Movement in reach only: a drone was intercepted at Aramco's Shaybah field on 21 October and its debris killed two outside the perimeter, with operations unaffected (energy ministry). Houthi claims on Yanbu and Aramco sites are claims. France's President said on 21 October that several of the east–west pipeline's capacities had been destroyed by Houthi fire and that France had offered to help rehabilitate and secure it: a third state's account, not an operator's. No operator restart or repair statement on the pipeline or Ras Laffan was found for a seventh review.
Brief itemStrikes killed four people in the Eastern Province, and Washington ordered its staff out
The text sent to the Turkish parliament with its approval bill (2/3961) was published by the press on 20 and 21 October: assistance against an armed attack by another country or group of countries, its extent set by each party; in force indefinitely once ratified. Not met: press publication is not a signatory's, and no protocol, threshold, invocation or named contribution followed. Türkiye's Defence Minister ruled out clashes with the Houthis.
Brief itemThe Makkah Agreement's text became public, and its trigger is an attack by another state
Saudi authorities reported a strike on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam on 21 October, two killed and eight injured, and a drone intercepted at Shaybah the same day whose debris killed two; Riyadh was hit again on 24 October. The United States ordered non-emergency staff out of the kingdom. Eight foreign ministers in Istanbul condemned the Houthi escalation on 23 October. No channel act, truce or external strike; no Saudi strike in Yemen with place and date; no Makkah invocation.
Brief itemStrikes killed four people in the Eastern Province, and Washington ordered its staff out
Reached repeatedly, restored unevenly, and the alternatives reached too.
Latest reviewMovement
Movement in reach only: a drone was intercepted at Aramco's Shaybah field on 21 October and its debris killed two outside the perimeter, with operations unaffected (energy ministry). Houthi claims on Yanbu and Aramco sites are claims. France's President said on 21 October that several of the east–west pipeline's capacities had been destroyed by Houthi fire and that France had offered to help rehabilitate and secure it: a third state's account, not an operator's. No operator restart or repair statement on the pipeline or Ras Laffan was found for a seventh review.
A commitment with institutions and a first consultation, without a demonstrated procedure.
Latest reviewMovement
The text sent to the Turkish parliament with its approval bill (2/3961) was published by the press on 20 and 21 October: assistance against an armed attack by another country or group of countries, its extent set by each party; in force indefinitely once ratified. Not met: press publication is not a signatory's, and no protocol, threshold, invocation or named contribution followed. Türkiye's Defence Minister ruled out clashes with the Houthis.
A Saudi-backed offensive, under way. On 4 October 2026 Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council announced operations to retake all Houthi-held territory, and the coalition stated an air campaign with air cover for the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Government forces claim Dhubab and Mokha and the movement denies losing ground; on 10 October government sources said the waterway was not secured. Attacks on Riyadh's airport killed three on 8 October and twelve on 10 October, by Saudi account; the United States blames the movement. No truce instrument is in force; no mediated round is announced.
Latest reviewMovement
Saudi authorities reported a strike on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam on 21 October, two killed and eight injured, and a drone intercepted at Shaybah the same day whose debris killed two; Riyadh was hit again on 24 October. The United States ordered non-emergency staff out of the kingdom. Eight foreign ministers in Istanbul condemned the Houthi escalation on 23 October. No channel act, truce or external strike; no Saudi strike in Yemen with place and date; no Makkah invocation.
Closed by judgment, not water: the strait remained physically passable.
Latest reviewMovement
Two tankers were struck in the strait, west of Bukha on 21 October and north-east of Limah on 22 October (UKMTO 179- and 181-26), and one off Al Faw in the northern Gulf on 20 October. The Revolutionary Guard claimed nine more on 22–23 October; Central Command called the mine claims incorrect. UKMTO counted 241 combined transits in the week to 21 October, about 70% below pre-conflict. France's President proposed, and did not create, a guarantee for cover. No cover written, no régime, IMO unchanged.
No Council or Command decision. The Istanbul statement of 23 October is not a Gulf Cooperation Council act, and the US ordered departure from Saudi Arabia is not an instrument. The authorisation vote was not checked.
No material change: no framework, schedule or text. Mediated talks between Iran and the United States were reported on 24 October to be no closer to results, and the Istanbul ministers backed the June Islamabad memorandum. OFAC's 21 October designations and wind-down General Licenses GG and HH act under existing authority and amend no instrument.
Command converges at the top on the record: the Supreme Leader appoints both forces’ commanders, and the clearest restraint order of the war, on 8 April 2026, went to all branches in his name.
Latest reviewUnchanged
No material change. Iran's state news agency styles Ali Abdollahi both Chief of the General Staff and Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (20 and 24 October); a title is not a published structure or stated authority for a merged headquarters.
A declared blockade, a changed shore, no established closure.
Latest reviewUnchanged
No material change. UKMTO's overview of 23 October reports no attack on shipping in the Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb since 24 August, transits 22% below the pre-blockade level, and classes the 17 October skiff shots in the Gulf of Aden (176-26) as piracy. Found late: MSCIO alert 132/26 records a container vessel attacked by a small craft that fired shots in the southern Red Sea on 7 October; UKMTO issued no warning, and it is not shown to be conflict-linked.
No inspection, resumed-verification statement or accountancy found, and no Security Council action on the 9 September referral. The trust-building plan exchanged through Qatar reportedly includes nuclear steps; no text is public.
Each Board cycle without an inspection lengthens the period the Agency cannot account for, and the accountancy gap grows with the calendar whether or not anything else moves.
No quiet question matches the current filter.
Local record tests2 further entries on the module’s standing watch list that stayed with the conflict record — record-specific tests rather than canonical questions.
2 local entriesrecord-specific tests on the module’s standing watch list
Watch the three legal systems separately, because they are separate: the United Nations measures that returned under the snapback, the European Union restrictive measures reimposed by Council decision on 29 September 2025, and United States measures including General License U of 20 March 2026 authorising certain Iranian petroleum transactions. The baseline is that all three are in force and were not adopted together. The change that would count is an amending instrument in one of them — and a change in one system is not a change in the others, which is why a sanctions headline is never a status for the file as a whole.
Watch for a change in the stated mandate of the Combined Maritime Forces or in its 47-nation membership. The baseline is a partnership whose stated mission is against illicit non-state actors, headquartered in Bahrain, commanded by the same officer who commands the United States Fifth Fleet and NAVCENT — and which is not a party to the interstate war on that account. The change that would count is a formal mandate change or a member's declared withdrawal. The shared commander is an institutional fact and not evidence of a merged mission, and this module does not treat coalition activity as belligerent activity.
