Gas & LNG
Qatari LNG export system
The cleanest dependency in the module: close to a fifth of world LNG, one complex, one strait, and no alternative of any size.
Coverage · Iran–Gulf
Context, not targeting. These records describe strategic dependence and documented disruption history. The schema has no fields for capacities, schedules, convoy composition, escort arrangements, storage or facility layout.
Supply systems 5 systems Iran–Gulf runs on, with 21 documented disruptions between them. Dependence is the strategic fact — a corridor matters because there is no substitute for it.
Mineral export
Hormuz-dependent crude and products export system
The system through which six of the seven core Gulf states send their oil to market, converging on one strait.
Mineral export
Iranian crude export system
A single terminal inside the strait, and a bypass that was built and has barely been used.
Mineral export
Saudi east–west crude transit
The largest Hormuz alternative in existence, limited by its terminal rather than by its pipeline, and opening onto a second contested strait.
Mineral export
UAE alternative export access
The only major bypass reaching the open ocean directly — smaller than commonly assumed, and itself reachable.
The corridor system
5 documented systems and 22 nodes, read from the records below. Select a corridor or a node to inspect it; the full record stays one click further on.
The system through which six of the seven core Gulf states send their oil to market, converging on one strait.
Saudi Arabia's principal crude export terminal and refinery complex on the Gulf coast, and the largest single loading point in the Hormuz-dependent export system.
In this systemSaudi Arabia's principal crude loading point and the largest in the system.
Why it mattersIt is where the largest producer in the system meets the water. Drones were intercepted over the refinery on 2 March 2026; a fire started from debris and the facility halted operations, reopening on 13 March. Saudi Arabia attributed the attack to Iran and Iranian officials denied targeting Gulf energy facilities.
What to watchLoading continuity, and whether the attribution of the March 2026 attack is ever independently established.
Port Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Iran's principal crude export terminal, in the northern Gulf. Reported as handling up to around ninety per cent of Iranian crude exports.
In this systemReported as handling up to around 90% of Iranian crude exports.
Why it mattersIran's own export concentration is as extreme as any in the region and its position is the same as its neighbours': inside the Gulf, upstream of the strait. Closing the Strait of Hormuz constrains Iranian exports too, which is the fact most often missing from accounts that treat the strait as an Iranian lever without a cost.
What to watchLoading continuity, and the share of Iranian exports moving through this terminal versus any alternative.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The principal Emirati refining and petrochemical complex on the Gulf coast, west of Abu Dhabi.
In this systemEmirati refining and product output facing the Gulf rather than the Fujairah route.
Why it mattersIt is the UAE's main refined-product output and a Gulf-facing node, so unlike the Fujairah route it remains inside the Hormuz-dependent system. It shows that a state with a bypass is not thereby outside the chokepoint: only the volumes actually routed through the bypass are.
What to watchWhether product exports continue to move through Gulf loadings or shift where the pipeline allows.
Refinery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Kuwait's principal crude export terminal on the northern Gulf coast.
In this systemKuwait's principal terminal; no alternative outlet exists.
Why it mattersKuwait has no route to market that avoids the Strait of Hormuz, and its exports were described as effectively halted during the closure. Its position at the head of the Gulf makes it the most enclosed of the major exporters — furthest from the strait and with no alternative coastline at all.
What to watchResumption and continuity of loadings.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Bahrain's refinery and export terminal, the smallest of the Gulf's national export outlets.
In this systemBahrain's terminal; the smallest national outlet in the system and equally dependent.
Why it mattersBahrain is the smallest producer in the system and, like Kuwait and Qatar, has no Hormuz alternative. Its exports were described as effectively halted during the closure. It demonstrates that exposure in this system is not proportional to size — the smallest producer is as completely dependent as the largest.
What to watchResumption and continuity of loadings.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Oman's principal crude export terminal, on the Gulf of Oman coast outside the Strait of Hormuz.
In this systemOman's principal terminal, and the one node in this list that sits OUTSIDE the strait. Included to show the exception rather than to imply Omani dependence on it.
Why it mattersThis marker is the Omani exception made concrete. Because Oman's export terminals face the open ocean rather than the enclosed Gulf, Omani production does not appear in official estimates of Hormuz closure-related shut-ins — the only Gulf Arab producer of which that is true, and a large part of why Oman can hold the position it does in the region's diplomacy.
What to watchWhether loadings continue undisturbed while Gulf-facing terminals do not.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The waterway connecting the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the open ocean, comprising Iranian and Omani territorial waters. Around 20 million barrels a day of crude oil and petroleum products moved through it in the 2025 baseline, with close to a fifth of world LNG exports.
In this systemThe single outlet. Its usable state is set by legal, physical and commercial conditions that moved independently in 2026.
Why it mattersEvery Gulf Arab producer except Oman must pass this water to reach a customer, and so must Iran. It is the single point on which the region's export economy, and a material share of the world's, converges. The alternatives to it carry between a sixth and a quarter of what it normally moves, and for LNG they carry nothing.
What to watchWhether commercial transit resumes at scale, and on what insurance terms — the strait's usable state has been set by commercial risk rather than by physical blockade.
Sea area / strait · broad context Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The Omani port and industrial complex on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz, and the water off it where Saudi crude is transferred between vessels.
In this systemAdded 20 September 2026. The water off the Omani port where Saudi crude loaded at Ras Tanura is transferred between vessels after running the strait on short escorted legs — the seaward end of a route that begins inside the chokepoint rather than avoiding it.
Why it mattersCreated on 20 September 2026 because the module's own records had been naming it as an absence. The energy-strike series listed Sohar among the nodes it could not count for want of a marker, and the September rerouting made the omission untenable: about sixty million barrels of Saudi crude were sold for September and October loading by ship-to-ship transfer in the waters off this port, after short escorted runs out of the Gulf. That makes Sohar the seaward end of a route that begins inside the strait rather than avoiding it — the opposite of what the east–west pipeline was built to do, and the reason the marker exists.
What to watchWhether the ship-to-ship arrangement persists once the east–west pipeline returns to capacity, and whether any incident is reported at the port or in the transfer area.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
DependenceNear-total for Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq, which have no alternative outlet at all. Partial for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, each of which can divert a fraction of normal volumes through a pipeline to a coast outside the strait. Absent for Oman alone. Iran's dependence is as high as its neighbours': its own exports leave through the same water it is able to constrain.
Why it mattersA constraint at one point reaches five producing states simultaneously, because they share an outlet rather than a route. That is what makes this a system rather than a set of national export chains, and it is why the module treats maritime access as the organising question of Gulf security rather than as one file among several.
Documented pressure
2026-02-28 onwardArmed interdiction Confidence: High
Iran declared the strait closed to normal commercial traffic on 28 February 2026 and cross-strait traffic largely halted. The United States Energy Information Administration described the strait as effectively closed to shipping and built its outlook on that assumption. Transit resumed briefly under a memorandum of understanding from mid-June before commercial access degraded again from early July.
2026-03 to 2026-06Armed interdiction Confidence: High
Production shut-ins attributed to the closure, as a dated series rather than a single figure: an estimated 7.53 million b/d in March 2026, a forecast peak of 9.10 million in April, 11.3 million in May and a forecast 11.34 million in June, easing to a forecast 10.11 million in the third quarter and 5.70 million in the fourth. These measure production made unavailable, not exports and not capacity.
2026-09-10 to 2026-09-26Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
With the east–west pipeline shut from 10 September, Saudi crude was loaded inside the Gulf and run through the strait on short escorted legs for ship-to-ship transfer off Sohar — state cargo, not a return of commercial traffic. Trade-data figures, each with its own vintage and each a tracker's estimate rather than a published operator series: Rystad Energy put Hormuz-route exports above two million barrels a day in the first two weeks of September; Kpler data reported by Baird Maritime put Saudi Hormuz-route exports at about 42 million barrels in the week of 13 September; Kpler cargo data reported by DataPortuaria showed six very large crude carriers loading nearly 12 million barrels at Ras Tanura and Juaymah on 21 September. Tracked commodity-vessel transits through the strait were 17 on the weekend of 19–20 September against 37 the weekend before (Kpler and LSEG), against a pre-war norm of about 125 large vessels a day; trackers note that tankers transiting with transponders off are not counted. The pipeline was reported restarted at a low rate on 22 September.
2026-09-27 onwardArmed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Kpler put September crude exports from the Gulf, excluding Iran, at no less than 16.5 million barrels a day, the pre-war average, by a changed route. About 60 per cent (9.9 million) physically crossed the strait, mostly on shuttle tankers; 23 per cent loaded on the Gulf of Oman coast, mainly at Fujairah; 17 per cent left through the Red Sea. Before the war 83 per cent crossed the strait. In August more than 70 per cent of the crude crossing the strait changed tankers off Fujairah or Sohar. Kpler states its recent figures are minimum confirmed volumes, recorded even when one tanker in a transfer is dark. Iranian exports remained blocked. On 1 October the Joint Maritime Information Center recorded 113 United States-facilitated transits in the four days to 30 September, while independent tracking of other cargo vessels above 1,000 dwt showed single-digit transits each way. It gave a 2025 baseline of about 138 vessels a day, on its own definition, which differs from the pre-war norm of about 125 large vessels a day carried above. Six tankers were struck in the strait between 28 September and 2 October.
2026-10-04 to 2026-10-08 (tracker data)Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Tracker data, each figure with its own definition. In a note dated 6 October, Kpler put crude crossing the strait in the latest week at no less than 10.1 million barrels a day, down 27 per cent from the war-time high of the week before, about 74 per cent of the pre-war level and level with the September average; most of the fall came from ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman. Exports from the Gulf of Oman coast and the Red Sea rose to 6.7 million barrels a day, more than double the pre-war level. Kpler counted seven commodity vessels through the strait on 6 October, the fewest since 23 July, and ten on 7 October, against more than twenty on 4 and 5 October; LSEG counted eight on 6 October against fourteen the day before. Neither count includes vessels transiting with transponders off. The fall followed the most strikes on tankers in the strait of any week of the war.
What disruption doesProduction that cannot reach a buyer is shut in rather than stored, which is why the effect appears as removed supply rather than as accumulating inventory at the terminals. The shut-in series above is the measure of that, and it grew for four months before easing — a disruption that deepened as it persisted rather than one absorbed by adjustment.
Confidence: High Status as of 2026-10-06 Reviewed 2026-10-04 Open the full record →
A single terminal inside the strait, and a bypass that was built and has barely been used.
Iran's principal crude export terminal, in the northern Gulf. Reported as handling up to around ninety per cent of Iranian crude exports.
In this systemReported as handling up to around 90% of Iranian crude exports.
Why it mattersIran's own export concentration is as extreme as any in the region and its position is the same as its neighbours': inside the Gulf, upstream of the strait. Closing the Strait of Hormuz constrains Iranian exports too, which is the fact most often missing from accounts that treat the strait as an Iranian lever without a cost.
What to watchLoading continuity, and the share of Iranian exports moving through this terminal versus any alternative.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The Iranian crude pipeline system running from the Goreh area to Jask on the Gulf of Oman. A single broad marker for the system, not a depiction of its route.
In this systemA single broad marker for the pipeline system. Design around 1m b/d; reported throughput under 70,000 b/d. No route geometry authored.
Why it mattersIran built this line to move crude outside the Strait of Hormuz and has barely used it: designed for around a million barrels a day, it has been reported carrying under seventy thousand, with a single tanker loading at Jask during the 2026 war. It is the module's clearest case of design capacity that is not available capacity.
What to watchWhether throughput rises materially — the observable that would turn a nominal bypass into a real one.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Iran's export terminal on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz, and the seaward end of the Goreh–Jask pipeline.
In this systemOutside the strait. A single tanker was reported loading here during the 2026 war.
Why it mattersIt is the bypass Iran built and has not used. The pipeline was designed for around a million barrels a day and has been reported carrying under seventy thousand, with a single tanker loading here during the 2026 war. Design capacity and available capacity are different quantities, and this terminal is the clearest demonstration of the difference in the module.
What to watchWhether loadings at Jask rise materially — the observable that would show the bypass becoming real rather than nominal.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The waterway connecting the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the open ocean, comprising Iranian and Omani territorial waters. Around 20 million barrels a day of crude oil and petroleum products moved through it in the 2025 baseline, with close to a fifth of world LNG exports.
In this systemThe outlet for the overwhelming majority of Iranian exports.
Why it mattersEvery Gulf Arab producer except Oman must pass this water to reach a customer, and so must Iran. It is the single point on which the region's export economy, and a material share of the world's, converges. The alternatives to it carry between a sixth and a quarter of what it normally moves, and for LNG they carry nothing.
What to watchWhether commercial transit resumes at scale, and on what insurance terms — the strait's usable state has been set by commercial risk rather than by physical blockade.
Sea area / strait · broad context Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
DependenceNear-total on Kharg Island and therefore on the strait. Downstream the dependence is on a single customer: reporting places around ninety per cent of Iranian oil exports as going to China, which is the practical ceiling on what the sanctions architecture achieves.
Why it mattersThis is the fact most often missing from accounts that treat the strait as an Iranian lever: closing it costs Iran its own exports too. Iran holds the same dependence as the states it can constrain, and the bypass it built to escape that dependence has never functioned at a scale that would relieve it.
Documented pressure
2026-03-13/14, 2026-04-07Armed interdiction Confidence: Low
United States strikes on Kharg Island were reported as targeting military sites while deliberately avoiding oil and gas infrastructure, with loading reported continuing.
2026-04 onwardArmed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Flows from Kharg reported disrupted following the start of a naval interdiction of Iranian oil exports in mid-April 2026. United States Central Command reported redirecting over 140 ships and disabling nine vessels during the blockade.
2026-09 (count as of 2026-09-30)Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
United States Central Command's figure as of 30 September 2026 was 125 commercial vessels redirected, three disabled and two boarded in enforcing the blockade of Iranian ports. The trade press describes the blockade as reinstated, and the count appears to run from that reinstatement. Its date is not established here, and the figure is not comparable with the earlier count above, which stands. Kpler analysts reported Iran cutting production and no longer loading floating storage.
2026-07-14 onward (count as of 2026-10-10)Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
On 10 October 2026, announcing that a United States fighter had disabled the Panama-flagged M/V Ocean Molica in the Gulf of Oman after it left an Iranian port, Central Command said four vessels had been disabled and 135 turned around since the blockade began on 14 July. That dates the reinstated count the 30 September figure above appears to run from. Both figures are the enforcing party's own. On 9 October Central Command declared the main shipping lanes open to vessels not violating United States sanctions on Iran.
What disruption doesIranian export revenue is compressed by two mechanisms operating at once — a restrictive architecture that limits who may buy, and a physical constraint on loading and moving cargo. They are separate causes with separate remedies, and the module does not merge them into a single figure or a single story.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-10-10 Reviewed 2026-10-04 Open the full record →
The largest Hormuz alternative in existence, limited by its terminal rather than by its pipeline, and opening onto a second contested strait.
The inland crude processing and stabilisation complex in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, and the origin point of the east–west pipeline to the Red Sea.
In this systemProcessing and stabilisation complex; the point at which crude can be sent east or west.
Why it mattersIt is the node at which Saudi crude can be sent either east to the Gulf or west across the peninsula. Everything the kingdom can route away from the Strait of Hormuz passes through here first, which makes it the hinge of the region's largest bypass.
What to watchContinuity of processing throughput, which sets the ceiling on how much can be moved west at all.
Industrial centre Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The Saudi east–west crude pipeline system running from the Eastern Province across the peninsula to Yanbu on the Red Sea. A single broad marker for the system, not a depiction of its route. Struck by drones in the Riyadh and Medina areas on 10 September 2026 and shut down by the Ministry of Energy as a precautionary measure; no restart has been announced.
In this systemA single broad marker for the pipeline system. No route geometry is authored, and the marker is not a waypoint.
Why it mattersIt is the largest Hormuz alternative in existence and the most commonly misdescribed. Its design ceiling of up to seven million barrels a day is not available export capacity: the constraint sits at the Yanbu terminal and in domestic refinery offtake, its Red Sea outlet became contested in July 2026, and since 10 September 2026 the line itself has been out of service. The alternative to one contested strait is now interrupted at its middle as well as at its mouth.
What to watchWhether a restart date is announced, and by whom; whether any damage assessment is published by the operator or the ministry; and whether the Red Sea outlet remains usable.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09-11 Show on the map →
Saudi Arabia's Red Sea export terminal and refinery complex, the western terminus of the east–west pipeline and the point at which the Hormuz bypass reaches the sea.
In this systemThe binding constraint. Wartime terminal throughput has been estimated at roughly 3m b/d, against a pipeline design ceiling of up to 7m b/d.
Why it mattersThe bypass is limited here rather than in the pipeline. Terminal throughput under wartime conditions has been estimated at roughly 3 million b/d against a pipeline design ceiling of up to 7 million, and Saudi refineries on this coast take a substantial share before export crude can load. It is the clearest case in the module of a system constrained by its outlet.
What to watchLoading volumes, and the share of arriving crude consumed by domestic refining before export.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. It is the outlet of the Red Sea route that Saudi Arabia's east–west pipeline exists to reach, and the second contested chokepoint in this system. Since 10–11 September 2026 the last government-held stretch of the Yemeni shore, and Perim island, have been reported taken by the Houthi movement; the Djiboutian and Eritrean shores are not, and no closure of the strait has been established.
In this systemThe Red Sea outlet, contested since July 2026.
Why it mattersMoving Saudi barrels west to Yanbu removes them from the Strait of Hormuz and delivers them here. Since the Houthi movement declared a blockade on shipping to and from Saudi ports in July 2026, the principal Hormuz alternative has depended on a waterway that is itself contested — which is why the module treats the two straits as one coupled system.
What to watchWhether the declared blockade on Saudi-linked shipping is lifted, extended or enforced differently — and whether presence on the Yemeni shore produces any independently observed interference with passage, which it has not so far.
Sea area / strait · broad context Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09-12 Show on the map →
DependenceSaudi Arabia depends on this system for whatever share of exports it moves away from the Gulf, and the system in turn depends on a single terminal and a single sea outlet. Nothing else in the region can use it: it carries Saudi crude only, so it reduces Saudi exposure and no one else's.
Why it mattersThis system is the reason "Saudi Arabia has an alternative to Hormuz" is true and misleading at the same time. It changes how much of one state's exposure can be reduced; it does not remove the region's dependence on the strait, and it substitutes one contested waterway for another.
Documented pressure
2026-03 Confidence: Moderate
Saudi Aramco announced a ramp of the pipeline to full capacity on 10 March 2026, with conversion reported complete the following day — an increase in utilisation rather than a disruption, recorded here because it is the dated change to the system's operating state.
2026-04Armed interdiction Confidence: Low
A drone strike was reported to have temporarily disabled around 700,000 b/d of the system's capacity. Duration was not stated in the source.
2026-09Armed interdiction Confidence: High
The pipeline was struck on the morning of 10 September in the Riyadh and Medina areas. The Ministry of Energy said the line had been shut down as a precautionary measure after multiple attacks, with injuries requiring medical care; the foreign ministry said the following day that several drones originating from Iraq had targeted it, that Saudi Arabia would not respond at this stage at the Iraqi prime minister's request, and that it reserved the right to act. Iraq said the drones were launched from Maysan province. No group claimed the attack. Satellite-based analysis reported substantial impacts at two pumping stations with extensive fire damage at one. No restart had been announced as of 12 September 2026.
2026-09-14 to 2026-09-20Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
The line remained shut through the week and no restart, official timeline or damage assessment was published. Three repair estimates were reported from three positions: the United States energy secretary said on 15 September the outage would be measured in days; Aramco was reported on 16 September to be working to bypass a damaged section and return about half capacity within days, with full capability in about six weeks; a wire estimate put repairs at three to five weeks. Analysis cited in the same reporting held that even at a 40 to 60 per cent restart only a limited volume would remain for export at Yanbu once domestic refinery offtake is met. In the meantime Saudi Arabia sold about sixty million barrels for September and October loading through ship-to-ship transfer off Sohar, loading at Ras Tanura and running the Strait of Hormuz on short legs under United States naval escort: Hormuz-route exports rose above two million barrels a day in the first two weeks of September, roughly a million above August, while total Saudi crude exports stood at about 2.1 million barrels a day against 7.5 million in January and February. The displaced volume has therefore been partly rerouted through the strait this system exists to avoid and mostly not moved at all; no operator figure for the shut-in exists.
2026-09-21 to 2026-09-26Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Reuters reported on 22 September, on three sources briefed on the matter, that the line had restarted that day and was pumping at a low rate, with one cargo scheduled to load at Yanbu for China; a security source said full resumption could take weeks. Wire reporting carried in the same coverage put a 40 per cent rate within days and a full restart at six to eight weeks; Maritime Executive, citing Bloomberg, the Financial Times and commercial satellite imagery, described a shunt bypassing a damaged pumping station, three stations damaged, and up to six weeks to restore nameplate capacity. The capacity figures differ by source — a line of up to 4 million b/d in the Reuters account, 7 million b/d nameplate in the other — and are carried as attributed; the 7 million figure is the 2019 design ceiling this record already distinguishes from sustained throughput. Reuters dates the shutdown to 11 September; the Ministry of Energy's announcement recorded on the attack event is 10 September. No operator or ministry statement of the restart, its rate, a timeline or a damage assessment had been published by 26 September. Saudi Hormuz-route loadings continued alongside the restart.
2026-09-27 to 2026-10-03Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Yanbu tanker loadings were reported resumed between 25 and 28 September. Reuters cited trade sources and shipping data, and an Asian refining source said Aramco had notified customers of an October loading programme. Bloomberg reported overseas shipments restarted after a 17-day halt, and TankerTrackers.com read imagery of 27 September as showing nearly 10 million barrels loading at Yanbu and Al Muajjiz. Throughput was estimated at about 2 million b/d by an industry source and 2.65 million b/d by Kpler. Kpler expected 3 to 4 million within days and the pre-attack rate of about 5.5 million within about a month. Two trade sources put Yanbu crude loadings at about 2 million b/d. These are estimates, not operator figures. The Joint Maritime Information Center called the restart unconfirmed on 1 October and said regular Yanbu loadings were not independently confirmed. No ministry or operator statement had been published by 3 October.
2026-07 onwardArmed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
The Houthi movement declared a blockade on shipping to and from Saudi ports; vessel traffic through Bab el-Mandeb fell by about a quarter and Saudi Arabia rerouted Asia-bound crude via Suez.
What disruption doesThe system works and it does not solve the problem. Even at full pipeline utilisation the volume that can actually load at Yanbu is a fraction of what the strait normally carries, and from July 2026 every cargo leaving it faced a contested strait or a month of additional steaming. Exposure was moved and reshaped rather than removed.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-10-01 Reviewed 2026-10-04 Open the full record →
The only major bypass reaching the open ocean directly — smaller than commonly assumed, and itself reachable.
The inland Emirati processing hub and the origin of the crude pipeline running to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.
In this systemInland processing hub and the origin of the pipeline.
Why it mattersIt is where Emirati crude is separated from the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline that begins here is the only major bypass in the region reaching the Indian Ocean directly rather than the Red Sea.
What to watchThroughput continuity, which sets what the Fujairah route can actually carry.
Industrial centre Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The Emirati crude pipeline system running inland from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. A single broad marker for the system, not a depiction of its route.
In this systemA single broad marker for the pipeline system. No route geometry is authored, and the marker is not a waypoint.
Why it mattersIt is the only major bypass reaching the Indian Ocean directly rather than the Red Sea, and at a reported capacity just under two million barrels a day it is real but far smaller than normal Hormuz volumes. A second line has been reported as targeting a substantially larger capacity by mid-2027; an announced plan is not an asset.
What to watchUtilisation against capacity, and whether the announced expansion progresses.
Corridor · supply & trade artery Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The Emirati export terminal and bunkering centre on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz, and the seaward end of the Abu Dhabi crude pipeline.
In this systemSeaward end on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Reported struck on 3, 14 and 16 March 2026.
Why it mattersIt is the region's only large export outlet facing the open ocean rather than an enclosed sea, and it carries a reported capacity just under two million barrels a day — real, and a fraction of normal Hormuz volumes. It is also reachable: terminal and storage facilities were reported struck in March 2026, which is the point most often missed about a bypass.
What to watchLoading volumes, and whether the second pipeline reported as targeting a substantially larger bypass capacity progresses beyond announcement.
Port Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
DependenceThe UAE depends on this system for the share of crude it routes away from the Gulf; the rest of its export and refining activity remains inside the Hormuz-dependent system. No other state can use it.
Why it mattersIt shows what a working bypass looks like and what it costs. The UAE reduced its own exposure by building one, and remained exposed anyway — its Gulf-facing refining and product output still loads inside the strait, and the bypass terminal was attacked in the war's first month.
Documented pressure
2026-03-03, 2026-03-14, 2026-03-16Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Terminal and storage facilities at Fujairah reported struck on three occasions in March 2026. A drone strike on 3 March was reported as causing a fire from intercepted debris.
What disruption doesA bypass that is itself struck provides less relief than its capacity suggests, and the effect of an attack on it is disproportionate: the volumes it carries have nowhere else to go except back into the strait the route exists to avoid.
Confidence: Moderate Status as of 2026-09 Reviewed 2026-09-04 Open the full record →
The cleanest dependency in the module: close to a fifth of world LNG, one complex, one strait, and no alternative of any size.
The world's largest natural gas field, lying offshore across the maritime boundary between Qatar and Iran. Qatar calls its side the North Field or North Dome; Iran calls its side South Pars. A broad, deliberately imprecise marker for a single geological structure.
In this systemThe offshore field, shared geologically with Iran. A shared reservoir and NOT a shared enterprise — see the record's own note below.
Why it mattersIt is a shared reservoir and NOT a shared enterprise. The two states have developed their sides separately — Qatar with international partners, Iran alone and, on reported evidence, in production decline. Vigil records the geology and authors no bilateral arrangement, because none was found: a shared field is not cooperation, and treating it as such would invent a relationship the evidence does not support.
What to watchWhether either side's development posture changes, and whether any joint arrangement is ever announced.
Mining area · broad region Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
Qatar's liquefied natural gas export complex, and the point through which close to a fifth of global LNG supply left the country in the 2025 baseline. Two of fourteen liquefaction trains were damaged on 18 March 2026.
In this systemLiquefaction and loading. Two of fourteen trains damaged 18 March 2026; repairs estimated at up to five years.
Why it mattersThere is no alternative to it. Qatar has no LNG pipeline or terminal that avoids the Strait of Hormuz, so this complex and that waterway together constitute the whole of the country's export capability. QatarEnergy estimated repairs to the damaged trains at up to five years.
What to watchWhether the damaged trains return to service, and on what timescale.
Port Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
The waterway connecting the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the open ocean, comprising Iranian and Omani territorial waters. Around 20 million barrels a day of crude oil and petroleum products moved through it in the 2025 baseline, with close to a fifth of world LNG exports.
In this systemThe only route to market.
Why it mattersEvery Gulf Arab producer except Oman must pass this water to reach a customer, and so must Iran. It is the single point on which the region's export economy, and a material share of the world's, converges. The alternatives to it carry between a sixth and a quarter of what it normally moves, and for LNG they carry nothing.
What to watchWhether commercial transit resumes at scale, and on what insurance terms — the strait's usable state has been set by commercial risk rather than by physical blockade.
Sea area / strait · broad context Confidence: High As of 2026-09 Show on the map →
DependenceTotal. There is no Qatari LNG route to market that avoids the Strait of Hormuz, and no capacity elsewhere replaces the volumes on the same timescale. Downstream, the dependence runs to Asian markets above all — around a quarter of Qatari LNG exports were destined for China in 2025 — with European buyers exposed through price rather than through direct supply.
Why it mattersQatar is the state in this system with the most to lose from a closed strait, the host of United States Central Command's forward headquarters, and the party Tehran will still talk to. Its exposure is not a consequence of its politics — it is a consequence of physics, and it cannot be negotiated away or built around on any timescale that matters.
Documented pressure
2026-03-02Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Ras Laffan struck; QatarEnergy suspended LNG production. Mesaieed's power-plant water tank was struck the same day, halting downstream petrochemical output. Iran's defence ministry reported the attacks while Iranian officials publicly denied targeting Gulf energy facilities.
2026-03-18Armed interdiction Confidence: High
A further attack damaged two of fourteen liquefaction trains, representing around 17% of Qatari export capacity. QatarEnergy estimated repairs at up to five years as of 19 March. A separate event from 2 March, and recorded separately.
2026-03 onwardArmed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
Transit rather than liquefaction became the binding constraint on exports, with cargoes unable to move reliably through the strait.
2026-09Armed interdiction Confidence: Moderate
S&P Global Commodity Insights counted 19 LNG cargoes through the strait in September, 13 from Qatar and 6 from the UAE, and Kpler counted 21. Both figures are the highest monthly count since the war began, against 15 in June. On Kpler data there had been no visible Qatar-linked LNG transit in August. Reuters reported that many carriers crossed with transponders off. These are trackers' counts, not operator figures. A trend remark by an S&P analyst places the level at roughly a quarter of pre-war at most.
What disruption doesLiquefaction capacity removed here is not replaced elsewhere on the same timescale, so the adjustment appears as widened price spreads between the American, European and Asian gas markets rather than as a physical shortage in any one of them. The transmission path is authored as an impact chain.
Confidence: High Status as of 2026-10-02 Reviewed 2026-10-04 Open the full record →
How a corridor fails
- Armed interdictionTraffic attacked on the route. Reversed, if at all, by security effort or by the attacker’s choice.
Kept apart deliberately. A road that is dangerous and a border that is shut both stop the goods, and nothing else about them is alike — including who is able to reverse it.
The chain ends where the records do. Vigil publishes no location records for the coastal ports these corridors run to, so the external terminus is carried by the primary-corridor node — which is named for its port pair — rather than drawn as a node that does not exist. Nothing here shows routes, distances, capacities or schedules.
What the nodes are not Qualifiers the records themselves carry. A node named on a corridor is not necessarily a working one — several are proposed, closed, seasonal or legacy, and each says so in the record's own words.
- North Dome / South Pars gas field — The offshore field, shared geologically with Iran. A shared reservoir and NOT a shared enterprise — see the record's own note below.
- Ras Laffan — Liquefaction and loading. Two of fourteen trains damaged 18 March 2026; repairs estimated at up to five years.
- Strait of Hormuz — The only route to market.
Hormuz-dependent crude and products export system
- Ras Tanura — Saudi Arabia's principal crude loading point and the largest in the system.
- Kharg Island — Reported as handling up to around 90% of Iranian crude exports.
- Ruwais — Emirati refining and product output facing the Gulf rather than the Fujairah route.
- Mina al-Ahmadi — Kuwait's principal terminal; no alternative outlet exists.
- Sitra — Bahrain's terminal; the smallest national outlet in the system and equally dependent.
- Mina al-Fahal — Oman's principal terminal, and the one node in this list that sits OUTSIDE the strait. Included to show the exception rather than to imply Omani dependence on it.
- Strait of Hormuz — The single outlet. Its usable state is set by legal, physical and commercial conditions that moved independently in 2026.
- Sohar — Added 20 September 2026. The water off the Omani port where Saudi crude loaded at Ras Tanura is transferred between vessels after running the strait on short escorted legs — the seaward end of a route that begins inside the chokepoint rather than avoiding it.
- Kharg Island — Reported as handling up to around 90% of Iranian crude exports.
- Goreh–Jask pipeline corridor — A single broad marker for the pipeline system. Design around 1m b/d; reported throughput under 70,000 b/d. No route geometry authored.
- Jask — Outside the strait. A single tanker was reported loading here during the 2026 war.
- Strait of Hormuz — The outlet for the overwhelming majority of Iranian exports.
- Abqaiq — Processing and stabilisation complex; the point at which crude can be sent east or west.
- East–West pipeline corridor (Petroline) — A single broad marker for the pipeline system. No route geometry is authored, and the marker is not a waypoint.
- Yanbu — The binding constraint. Wartime terminal throughput has been estimated at roughly 3m b/d, against a pipeline design ceiling of up to 7m b/d.
- Bab el-Mandeb — The Red Sea outlet, contested since July 2026.
- Habshan — Inland processing hub and the origin of the pipeline.
- Abu Dhabi crude pipeline corridor — A single broad marker for the pipeline system. No route geometry is authored, and the marker is not a waypoint.
- Fujairah — Seaward end on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Reported struck on 3, 14 and 16 March 2026.
Evidence and grading
- Scope
- These records describe strategic dependence and documented disruption history. The schema has no fields for capacities, schedules, convoy composition, escort arrangements, storage or facility layout, and the alternatives section describes whether redundancy exists — never which route to use.
- Confidence
- How well established Vigil considers this assessment to be. It is not a measure of how severe the situation is.