ARE CARRIED AS THREE SEPARATE CLAIMS, NOT ONE NUMBER. The Revolutionary Guard claimed aircraft destroyed and a large number of United States personnel killed in Jordan; two United States officials told Reuters that initial assessments showed no American casualties, and a United States official told Al Jazeera there were no injuries or significant damage at the Marine facility; Iranian authorities reported civilian deaths from the United States strikes. A denial does not erase a claim and a claim does not survive a denial: both stand, attributed, and no figure from any party is carried as established.
• INTERCEPTION FIGURES ARE ONLY MEANINGFUL WITH THEIR DENOMINATOR, AND THE DENOMINATORS HERE DIFFER. Jordan’s military stated that thirteen ballistic missiles entered its airspace and that it intercepted ten, with the remainder falling on open ground — a count of missiles entering one state’s airspace. The module’s aggregate of more than 6,700 counts LAUNCHES at six states over eleven weeks. These measure different things at different scales and no percentage is calculated across them. Launched, entered airspace, engaged, intercepted, destroyed and impacted are six different quantities and the module never substitutes one for another.
• BATTLE-DAMAGE CLAIMS ARE GRADED AS CLAIMS WHOEVER MAKES THEM. More than ten thousand targets struck, air superiority over vast swaths of Iran, much of Iran’s missile manufacturing capacity destroyed, much of its regular naval surface fleet destroyed, more than 140 ships redirected and nine disabled — every one of these is a participant’s account of its own operations, carried with its attribution and none carried as confirmed damage. The same rule applies to Iranian and Gulf claims. Repetition by other outlets does not promote a claim, and the identity of the speaker does not grade it.

證據同樣支持的其他解讀

• Part of the production shut-in total may reflect demand destruction and voluntary restraint rather than an inability to move cargo. The source attributes the series to the closure; Vigil records that attribution rather than independently establishing the cause of each barrel.

列出這些解讀，是因為該紀錄本身的評估並非其來源所允許的唯一評估 — 而不是對上述評估的保留。