Standing Watch · Demonstration scope

Gulf Energy & Maritime Risk

Commercial access, energy infrastructure and regional security conditions affecting Gulf maritime and energy exposure. A demonstration scope: it shows how Standing Watch organises existing Vigil monitoring around a defined exposure, on the public record, with no organisation represented.

How Standing Watch works

29 places named by this scope's questions — point at a mark to name itMap — Iran–Gulf

Is the Strait of Hormuz commercially usable again?: Movement observed
Is Bab el-Mandeb still usable, and for whom?: No material change
Does the Saudi–Houthi front settle into a negotiated arrangement, or escalate into a Saudi campaign in Yemen?: Movement observed
Are the Gulf's fixed energy nodes being restored faster than they are re-struck?: Movement observed
Does Gulf air and missile defence become institutionally integrated?: No material change
Does the Makkah Agreement become an operational defence mechanism?: Assessment changed

Questions: 6
Module: Iran–Gulf
Cadence: Weekly
Scope reviewed through: 2026-11-01
Current cycle: 2026-11-01
Material changes: 4

Exposure

An organisation whose operations, cargoes, cover or supply run through the Strait of Hormuz, the southern Red Sea or the Gulf's fixed energy nodes — a charterer, an underwriter, an energy trader, a corporate security or country-risk function with Gulf exposure. The questions it has to keep checking are not whether an incident occurred this week, which reporting answers, but whether the conditions that govern usability, restoration and protection have moved — and whether a competent review found that they had not.

Why these questions together

The five questions are one coupled system read from five sides. The strait is closed by the insurance market rather than by a navy, so the first question is whether cover is written on terms charterers take up. The Red Sea route is the Gulf's principal Hormuz alternative and the second question keeps physical access, declared targeting and observed interdiction apart. The fixed energy nodes are what both routes carry, and the third question reads their restoration against the tempo at which they are re-struck. The last two ask whether the protection of all of that is becoming institutional — inside the GCC, and through the Makkah Agreement outside it. Each rests on a canonical Watch record with its own ledger; the scope adds the exposure, the relevance and the portfolio state, and nothing else.

What this scope does not answer

It does not price anything. No war-risk premium, freight rate, insurance multiple or cargo value is published on any question in this scope, and the module states that the pre-war premium baseline required for any such figure does not exist.
It does not cover the land war in Yemen, the nuclear file or the sanctions systems. Those move on different evidence and are read by other questions in the module; a reader whose exposure is to them is reading the wrong scope.
It does not forecast reopening. Every question reads a recorded condition and names the evidence that changes it; none carries a date, a probability or a trajectory for the strait, the coast or the nodes.
Its recorded-activity series count occurrences at published markers and never effect: a week with three records is not a worse week than one with two, and no series in the scope is commensurable with another.

Watch on Iran–Gulf 6 of the module’s active questions are in scope; membership is an editorial decision, recorded on the scope.

Latest review Cycle of 2026-11-01. Outcomes are the questions’ own review outcomes, counted; a question not reviewed in the cycle is shown as pending.

Questions reviewed: 6 of 6
Assessment changed: 1
Movement observed: 3
No material change: 2

Every active question was reviewed in the cycle of 2026-11-01. 1 question changed its assessment, 3 recorded movement, and 2 recorded no material change.

What changed 4 questions recorded material movement — new evidence, a named observable met, or a changed assessment. Each finding is the review’s own; the link is the canonical record.

06Defence mechanism
Does the Makkah Agreement become an operational defence mechanism?
Assessment changed2026-11-01
Observed
The condition still said no text was public, untrue since 20–21 October. Türkiye's Foreign Affairs Commission approved the approval bill on 27 October, and its deputy foreign minister said Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had completed ratification; the bill was not on the General Assembly agenda of 28 October. On 26 October the three signatories sent a joint delegation to Tehran. Not met: implementing-instrument; no invocation or named contribution.
Evidence
Brief itemTürkiye's commission approved the Makkah Agreement, and its three signatories went to Tehran together
04Energy infrastructure
Are the Gulf's fixed energy nodes being restored faster than they are re-struck?
Movement observed2026-11-01
Observed
Movement in reach, unconfirmed: the Houthi movement claimed Ras Tanura on 27 and 29 October, and Bloomberg, citing an unnamed person, reported a fire near the terminal contained on 27 October; no Saudi or Aramco statement was found. No operator restart or repair statement on the east–west pipeline or Ras Laffan for an eighth review.
Evidence
Brief itemThe Houthis claimed Ras Tanura twice, and Riyadh confirmed neither strike
01Maritime access
Is the Strait of Hormuz commercially usable again?
Movement observed2026-11-01
Observed
Tankers were struck in the strait on 28, 29 and 30 October (UKMTO 186-, 187- and 189-26; Oman's account of the RITI), one by explosives a small boat fixed to its hull. The Revolutionary Guard claimed four tankers halted or mined; Central Command said the main routes were cleared. UKMTO counted 277 combined transits in the week to 28 October, about 70% below pre-conflict. No cover written, no régime, IMO unchanged.
Evidence
Brief itemTankers were struck in the strait on three more days, one by explosives fixed to its hull from a small boat
03Red Sea front
Does the Saudi–Houthi front settle into a negotiated arrangement, or escalate into a Saudi campaign in Yemen?
Movement observed2026-11-01
Observed
The Houthi movement claimed Ras Tanura on 27 and 29 October, with Rabigh, Abqaiq and the Riyadh and Dammam airports; Riyadh confirmed none. The coalition reported interceptions towards Riyadh on 29 and 31 October. Egypt's parliament authorised support at the kingdom's request on 26 October. Saudi strikes in Yemen are reported by Houthi media only. No channel act, truce, external strike or Makkah invocation.
Evidence
Brief itemThe Houthis claimed Ras Tanura twice, and Riyadh confirmed neither strike

No material change: 02 Is Bab el-Mandeb still usable, and for whom?05 Does Gulf air and missile defence become institutionally integrated?

Questions under watch 6 canonical Watch questions, in scope order, spanning Maritime access · Red Sea access · Red Sea front · Energy infrastructure · Regional protection · Defence mechanism. The record is the question’s own; the relevance note is the scope’s.All Watch questions

Maritime accessLogistics
Is the Strait of Hormuz commercially usable again?
Cover written on terms charterers take up, the IMO's navigational assessment and the legal régime — three accesses that have moved independently.
Movement observed2026-11-01Moderate confidence
Brief itemTankers were struck in the strait on three more days, one by explosives fixed to its hull from a small boat
Current condition as of 2026-10-11
Closed by judgment, not water: the strait remained physically passable.
Observables 6 named
1. War-risk cover written for Hormuz transits at rates charterers accept
2. Commercial transit counts against the pre-war rate
3. A revised IMO navigational assessment
All 6 observables
1. 2026-09-13: Movement observed
2. 2026-09-20: Assessment changed
3. 2026-09-27: Assessment changed
4. 2026-10-04: Assessment changed
5. 2026-10-11: Assessment changed
6. 2026-10-18: Movement observed
7. 2026-10-25: Movement observed
8. 2026-11-01: Movement observed
2026-09-132026-11-019 reviews since 2026-09-04
Relevance to this scope
The strait's usable state is set by the war-risk market, not by whether a vessel can physically pass, and every export and bypass chain in the Gulf runs through that one condition. For this exposure the observable that matters is cover written on terms charterers actually take up — not an announcement that cover exists and not a single voyage — because that is the point at which routing, rate and shut-in decisions change.
View question Open in Explore
Red Sea accessLogistics
Is Bab el-Mandeb still usable, and for whom?
Observed interference and what actually transits — kept apart from territorial presence on the Yemeni shore and from declared targeting.
No material change2026-11-01Moderate confidence
Weekly BriefIran–Gulf developments — 1 November 2026
Current condition as of 2026-09-12
A declared blockade, a changed shore, no established closure.
Observables 7 named
1. Independently observed interference with a vessel at or near the strait
2. A sustained change in transits through the strait
3. War-risk terms for Bab el-Mandeb transits
All 7 observables
1. 2026-09-13: Movement observed
2. 2026-09-20: Movement observed
3. 2026-09-27: Movement observed
4. 2026-10-04: Movement observed
5. 2026-10-11: Movement observed
6. 2026-10-18: No material change
7. 2026-10-25: No material change
8. 2026-11-01: No material change
2026-09-132026-11-019 reviews since 2026-09-12
Relevance to this scope
Saudi crude leaves the Red Sea coast at Yanbu because the east–west pipeline exists to avoid Hormuz, so the southern strait is the Gulf's principal alternative route and its usability decides whether the bypass arithmetic holds. The question keeps three things apart that reporting collapses — territorial presence on the Yemeni shore, declared targeting of Saudi-linked shipping, and independently observed interdiction — and this exposure turns on the third.
View question Open in Explore
Red Sea frontMilitary
Does the Saudi–Houthi front settle into a negotiated arrangement, or escalate into a Saudi campaign in Yemen?
Saudi strikes inside Yemen, Houthi strikes on Saudi territory, the Riyadh–Sanaa channel and the shore of Bab el-Mandeb — each read separately, none inferred.
Movement observed2026-11-01Moderate confidence
Brief itemThe Houthis claimed Ras Tanura twice, and Riyadh confirmed neither strike
Current condition as of 2026-10-11
A Saudi-backed offensive, under way. On 4 October 2026 Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council announced operations to retake all Houthi-held territory, and the coalition stated an air campaign with air cover for the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Government forces claim Dhubab and Mokha and the movement denies losing ground; on 10 October government sources said the waterway was not secured. Attacks on Riyadh's airport killed three on 8 October and twelve on 10 October, by Saudi account; the United States blames the movement. No truce instrument is in force; no mediated round is announced.
Observables 7 named
1. Saudi or coalition strikes inside Yemen, dated and acknowledged
2. Houthi missile and drone strikes on Saudi territory
3. A delegation, a round or a mediator's statement between Riyadh and Sanaa
All 7 observables
1. 2026-09-14: Baseline
2. 2026-09-20: Movement observed
3. 2026-09-27: Movement observed
4. 2026-10-04: Assessment changed
5. 2026-10-11: Assessment changed
6. 2026-10-18: Movement observed
7. 2026-10-25: Movement observed
8. 2026-11-01: Movement observed
2026-09-142026-11-018 reviews since 2026-09-14
Relevance to this scope
Whether the southern strait's usability is a term in a settlement or a hostage to a movement's declarations is decided by what Riyadh does next, and the choice is observable in acts — strikes acknowledged inside Yemen, a delegation received, a truce instrument with dates — rather than in either side's statements. For an exposure that runs through Bab el-Mandeb the front is the condition the access question sits on, and the two are read together.
View question Open in Explore
Energy infrastructureInfrastructure
Are the Gulf's fixed energy nodes being restored faster than they are re-struck?
Restart and repair announcements at the named terminals, refineries and pipelines read against the recorded strike tempo — never the strike tally alone.
Movement observed2026-11-01Moderate confidence
Brief itemThe Houthis claimed Ras Tanura twice, and Riyadh confirmed neither strike
Current condition as of 2026-09-27
Reached repeatedly, restored unevenly, and the alternatives reached too.
Observables 6 named
1. Restart, resumption or repair announcements at struck nodes
2. The Ras Laffan repair estimate
3. The east–west pipeline's restart
All 6 observables
1. 2026-09-13: Baseline
2. 2026-09-20: Movement observed
3. 2026-09-27: Assessment changed
4. 2026-10-04: Movement observed
5. 2026-10-11: Movement observed
6. 2026-10-18: Movement observed
7. 2026-10-25: Movement observed
8. 2026-11-01: Movement observed
2026-09-132026-11-018 reviews since 2026-09-13
Relevance to this scope
A terminal that resumes loadings the next day has absorbed a strike; a liquefaction train under a five-year repair estimate has not; a pipeline shut with no restart date sits between. For an exposure that depends on what the routes actually carry, the restoration layer — restart announcements, repair estimates, loadings resumed at the bypass outlets — is the state that matters, read against the recorded strike tempo rather than the tally alone.
View question Open in Explore
Regional protectionMilitary
Does Gulf air and missile defence become institutionally integrated?
Formal GCC machinery — a joint early-warning system, a shared air picture, common rules of engagement — not a joint exercise or parallel procurement.
No material change2026-11-01Moderate confidence
Weekly BriefIran–Gulf developments — 1 November 2026
Current condition as of 2026-09-04
An institution without an operational command.
Observables 6 named
1. A formal GCC decision creating a joint early-warning system
2. A shared air picture in service
3. Common rules of engagement adopted
All 6 observables
1. 2026-09-13: No material change
2. 2026-09-20: Movement observed
3. 2026-09-27: Movement observed
4. 2026-10-04: No material change
5. 2026-10-11: No material change
6. 2026-10-18: No material change
7. 2026-10-25: No material change
8. 2026-11-01: No material change
2026-09-132026-11-019 reviews since 2026-09-04
Relevance to this scope
Six national air defences engaged by one adversary's missile and drone force are six separate pictures unless an institution joins them, and the nodes this scope depends on sit under those six pictures. The change that counts is an institutional act — shared early warning, a common air picture, common rules of engagement, or a US access instrument signed or ended — because that is what alters the protection of the infrastructure rather than the story of one intercept.
View question Open in Explore
Defence mechanismDiplomatic
Does the Makkah Agreement become an operational defence mechanism?
A published procedure, an activated Secretariat, or a contribution named as made under the Agreement — not a bilateral deployment or a maritime-coalition act.
Assessment changed2026-11-01Moderate confidence
Brief itemTürkiye's commission approved the Makkah Agreement, and its three signatories went to Tehran together
Current condition as of 2026-11-01
A commitment with institutions, a published text and no demonstrated procedure.
Observables 9 named
1. A Turkish or Pakistani contribution named as made under the Agreement
2. A signatory formally invokes the Agreement after an attack
3. An implementing protocol or response mechanism is published
All 9 observables
1. 2026-09-20: No material change
2. 2026-09-27: Assessment changed
3. 2026-10-04: No material change
4. 2026-10-11: No material change
5. 2026-10-14: Movement observed
6. 2026-10-18: No material change
7. 2026-10-25: Movement observed
8. 2026-11-01: Assessment changed
2026-09-202026-11-0110 reviews since 2026-09-12
Relevance to this scope
Saudi Arabia is defended through several arrangements at once, and only one of them — the Makkah Agreement — carries a collective-defence undertaking with no demonstrated procedure. Whether it acquires one decides whether the Gulf gains a second security architecture with a decision mechanism of its own, which bears directly on the recovery and protection of the Red Sea coast this exposure runs through. The observables are institutional acts, never a deployment or an intention.
View question Open in Explore

Activity context The recorded series the questions sit beside — a count of dated, sourced occurrences at published markers, per week, never an effect or a live picture. The Map surface carries the full series, the key developments and the inspector.Map — Iran–Gulf

Maritime disruption activity
Reported attacks, seizures and strikes on vessels and maritime nodes at the sea-area and port markers this module publishes — a count, never the IMO's total.
1. 10 Aug 2026 to 16 Aug 2026: 4 records.
2. 17 Aug 2026 to 23 Aug 2026: 1 record.
3. 24 Aug 2026 to 30 Aug 2026: 3 records.
4. 31 Aug 2026 to 06 Sep 2026: 4 records.
5. 07 Sep 2026 to 13 Sep 2026: 2 records.
6. 14 Sep 2026 to 20 Sep 2026: 1 record.
7. 21 Sep 2026 to 27 Sep 2026: 2 records.
8. 28 Sep 2026 to 04 Oct 2026: 6 records.
9. 05 Oct 2026 to 11 Oct 2026: 5 records.
10. 12 Oct 2026 to 18 Oct 2026: 3 records.
11. 19 Oct 2026 to 25 Oct 2026: 3 records.
12. 26 Oct 2026 to 31 Oct 2026: 3 records.
10 Aug 202631 Oct 2026
Recorded events · each resolves to a source · weekly bins · 28 Feb 2026 → 31 Oct 2026
Newest week
3
12 weeks
37
Full series
68
Reviewed
2026-11-01
Bears on01 Is the Strait of Hormuz commercially usable again?02 Is Bab el-Mandeb still usable, and for whom?
Open on the map
Energy infrastructure strike activity
Reported strikes and strike effects at the terminal, refinery, processing and pipeline markers this module publishes — never damage, duration or effect.
1. 10 Aug 2026 to 16 Aug 2026: 0 records.
2. 17 Aug 2026 to 23 Aug 2026: 0 records.
3. 24 Aug 2026 to 30 Aug 2026: 0 records.
4. 31 Aug 2026 to 06 Sep 2026: 0 records.
5. 07 Sep 2026 to 13 Sep 2026: 2 records.
6. 14 Sep 2026 to 20 Sep 2026: 0 records.
7. 21 Sep 2026 to 27 Sep 2026: 0 records.
8. 28 Sep 2026 to 04 Oct 2026: 0 records.
9. 05 Oct 2026 to 11 Oct 2026: 0 records.
10. 12 Oct 2026 to 18 Oct 2026: 0 records.
11. 19 Oct 2026 to 25 Oct 2026: 0 records.
12. 26 Oct 2026 to 26 Oct 2026: 0 records.
10 Aug 202626 Oct 2026
Recorded events · each resolves to a source · weekly bins · 28 Feb 2026 → 26 Oct 2026
Newest week
0
12 weeks
2
Full series
29
Reviewed
2026-11-01
Bears on01 Is the Strait of Hormuz commercially usable again?02 Is Bab el-Mandeb still usable, and for whom?04 Are the Gulf's fixed energy nodes being restored faster than they are re-struck?
Open on the map
Attacks on US and partner military positions
Reported attacks with an impact at the US and partner base markers this module publishes — interception-only nights are not counted, and effect is never graded.
1. 10 Aug 2026 to 16 Aug 2026: 0 records.
2. 17 Aug 2026 to 23 Aug 2026: 0 records.
3. 24 Aug 2026 to 30 Aug 2026: 1 record.
4. 31 Aug 2026 to 06 Sep 2026: 1 record.
5. 07 Sep 2026 to 13 Sep 2026: 1 record.
6. 14 Sep 2026 to 20 Sep 2026: 0 records.
7. 21 Sep 2026 to 27 Sep 2026: 0 records.
8. 28 Sep 2026 to 04 Oct 2026: 0 records.
9. 05 Oct 2026 to 11 Oct 2026: 0 records.
10. 12 Oct 2026 to 18 Oct 2026: 0 records.
11. 19 Oct 2026 to 25 Oct 2026: 0 records.
12. 26 Oct 2026 to 31 Oct 2026: 0 records.
10 Aug 202631 Oct 2026
Recorded events · each resolves to a source · weekly bins · 28 Feb 2026 → 31 Oct 2026
Newest week
0
12 weeks
3
Full series
16
Reviewed
2026-11-01
Bears on05 Does Gulf air and missile defence become institutionally integrated?06 Does the Makkah Agreement become an operational defence mechanism?
Open on the map

0
1–2
3–5
6–10
10+

System access The questions are not floating text. They run through records the module maintains, and they are read on four surfaces. Listed below: the surfaces, and every record at least two of the scope’s questions share.

Records the scope’s questions share named by two or more questions

Parties and forces 17

Actors

Forces

Means and systems 8

Logistics

Campaigns

Red Sea frontCampaign

Impact chains

Ground 13

Places

Terrain

Arrangements and events 14

Relationships

Events

Vigil analysis 2

Meaningful-change notice What a notice between weekly reviews would contain, composed from this cycle’s own material changes. An example of the concept — nothing here is sent, and no delivery system exists.

ExampleGulf Energy & Maritime Risk2026-11-01Issued only on movement observed, observable met or assessment changed. A quiet review stays in the weekly state.

Assessment changed2026-11-01
Does the Makkah Agreement become an operational defence mechanism?
The condition still said no text was public, untrue since 20–21 October. Türkiye's Foreign Affairs Commission approved the approval bill on 27 October, and its deputy foreign minister said Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had completed ratification; the bill was not on the General Assembly agenda of 28 October. On 26 October the three signatories sent a joint delegation to Tehran. Not met: implementing-instrument; no invocation or named contribution.
Brief itemTürkiye's commission approved the Makkah Agreement, and its three signatories went to Tehran together
Movement observed2026-11-01
Are the Gulf's fixed energy nodes being restored faster than they are re-struck?
Movement in reach, unconfirmed: the Houthi movement claimed Ras Tanura on 27 and 29 October, and Bloomberg, citing an unnamed person, reported a fire near the terminal contained on 27 October; no Saudi or Aramco statement was found. No operator restart or repair statement on the east–west pipeline or Ras Laffan for an eighth review.
Brief itemThe Houthis claimed Ras Tanura twice, and Riyadh confirmed neither strike
Movement observed2026-11-01
Is the Strait of Hormuz commercially usable again?
Tankers were struck in the strait on 28, 29 and 30 October (UKMTO 186-, 187- and 189-26; Oman's account of the RITI), one by explosives a small boat fixed to its hull. The Revolutionary Guard claimed four tankers halted or mined; Central Command said the main routes were cleared. UKMTO counted 277 combined transits in the week to 28 October, about 70% below pre-conflict. No cover written, no régime, IMO unchanged.
Brief itemTankers were struck in the strait on three more days, one by explosives fixed to its hull from a small boat
Movement observed2026-11-01
Does the Saudi–Houthi front settle into a negotiated arrangement, or escalate into a Saudi campaign in Yemen?
The Houthi movement claimed Ras Tanura on 27 and 29 October, with Rabigh, Abqaiq and the Riyadh and Dammam airports; Riyadh confirmed none. The coalition reported interceptions towards Riyadh on 29 and 31 October. Egypt's parliament authorised support at the kingdom's request on 26 October. Saudi strikes in Yemen are reported by Houthi media only. No channel act, truce, external strike or Makkah invocation.
Brief itemThe Houthis claimed Ras Tanura twice, and Riyadh confirmed neither strike

What this demonstrates This public scope shows how Vigil organises a defined set of standing questions around one exposure. The records under it remain part of the public corpus.

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The value is the customised scope, the sustained attention, a defined review responsibility, interpretation relevant to the exposure, and delivery of the material changes between reviews. Not access to information already published.

Exists: The public demonstration scope. The weekly review that already produces every figure on it. This contact channel.
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