Relationship record

Armenia — Azerbaijan

A dispute that changed subject rather than ending — from the status of Karabakh to the line of a border that has barely been drawn.

Territorial dispute Since 1988-02

Active
Assessed as of
2026-08
Last reviewed
2026-10-14

AssessmentHigh confidence

A described arrangement, not a rating. Vigil publishes no measure of how strong, warm or hostile a relationship is, and no relationship on this site carries a score, a trend or a direction of travel. What is recorded is what the arrangement covers, when it began, what has changed it, and how firmly each of those is established.

In short

The interstate territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Since Azerbaijan took Karabakh in 2023 its content has been the undelimited boundary and the Soviet-era enclaves, with an agreed delimitation method, an agreed but unsigned treaty text, and about a dozen kilometres marked.

A symmetric arrangement: it reads the same from either side. Authored once, on one record.

The arrangement

Status
ActiveIn force and operating. Says nothing about how well it is working, or about which way it is heading.Last material change: 2026-08.
What it covers
DiplomaticLegal and treatyCategories the arrangement is documented to include. Not a measure: a relationship covering more of them is described in more detail, not held more firmly.

Summary

Armenia and Azerbaijan have contested territory continuously since 1988. The Karabakh chapter closed in September 2023, when Azerbaijan took the territory and its Armenian population left; what remains is an interstate boundary question. Both states have agreed to delimit on the basis of the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration and the maps then in force, and a first section of roughly a dozen kilometres in the Tavush direction was delimited in 2024, involving the transfer of four villages to Azerbaijani control. The text of a peace treaty was agreed in March 2025 and has not been signed; Azerbaijan conditions signature on Armenian constitutional amendment. In August 2026 Pashinyan stated publicly that on the agreed Alma-Ata basis Artsvashen is Armenian and Kyarki (Tigranashen), Barkhudarlu and Yukhari Askipara are not — the first time an Armenian government had spelled out what its own agreed method implies for the enclaves. Nothing has been transferred and no delimitation decision has been taken on them.

Why it matters

This is the relationship the module's principal diplomatic file exists to settle, and the one place where the difference between an agreed method and a settled border is visible in kilometres. Tigranashen sits on Armenia's main north–south interstate road, so the enclave question is not symbolic: applying the agreed baseline to it would move a road Armenia depends on.

Agreements

  • Alma-Ata Declaration — the agreed delimitation baseline · signed 1991-12

    Not a bilateral instrument, and cited here for the use both states have agreed to make of it: delimitation on the basis of the declaration and the Soviet administrative maps then in force.

  • Agreed peace treaty text · signed 2025-03

    Agreed, not signed. The text has not been published, and Azerbaijan conditions signature on Armenian constitutional amendment.

Related events

What remains unknown

  • The peace text agreed in March 2025 has not been published, so its treatment of the boundary is described from the parties' characterisations rather than from the document.
  • Delimitation has covered a small fraction of the boundary. The length and course of the remainder are not publicly fixed, and neither party publishes a map of what it considers agreed.
  • No decision has been taken on any of the four enclaves named in August 2026, and neither government has stated a timetable for one.

Readings the evidence also supports

  • Azerbaijan's pacing of the process can be read as a genuine constitutional concern about a claim it says Armenia's basic law still carries, or as the use of an unmeetable condition to keep a favourable status quo open. The public record supports both readings and settles neither.

Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.

Watch questions this relationship bears on

Standing analytical questions whose evidence runs through this relationship, each with its latest review. Derived from the Watch object, never restated here.

  • DiplomaticDoes the Armenia–Türkiye border open?Unchanged
    1. 2026-09-14: Baseline
    2. 2026-09-20: No material change
    3. 2026-09-27: No material change
    4. 2026-10-04: No material change
    5. 2026-10-11: No material change
  • PoliticalHas delimitation extended beyond the 2024 Tavush section?Unchanged
    1. 2026-08-23: Baseline
    2. 2026-09-13: Movement observed
    3. 2026-09-20: No material change
    4. 2026-09-27: No material change
    5. 2026-10-04: No material change
    6. 2026-10-11: No material change
  • DiplomaticHas the initialled peace agreement been signed?Unchanged
    1. 2026-08-23: No material change
    2. 2026-08-30: No material change
    3. 2026-09-06: No material change
    4. 2026-09-13: No material change
    5. 2026-09-20: No material change
    6. 2026-09-27: Movement observed
    7. 2026-10-04: Movement observed
    8. 2026-10-11: No material change
  • LogisticsHas TRIPP moved from framework and survey into construction?Unchanged
    1. 2026-08-30: No material change
    2. 2026-09-06: No material change
    3. 2026-09-13: No material change
    4. 2026-09-20: Movement observed
    5. 2026-09-27: No material change
    6. 2026-09-28: Movement observed
    7. 2026-10-04: No material change
    8. 2026-10-11: No material change

All Caucasus relationships Open in Explore

Assessed as of — 2026-08 Last reviewed — 2026-10-14