The Karabakh conflict, 1988–2023
Thirty-five years, three rounds of fighting and a complete reversal — the territorial question that organised the whole region's politics, now closed by force.
The dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh ran from 1988 through two full wars and a one-day operation in September 2023, after which the territory came under Azerbaijani control and its Armenian population left. The territorial question is closed; return, property, heritage and the missing are not.
Summary
The conflict began as a political movement in 1988 seeking the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia, and escalated into full war as the Soviet Union dissolved. The first war, fought from 1992 to 1994, ended with Armenian forces controlling the former oblast and substantial surrounding territory, and with large-scale displacement in both directions — Azerbaijani sources state several hundred thousand Azerbaijanis displaced from the region and adjacent districts; Armenian sources record comparable displacement of Armenians from Azerbaijan. A ceasefire agreed at Bishkek in May 1994 held without a settlement for twenty-six years, punctuated by escalations including four days of fighting in April 2016. In autumn 2020 Azerbaijan recovered most of the surrounding territory and part of the former oblast in a forty-four-day war, ended by a trilateral statement that deployed Russian peacekeepers and left a corridor connecting the remaining Armenian-populated area to Armenia. That corridor was blockaded from December 2022. On 19–20 September 2023 Azerbaijan conducted a one-day operation that ended organised resistance; within about ten days almost the entire Armenian population — reported by international agencies as over one hundred thousand people — had left for Armenia, and the de facto authorities announced dissolution effective January 2024.
Why it matters
This is the conflict that organised the region's politics for a generation, and its ending reshaped everything else in the module: Armenia's security realignment, Russia's loss of standing, Türkiye's gains, and the corridor diplomacy that now dominates the negotiation. It is also the clearest case in Vigil of a conflict that ended decisively without ending its consequences — the territorial question is settled and the files it generated, from property and heritage to detainees and the missing, are not.
Stated objectives
What the participants say. Each entry cites where the position was stated; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.
Azerbaijan stated its objective as the restoration of its territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders, a position supported by UN Security Council resolutions adopted during the first war.
Armenian and Karabakh authorities stated their objective as the security and self-determination of the territory's Armenian population, and did not obtain international recognition for it from any state.
Assessed objectives
Vigil's reading, graded. Kept structurally apart from stated positions so an assessment can never be published as someone's declared aim.
The 2020 outcome was decided substantially by a change in the military balance — Azerbaijani resourcing and external partnership against an Armenian posture built on the 1994 lines — rather than by any change in the diplomatic position.
The September 2023 operation was brief because the preceding blockade had already made the position untenable, which makes the nine-month blockade the decisive phase rather than the fighting.
Primary forces
- Azerbaijani Armed Forces Primary force · Confidence: High · as of 2023-09
Opposing forces
- Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces (Artsakh Defense Army, 1992–2023) Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2023-09
The de facto entity's armed forces, dissolved with the entity in 2023–24.
- Armenian Armed Forces Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2020-11
Armenian involvement was direct in the first war and in 2020; Armenia stated it was not a party to the September 2023 operation.
Supporting & external
- Turkish defence partnership with Azerbaijan External supporter · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2020-11
Turkish equipment and support to Azerbaijan is widely assessed as material to the 2020 outcome. Recorded as external support, with the scale contested between the parties.
Affected parties
- Russian peacekeeping contingent in Karabakh (2020–2024) Affected party · Confidence: High · as of 2024-06
Deployed under the November 2020 trilateral statement; withdrew in 2024 after the territory changed hands.
Phases
Movement, pogroms and the Soviet collapse
A petition movement for transfer of the autonomous oblast escalated into intercommunal violence, including the Sumgait events of February 1988 and the Baku events of January 1990, and into armed conflict as Soviet authority collapsed.
The first war and the 1994 ceasefire
Full war ended with Armenian forces holding the former oblast and adjacent districts. Large-scale displacement occurred in both directions. The Bishkek Protocol froze the lines without a settlement.
Twenty-six years without a settlement
Mediation under the OSCE Minsk Group produced frameworks but no agreement, while the military balance shifted with Azerbaijani hydrocarbon revenue. Four days of fighting in April 2016 demonstrated the change.
The forty-four-day war
Azerbaijan recovered the surrounding districts and part of the former oblast. A trilateral statement ended the fighting, deployed Russian peacekeepers and provided for a corridor to Armenia and for unblocking regional transport links.
Blockade, one day of fighting, and dissolution
The Lachin corridor was blockaded from December 2022, cutting the territory's connection to Armenia. A one-day Azerbaijani operation on 19–20 September 2023 ended organised resistance; the Armenian population left within about ten days and the de facto entity announced dissolution.
Outcome and present status
Concluded, decisively and in Azerbaijan's favour. The territory is under Azerbaijani control, the de facto entity has dissolved, and its Armenian population has left almost in its entirety. What has not concluded is the set of files the conflict generated: return and property claims, the treatment of cultural and religious heritage, detained former officials, the missing from all three rounds of fighting, and mine and unexploded-ordnance contamination across the districts fought over since 1992. Vigil records the territorial question as closed and these as open.
Observed adaptations
Azerbaijani use of uncrewed systems and loitering munitions in 2020 against a defence built for the 1994 lines is the most-studied military lesson of the conflict and was widely examined elsewhere afterwards.
The 2022–23 blockade demonstrated that access denial could achieve what the 2020 fighting had not, at far lower military cost.
Political implications
The conflict's end removed the organising question of regional politics and directly produced Armenia's security realignment and Russia's loss of standing.
Economic implications
Closed borders dating from the first war remain Armenia's principal structural economic constraint.
Humanitarian implications
Displacement occurred in both directions across three rounds; the 2023 departure was near-total and effectively instantaneous.
Linked events
Locations
Places this module already publishes as map markers, listed because the campaign is about them. Not an operational area.
What remains unknown
- Casualty figures for all three rounds are stated differently by the parties and are not reconciled by any independent count; this record attributes rather than adjudicates them.
- Displacement figures from the 1990s were compiled under wartime conditions on differing bases and are contested.
- The number and status of detained former officials is stated differently by the parties and by international bodies.
- Assessments of heritage damage are contested and access for independent survey has been limited.
Readings the evidence also supports
- The 2020 outcome can be attributed to Azerbaijani military modernisation and external support, to Armenian strategic and diplomatic failures over the preceding decades, or to the withdrawal of effective Russian backing. All three are argued by serious analysts, they are not mutually exclusive, and the weighting between them remains contested.
- The September 2023 departure of the Armenian population is described by Azerbaijan as voluntary movement following an offer of integration, and by Armenia and several international bodies as forced displacement. The physical facts — near-total departure within about ten days — are not disputed; the characterisation is, and this module records both.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
What to watch
Progress on the missing, detainees and heritage files
The conflict's unresolved remainder. These files can move independently of the treaty and shape whether it is signed.
Mine clearance in the districts fought over
Contamination dates from 1992 onward and is the conflict's longest-lasting physical consequence.
Whether any return arrangement is negotiated
No mechanism currently exists. Its creation would be a substantive change.