Standing assessment
Current condition
High confidenceAs of
Verification stopped on 28 February 2026.
Access is denied to twenty declared sites and one location outside facilities; the only inspection since was at Bushehr on 1–3 June 2026. The Agency states it has lost continuity of knowledge: the last verified stockpile figures date from 13 June 2025 and are a historical baseline, not a current inventory. A Board of Governors resolution urging cooperation was adopted on 10 June 2026 and no inspections followed it.
Latest reviewBaseline
Opened on the module baseline. No weekly review trail exists before the module's first Sunday brief; nothing earlier is inferred.
Brief itemNuclear verification stopped on the war's opening day
Why it matters
The distinction between an undertaking and an inspection is not theoretical here: practical modalities to resume inspections were agreed in September 2025 and no inspections followed. Until a verified figure with its own as-of date exists this module carries no 2026 enrichment or stockpile figure and calculates none — and the absence of verification is not evidence that enrichment either stopped or continued. Every nuclear-diplomacy question in the module is downstream of whether the Agency can see anything.
Why continued absence matters
Each Board cycle without an inspection lengthens the period the Agency cannot account for, and the accountancy gap grows with the calendar whether or not anything else moves.
Observables4 named · “met” describes evidence, not success
01Test
A completed inspection at a declared site other than Bushehr
The Agency reporting an inspection carried out, at a named site, with a date — as distinct from access agreed.
02Test
The Agency reporting resumed verification activities
A Director General's report or Board statement that verification has resumed, and at how many of the twenty denied sites.
03Test
A reconciled nuclear material accountancy
A verified current figure for enrichment level, scale or centrifuge inventory, with its own as-of date — the observable the nuclear-inventory question named before it was folded into this one.
04Test
The Agency's statement on continuity of knowledge
Whether the Agency continues to state that continuity has been lost, or reports it re-established for any material balance area.
What would change the assessment3 thresholds · the boundaries as the record states them, none with a number
A completed inspection at one of the twenty denied sites, reported by the Agency with a date
Would meanchanges the condition from denied to partial.
A published verified quantity with its own as-of date
Would meanis the point at which the module carries a 2026 figure.
A formal Iranian withdrawal from the safeguards agreement
Would meancloses the question in the other direction.
What remains unknown
- What is at the twenty denied sites since February 2026 is not known to the Agency and is not estimated here.
- The September 2025 modalities understanding was not published in full.
Readings the evidence also supports
- Access is being traded inside the wider nuclear-diplomacy track rather than decided on its own terms, in which case the observable to read first is the implementation question.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
Review ledger1 entry · opened · newest first, each tied to the review that made it
Baseline
Opened on the module baseline. No weekly review trail exists before the module's first Sunday brief; nothing earlier is inferred.
Brief item Nuclear verification stopped on the war's opening dayReviewed in 2026-09-04
Connected system14 canonical records this question runs through · Watch owns the edge; each record shows the question back
Parties and forces 6
Actors
Arrangements and events 6
Relationships
Vigil analysis 2
Weekly Briefs that reviewed it1 review
Weekly Briefs 1
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Assessed as of — 2026-09-04 Last reviewed — 2026-09-04