此戰役是什麼
Sustained military, coast guard and economic pressure around Taiwan, conducted continuously and below the threshold that would compel a response. Its achievement is the erosion of the median line and the normalisation of activity that was newsworthy a few years ago.
This is the actual conflict in this module: not a war that might happen but a campaign that is happening, whose currency is expectations. Each increment makes the previous one unremarkable, which is why the median line's erosion matters more than any single crossing. It also imposes real and continuous costs — on Taiwanese air defence readiness, on the civil systems that respond, and on regional shipping and aviation — without ever presenting a moment at which anyone must respond. Understanding the pressure campaign is the precondition for understanding why deterrence rather than defence is the subject of this module.
信心：高 截至2026-08檢視於2026-08-28
摘要
The People's Republic of China conducts sustained military and paramilitary activity around Taiwan, reported daily by Taiwan's defence ministry: aircraft operating in the air defence identification zone, naval vessels around the island, and coast guard patrols around the outlying islands. The pattern intensified from 2020, escalated sharply around the August 2022 Pelosi visit — after which the unwritten median line ceased to function as a restraint — and has since become the baseline rather than the exception. Large exercises follow political events, including the May 2024 inauguration and the Justice Mission-2025 exercises of late December 2025, the eighth major exercise since 2022. Coast guard patrolling around Kinmen began in February 2024, applying a law-enforcement rather than a military framing to presence in contested waters, and from June 2026 standing coast guard patrols were established east of the island as well. The air and naval pictures have diverged since December 2025: detected air activity fell from about 270 sorties in January 2026 to 173 in March, against 431 in March 2025, while naval detections held at roughly 7.2 vessels a day inside the range that characterised 2025. Air activity tracks political calendars; naval presence behaves more like a standing floor. Alongside the military activity run economic measures — coercive and, at Kinmen, increasingly inducement-shaped — diplomatic isolation and information operations.
宣示目標
參與方所說的內容。每一條目都註明立場的提出出處；Vigil記錄的是該立場曾被提出，而非其為真。
Beijing describes its military activity as necessary responses to "separatist" actions and to external interference, and asserts that the strait is not international water.
Taiwan describes the activity as coercion intended to exhaust its defences and normalise encroachment, and publishes daily figures for that reason.
經評估的目標
Vigil的解讀，附等級。在結構上與宣示立場分開，因此評估永遠不會被當作某一方的宣示目標發布。
The operative objective is normalisation rather than any single outcome: each level of activity, once routine, becomes the baseline from which the next increment is measured.
The use of coast guard rather than naval units around Kinmen is a deliberate framing choice, placing presence in a law-enforcement category that is harder to answer militarily.
Cost imposition on Taiwanese readiness is an effect and is plausibly an objective, but Vigil grades this low: the inference rests on the activity pattern rather than on anything stated or documented.
支援方與外部方
- 中國海警 Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06
The Kinmen patrols from February 2024 are the clearest case of law-enforcement framing applied to a contested-waters presence.
Reported participants
- 中華人民共和國海上民兵組織 Reported participant · Confidence: Low · as of 2026-06
Maritime militia participation is reported by analysts and is not officially acknowledged; recorded as reported rather than established.
Intensification and the first sustained increase
Air defence identification zone activity increased substantially and became a daily published figure rather than an occasional report, establishing the reporting regime through which the campaign is now observed.
The median line stops functioning
Exercises following the Pelosi visit were the largest in decades and included announced closure areas. Median-line crossings, previously individually newsworthy, became routine afterwards — the campaign's single most consequential achievement.
Coast guard patrolling and the outlying islands
China Coast Guard patrols began around Kinmen following a fatal incident involving a Chinese vessel, extending regular presence into waters close to Taiwan-administered islands under a law-enforcement framing.
A higher baseline, and variation within it
Activity levels varied around the post-2022 baseline rather than rising monotonically. Undersea cable damage in the same period raised civil-infrastructure questions with attribution contested in every case, and Japanese statements on a Taiwan contingency in late 2025 drew sustained PRC economic and informational pressure on Japan.
A peak in December, and a quieter air picture after it
The Justice Mission-2025 exercises of 29–31 December 2025 were the eighth major exercise around Taiwan since August 2022 and the closest: several announced areas overlapped waters Taiwan claims as territorial sea, though no PRC vessel entered them, and around ten rockets are reported to have impacted within the contiguous zone. Coast guard vessels operated inside the joint exercise, 13 detected on the first day and 15 on the second. Detected air activity has fallen since — roughly 270 sorties in January 2026, 190 in February and 173 in March, against 431 in March 2025 — while naval presence held steady at about 7.2 vessels a day in March, inside the 5–9 range that characterised 2025. The two domains are not moving together, and reading the air decline as de-escalation ignores the naval floor underneath it. Effort also shifted rather than stopped: from June 2026 the coast guard established standing patrols east of Taiwan, rotating a second named task group in on 4 July.
結果與目前狀態
Ongoing and, on its own terms, partially successful. The median line no longer restrains anything and regular presence around the outlying islands has been established, both of which are durable changes achieved without a shot. It has not produced any movement in Taiwan's political position, has coincided with increased Taiwanese defence spending and conscription reform, and has hardened rather than softened regional attitudes in Japan and the Philippines. The campaign's achievements and its costs to its author are both real.
觀察到的調整
Substitution of coast guard for naval units in the outlying-island patrols, which changes the legal and escalatory character of an otherwise identical presence.
Taiwan's shift to publishing daily activity figures, which converted a diffuse pressure campaign into a measurable one and is itself a counter-move in the information dimension.
Japanese and Philippine reporting and basing decisions responding to activity in the channels, extending the campaign's political effects beyond the two principals.
政治意涵
The campaign's real currency is what counts as normal, which makes its effects cumulative and hard to reverse without an explicit decision.
軍事意涵
Imposes continuous readiness costs on Taiwan without presenting a moment at which a response is required — the defining problem of grey-zone coercion.
經濟意涵
Announced closure areas and cable incidents both reach commercial shipping and connectivity, which is how a military campaign becomes an insurance question.
關聯事件
仍然未知的事項
- Activity figures are published by one party and are not independently verified. Counting methods have also changed over time, which complicates trend comparison.
- No current dispositions, force levels or unit locations are published by this module and none are the basis of any claim here.
- Attribution for the undersea cable incidents has not been established in any case.
- Maritime militia participation is reported by analysts rather than acknowledged, and its scale is not measurable from open sources.
證據同樣支持的其他解讀
- Exercise and patrol activity can be read as coercive signalling, as routine training an expanding military would conduct regardless, or as responses to specific political events. All three are advanced by serious analysts, they are not mutually exclusive, and activity data alone does not separate them. **This module does not treat exercise activity as preparation for invasion: that inference requires evidence of intent which does not exist in the public record, and drawing it from capability and tempo alone is precisely the error the module's classification model exists to prevent.**
- The 2026 return toward pre-2024 activity levels can be read as de-escalation, as resource constraint, or as consolidation of gains already made — a baseline does not need reinforcing once it is accepted. Reporting supports all three and the module does not adjudicate between them.
- Cable damage can be read as deliberate grey-zone action or as the ordinary consequence of heavy anchor traffic in busy shallow water, where such damage is common worldwide.
列出這些解讀，是因為該紀錄本身的評估並非其來源所允許的唯一評估 — 而不是對上述評估的保留。
此戰役涉及的Watch問題
證據經由此戰役的常設分析問題，各附最新一次檢視。內容衍生自Watch物件，從不在此重述。
在探索中檢視執行此戰役的部隊 互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。
評估截至 — 2026-08 最近檢視 — 2026-08-28